

The Tito-Stalin Split 70 Years After

Tvrtko Jakovina
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(eds.)

The Tito-Stalin Split



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Edited by: Tvrтко Jakovina &
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Tvrtko Jakovina & Martin Previšić

Challenging the Cominform: Tito - Stalin Split 70 Years Later

There is nothing as important and as defiant in the history of Tito's (or republican) Yugoslavia than the split between Tito and Stalin in the summer of 1948. Tito was one of the first to defy Stalin – and he got away with it. Yugoslavia was regarded as the most reliable Soviet ally until 1948, so the shock was quite substantial. Tito was not against the Soviets, but he was not a Muscovite. The victory of his partisan movement in the Second World War and the civil war in Yugoslavia made him important. He had proved himself as a good organizer and was very careful when selecting his closest associates.

The possibility of having an independent communist state outside the Soviet orbit was unthinkable at the time. After 1945, Soviet Russia was not only a recognized super-power, a victorious country, a country with a huge military might, it also followed a specific realpolitik. Unlike the still revolutionary Tito, Stalin was aware that the revolution, as well as the ideology of Leninism, should be used to propel the interests of the Soviet Union, as well as the block they were leading, but not in the way which would jeopardize its core – Russia proper.¹ In his Secret Speech in 1956, Khrushchev claimed that Stalin had declared, “I will shake my little finger, and there will be no more Tito.”² A possibility to have an independent communist regime, free from Moscow's tutelage, appeared impossible to most people in the West. Tito seemed to be Stalin's favorite communist son³, the Communist Party of Yugoslavia was the best organized and ideologically purest after the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks). Belgrade, after all, was the headquarters of the Cominform, Communist Information Bureau (Informburo). However, there were a few diplomats and politicians who understood the opportunity the breach between the two leaders would bring. The West seized this opportunity to drive a wedge between Yugoslavia and the East, changing the nature of the Cold War.

1 Zubok/Pleshakov, *Kremlin's Cold War*, pp. 13-15; 54-55.

2 *Tajni referat N.S. Hruščova*, p. 70; Gaddis, *The Cold War*, p. 33.

3 Roberts, *Molotov*, p. 117.

In June 1948, the Cominform denounced Tito for various “heresies” and this “ex-communication” was followed by extensive propaganda campaigns from Moscow and the capitals of its Soviet satellites. Then a commercial boycott followed, becoming total in the summer of 1949. The main causes of the Split were Yugoslav actions in the Balkans: Yugoslavia’s involvement in the Greek Civil War, its federation project with Bulgaria and its influence in Albania, as well some others, like the existence of the Yugoslav Army and civil bureaucracy of Yugoslavia, which had been created not by the emissaries from Moscow but by the Yugoslav Communists themselves during the national and civil war and were therefore considered unreliable by Moscow. This was also why the regime survived: the army officers and the civil bureaucrats were loyal to Tito, not to Moscow.⁴

Before the summer of 1948, Tito was generally despised by the West. He was giving the West a hard time, pushing and antagonizing them far more vehemently than Stalin.⁵ “I was mad at you for some time,” Winston Churchill said to Tito in London in 1953, during his first official visit to a Western country. The visit took place while the Kremlin was preparing to bury Stalin.⁶ Tito had survived a Stalinist purge for the second time, showing that there were limits to the Soviet control of East Europe. Therefore, Tito, who may have been a “son-of-a-bitch”, became “our son-of-a-bitch”, to use the words of Dean Acheson, who was appointed American Secretary of State in 1949. After the Information Bureau of the Communist Parties had condemned Yugoslavia and Titoism as “heresy” at its second meeting in Bucharest, the Yugoslav path changed dramatically. The lives of millions of people suddenly changed. For many, the change was not very positive, but for the majority it was probably a step in the right direction. Six months after the Cominform Resolution, Soviet methods became evident, but they were not strong enough to weaken or disarm the core of the Party. It became clear that Belgrade was strong and solid.

“...the political world was staggered by a break in the ‘unbreakable’ Communist monolith,” Bernard Newman wrote in 1952.⁷ How was it possible that no one of any importance predicted such a radical shift? Why were informed observers, diplomats and analysts, who had warned their governments of the possible break, not heard? What does this tell us about diplomacy, hierarchy or experts in general?

The Yugoslav break away from Soviet domination (although this domination was to a large extent voluntary or even invited) was a clear sign that in 1948 Yugoslavia was not a mere pawn of the Soviet Union. The effects of the break had enormous implications on all Yugoslavs, those living in Montenegro or Belgrade, those who returned to Yugoslavia from Australia, but also all Yugoslavs living abroad. Most importantly, all East

4 *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, Volume 23, p. 920.

5 Jakovina, *Američki komunistički saveznik*, pp. 56-74, 164-174.

6 Mandić, *Tito u dijalogu*, p. 657.

7 Newman, *Tito's Yugoslavia*, p.13.

Europeans, all members and supporters of the communist ideology and the whole world scene were colored by the most important event since the victory over Japan, as American diplomats reported.⁸ “Would it be possible to emulate Tito’s example?” was another question. It was tempting to search for a Tito in China, Korea, possibly Vietnam, but those hopes were never exceptionally strong. These three Asian countries were fighting alone, and their struggle against foreign invasions overlapped with the world conflict, but an “Asian Tito” was not destined to appear in the near future. The communist monolith seemed rather solid over there.⁹ However, already in the early 1950s Burma, which was very close to Yugoslavia politically, was compared to it, and even nicknamed Asian Yugoslavia. Milovan Djilas, one of the top Yugoslav politicians, wrote that it was because of the originality of the two countries.¹⁰ Asians were poor but the people in South East Europe were just marginally better off. What was essential was something never before seen, those original sentences and ideas produced by a small regime of one of the poorest, most marginal countries of Europe.

The summer of 1948 is probably one of the most understudied periods of the crisis caused by Stalin’s decision which shocked the Yugoslavs. What was going on in the Yugoslav establishment? What was Tito’s first reaction that night in Zagreb when the Resolution was announced? What was going through the minds of the top Yugoslav politicians when the first problems between Belgrade and Moscow became real, visible? After it was all revealed, everything was turned into the basis for a new, different system Yugoslavia was trying to build. How the change was received by the diaspora is one thing, but the reaction of the leaders, politicians and elites of the previous regime deserves a study. To what extent were those who were not on the Tito’s side in favor or even supportive of his split with the Soviets might be an interesting topic for research.

For the Yugoslavs, an independent position vis-à-vis the Soviet Union created a feeling of exceptionalism. Never too modest, often even megalomaniac, the propaganda whose objective was to boost the spirits of the party members, but also of all those who were afraid of the strong, victorious Red Army, created overly proud and all too stubborn citizens. One of the ways of defending the regime was through strengthening the Yugoslav exceptionalism vis-à-vis the Soviet model and the Soviet dominated countries. Strong national sentiments or nationalism, if you wish, helped Yugoslavia in 1948, Tito explained on several occasions. The only important thing was not to cross the line into “chauvinism”, since there is a huge difference between “national sentiments and chauvinism”, Tito stated.¹¹

8 Jakovina, *Američki komunistički saveznik*, p. 243.

9 Gaddis, *The Cold War*, pp. 37-38.

10 Djilas, *Istočno nebo*, p. 537.

11 Tito, *Govori i članci*, Iz razgovora sa urednikom engleskog časopisa “Kvin”, Belgrade, September 18, 1962. *Naprijed*, Zagreb.

Therefore, the accusation of nationalism in Yugoslavia, which was always on the table in Moscow, actually fed Yugoslav nationalisms. The Macedonians fought fiercely for their identity in the southernmost Yugoslav republic.¹²

Unlike the Hungarian Revolution of 1956, which lasted from 23 October to 10 November, or the Prague Spring from 5 January to 21 August 1968, the Yugoslav experiment lasted from the summer of 1948 to the end of Yugoslavia or the end of the Cold War. Special institutes have been created to study the Hungarian Revolution and the Prague Spring and their international relevance, but the year 1948 in Yugoslavia was relatively ignored for various reasons. Partially, this has been because Yugoslavia ceased to exist, never having a chance to reflect, analyze and reinterpret that part of its history in a meaningful way. Yugoslav historiography de facto never existed. Rather, it was a combination or aggregation of historiographies of the individual republics. During the socialist period, historians did not even deal with events from the Titoist period, leaving the whole period to specialized institutes which researched the “history of the workers movement” or to political scientists. “Pure” historiography, with a few notable exceptions, was concentrated in the West until the end of the Cold War.

Ever since 1948, or 1955 and 1956, when the relations between Moscow and Belgrade improved, the split and the different approaches towards socialism the two countries had, had remained important, it had always been present. For example, during Tito’s last visit to Brezhnev, the two leaders stated that “another is the question of looking back into the past.” “History,” Brezhnev stated, “should not be forgotten, but also not constantly reheated.” “Yugoslav constant reminders of the past were never intended to criticize the Soviet Union; on the contrary, we were full of praise for everything the CPSU did after the twentieth congress.” Still, as Stane Dolanc stated in 1979, official party documents that were published in Moscow still condemned the Yugoslav League of Communists.¹³ Brezhnev then lost it and became rude after such an open criticism. Not since 1956 had the conversation about the troubled history between the two countries been so open. However, after 1948, especially after the Soviet Canossa, as the Yugoslav and western historians often called Nikita Khrushchev’s visit to Belgrade in 1955, no Yugoslav-Soviet meeting, agreement or statement concluded without the invocation of the two agreements: the Belgrade and the Moscow Declarations. The former normalized the state and the latter party relations. Who were those in Yugoslavia who were in favor of better relations with Moscow, and who leaned more towards the Titoist

12 Koliševski, *Makedonsko pitanje*, pp. 264, 273.

13 BL (BL stands for the private archival collection of former minister Budimir Lončar, Zagreb), Kabinet Predsednika Republike, Služba za spoljnopolitička pitanja. Str.pov.br.22/7, Beograd, 23.maj 1979, Državna tajna; Stenografske beleške sa razgovora predsednika Republike i predsednika SKJ Josipa Broza Tita i generalnog sekretara CK KPSS i predsednika Prezidijuma Vrhovnog Sovjeta SSSR Leonida Iljiča Brežnjeva, održanih 17. i 18. maja 1979. godine u Kremlju – Moskva; Mandić, *Tito*, pp. 632–633.

position is definitely something historiography should touch on in the next phase of research of the Tito-Stalin split.

Mikhail Gorbachev's visit to Yugoslavia in 1988 was rather overdue and once delayed. Eduard Shevardnadze, the Soviet foreign minister, proposed the signing of a new declaration on relations between USSR and Yugoslavia in 1987. "We have accepted it, but we have also made it clear that the new document does not mean that the Moscow and Belgrade declarations were overdue; they have permanent importance, their historical importance should be underlined in the new document, document which has permanent value..." "Everybody should be aware of the historical importance that the documents from 1955 and 1956 had for international relations and relations between socialist countries," said the secretary for foreign relations to the delegates of the Yugoslav Parliament.¹⁴ Therefore, it was only at the time of Mikhail Gorbachev's visit to Yugoslavia that the Soviet Union finally distanced itself from the legacy of 1948. They finally erased the segment on Yugoslavia from their Party manifesto of the CPSU. Finally, Perestroika helped the Soviets reach "our views from the 1960s." This was stated during the meeting with the then new (and last) federal secretary for foreign relations, Budimir Lončar. For four decades the Soviets had a problem of digesting the Yugoslavs. "In 1948 we reached a certain point which became a factor that Yugoslavia has not been able to abandon ever since."¹⁵ After the summer of 1948, it had been essential for the success of Yugoslavia that it remained anti-Cominformist.

The end of the Cold War and the end of Yugoslavia did not bring much, or even enough, research on this or many related phenomena in the history of Yugoslavia. In Slovenia and Serbia, there were several scholarly conferences on various aspects of the Tito-Stalin split.¹⁶ Since its independence, only one has taken place in Croatia, that organized by the veterans of the Second World War and the Josip Broz Tito Society. Croatian political circles criticized everything connected with former Yugoslavia. Most studies on the Tito-Stalin split addressed the international consequences of the event. However, since the 1980s, internal changes within the CPY and the relationship towards the real and alleged associates of Stalin have increasingly been dealt with, first in art, film and literature, and then in historiography as well. The Goli Otok camp and its 13,000 inmates are becoming central research topics. Croatian political circles have

14 BL, Izlaganje Raifa Dizdarevića, Saveznog sekretara, na zajedničkoj sednici odbora Saveznog veća Skupštine SFRJ za spoljnu politiku i odbora Veća republika i pokrajina za ekonomske odnose sa inostranstvom, koja je održana 9. jula 1987. godine; Dizdarević, *Sudbosni podvig Jugoslavije*, pp. 213-216, 218-224.

15 BL, SSIP, Kabinet saveznog sekretara, Str.pov.br.47243, Stenografske beleške sa sastanka Kolegijuma saveznog sekretara, održanog 15. februara 1988. godine; BL, SSIP, F7, Zvanična poseta Generalnog sekretara CK KPSS Mihaila Gorbačova Jugoslaviji, 14-18. mart 1988; Str.pov.br.413284, 7.4.1988, Izveštaj o poseti generalnog sekretara CK KPSS Mihaila Gorbačova Jugoslaviji, od 14. do 18.3.1988. godine.

16 For example: *Jugoslavija v Hladni vojni/ Yugoslavia in the Cold War*, Ljubljana 2004 (Institut za novejšo zgodovino, Ljubljana and University of Toronto) or *Jugoslavija u Hladnom ratu*, Beograd 2010 (Institut za noviju istoriju).

criticized everything connected with the former Yugoslavia. They have been reluctant to speak about the positive consequences of the split because Tito would probably end up being better than Stalin, or, alternately, it would be hard to praise Stalin and not Tito. How can you condemn Tito for the Goli Otok camp – which was definitely one of the most gruesome camps of the Titoist era – when the majority of those imprisoned there were not Croats, so Croatian authorities have never been interested in preserving the place, making it a place of remembrance. Montenegrins, who made up only 2.73% of the Yugoslav population, made up almost 21.13% of all imprisoned Cominformists.¹⁷ Slovenes and Croats were the least represented.

The goal of the Zagreb conference “The Tito–Stalin Split: 70 Years Later”, Zagreb–Goli Otok, 28–30 June 2018, as well as of the papers presented, was to show not only the new interpretations and takes on the subject, but to present the Yugoslav 1948 as a global event, one that touched lives of so many people around the world. It had a very significant impact not only on politics¹⁸, international relations¹⁹, prisoners²⁰, army cooperation and army relations²¹, ideology²², but also cultural life and production, especially in Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union²³.

Most of the papers presented at the Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, University of Zagreb, which co-organized the whole event with colleagues from the University of Ljubljana, Slovenia, are published in this volume. A few papers were presented but the authors did not contribute the text (those were: Mark Kramer, Peter Ruggenthaler, Ondřej Vojtěchovský, Klaus Buchenau, Andreii Edemskii, Boris Stamenić, and Marie-Janine Calic). Also, one paper on China was not presented, but the text is here. We hope this volume will be an important contribution to the continuous dialogue that should be not only regional, but global. It should also be ongoing, since there is hardly an event in the history of the Cold War whose consequences were as important and as global as this one’s.

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17 Radonjić, *Socijalizam u Crnoj Gori*, pp. 332–336.

18 Goldstein, *Tito*, pp. 463–465; Jakovina, *Komunistički saveznik*.

19 Ristović, *Građanski rat u Grčkoj*.

20 Previšić, *Povijest Golog otoka*.

21 Životić, *Vojne suprotnosti*.

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**1948: THE FALL OF
YUGOSLAV IRON CURTAIN**

Ivo Goldstein

The Tito-Stalin Split of 1948 as a Personal Conflict

The conflict in 1948 was quite complex and stratified – it was ideological and political, with obvious economic roots and consequences. Nevertheless, it was also personal because it was a conflict between two charismatic personalities – Josip Broz Tito and Ioseb Besarionis dze Jughashvili - Stalin.

In modern historiography, different terms are used for the events of 1948: the split between Yugoslavia and the Eastern Bloc, or the Yugoslav-Soviet split, but also the Tito-Stalin split, for quite obvious reasons.

I am not an adherent of the 19 century historical concept of Leopold Ranke, who views the development of the main historical processes as a struggle between key historical persons, as he shows in his emblematic work *Die römischen Päpste, ihre Kirche und ihr Staat im sechzehnten und siebzehnten Jahrhundert* (*The Popes of Rome, Their Church and State in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries*), in which he offers colorful portrayals of Pope Paul IV, Ignatius of Loyola and Pope Pius V. Despite all my reluctance, it has to be said that the roles of Tito and Stalin, the key personalities in the events of 1948, were essential. One can compare these events with those 20 years later – can anybody say that the invasion of Czechoslovakia and the crushing of the Prague Spring was a consequence of a Brezhnev-Dubcek conflict?

The conflict of 1948 was very much personalized. Latinka Perović observes that “at a juridical and at a symbolic level, Tito was Yugoslavia and Yugoslavia was Tito.”¹ Needless to say, Stalin was the Soviet Union and the Soviet Union was Stalin.

In the beginning, it was like a love story. Tito saw Stalin for the first time in 1935 during the Seventh Congress of the Comintern in Moscow. Tito was among the delegates, Stalin was sitting at the podium, raised up from everybody, like a god. At that time, Stalin was the subject of a pervasive personality cult within the international Marxist-Leninist movement; Tito was one of the believers.

1 Perović, *Josip Broz Tito*, p. 23.

However, Stalin loved Tito, despite his suspect character. In certain elements, Tito's biography was similar to Stalin's: born to a poor family and repeatedly arrested, he entered the party hierarchy out of the blue, i.e. owing to his own merits. At the funeral of Mikhail Kalinin in 1946, Stalin invited Tito to the central podium and placed him at his side, the only foreign leader to be so honored. That would not have happened if Stalin had not had certain sympathy for Tito.

But soon after the war, it turned out that the Tito-Stalin relationship would be yet another story about love and hatred, like so many others. Keeping in line with that perspective, Koča Popović, one of Tito's closest collaborators, claimed that "that conflict was absolutely unavoidable." Openly criticizing Stalin after his death, Nikita Khrushchev concluded that in general Stalin gradually developed a "hatred toward Tito."²

Already in 1945, the Yugoslav communist movement enjoyed greater independence than its counterparts in Eastern Europe because it had largely fought its own way into power. Tito had returned to Yugoslavia in 1938 as a Soviet communist agent or Soviet pawn, but his wartime victories had helped him outgrow that early role and develop into an extremely confident leader who would not allow the USSR and Stalin to dictate to him. His ambitions also grew.³

One of the outstanding features of Tito's character was his personal courage. He demonstrated it in 1928, during his trial called *Bombaški proces*. He was tried in November 1928 for his illegal communist activities, which included allegations that the bombs that had been found at his address in Zagreb had been planted by the police. He acknowledged that he was a member of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (CPY), fully aware that this would bring him longer imprisonment. Indeed, he was sentenced to five years' imprisonment.⁴

When war came to Yugoslavia in 1941, Tito bravely called for an uprising against the invading Germans and Italians and from almost nothing created a movement of resistance fighters that would come to be known as the Partisans.

He displayed the same courage in facing down Josef Stalin, which led to the break between the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia in 1948. By trusting his own judgment once again, he was able to gather enough partisan veterans and other men ready to support him against this direct confrontation with the Soviet Union and even to resort to an armed struggle if necessary.

After the war, Tito was seen as the second leader in the Eastern Bloc after Stalin. According to some testimonies, Tito's popularity among party leaders and the public in Eastern European countries in 1946–1947 was high, perhaps even equal to Stalin's. A

2 Nenadović, *Razgovori s Kočom*, p. 130; Đilas, *Vlast i pobuna*, p. 131; Khrushchev, *Memoirs of Nikita Khrushchev*, p. 509.

3 I. Goldstein – S. Goldstein, *Tito*, p. 169.

4 Sobolevski, *Bombaški proces Josipu Brozu*; Goldstein – Goldstein, *Tito*, pp. 61–67.

great expert on the history of that time François Feytö claims that “in the autumn of 1947 Yugoslavia was at the height of its prestige within the Eastern Bloc: it was enjoying a honeymoon with the international communist movement.” This was perhaps one of the reasons for Stalin’s actions in 1948.⁵

The state that Tito led had become his personal plaything: he had tried to achieve domination over Albania, he planned to make himself the head of a Balkan federation that would include Bulgaria, he was helping Greek communists in the Greek Civil War, he was firmly defending Yugoslav territorial claims against Italy and he complained to the Soviet authorities when they imposed unequal economic relations on Yugoslavia, practically bordering on exploitation.

Tito himself had already started creating his own personality cult in late 1942, a few days after he revealed his true identity.⁶

One of the reasons why Tito was so popular in Yugoslavia lies in the structure of the leadership: by the end of the 1930s, Tito had chosen his closest collaborators, who were all almost 20 years younger than he was – Aleksandar Ranković (1909), Edvard Kardelj (1910), and Milovan Đilas (1911). He created a relationship, even a friendship, with all three of them. They called him *Stari* – the Old Man. However, with Andrija Hebrang (1899), with whom he had a long friendship dating back to the late 1920s, he had a different kind of relationship, and Hebrang could call him *Joža* (which is ahyponym of Josip).

Nevertheless, Hebrang became a personal rival, was arrested, and he allegedly committed suicide in prison. It cannot be said that this happened because of their rivalry since the origins of the clash between Tito and Hebrang were much deeper. At the same time, one cannot deny that this personal rivalry played a role in that affair.⁷

After taking power in virtually all of Yugoslavia in 1944–45, Tito created an archetypal Bolshevik system, part of whose structure was a personality cult of the leader. Tito drew his greatest support from Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro and from a large part of Croatia, primarily by proposing the creation of a state that would be free of foreign conquerors, free from the Ustasha terror and without Greater Serbian hegemony. At the same time, he took advantage of the four years of war to solidify his personal popularity, which would ensure his position as the leader of the country after the end of the war.

In any case, even the Soviets themselves recognized his merits and were even raising his self-confidence – in 1944 the writer Ilja Erenburg wrote in the Moscow press that “Yugoslavia is not a detail and not an episode in World War II” and that “the entire

5 Feytö, *Histoire des démocraties*, pp. 198–199; Dedijer, *Josip Broz Tito – prilozi za biografiju*, p. 486; Berić, *Zbogom XX. stoljeće*, p. 55; Đilas, *Vlast i pobuna*, pp. 174–175; Terzić, *Titova vještina vladanja*, p. 223; see also: Sovilj, *Tito i čehoslovačka javnost 1945–1948.*, pp. 489–497.

6 Goldstein – Goldstein, *Tito*, pp. 479–497.

7 *Ibid.*, pp. 471–473; Ivanković – Vonta, *Hebrang*.

world is talking about the Yugoslav national liberation army, and the name of Marshal Tito is known on all five continents of the world.”⁸

Nevertheless, as the months after the war passed, Stalin became more and more suspicious of Tito – because of his ambition of becoming a regional leader, this former guerrilla chief could become a problem and disrupt his entire strategy. Stalin did not need local skirmishes, let alone local victories – in the postwar period, a sphere of influence in Yugoslavia and its surrounding region played a secondary role. Stalin was primarily interested in the center of Europe – Germany. Another reason why Stalin wanted to discipline Tito was that he was afraid that the ambitious Yugoslav leader might become involved in a serious conflict with the West, especially with the United States, which had the atomic bomb, while the Soviet Union at that time did not. “There was some internal logic to the Soviet attitude. How much the leadership of some country consistently carries out proletarian internationalism is not measured by the struggle between fascism and national socialism, as the Yugoslav leadership and Tito emphasized, but by a positive attitude toward the USSR and the unquestioned defense of the first country of socialism,” which, of course, included absolute obedience to Stalin.⁹

Tito’s disobedience was both a danger and a challenge because it could incite disobedience in other countries and parties and their leaders.¹⁰

In addition, the devotion of Tito and his collaborators to bolshevism, claims Tony Judt, always seemed to Stalin as “too enthusiastic. Stalin was always less interested in spreading bolshevism than in spreading his power.”¹¹

Close relations between the two communist movements and the two leaders began to shake even during the war because Tito sometimes acted independently, irrespective of Moscow’s ambition to dominate. Koča Popović observes that “during the war, Tito had become accustomed to independence so that, already by the nature of his position, charisma, and the authority connected to his personality, he could no longer even think of returning to a position subordinate to Stalin”.¹²

Thus, in September 1944, Tito had obtained for the Yugoslavs an agreement with Stalin that none of the other Eastern European countries had achieved – sufficient reason for Stalin to feel that his prestige was being threatened.¹³

As the war was coming to an end, Tito was increasingly emphasizing the strength and independence of the movement that he was leading and the importance of the state he had just created. In September 1944, he said that “we want to sit together with our allies at the table where the destiny of Europe, including our own country, will be

8 Dedijer, *Novi prilozai*, III: 200-201; Anikejev, *Sovjetsko-jugoslavenski sukob*, p. 463.

9 Jakšić, *Smutna vremena*, p. 74.

10 Đilas, *Susreti sa Staljinom*, p. 82; Judt, *Postwar*, p. 145.

11 Judt, *Postwar*, p. 140.

12 Nenadović, *Razgovori s Kočom*, p. 104.

13 In detail, Goldstein – Goldstein, *Tito*, pp. 443-478.

decided. "In late October, when he learned that Churchill and Stalin had negotiated in Moscow about spheres of influence in Yugoslavia, he stated that Yugoslavia was not and could not be a "bargaining chip", indicating that he would not submit to any Soviet dictates. He added that "today's Yugoslavia cannot be compared with that of 1919. Today, there is a new Yugoslavia." The Soviet government quickly responded that it perceived "Comrade Tito's speech as a hostile act against the USSR." By making this statement, Tito had hit at the very essence of Soviet hegemony, which became the main point of the indictment against him in 1948.¹⁴

A new, significant disagreement occurred in late 1944, when news reached Tito that Soviet officers were massively raping Yugoslav women and girls, which Milovan Đilas loudly condemned, and which Tito abhorred and probably protested, but considerably more quietly.¹⁵

Toward the end of the war, Tito increasingly showed that he wanted to position Yugoslavia as a regional power with himself as its leader. Already in May 1945, he deviated from the dogma about the two phases of the revolution, imposed by Bolshevik propaganda, and claimed that in the construction of socialism "we are going new ways, another way, imposed on us by the situation of this great liberation war." He concluded by saying that "we will glide inconspicuously into communism, and we will not observe the two phases of the liberation war because the stages of the bourgeois-democratic and proletarian revolution are not well-formed."¹⁶

Moscow judged that deviation from strictly established revolutionary canons as just another Yugoslav blasphemy. Furthermore, there was one other thing that Moscow did not like – the Yugoslav five-year development plan. Adopted in 1947, it stressed the need for the development of heavy industry, while Moscow pushed for the development of agriculture, the construction of energy plants and the exploitation of mineral resources (and Žujović and Hebrang supported Moscow's ideas). In fact, Moscow saw Yugoslavia as the granary of South East Europe, but Tito did not agree. In a speech to the parliament during the adoption of the plan, Tito mentioned the USSR only once, stating that "in a socialist economy, such as that in the USSR, a crisis is not possible" – and nothing more. Not a word about Stalin, although this was a good opportunity to mention the genius creator of the first five-year-plan in the world. Observers also noted that Tito emphasized the need for the economic and political independence of Yugoslavia.¹⁷

14 Tito, *Sabrana djela*, 23:113; 24:135; see also: Đilas, *Vlast i pobuna*, pp. 137-138; Dedijer, *Novi prilozi II*: 918-919; Dedijer, *Novi prilozi III*: 103-104, 883; Strčić, *Tito: Naša Istra*, p. 36; Feytö, *Histoire des démocraties*, p. 72; in detail, Mićunović, *Moskovske godine*.

15 Tito, *Sabrana djela*, 24:95; Dedijer, *Josip Broz Tito*, p. 442; Dedijer, *Novi prilozi II*: 196-197, 640-641; Deutscher, *Staljin, politička biografija*, p. 509; Simić – Despot, *Tito, strogo povjerljivo*, pp. 130-133; Popović, *Jugoslovensko-sovjetski odnosi*, p. 167; Pirjevec, *Tito i drugovi*, pp. 190-191; Nikoliš, *Korijen, stablo, pavetina*, p. 637; Mandić, *S Titom*, pp. 74-76.

16 Dedijer, *Novi prilozi III*: 136; Vodušek Starič, *Kako su komunisti*, p. 235.

17 *Vjesnik*, 1. V. 1947; Feytö, *Histoire des démocraties*, p. 168.

During these years, Tito was reluctant to congratulate the Soviet leader on his birthdays and other important anniversaries, unlike many other Eastern European leaders. He acknowledged the concrete achievements of Stalin and the USSR, but he did not indulge in emotions. Furthermore, Tito felt that there were many problems and issues about which it was not necessary to consult Moscow, and for which Stalin thought that such consultations were “necessary”. Stalin believed that the CPY should be “a role model for other parties,” but that meant “the CPY and its leadership would enjoy his special confidence while implementing Soviet policies.”

This did not mean that Tito received a “green light” for independent action from Stalin.¹⁸ At that time, Tito was giving free reign to his charisma, and he was establishing a cult of his personality in Yugoslav society. The Soviets could not have missed the fact that in the second half of 1946 an issue of the military magazine *Narodna armija* published 23 photographs of Tito and only five of Stalin.¹⁹

Tito also refused to allow the Soviets to create a parallel intelligence network.²⁰ In June 1947, the Soviet authorities apparently sought permission from Belgrade for the Red Army to establish naval bases in Pula, Šibenik and Boka Kotorska. They tried again in early 1948, but Tito refused both times.²¹

Thirty years later, in 1978, Kardelj recalled how Stalin “tolerated Tito, in spite of the hatred that was boiling in him. I think that he was somehow afraid of us because Yugoslavia was genuinely independent and we were ready to react to his demands.” Kardelj also claimed that “Within the entire socialist movement, Stalin hated Tito the most, and therefore sought any opportunity to subvert him.”²²

Stalin’s biographer, Simon Sebag Montefiore, claims that “the federation of Bulgaria and Yugoslavia, which Tito wanted to create without Stalin’s permission,” was the moment when Stalin concluded that “enough was enough.” At a meeting with senior Yugoslav officials (Kardelj, Đilas, Ranković), he said, “when I say no, that means no!” He suggested that “Yugoslavia should swallow up Albania, and with fingers and mouth he imitated swallowing,” but the Yugoslav trio was unimpressed. Speaking to François Feytö in 1983, Đilas said that at that time they were unaware of the ultimate goal of Stalin’s manipulation, namely, “the perfidious Georgian wanted to see how far Tito’s ambitions went.”²³

Both Tito and Stalin were making decisions in these key moments, but “there was a difference in the way that they were reaching those decisions. Stalin was everything,

18 Anikejev, *Sovjetsko-jugoslavenski sukob*, p. 462.

19 Dimitrijević, *Jugoslavenska armija*, p. 803.

20 Đilas, *Vlast i pobuna*, pp. 118, 131, 133-134.

21 Pirjevec, *Tito i drugovi*, p. 243.

22 Dedijer, *Novi prilozii III*:127.

23 Dedijer, *Josip Broz Tito*, p. 470; Đilas, *Susreti sa Staljinom*, p. 82; Montefiore, *Staljin*, p. 566; Feytö, *Mémoires*, pp. 303-305.

his word was the first and the last. Tito did it in a wiser way. He listened to the opinions of the people around him, sometimes even abandoning his ideas and suggestions and accepting the majority opinion within the Yugoslav leadership (...) The personalities of Tito and Stalin were quite an important factor in the conflict. Their social psychology was created in the regions in which they grew up." "Resistance to Stalin was," Vladimir Dedijer clarified, "more a spontaneous response to the aggressive pressures in defense of independence and freedom," than an awareness of Tito and his associates of historical consequences of resistance to the USSR.²⁴

Stalin had abundant experience in executing his rivals, and he was carefully preparing to deliver the final blow to the heretic, which Tito now was in his eyes. Tito was warned by several people that Stalin wanted to remove him, including the General Secretary of the Communist Party of Romania, Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, and Josip Kopinič, his friend and Soviet intelligence officer, who was then on a mission in Turkey.

Yet another warning – this time announced in public – came in mid-February. The Vienna correspondent of the Paris newspaper *Le Figaro* wrote that Tito's portraits had been removed from all Bucharest shop windows, where they used to be displayed together with portraits of other prominent communist figures. The well-informed correspondent speculated that "Tito has lost the trust of Moscow" and concluded that these are "at the moment unconfirmed rumors, but deserve to be noted."²⁵

In his actions Stalin applied "the methods of an inquisition" and, more importantly, "all of these methods have been improved and used in his own country in the struggle against the Old Bolsheviks and against an enormous number of his own population."²⁶

Stalin thought that he could apply the same methods in Yugoslavia. As Jean-Marie Soutou, a former high-ranking French diplomat in Moscow explained, "If the branch does not bear fruit, it should be cut off." In Soutou's view, there were different solutions for a compromise, but for Stalin there was only one alternative, "I'm breaking him, or I am capitulating."²⁷

So, in the case of Tito and Yugoslavia, the strong man of the Kremlin did not show inventiveness and it came back to haunt him. Meanwhile, in February 1948, he pressured Czechoslovakia and the Communists took power in that country. These events further convinced Stalin of his own omnipotence.

The fact that Tito was crossing the red line in many respects forced Stalin to react. On 18 March, General Barskov, serving in the Soviet Embassy in Belgrade, informed Tito personally that the Soviet government was withdrawing its military advisers from

24 Dedijer, *Novi prilozi III*:30, 191.

25 Dedijer, *Josip Broz Tito*, p. 505; Dedijer, *Novi prilozi III*:257, 258; Pavlowitch, *Tito, Yugoslavia's Great Dictator*, p. 57; Đilas, *Vlast i pobuna*, p. 208; Jakovina, *Američki komunistički saveznik*, p. 239; *Le Figaro*, 12. II. 1948.

26 Dedijer, *Novi prilozi III*:32.

27 Soutou, *Un diplomate engagé*, p. 64.

Yugoslavia. The following day, the Soviet chargé d'affaires Armjaninov announced that civilian advisers would also be recalled. The alleged reason was that it was impossible for them to remain in an atmosphere of hostility. Incidentally, the most important work of these advisers was recruiting for the Soviet secret services. According to Tito's later testimony, that was the moment when he felt there was a deep "distrust or misunderstanding" and that "it was like the story about the wolf that accuses the lamb of polluting the water in a brook, although he is drinking upstream from the lamb." According to Stalin's successor as General Secretary of the Communist Party, Nikita Khrushchev, it was the beginning of an "artificial influx of conflict between the USSR and Yugoslavia."²⁸

At a session of the extended Politburo on 1 March, Tito spoke very openly about some elements of the conflict. He pointed out that the proposed Danube navigation agreement was "for us shameful" and that the air transport agreement was "unbalanced." He added that the Soviets said, "Why do you need a strong army? We are here," and that the Soviets "are exerting economic pressure on us. We must endure this pressure." He then concluded, "The independence of our country is at stake."²⁹ Then, in an unexpected and, according to Đilas, pathetic manner, Tito offered his resignation (it was the first and the last time he would do this, if we do not count the dramatic meeting of CC in Drenovi in December 1941), but he added, "if the Russians continue with such a policy toward us." Đilas did not think that Tito was serious, but that "he did it to test the attitude of the people present, and whether they would find anyone who would accept the resignation." "Everyone was unanimously against such an idea, and only Tito's long-term, close associate Sreten Žujović was conspicuously keeping his mouth shut."³⁰

Moscow carefully continued to increase its pressure. Letters from Moscow were signed by the Central Committee. Tito answered them from Belgrade and wrote to Stalin and to Molotov, who was the Minister of Foreign Affairs. The difference is obvious. Moscow wanted to keep the conflict within the Party, while Tito was trying to expand it to the relations between the two countries. Đilas described how "during that time Pavel Judin, the editor-in-chief of the Cominform magazine and the Soviet representative in the Cominform, visited Tito. He asked Tito to write an article for his magazine— as if nothing was happening between the two leaders. Tito agreed, but no one interpreted Judin's visit to Tito as related only to that article. Both we and the Soviet officials were aware that nothing happens by chance (...) Judin's visit to Tito was part of their planned tactics. At first, Tito should not be provoked, the aim was to separate him from the rest of the leadership, to give him the prospect of personal salvation." Nevertheless, things did not develop the way Moscow had planned.³¹

28 Tito, *Autobiografska kazivanja*, II:25; *Tajni referat N. S. Hruščova*, p. 70; Dedijer, *Josip Broz Tito*, p. 443; Špadijer, *Vladimir Popović Španac*, pp. 184–185; Feytö, *Histoire des démocraties*, p. 226.

29 Dedijer, *Dokumenti 1948*, knj. 1:194; Dedijer, *Josip Broz Tito*, pp. 507–509; Dedijer, *Novi prilozi III*: 304.

30 Đilas, *Vlast i pobuna*, p. 211; Đilas, *Druženje s Titom*, pp. 130–131.

31 Đilas, *Vlast i pobuna*, p. 215; Feytö, *Histoire des démocraties*, p. 227.

Though Tito wrote to Molotov, warning him in a very friendly way that the withdrawal of experts was damaging and unfounded (“our wish would be that the USSR government inform us frankly what this is about ... such a course of action is detrimental to both countries. Sooner or later, we will have to remove all the obstacles that can harm friendly relations.”). Nevertheless, new, greater tensions occurred very soon. On 27 March, the Soviet Central Committee, but in fact Stalin, sent to the Yugoslav Central Committee a letter stating that there was “a lack of democracy in the country,” that the Yugoslav authorities were trying to “dethrone the Soviet system,” and that they were accusing the USSR of “great state chauvinism.” The Yugoslav Central Committee was accused of revisionism. It was also claimed that British spies were working in the Yugoslav Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Finally, Tito was accused of the most grievous of sins – Trotskyism (“we consider Trotsky’s political career to be sufficiently instructive”). There was no doubt that “Stalin had decided to destroy Tito.”

A plenary session of the Yugoslav Central Committee convened on 12 and 13 April in the library of the Old Court, where meetings were never held, so there was little possibility that the Soviets could listen in on it. Tito came to the meeting “aware of its fateful meaning” (François Feytö called it a “fateful battle”). Afterwards, Tito told Dedijer that “life taught him that in such critical moments the most dangerous thing is to be without an attitude, which means – to hesitate. In such a situation one must always react boldly and decisively.” Tito chaired the session and made a one-hour introductory speech. He stressed that “this is not a theoretical discussion, it is not about the mistakes of the CPY, about our alleged ideological aberration. We should not let ourselves be pushed into a discussion about it (...) this is a letter of tremendous slander. Incorrect accusations. Please keep the discussion cool-headed.”

Sreten Žujović had a different opinion. Đilas, who was sitting next to him understood that “Žujović was shaking for himself. Betrayal! The betrayal of the people, the state, and the Communist Party!” Tito also understood Žujović’s condition, so he turned to him and said: “You, Black (Black was Žujović’s nickname), have exercised the right to love the USSR more than I do (...) Our Party is pure as the sun”. Then he paused, stood up and said: “Comrades, our revolution does not eat its children. The children of this revolution are honest.” Tito was “outraged sincerely, deeply. This was inspired by his personal qualities– he perceived political processes as personal problems, and vice versa –he treated personal situations and moods as problems of the Party and the state,” Đilas concluded.³²

After a “bitter and combative” discussion, “a discussion full of anger,” in which Žujović was attacked by Tito and by many others, it was decided that the Yugoslav Central Committee would respond to the charges from Moscow. In a 33-page letter, the Central

32 Đilas, *Vlast i pobuna*, p. 219; Dedijer, *Josip Broz Tito*, pp. 517-520; Feytö, *Histoire des démocraties*, pp. 232-234; Pirjevec, *Tito i drugovi*, p. 260.

Committee and Tito expressed their dissatisfaction (“terrible astonishment”) with the opinions expressed in the letter of 27 March and the manner in which it was done. In addition, the letter argued that there was essentially a difference in understanding what the relationships between socialist countries should be. It primarily urged mutual understanding and asked that local circumstances and traditions should not be sacrificed, but respected. Tito was prepared for only one concession: the replacement of Vladimir Velebit as assistant foreign minister followed by a detailed investigation of the case.

At that moment, Tito and his associates were trying to affirm the view that relations between socialist countries and parties should be based on equality. The senior state and party hierarchy (except Andrija Hebrang and Žujović), as well as central committees at the republic level, supported the letter. Žujović was expelled from the Central Committee, and later arrested along with Hebrang. Thus, the Yugoslav leadership supported and remained unified behind Tito. Stalin had lost the first round of the conflict. News of the removal of Hebrang and Žujović because of “hostile and anti-national work” was published two months later, when the “Resolution of the Cominform” was published.³³

In a letter sent to Yugoslavia in early May, Stalin and Molotov assessed the Yugoslav Central Committee’s response as “an intensification of the conflict.” They viewed the letter from Belgrade almost as an “accusation,” underlining the “anti-Soviet position of Comrade Tito” and speaking of “defamatory propaganda from the leaders of the CPY.” Tito (along with Kardelj) was identified as the main cause for the disorder in the ranks of the Yugoslav Communist Party. In the meantime, silent changes were hardly noticeable, but they were significant: during the 1 May parade in Belgrade, there were more pictures of Tito than of Stalin, and the only communist leader who congratulated Tito on his birthday (25 May) was Georgi Dimitrov.

A meeting of the Cominform was convened from 20 to 22 June in Bucharest. Tito and his associates did not attend (the Yugoslav ambassador in Moscow, Vladimir Popović, thought that their attendance would be “suicide”). Instead, they sent a letter to the participants of the meeting in which they stressed that the issue of disagreements had been “incorrectly” presented and that discussions in Bucharest would only lead to a deterioration of the situation. “We feel so unequal in this matter that we cannot accept trying to resolve it at the meeting in Bucharest,” they claimed. They knew that their position would be unanimously condemned, and that they, most probably, would not return from Bucharest. Tito later said that he “knew what his trip to Bucharest would mean. Well, I’ve already paid off my life a long time ago. I could go and die there, if that would be of any use.”³⁴ But, of course, it was not.

33 *Riječki list*, 22. VI. 1948; Dedijer, *Josip Broz Tito*, p. 525; Šuvar, *Vladimir Velebit – svjedok historije*, pp. 163-164; Pirjevec, *Tito i drugovi*, pp. 257-258; Đilas, *Vlast i pobuna*, pp. 139-140, 218-230.

34 Broz, *Autobiografska kazivanja II:23*; Đilas, *Vlast i pobuna*, pp. 224, 226; Dedijer, *Novi prilozii II:1232*; Špadijer, *Vladimir Popović Španac*, p. 189.

During the discussion of “the situation in the CPY” in Bucharest, the Soviets wanted to turn the Cominform into a court. Obviously, if Tito and his associates had been there, the meeting would have been transformed into something like the Stalinist Moscow trials, where the accused would express self-criticism, thus signing their death sentence. Andrey Ždanov claimed that Moscow “possesses information that Tito is an imperialist spy,” which leaves no doubt as to what Tito’s fate would have been.³⁵

The text of the “Resolution of the Cominform,” which was signed by all participants of the meeting in Bucharest, summarized and reinforced the previous accusations and criticisms of the Yugoslav leadership. Initiatives were welcomed to “unmask the improper policies of the Yugoslav Central Committee and, above all, the improper policies of Comrades Tito, Kardelj, Đilas and Ranković.”

Over time, Tito and his associates understood that if the Yugoslav public knew what was happening, it would support them. Therefore, when the text of the “Resolution of the Cominform” came to Yugoslavia, they decided to publish a response to it, which they called a “Declaration.” At first, Tito did not want to publish the “Resolution of the Cominform”, but only the Declaration. However, he soon accepted the majority opinion of the Politburo and agreed to publish the resolution as well.³⁶

The “Resolution of the Cominform” was published in newspapers on 30 June and broadcast on the radio. It was a great shock to the Yugoslav public, but an even greater one for Stalin and his associates. That same day, Tito and several associates (Bakarić, Koča Popović, Svetozar Vukmanović-Tempo and others) visited the construction site of New Belgrade. They stayed for two hours. Tito talked with the supervisors and workers. He was interested in “how the work and their lives [were] progressing.” He visited “almost all of the housing barracks.” The workers “cheered Tito, shouting Tito– Party.” Life in Belgrade was quite normal. International telegraph and telephone traffic was not disrupted, trains ran on schedule, and no special military or police measures were discernible. Tito’s visit to the construction site appeared at the top of the front page of all of the newspapers, suggesting to the Yugoslav public that nothing was happening which would disturb Tito’s daily commitments and that he had not lost the support of the people.

The “Resolution of the Cominform” predicted that “healthy forces” would soon take the initiative and overthrow Tito and his associates. Speaking at the 20th Congress of the CP USSR in 1956, Nikita Khrushchev stated that at this time Stalin boasted that all he had to do was “lift his little finger and Tito would no longer be there. He would fall.” Stalin thought that Tito and his associates would not be able to withstand the pressure and that they would resign. François Feytö warned that Moscow should not be

35 Feytö, *Histoire des démocraties*, p. 194; Montefiore, *Staljin*, p. 568.

36 Đilas, *Vlast i pobuna*, pp. 236–237.

underestimated. “Stalin and his associates could believe in such a result because Moscow had secured significant support within the Yugoslav military, police, party circles.” On the basis of these estimates, Moscow calculated that there would be a split in the Yugoslav Communist Party and Yugoslav society. Only a little help would be needed from Moscow for “healthy forces” to prevail, such as when they showed that they would protect Hebrang and Žujović. Soviet intelligence from Belgrade probably overestimated the strength of this “serious support,” which clearly began to weaken when Tito and his associates launched their counter-offensive. In addition, Stalin was relying on his authority within the international communist movement and the unconditional support of the Cominform member states. However, the Kremlin strongman was deluding himself when he demanded the degrading humiliation of the victors of the war in Yugoslavia.³⁷

Tito rightly estimated that he had support among the Yugoslavs (compared to other Eastern bloc leaders, Tito’s personal popularity in 1948 was incomparably greater). Tito could also count on the support of the party elite. In other words, he had the strength to oppose Stalin, although there were many people in Yugoslavia who, because of their radicalism and indoctrination, admired Stalin as the “guardian of the only truth.” Tito’s reputation as a victor in wartime and a self-proclaimed post-war leader could not be tarnished by insinuations from Moscow, which recklessly and crudely denied some of the most important CPY achievements in the war. For example, a letter in May 1948 claimed that in the summer of 1944, “the Yugoslav National Liberation Movement survived a grave crisis,” and that “the Soviet army came to the aid of the Yugoslav people, smashed the German occupiers, liberated Belgrade and thus created the conditions necessary for the Yugoslav Communist Party to come to power.” Moscow also claimed that “Tito and Kardelj did not take this into account,” and therefore “they should be more decent and humble.” It concluded that “Yugoslav leaders were getting on everybody’s nerves with their exuberant boasting” about their successes during the war. Of course, in the summer of 1944 the Yugoslav National Liberation Movement was not in crisis. In fact, they had started the liberation of Dalmatia and the southern parts of the country and had penetrated into Serbia, and the Soviets did not liberate Belgrade on their own.³⁸

Last but not least, 3,000 survivors of the famous Partisan battles at Neretva and Sutjeska knew that the Soviets were lying and they were prepared to fight to the death for Tito.

Despite all of this, Tito and Yugoslavia continued to adore Stalin until the last moment and even after it. Stalin’s biographer Montefiore precisely concludes, “The departure of Yugoslavia from the Eastern bloc was an unnecessary consequence of Stalin’s

37 *Tajni referat N. S. Hruščova*, pp. 69-70; Anikejev, *Sovjetsko-jugoslavenski sukob*, pp. 463-464.

38 Koren, *Prošlost na koju su sjećanja svake godine sve življa*, p. 41; Petranović – Zečević, *Jugoslavija 1918-1954*, p.759; Popović, *Za pravilnu ocenu*.

stubbornness.”³⁹ One month after the “Resolution of the Cominform,” in the prevailing tense and uncertain atmosphere of the Fifth Congress of the CPY, Tito and the Yugoslav communists were still saluting Stalin. Tito concluded his report with the words, “Long live CPY! Long live the USSR with the genius Stalin as its leader!” The delegates applauded and chanted “Stalin – Tito!” In Yugoslavia, Stalin’s popularity was much weaker than Tito’s. There was certain support for the Resolution of the Cominform, but much less than Stalin and his associates had expected and hoped for.

Therefore the deconstruction of Stalin’s personal cult soon started in Yugoslavia.⁴⁰ For example, the original version of the well-known song “With Marshall Tito, bravest hero” by distinguished Croatian poet Vladimir Nazor (1876–1949) goes as follows:

With Tito and Stalin, our two bravest heroes,
We’ll be even stronger than Hell!
We raise our heads bravely, and don’t hang down gravely,
And clench our fists hard as well.

Soon, the poem was rewritten and it went as follows:

With great Marshall Tito, our land’s bravest hero,
We’ll be even stronger than Hell!
We raise our heads bravely, and don’t hang down gravely,
And clench our fists hard as well.

As for Stalin, he started a propaganda war: anti-Yugoslav and anti-Titoist propaganda systematically denigrated Tito and “Tito’s clique” in the USSR and all its satellites. Cartoons portrayed Tito with a swastika, or with a skull, and with a face that resembled to Hermann Goering’s. It was claimed that “Tito’s group has fallen into the mud of bourgeois nationalism,” that it was “the fascist Tito’s clique,” or “the criminal gang of Tito-Ranković.”

In Hungary, propaganda was spread that Tito was an “American dog on a chain” just waiting for a sign from Washington to attack. In the USSR he was “a traitor, a provocateur, a spy.” There was also a gloomy pronouncement that gallows would be made for him at Terazije Square in the center of Belgrade. In Moscow, a certain Antony Maljcev published the novel *The Yugoslav Tragedy*, in which Tito and his associates were shown as Gestapo agents and associates of Western spy networks. The book won the Stalin Prize.

³⁹ Montefiore, *Staljin*, p. 494; Feytö, *Histoire des démocraties*, p. 231.

⁴⁰ Goldstein – Goldstein, *Tito*, pp. 511–516.

One American diplomat concluded at this time that because of the adverse Soviet propaganda "Tito no longer needs to be removed physically, his regime can survive as the living object of the hatred of all communists."⁴¹

Josip Broz Tito won that battle, becoming the only international leader who gained victories over both Hitler and Stalin.

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41 Pirjevec, *Tito i drugovi*, pp. 304, 309-310; *Bela knjiga*, p. 238; Grigorov, *Antititovske/antijugoslovenske karikature*, pp. 731-737; Vojtěchovský, *Z Práhy proti Titovi!*; Bekić, *Jugoslavija u hladnom ratu*, pp. 35, 38, 89, 90, 110, 116, 123; Dedijer, *Izgubljena bitka*, p. 229.

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Summary

Ivo Goldstein

The Tito-Stalin Split of 1948 as a Personal Conflict

The conflict of 1948 was quite complex and stratified – it was ideological, political, with obvious economical roots and consequences. It was at the same time personal, because it was the conflict of two charismatic personalities – Tito and Stalin. The Yugoslav communist movement enjoyed greater independence than others in Eastern Europe because it had largely fought its own way into power. Tito came to Yugoslavia in 1938 as a Soviet communist agent, but his war victories helped him outgrow that early role and he developed into an extremely self-confident leader who would not allow the USSR and Stalin to dictate to him. His ambitions also grew. He tried to achieve domination over Albania, he planned to make himself head of a Balkan federation that would include Bulgaria, and complained to the Soviet authorities when they imposed unequal economic relations bordering on exploitation on Yugoslavia. All this made Stalin and the other Soviet leaders regard him with suspicion, and they began to exert various kinds of pressure on the Yugoslav leadership. The author investigates various aspects of this conflict. Josip Broz Tito won that battle, becoming the only international leader who gained victory over Hitler and Stalin.

Petar Dragišić

Walking a Tightrope: Tito's Regional Ambitions and the Cominform Resolution

One of the major consequences of the Second World War in the Balkans was the formation of a powerful and highly ambitious regime in Belgrade. Tito skillfully capitalized on the turmoil in the region and the opportunity to create a multiethnic socialist state between Kranjska Gora and Gevgelia arose from the rivalry between the anti-Hitler powers – the Soviet Union and the Western Allies. The power of Tito's regime rested on the potent Communist Party of Yugoslavia and an impressive army which, at the end of the Second World War, numbered around 800,000 soldiers.¹ Tito's growing self-confidence soon turned into megalomania which affected almost all countries neighboring Yugoslavia. Tito attempted to extend his influence in the region in two ways – by territorial claims against Yugoslav neighbors as well as by strengthening the ties with the communist parties in the region. In addition, while pursuing this high-risk strategy, the regime in Belgrade took advantage of the existence of substantial Yugoslav ethnic groups in the neighboring countries. The long-term goal was an enlarged Yugoslavia (at the expense of Yugoslav neighbors) and Yugoslav leadership in Southeast Europe, which jeopardized the interests of both the Soviet Union and the Anglo-Americans.

The complexity of Tito's strategy was influenced chiefly by the geopolitical Cold War dynamic in the region of Southeast Europe. Given the Yugoslav affiliation to the Soviet sphere of influence, which was cemented by the Soviet-Yugoslav Treaty of friendship, mutual assistance and post-war cooperation concluded in Moscow on 11 April 1945,² a clear pro-Soviet orientation of the communist establishment in Belgrade in the immediate postwar years put Tito's regime in an awkward position. On the one hand, being a part of the Soviet sphere of influence, Yugoslavia was confronted with

1 Petranović, *Istorija Jugoslavije 1918-1988 II*, p. 435.

2 *Jugoslovensko-sovjetski odnosi 1945-1956*, pp. 15-17.

determined attempts of Moscow to restrain its political, ideological and economic sovereignty.³ On the other hand, Yugoslav pro-Soviet orientation from 1945 to 1948 brought the regime in Belgrade into direct confrontation with Washington and London. A clear example of these tensions were Yugoslav attacks on two American transport planes C-47 in Slovenia in August 1946.⁴ The distrust of the Yugoslav regime by the two protagonists of the Cold War – the Soviet Union and the Anglo-Americans – was a major obstacle to Yugoslavia's highly ambitious plans in the region.

The targets of Yugoslav expansionism in the region from 1943 to 1948 were Italy, Austria, Albania, Greece and Bulgaria. The Yugoslav regime tried to expand eastwards both through the project of a Yugoslav-Bulgarian federation as well as by annexing the Bulgarian portion of Macedonia (Pirin Macedonia). However, in early 1945, the federation project failed due to opposition by the Western members of the anti-Hitler coalition – the United Kingdom and the USA, who feared that a mighty communist state, stretching from Trieste to the Black Sea, could upset the equilibrium in the Balkans and consequently jeopardize the Western (British and American) supremacy in Greece. The leading British diplomats – Anthony Eden and Orme Sargent – were convinced that the creation of a South Slavic federation, i.e. the Yugoslav-Bulgarian federation, would significantly strengthen the Soviet strategic position in the Balkans. In a bid to avoid conflict with his former Western partners, Stalin, who in all likelihood launched this ambitious project, put the whole thing on ice. Anyway, the plan was impeded by the dispute between Yugoslavia and Bulgaria over the structure of the South Slavic federation since Belgrade opposed the dual composition of the Yugoslav-Bulgarian federation (Yugoslavia + Bulgaria), preferred by Sofia. Instead, the Yugoslav regime insisted on including Bulgaria into the existing Yugoslav federal system as a seventh federal unit.⁵

Therefore, in the spring of 1948, the Yugoslav regime sabotaged the unification with Bulgaria. The Yugoslav communist establishment categorically rejected Stalin's new plan for the creation of a Yugoslav-Bulgarian federation, insisting on Yugoslav sovereignty and independence and fearing that Bulgaria could act as a Soviet Trojan horse in the enlarged South Slavic federation. Belgrade officially vetoed Stalin's initiative at the Politburo session held on 1 March 1948.⁶

The debacle of the Yugoslav concept of the Yugoslav-Bulgarian federation did not discourage the regime in Belgrade from seeking to extend its influence beyond the Yugoslav-Bulgarian border. Therefore, the establishments in Belgrade and Skoplje, including their highest representatives – Josip Broz Tito, Lazar Koliševski, Dimitar Vlahov – vehemently demanded the annexation of the Bulgarian part of Macedonia (Pirin

3 Dedijer, *Izgnubljena bitka*, pp. 103-141.

4 Lees, *Keeping Tito Afloat*, p. 14; Jakovina, *Socijalizam na američkoj pšenici*, p. 16.

5 Dragišić, *Jugoslovensko-bugarski odnosi*, pp. 59-80; Hatschikjan, *Tradition und Neuorientierung*, pp. 110-115; Лалков, *От надеждата към разочарование*, 1994.

6 Dragišić, *Jugoslovensko-bugarski odnosi*, pp. 141-148; Petranović, *Zapisnici sa sednica Politbira*, pp. 242-244.

Macedonia), i.e. the unification of Pirin and Vardar Macedonia within the Yugoslav federation. Although Sofia was reluctant to meet this Yugoslav demand, the Bulgarian leadership made some concessions to Belgrade and Skoplje by endorsing the process of *macedonization* of Pirin Macedonia.⁷ The Yugoslav claims to Pirin Macedonia were fiercely opposed by the Foreign Office, who feared the consequences of the unification of Pirin and Vardar Macedonia for the future status of the Greek part of Macedonia.⁸

The Yugoslav policy towards Greece, i.e. its role in the civil war in Greece, was an inseparable part of the Macedonian question. Since Yugoslavia provided considerable support for the Democratic Army of Greece and the Greek Communist Party in the Greek Civil War (despite the dispute over the Macedonian issue, due to Yugoslav territorial claims over Aegean Macedonia), in the late 1940s, the two countries were in a state of undeclared war. The Yugoslav attitude towards the government in Athens was extremely hostile. On the other hand, the relations between Belgrade and Skopje on the one hand and Greek communists on the other were burdened by Yugoslavia's overt claims over Greek/Aegean Macedonia. In September 1946, one of the most prominent leaders of Vardar Macedonia, Dimitar Vlahov, claimed in his article in the Yugoslav daily *Politika* that the population of Pirin and Aegean Macedonia aspired to unification with Vardar Macedonia within socialist Yugoslavia. Furthermore, by March 1946 the Communist Party of Macedonia (Vardar Macedonia), had founded branches of the People's Front in almost all towns and villages of Aegean Macedonia. Still, in spite of the disagreements between Yugoslav and Greek communists in Aegean Macedonia, the Yugoslav regime strongly supported the Democratic Army of Greece. According to Yugoslav sources, Yugoslavia provided Greek communists with, among other things, 35,000 to 100,000 rifles, 3,500 to 7,000 machine guns and 7,000 anti-tank weapons.⁹

After the Second World War, Yugoslav room for maneuver in Greece was significantly reduced by two global players – the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom. Given the importance of Greece for the British strategy in the region, London was determined not to allow a Yugoslav annexation of Aegean Macedonia.¹⁰ Furthermore, in early 1948, the Kremlin urged the Yugoslavs to stop interfering in the Greek Civil War, i.e. supporting the guerrillas of the Democratic Army of Greece. In a conversation with Milovan Đilas and Edvard Kardelj in January 1948, Stalin signaled his determination to avoid conflict with London and Washington by leaving Greek communists in the lurch.¹¹

7 Мичев, *Македонският въпрос*, pp. 124-251; Broz, *Govori i članci II*, p. 52; Влахов, *Одабрани говори и статии*, p. 357.

8 Ristović, *Britanska balkanska politika*, pp. 72-87.

9 On Yugoslav role in the civil war in Greece, see: Ristović, *Na pragu Hladnog rata*; Ristović, *Jugoslavija i građanski rat*, pp. 71-85.

10 Barker, *British Policy*, pp. 200-201.

11 Đilas, *Razgovori sa Staljinom*, pp. 116-117.

During the Second World War, the Communist Party of Yugoslavia helped the establishment of the Albanian Communist Party tremendously. Consequently, by 1948, Tito's Yugoslavia was closely supervising the building of socialism in Albania, steadily extending its influence in Tirana. The Yugoslav influence in Albania was exercised chiefly by a colony of Yugoslav experts, entrusted with overseeing the various aspects of political, ideological and economic development in postwar Albania.¹² In addition, Yugoslav dominance in Albania was increased by a number of agreements between Belgrade and Tirana. In 1946, Enver Hoxha visited Yugoslavia in order to meet Tito and sign the bilateral Agreement of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance. Several months later, Albania and Yugoslavia signed the Agreement on a Customs Union. Furthermore, by November 1946, Belgrade and Tirana had concluded another 18 agreements on various issues of bilateral economic relations.¹³ By 1948, Yugoslavia strongly supported Albania by providing Albanians with food, weapons, as well as with industrial and technical equipment, among other things.¹⁴

Certainly, Yugoslav support for Albania in the immediate postwar years was not motivated by altruism of the Yugoslav leaders but by their intention to absorb Albania, namely to include it into the Yugoslav sphere of influence. According to the controversial book by Enver Hoxha "The Titoites", at Hoxha's meeting with Josip Broz Tito in Yugoslavia in 1946, the Yugoslav prime minister and Party leader indicated Yugoslav intentions to include Albania in the Balkan federation, which was supposed to have been led by Belgrade. According to Hoxha's book, the Yugoslav leader regarded this step as a precondition for a major concession to Tirana – ceding Kosovo to Albania.¹⁵ At a meeting with Stalin in April 1947, Edvard Kardelj reiterated this Yugoslav position, underlining Yugoslav readiness to fulfill Albanian aspirations in Kosovo in case of further strengthening of ties between Belgrade and Tirana.¹⁶

The available sources suggest that in 1946 the influence of the Soviet Union on Albanian politics and economy was rather insignificant in comparison to that of Yugoslavia. In the autumn of 1946, Moscow intensified its presence in Tirana, in particular by strengthening its military and economic support of Albania, as well as by increasing the number of Soviet military and economic experts in Hoxha's domain.¹⁷ A year later, Hoxha's visit to the Soviet Union intensified the rivalry between Moscow and Belgrade in Albania, thus deepening the distrust between Tito and Stalin. After the meeting between Hoxha and Stalin in July 1947, the Soviet Union extended its influence in Tirana, deliberately suppressing the Yugoslav presence south of Prokletije. The Soviets were

12 Životić, *Jugoslavija, Albanija i velike sile*, pp. 143-170.

13 Hadalin, *Boj za Albanijo*, pp. 136-145.

14 Životić, *Jugoslavija, Albanija i velike sile*, pp. 143-247; Petranović, *Balkanska federacija 1943-1948*, pp. 142-143.

15 Petranović, *Balkanska federacija*, p. 157.

16 Životić, *Jugoslavija, Albanija i velike sile*, p. 248.

17 *Ibid.*, pp. 193, 247.

clearly determined to restrain Yugoslav interference in Albanian affairs and establish overwhelming dominance in this important geopolitical region.¹⁸ This explains Stalin's fierce criticism of Yugoslavia's decision to deploy a division in Albania in early 1948.¹⁹ The Soviet-Yugoslav dispute over Albania demonstrated profound mutual distrust and contributed significantly to the head-on collision between Moscow and Belgrade in the spring and summer of 1948.

Yugoslav regional imperialism prior to the Cominform Resolution did not target the *people's democracies* in Yugoslavia's neighborhood exclusively. Two Western capitalist neighbors of Yugoslavia – Austria and Italy – were also affected by the grandiose plans of the Yugoslav establishment. The Yugoslavs revealed their lofty aspirations in Carinthia and Venezia Giulia even before the formal constitution of the communist regime in Belgrade. In his notable speech on the Croatian island of Vis in September 1944, the Yugoslav war leader Josip Broz Tito declared Yugoslavia's intentions of increasing its territory at the expense of Austria and Italy. Moreover, the president of the National Liberation Committee (NKOJ) made the Yugoslav *modus operandi* public in Carinthia and Venezia Giulia using the existence of Slovene minorities in these border regions as a pretext for Yugoslav territorial claims against Austria and Italy.²⁰

The relations between Yugoslavia and Austria in the second half of the 1940s were considerably contaminated by Yugoslav territorial claims against Austria. Several weeks before World War II ended, the new Yugoslav government officially made claims over the southern provinces of Austria populated by ethnic Slovenes. The regime in Belgrade attempted to take advantage of a confused situation in Austria in early May 1945 and confront them with a *fait accompli*. Still, the Yugoslav brief occupation of parts of Carinthia (including Klagenfurt) proved to be futile, given the strong antagonism of London and Washington towards Yugoslav ambitions in Carinthia. Faced with resolute opposition from the British and American governments, Tito had no other choice but to withdraw the troops of the Yugoslav Army from Austria.²¹

The fiasco of Yugoslavia's brief occupation of Carinthia compelled Belgrade and Ljubljana to change their position on the Carinthian question. In 1947 and 1948, the Yugoslav regime lobbied hard for its territorial claims in Carinthia at the international conferences before the signing of the Austrian State Treaty (*Staatsvertrag*). Yugoslav demands were firmly rejected by the three Western participants in negotiations on the peace treaty with Austria – the UK, the USA and France.²²

18 Ibid., pp. 247-277; Borozan, *Jugoslavija i Albanija*, p. 301; Đilas, *Razgovori sa Staljinom*, p. 88.

19 Đilas, *Razgovori sa Staljinom*, p. 115.

20 Broz, *Govori i članci I*, p. 219.

21 On Yugoslav territorial claims against Austria after the Second World War, see: Suppan, *Die Kärntner Frage*, pp. 187-235; Suppan, *Jugoslawien und der österreichische Staatsvertrag*, pp. 431-475; Pleterski, *Avstrija in njeni Slovenci*; Nečak, *Koroški Slovenci v drugi avstrijski republiki*; Dragišić, *Odnosi Jugoslavije i Austrije*.

22 *Memorandum vlade Federativne Narodne Republike Jugoslavije*; Stourzh, *Um Einheit und Freiheit*, pp. 59-161; Dragišić, *Odnosi Jugoslavije i Austrije*, pp. 48-82.

Yugoslav attempts to take advantage of its military dominance in the region also failed in Venezia Giulia. Like in Carinthia, Yugoslavia's adventure in northwestern Italy was short-lived. The temporary Yugoslav occupation of Trieste, Gorizia and Monfalcone ended in early June 1945 owing to vehement opposition from the Western allies to Yugoslav claims in Venezia Giulia. Still, the defeat of Yugoslavia in the dispute over Trieste was not total. Though the main goal of Belgrade and Ljubljana in Italy, namely the annexation of Trieste, was not achieved, in 1954 Yugoslavia increased its territory by absorbing Zone B of the Free Territory of Trieste. The compromise between Belgrade and Rome, confirmed by the Memorandum of Understanding of London, was a direct consequence of the new geopolitical position of Yugoslavia after the Tito-Stalin split. The intention of Washington and London was to satisfy both sides – the loyal NATO member (Italy) and their potential ally in the Balkans (Yugoslavia).²³

The tensions between Moscow and Belgrade culminated in the Cominform Resolution, which displayed Stalin's deep dissatisfaction with the political and ideological facets of the Yugoslav road to socialism in the immediate postwar years. The document approved by the communist parties of the Soviet Union, Bulgaria, Romania, France, Italy, Czechoslovakia, Poland and Hungary focused chiefly on the ideological "deformation" of the Yugoslav socialist system. The Information Bureau accused the establishment in Belgrade, among other things, of "departing from the positions of the working class," "breaking with the Marxist theory of classes and class struggle," as well as of "growing capitalist elements" in Yugoslavia. The Information Bureau (i.e. Moscow) directed its criticism chiefly at the Yugoslav policy in the countryside. The Communist Party of Yugoslavia was blamed for "pursuing an incorrect policy in the countryside by ignoring the class differentiation in the countryside, and by regarding the individual peasantry as a single entity, contrary to Marxist-Leninist doctrine of classes and class struggle." Furthermore, the Yugoslavs were criticized for "pursuing an unfriendly policy toward the Soviet Union and the CPSU(b)."²⁴

Although the author(s) of the Cominform Resolution did not refer to Yugoslav foreign policy, there is no doubt that Tito's policy towards the neighboring countries significantly contributed to the deterioration of relations between Moscow and Belgrade. In March 1948, in an instruction to Mikhail Andreyevich Suslov, the International Department of the CC CPSU accused the Yugoslav leaders of trying to assume a leading role in the Balkans as well as in the region of Podunavlje. In addition, the attitude of Yugoslav communists towards other "fraternal" communist parties was characterized as "anti-Marxist".²⁵ Ivo Banac interpreted Stalin's conversation with Kardelj and Đilas in

23 On the Trieste question after the Second World War, see: Cattaruzza, *L'Italia e il confine orientale*; Novak, *Trieste 1941-1954*; Milkčić, *Tršćanska kriza*; Dimitrijević-Bogetić, *Tršćanska kriza*; Bucarelli, La "questione jugoslava".

24 Farrell, *Jugoslavia and the Soviet Union*, pp. 75-81.

25 *Jugoslovensko-sovjetski odnosi 1945-1956*, pp. 272-273.

February 1948 as a discussion on “Yugoslav independent and combative foreign policy” and Yugoslav “readiness to assert its militant alternative to the USSR in Eastern Europe, especially among the Balkan communist parties.”²⁶

The conflict with Moscow in 1948 represented a serious blow to Yugoslav ambitions in the region by putting Tito on the defensive. Consequently, Tito gave up his dream of Yugoslav predominance in the Balkans and focused on protecting Yugoslav borders, both from Soviet satellite countries and from the two NATO members in the region – Italy and Greece.

The Yugoslav conflict with Moscow represented a watershed in the Yugoslav-Bulgarian relations. Since the Bulgarian communist establishment sided with Soviets, the Yugoslav-Soviet dispute had a strongly negative impact on the relations between Belgrade and Sofia. In the summer of 1948, the regime in Sofia decided to stop the *macedonization* of Pirin Macedonia endorsed at the 10th plenary session of the Bulgarian Workers Party in 1946. Countless incidents on the border between Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, repression against Yugoslav citizens in Bulgaria, and vice versa, were regular occurrences in Yugoslav-Bulgarian relations until Stalin's death in 1953.²⁷

Yugoslav relations with Albania after the Cominform Resolution followed the same pattern. After his conversation with Stalin in July 1947, Enver Hoxha gradually started distancing himself from Yugoslavia and strengthening his ties with the Soviet Union. When the conflict between Tito and Stalin occurred in the spring of 1948, Hoxha promptly sided with Moscow. Before Stalin's death, Albania actively took part in the Soviet campaign against the communist establishment in Belgrade.²⁸

After the Cominform Resolution in 1948, Tito's position on the civil war in Greece was shaped by two factors. Firstly, faced with a threat from the East (Moscow), Tito was determined to avoid a clash with the key players in the West in case of a prolonged support for the Democratic Army of Greece. Secondly, the partnership between Belgrade and the Greek Communist Party deteriorated since Zachariadis complied with the Cominform Resolution on Yugoslavia. Consequently, Belgrade left its Greek comrades in the lurch and closed the Yugoslav-Greek border.²⁹

Tito's policy towards Yugoslavia's western neighbors after the Tito-Stalin split was also a complete fiasco. At the Paris Conference of Foreign Ministers in June 1949, the Soviets (Andrey Vyshinsky) withdrew their support for Yugoslav territorial claims in Carinthia, paving the way for the Paris Compromise, which guaranteed the territorial integrity of Austria.³⁰

26 Banac, *With Stalin against Tito*, pp. 40-41.

27 Мичев, *Македонският вџпрос*, pp. 385-487; Dragišić, *Jugoslovensko-bugarski odnosi*, pp. 171-250.

28 Hadalin, *Boj za Albanijo*, pp. 202-234; Životić, *Jugoslavija, Albanija i velike sile*, pp. 295-356; Komatina, *Enver Hodža i jugoslovensko-albanski odnosi*, pp. 83-95.

29 See note 9 above.

30 Dragišić, *Odnosi Jugoslavije i Austrije*, pp. 68-74.

The Cominform Resolution and the Yugoslav clash with Moscow also significantly impacted the solution of the Trieste question. The conflict with Stalin and the Soviet satellites moved Yugoslavia closer to the West, thus removing the Cold War component from the Yugoslav-Italian relations. Consequently, London and Washington backed a compromise solution (the Memorandum of London) which confirmed the partition of the Free Territory of Trieste (Territorio libero di Trieste), de facto resolving the Yugoslav-Italian postwar border dispute.

Any comparison of Tito's original goals in his policy in the region with the final result of his strategy inevitably leads to the conclusion that his regional policy ended in failure. Already in the final phase of the Second World War, Tito made it abundantly clear that his ambitions went beyond the restoration of pre-war Yugoslavia. Misguided by his excessive confidence³¹ Tito set extremely ambitious goals. In October 1943, in a letter to Svetozar Vukmanović Tempo, Tito pointed out that Yugoslavia should be the political and military leader of the Balkans.³² Several weeks later, in a Proclamation of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, Milovan Đilas argued for the creation of a South Slavic federation "from Trieste to the Black Sea."³³ This mammoth federation was to include Bulgaria and, in all likelihood, Albania, which explains massive Yugoslav support for Albania until 1948. Furthermore, Tito made territorial claims over Carinthia and parts of Venezia Giulia. In February 1944, in a cable to the Communist Party of Slovenia, Edvard Kardelj highlighted that Yugoslavia and its Communist Party represented a center for all communist movements "in this part of Europe."³⁴

The Tito-Stalin split of 1948 had a major impact on Yugoslav strategy in the region. Since the regional *people's democracies* sided with the Soviets in their conflict with Belgrade and taking into account the tensions in the relations with Austria and Italy because of Yugoslav territorial claims in the Alps-Adria region, Tito was compelled to fight for his very survival. Consequently, the Yugoslav regime abandoned its ambitious plans in the region and launched a policy of reconciliation with its neighbors. In the first half of the 1950s, Yugoslavia improved its relations with Austria, Italy, Greece and, following the death of Stalin, with the Soviet satellite states in the region – Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, and even Albania.³⁵

31 In April 1945, Georgi Dimitrov portrayed Josip Broz Tito in his diary as flippant and arrogant: "General impression: *underestimation* of the complexity of the situation and the impending difficulties, *too arrogant*, heavy dose of conceit and sure signs of *dizziness with success*. To hear him talk, of course, you would think everything was under control . . ." *The Diary of Georgi Dimitrov*, p. 367.

32 Petranović, *Balkanska federacija*, pp. 66-67.

33 *Ibid.*, pp. 73-74. "Zato nova Jugoslavija postaje žarište otpora ne samo svih jugoslovenskih naroda, nego i ostalih naroda Balkanskog poluostrva: ona je postala primer za sve potlačene narode Evrope. Stvaraju se uslovi za ostvarenje (...) bratske federativne zajednice južnoslovenskih naroda od Trsta do Crnog mora."

34 *Ibid.*, p. 139.

35 Cvetković, *Pogled iza gvozdene zavese*, pp. 35-336.

Still, the legacy of Yugoslav disputes with its neighbors prior to the Cominform Resolution, coupled with the global Cold War dynamic (since all Yugoslav neighbors, with the exception of Austria, acted as proxies of two super powers – the USA and the USSR) hampered the full normalization of Yugoslavia's relations with its neighbors. Moreover, all other neighboring states represented a potential threat to Yugoslavia, and the proximity of Soviet troops and American tactical and strategic nuclear weapons were a matter of grave concern for Tito's regime.

Considering Tito's intentions in the region in the aftermath of the Second World War and the final result of his policy one can describe the outcome of the Yugoslav conflict with Stalin in 1948 not as Tito's glorious victory, but rather as his defeat or a Pyrrhic victory at best, which permanently reduced his room for maneuver in the region. The clash with Stalin in 1948 was his *salto mortale*, which made him a prisoner in an extremely hostile environment. Consequently, Tito had to give up the idea of being a regional geopolitical player. Instead, eager to achieve his ambitious objectives, he picked an alternative chessboard outside the Balkans, namely in the Global South. In the 1960s and 1970s Tito was perceived as a global leader, in regard to his position in the Non-Aligned movement. At the same time, paradoxically, Tito's role in the home region was rather passive, focusing on his struggle for survival.

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Summary

Petar Dragišić

Walking a Tightrope: Tito's Regional Ambitions and the Cominform Resolution

In the aftermath of the Second World War Tito's National Liberation Army emerged as the most powerful military force in the Southeast European region. Consequently, the newly established communist regime in Yugoslavia endeavored to capitalize on its strength, the weakness of the Yugoslav neighbors as well as on the favorable geopolitical conditions. In the first post-war years Tito's regime focused its efforts on expanding the territory of Yugoslavia and extending its influence in the neighboring countries (the Trieste crisis, the project of South Slavic federation, the support for the communist "Democratic Army of Greece", the territorial claims against Austria, etc.). Nevertheless, the conflict with Moscow in 1948 represented a serious blow to the Yugoslav power putting Tito on the defensive. Consequently, Tito gave up his ambitious projects in the Balkans and focused on protecting Yugoslav borders. Given the presence of both global Cold War coalitions on its borders Yugoslavia was constrained to play a demanding simultaneous game in the Balkan minefield. The paper focuses on the relations of Tito's Yugoslavia with its neighbors and the regional strategies of Tito's regime from the final stage of the Second World War and the subsequent establishing of the communist regime in Belgrade to the initial phase of the Tito-Stalin split in 1948/1949. The research will test the hypothesis that the Yugoslav relations with its neighbors were shaped by a blend of global (Cold War bipolarity) and regional (minority issues, pre-war territorial disputes...) factors. The research will focus on principal objectives of Tito's policy towards the Yugoslav neighbors in the first post-war years. In this regard the paper will pay particular attention to the impact of the Tito-Stalin split on the Yugoslav neighborhood policy in 1948/1949. The research is based on an analysis of archive sources (from the Archive of Yugoslavia and the Diplomatic Archive of Serbia), contemporary press articles, published documents and secondary sources.

Bojan Balkovec

Statements about Žujović and Hebrang from Party Cells

In the spring of 1948, relations within the leadership of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia became complicated because of the issue of its attitude towards the Soviet Union. Andrija Hebrang and Sreten Žujović stood out due to their deviation from the line of Josip Broz.¹ These intense events culminated at the session of the Central Committee of the CPY on 13 April 1948. At this session they formed a commission that was to prepare a report on the anti-party actions of Hebrang and Žujović. The commission included Blagoje Nešković, Ivan Gošnjak and Vida Tomšič.

The commission prepared a six-page report. The Archives of the Republic of Slovenia keep this report in the Janez Vipotnik fonds.² The kept copy is written in the Slovene language. On 9 May 1948, the Politburo of the CPY made an announcement consisting of three parts. The first page is a statement entitled “To All Members of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia”. In it, the Politburo accepts the report from members of the commission and based on the report decides to expel Hebrang and Žujović from the CPY. The next four pages comprise the commission’s report on the mistakes made by Hebrang and Žujović. It mentions their mistakes before the war, during the war, and after the war. The wartime mistakes of course include Hebrang’s conduct in the Ustasha prison. The many mistakes made after the war are connected with economic development. In the case of Žujović, they also found mistakes from the 1930s. During the war, he made mistakes in the Fifth Enemy Offensive (Sutjeska) and after the war in economic policy. The third part of the report is the decision regarding Hebrang and Žujović from 1946.

Below, I will analyse the statements from the party cells of the Slovene Communist Party regarding the above-mentioned report. Let us begin by trying to establish the

1 For more on the Tito-Stalin conflict and on Hebrang and Žujović, see e.g. Goldstein, *Tito*, pp. 443-478. and Pirjevec, *Tito, Stalin in Zabod*, pp. 90-128.

2 SI AS 99 Janez Vipotnik. The report is kept in the technical unit 131.

number of party members in Slovenia. A few figures are given in the introductory part of the collection of Politburo Minutes, published by Darinka Drnovšek. Drnovšek claims that there were 4,978 members in 1945. This figure was allegedly based on a report, most likely from August 1945. In 1948, there were said to be as many as 38,635 members.³

On 29 February 1948, a session of the Politburo of the Slovene Party was held, and was continued on 5 March 1948. They discussed the Party's status in the countryside. The session minutes record a debate by Janez Hribar⁴. Hribar talked about party cells in the countryside and mentioned 902 cells with 9,095 members. He pointed out the small number of farmers, especially large farmers. There were another 1,344 member candidates in the villages and 7,366 members of the League of Communist Youth of Yugoslavia. In his opinion, farmers accounted for 10% of all members of the CPS.⁵

The party cells were relatively small. They were organised as territorial cells and as company cells. The local cells in the countryside were limited to settlements, i.e. villages. Some of the village cells had only a few members, sometimes fewer than ten. In the case of larger settlements, they were divided into parts and the cells included members from specific parts of the settlement. For some of the smaller village cells the documents preserved show the exact number of members in a cell because they either mentioned the number of members or the members signed the statement. One example of the members' signatures is the statement from the cell of the village of Kal-Koritnica. The members of the cell signed the second page of the statement. There are six members' signatures on the left-hand side, two signatures on the right and the title *Segretar* (secretary) above them. A greater number of signatures can be seen e.g. in the statement from the cell in Renče. The first to sign the statement was the cell's secretary. Underneath his signature, which is on the right-hand side of the sheet, they wrote the word *Člani* (members) on the left and made signature lines underneath using a typewriter. However, there were not enough lines. The members signed all the lines then ran out of space, so they signed in a new column to the right of the first one. A few lines have been left blank, though. Perhaps the people signing did not like the relatively narrow space for their signatures, or the first few assumed that they had to leave a line empty for greater legibility. Namely, only the lines two, four and six are empty. Twenty-one members signed this page, and twenty more the back of it. Signature lines are also given on the second page. That page contains only one "mistake" – a person signed on the same line as the one before him.⁶

3 Drnovšek, *Zapisniki politbiroja CK KPS/ZKS, 1945-1954*, p. 9.

4 Hribar, Janez, *Enciklopedija Slovenije*. In the government appointed on 5 May 1945, Hribar acted as the minister of agriculture. From August 1947 onward he was a minister without portfolio and the chairman of the commission for cooperatives in the government of the People's Republic of Slovenia. *Uradni list Ljudske republike Slovenije*, Year IV, No 35, August 23 1947, notice number 198.

5 Drnovšek, *Zapisniki politbiroja CK KPS/ZKS, 1945-1954*, p. 102.

6 Krajevna celica KPS Renče, CENTRALNEMU KOMITETU KOMUNISTIČNE PARTIJE JUGOSLAVIJE BEOGRAD, Renče dne 24 maja 1948 in Centralnemu komitetu K.P.J. Beograd, Dne 16-5-1948 (letter from the Kal-Koritnica cell). SI AS 1589 Centralni komite Komunistične partije Slovenije, box 6.

Company cells were active in all sectors of the economy. In large companies, cells could be organised by individual plants and then hierarchically upgraded to a sort of company party leadership. In the case of construction companies, cells could also be organised by work sites. Cells were present in the industry, cooperatives, commerce, the education system, and administration. Cells in secondary schools could also have students as their members.

I used both boxes kept by the Archives of the Republic of Slovenia to analyse the statements from cells.⁷ The boxes are a part of the Central Committee of the CPS fonds. The inventory is not entirely accurate and the boxes were not that easy to find. Each box contains a folder with sheets containing statements from party cells. In total, the two boxes contain just over 1,850 statements from party cells.

There is too much material in the boxes and it would be sensible to divide it into three boxes. The material is in a relatively good condition, mostly tear-free; however, some of the sheets are folded because of the format. A few effects of their age and of the used type of paper and ink are noticeable. These elements can help us determine what kind of paper was used (format, thickness) and what kind of ink. As regards the contents of the statements, let me mention the most common elements that can be analysed. In general, the statements have three substantive parts. The introductory part contains the recipient's address and/or the document title. Usually, the name of the addressee was written on the statement and sometimes also the title of the document. Only exceptionally was the date dropped; it was usually written at the beginning of the statements, sometimes also in the introductory sentence. The body of the statement explains the reasons for the meeting, the cell's decision regarding the commission's report on Hebrang and Žujović, the cell's attitude towards the sentence, its attitude towards party discipline and the cell's promises. The promises are also sometimes included in the final part of the document or combined with the salutations. The final part of the document consists of salutations and various signatures.

Different types of paper were used for the statements. Most often, white A4 sheets were used. More than seventy years later, it is difficult to assess the whiteness of the paper, for even the quality of first-rate, pure and white paper can diminish simply because a lot of time has passed. The so-called lengthened A4 format is not that rare. It was a paper format slightly longer than the current standard A4 format and was the most commonly used paper format in Europe before the introduction of today's standards. The sheets of this format could be loose or in the form of folded sheets. Some of the folded sheets are most likely letter writing paper, based on their size and shape. The limited access to paper is also evident from the statements written on ruled sheets, for which we can reasonably deduce that they had been torn out of notebooks.⁸ It was most

7 SI AS 1589 Centralni komite Komunistične partije Slovenije A.E, 296, boxes 6 and 7.

8 Člani celice Notr. gorice, SI AS 1589 Centralni komite Komunistične partije Slovenije, box 6.

likely the only type of paper they had. The statements were also written on white paper of smaller formats, e.g. A5, and on non-standard formats. All of the above-mentioned types of paper are either blank, ruled or squared. A special type of blank sheets was that with pre-printed headers. The pre-printed sheets contain the names of institutions, such as DISTRICT COMMITTEE OF CPS Trbovlje, TOWN COMMITTEE OF CPS MARIBOR or LOCAL UNION COUNCIL CELJE⁹. All three examples have a pre-printed name of the institution, the name of the place, and a space for the date. The text on the forms from Trbovlje and Celje is red, while the one on the form from Maribor is black. The Trbovlje form does not have a logotype, while the Maribor form has the CP logotype, a red star with a white hammer and sickle within the star. The document from Celje bears the union emblem in red.

The statements were written by hand or typed on a typewriter. In box six, the ratio between the handwritten and typed statements is roughly 40:60. The same holds true for box seven. The handwritten statements are sometimes written in the awkward handwriting of someone not used to writing.¹⁰ The aforementioned statement from the village of Poletiči has two sheets. It seems that one of the two is in fact an unfinished beginning of a statement. Only the name of the addressee is written on the second sheet; this time the initials are "K.P.S." (CPS), but on the sheet on which the statement is written, the initials are "K.P." The sheet without a statement contains the date of the statement, which the sheet with the statement does not. The handwriting is very awkward; the writer was unable to write in a straight line on a blank sheet. The text is also linguistically poor; letters are missing from certain words, and capital letters are used inaccurately.

The text is written in pencil. Handwritten statements were often written in pencil. Pens were also used. The exact opposite of the statements described above are those in which the writer made an effort and attempted to highlight the text's meaning with its form. Such handwriting is not only legible, it actually borders on calligraphy¹¹. Ink colours must have varied because this is noticeable in the preserved material. Of course, we must take into account that a specific type of ink may have changed its hue due to external influences. The current condition of the various inks indicates that the handwritten statements were written in black, blue, red, violet and green. A few examples have been preserved where it seems that dual hues were used, namely greenish blue and greenish black. There are two possible reasons for this. Perhaps two inks were mixed; the first ink ran out and was replaced by an ink of a different colour. Another reason could be

9 OKRAJNI KOMITET KPS TRBOVLJE, Centralnemu komitetu KPS Ljubljana, Trbovlje, 22. maja 1948, MESTNI KOMITETT KPS MARIBOR, DRAGI NAŠ TOVARIŠ TITO!, Maribor, 26. maj 1948 in KRAJEVNI SINDIKALNI SVET CELJE, CENTRALNEMU KOMITETU KP JUGOSLAVIJE BEOGRAD, Celje, dne 19. maja 1948. SI AS 1589 Centralni komite Komunistične partije Slovenije, box 6.

10 Celica K.P. vas Polotiči okraj Sežana. SI AS 1589 Centralni komite Komunistične partije Slovenije, box 7.

11 Centralnemu komitetu K.P.J., Beograd, Bosljiva loka, dne 17. maja 1948. SI AS 1589 Centralni komite Komunistične partije Slovenije, box 7.

chemical changes that affected the inks after 1948. In addition to pens and various inks, pencils were also used and at least two types of coloured pencils at that – blue and red/violet. The latter was in fact quite commonly used. This pencil was blue on one end and red or violet on the other. In the handwritten statements there are no major differences between the texts of the statements and the signatures.

The typed statements reveal the various conditions of the typewriters used. Many typewriters had a worn-out ink ribbon, which is why the impression is very pale. Since there was a shortage, people were allowed to use ribbons of different colours, which is why quite a few statements are typed, for example, in red. The linguistic suitability of typewriters also varied. Many of them did not have the special letters of the Slovene alphabet. There are two possible explanations for this. If a territory had been part of Italy before the war, then they might have used old, pre-war typewriters. Namely, the Italian ones did not have special Slovene letters. Nor did the typewriters from the German occupation zones. But they did find a typewriter or two somewhere that dated back to the pre-war Yugoslavia and were linguistically suitable. The use of typewriters without Slovene letters is easily noticed. If carons were added to the letters c, s and z in a typed statement, then one of those typewriters was used. Of course, there are also statements that were typed using such typewriters, but no carons were added.

The preserved material from the Politburo and the Central Committee of the Communist Party contains no instructions to party cells to give their support to the measures taken against Hebrang and Žujović. I have inferred the existence of such an instruction from a letter sent by the District Committee of CPS Trbovlje to the Central Committee of CPY. This district committee sent the Central Committee 70 reports in support of the resolution adopted by the party cells in the district.

“Enclosed is the material regarding the expulsion from the Party of Comrade A. Hebrang and S. Žujević, which was given to the District Committee of CPS to be studied by the cells. We are returning the material from numbers 25626 to 25655, inclusive.

Also enclosed are 70 resolutions, prepared by the cells where the members were given interpretations of the decisions of the Politburo of the CC CPY. Please confirm the receipt of this material.”¹²

These statements were made after 9 May 1948. The oldest one is dated the following day. It was written at the Hrastnik glassworks.¹³ Most of the statements are from

12 OKRAJNI KOMITETE KPS TRBOVLJE, Trbovlje, dne 22. maj 1948. SI AS 1589 Centralni komite Komunistične partije Slovenije, box 6.

13 Centralnemu komitetu K.P.J. Beograd, Hrastnik, dne 10.5.1948. SI AS 1589 Centralni komite Komunistične partije Slovenije, box 6.

May 1948, and a few from the first days of June. The meetings at which they read the decision regarding the expulsion and debated it were held every day of the week, including Sundays. In a few statements, the time of the meeting is also given. One such example is the statement from the Dob cell, whose introductory sentence mentions that they convened for a special meeting on 16 May 1948 at 9 a.m. on the premises of the Local People's Committee. The meeting was easily held at 9 a.m. because it was a Sunday.¹⁴ On working days the meetings were usually held in the afternoon, outside working hours.

The statement usually ended with a salutation and signature. I have already said a few words about signatures in the paragraph on ink and writing. The signature was usually that of the cell's secretary. Usually it was only a signature; only rarely was the secretary's name typed next to it or written in another way. If the statement was a joint statement from several cells, usually all of the secretaries signed it. Some of the signatures are easily legible, while some make it impossible to decipher the signatory's name or, even more often, the surname. As has already been mentioned, the statements could also be signed by all the present members of the cell. Sometimes there are only a few signatures, often fewer than ten in the statements from the countryside. An exact opposite is e.g. the statement from the local cell in Renče, which I have already mentioned,¹⁵ and the statement from the Communists of the Department of Mining probably at a school (we cannot recognize the name) in Ljubljana¹⁶. The former was signed by 41 members and the latter by 32. No secretary signed the second statement. On the first page, the statement ends with the salutation "Smrt fašizmu – svoboda narodu" (Death to Fascism – Freedom to the People) and a sort of signature "Komunisti rudarskega oddelka na FŠŠ v Ljubljani" (Communists of the Department of Mining at the ... in Ljubljana). On the second page containing the signatures, none of them mention the function of cell secretary.

A peculiarity of these two statements is their form. They are not written as the minutes of a meeting, but as a letter from a party cell to a higher-ranking body. This is corroborated by the beginning of the document, in which they wrote the addressee, and by the conclusion, where they added salutations. In most documents the addressee was the Central Committee of the CPY. However, the ways the addressee is written vary greatly. The words "Centralni komitet" (Central Committee) was sometimes written in the usual way, i.e. "Centralni" in upper case and "komitet" in lower case. It is not that rare for both words to be written in upper case. This most likely has to do with the

14 Celica KPS Okraj Kamnik, Dob, 16.V. 1948. SI AS 1589 Centralni komite Komunistične partije Slovenije, box 6.

15 Krajevna celica KPS Renče, CENTRALNEMU KOMITETU KOMUNISTIČNE PARTIJE JUGOSLAVIJE BEOGRAD, Renče dne 24 maja 1948. SI AS 1589 Centralni komite Komunistične partije Slovenije, box 6.

16 Resolucija. Centralnemu komitetu KPJ Beograd. Ljubljana, 21. V. 1948. SI AS 1589 Centralni komite Komunistične partije Slovenije, box 6.

writers' desire to demonstrate the importance of the document. The writers of the minutes sometimes resorted to using the acronym "CK" (CC). The acronym "KPJ" (CPY) is written in several ways, most often as "KPJ", though sometimes they wrote a full stop after each letter ("K.P.J."). Belgrade is also frequently mentioned as the head office of the body addressed. If the writers of the statement were not satisfied with merely addressing the Central Committee, they also added the word "resolucija" (resolution). That word was also written in different ways. In the typed statements the word "resolucija" is written as e.g. *Resolucija*, *RESOLUCIJA*, *RESOLUCIJA*. The word "Resolucija" was usually followed by the words "Centralnemu komitetu KPJ" (To the Central Committee of the CPY), again written in different ways. A special way of addressing can be seen in the statement prepared by the Vir cell. As we can see, they began with the introductory sentence, in which they mentioned the addressee, the reason for preparing the statement, and only afterwards wrote that they were adopting the resolution.

"CPS Cell Vir pri Domžalah.

Vir, on 19 May 1948,

At this special meeting, in light of the presented actions against the state and plotting from members of CC CPY, we, members of the CPS Cell Vir pri Domžalah, the members gathered (in the field), propose the following

RESOLUTION!¹⁷

Even more interesting is the salutation, which was only exceptionally left out. In fact, there are roughly three types of salutations. In the first group are salutations that can be recognised as such by their form or usage. In the second group are salutations in the form of exclamations, such as "Naj živi..." (Long live ...) or the word "pozdrav" (salute) with the prefix "Tovariški" (comrade), and the like. In the third group are salutations that look more like promises or oaths. This last type can be supplemented by oaths and promises given in the body of the statement. There are also examples when a promise or oath is mentioned only at the bottom as a salutation. Among rather standard salutations is the salutation "Smrt fašizmu – Svoboda narodu" (Death to Fascism – Freedom to the People), which was already in use during World War II.¹⁸ This salutation could be written in many ways. The first two words were always the same, but the last two could be spelled "Svobodo narodu". This salutation often ended with an exclamation mark. Sometimes it was shortened to "SF – SN". Another comparable expression is "borben pozdrav" (a fighting salute). This one can also be found in the bodies of statements.

17 KPS Celica Vir pri Domžalah. Vir, dne 19. maja 1948. SI AS 1589 Centralni komite Komunistične partije Slovenije, box 6.

18 „Smrt fašizmu - sloboda narodu!"; Hladnik - Milharčič, „Alojz Kajin“.

Various phrases were added to the salutation "Naj živi" (Long live) or "Živel" (Hail). The phrases were mostly connected with Tito and the (CC) (Politburo) of the CPY. The salutation to Tito was either a simple "Naj živi tovariš Tito" (Long live Comrade Tito), in which the name Tito was often spelled in upper case or in upper case and spaced. Of course, such a salutation could be longer and more detailed. It could praise Tito's leadership skills e.g. "Živel naš voditelj tov. maršal Tito" (Hail our leader Comrade Marshal Tito)¹⁹, *NAJ ŽIVI NAŠ VELIKI VODITELJ Tov. T I T O SEKRETAR CENTRALNEGA KOMITETA KPJ JUGOSLAVIJE!* (LONG LIVE OUR GREAT LEADER Comrade T I T O SECRETARY OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE CP OF YUGOSLAVIA!)²⁰ "Naj živi Centralni Komitet in Komunistična Partija Jugoslavije pod modrim vodstvom in borcem za pravice delovnega ljudstva MARŠAL TITO" (Long live the Central Committee and the Communist Party of Yugoslavia under the wise leadership of the fighter for the rights of the working people MARSHAL TITO)²¹. Tito was hailed as a teacher, e.g. "Naj živi Maršal Tito buditelj in učitelj jugoslovanskih narodov" (Long live Marshal Tito, the awakener and teacher of Yugoslav nations), "Naj živi naš vodja in učitelj tvorec vseh naših zmag maršal Jugoslavije tovariš T I T O" (Long live our leader and teacher, the author of all our victories, the Marshal of Yugoslavia, Comrade T I T O), and "Naj živi močna in monolitna K.P. Jugoslavije, ki nas neomajno vodi v socializem" (Long live the strong and monolithic CP of Yugoslavia, which is leading us steadfastly towards socialism)²². Tito was hailed as a comrade in arms, e.g. *Z Titom v borbi – z Titom v miru* (With Tito in battle – with Tito in peace) – the original text contains some spelling mistakes.²³ Let me mention a linguistic peculiarity in the statements from the Primorska region, namely the frequent use of the word *segretar* instead of *sekretar* (meaning "secretary"). This spelling was of course influenced by the Italian word for this function. The word was also used in salutations, e.g. "Naj živi Segretar KPJ Maršal Tito" (Long live the Secretary of the CPY Marshal Tito)²⁴. Some of the cells were quite harsh and direct in their statements, and some in the salutations,

19 RESOLUCIJA, CENTRALNEMU KOMITETU KOMUNISTIČNE PARTIJE V BEOGRADU., LJUBLJANA 20. MAJA 1948. SI AS 1589 Centralni komite Komunistične partije Slovenije, box 6. The original contains the misspelled word "vodotel" instead of "voditelj" (leader). The statement was sent by the cell at the cannery in Vič, Ljubljana.

20 CENTRALNEMU KOMITETU KPJ BEOGRAD. DUPLICA, DNE 17. MAJA 1948. SI AS 1589 Centralni komite Komunistične partije Slovenije, box 6.

21 Partijska celica : Sekcija za zveze in varnostne naprave, Ljubljana - Šiška. SI AS 1589 Centralni komite Komunistične partije Slovenije, box 6.

22 Celica baza za repatricijo izseljencev - Kamnik, Kamnik, dne 21. V. 1948. SI AS 1589 Centralni komite Komunistične partije Slovenije, box 6. The last two salutations are two out of four in the same statement. Also added were "Naj živi C.K.K.P.J.!" (Long live CC CPY!) and "Smrt fašizmu - svobodo narodu!" (Death to Fascism - Freedom to the People!).

23 AKTIV KOMUNISTOV UPRAVE NM za gl. mesto LJUBLJANA. Ljubljana, 24. maja 1948. SI AS 1589 Centralni komite Komunistične partije Slovenije, box 6.

24 Krajevna celica Vrhovlje, Vrhovlje 1. VI. 1948. SI AS 1589 Centralni komite Komunistične partije Slovenije, box 6.

as well. The cell in Križe concluded its resolution, addressed to the Central Committee of the CPY with a misprint (“Centralni kometet KPJ”), with two salutations. In the first it called for “SMRT VSEM SOVRAŽNIKOM NAŠE PARTIJE, ARMIIJE IN NARODA!” (DEATH TO ALL ENEMIES OF OUR PARTY, ARMY AND NATION!). Then it greeted the CC CPY and Tito with “ŽIVEL CENTRALNI KOMITE KOMUNISTIČNE PARTIJE JUGOSLAVIJE NA ČELU S TOVARIŠEM TITOM!” (HAIL THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF YUGOSLAVIA, LED BY COMRADE TITO!).²⁵ In salutations, they also mentioned the path towards socialism under party leadership, class struggle, the five-year plan, the FPRY, and glorified labour with “Delu čast in oblast!” (Honour and Power to Labour!).²⁶ I will mention three more salutations. The first one is interesting due to the political circumstances at the time. The relations between the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia were no longer idyllic, which is why the salutation “Naj živi velika partija Lenina - Stalina! (Long live the great party of Lenin - Stalin!)”²⁷ from late May 1948 is interesting. Such expressions are rare in the analysed statements. Another statement is an interesting rare example of party members greeting the party commission that wrote the report on Hebrang and Žujović. Members of the cell in the village of Brestje in the region of Goriška Brda wrote four “Naj živi” (Long live) salutations. The first three are reserved for Marshal Tito, the party and the committee (they probably forgot to write the word “Centralni/Central” in front of “committee”). The last salutation goes: “Naj živi raziskovalna komisija, saboterjev in omadezevalcev KP!” (Long live the research commission into saboteurs and tarnishers of the CP!) – in the original, the carons on the letter ž are missing.²⁸

The third example are salutations which mention death. The Breginj cell concluded its statement with three salutations. The first is “Smrt saboterjem in izmečkom našega naroda!” (Death to the saboteurs and dregs of our nation!). This is followed by two more salutations: “Naj živi naša KP pod trdnim vodstvom maršala Tita!” (Long live our CP under the firm leadership of Marshal Tito!) and the rare “Naj živi FLRJ pod vodstvom naše slavne KP!” (Long live the FPRY under the leadership of our glorious CP!).²⁹ Two similar salutations are “Smrt saboterjem!” (Death to saboteurs!)³⁰ and the salutation

25 CENTRALNEMU KOMETETU K.P.J. Beograd. Križe 22. maja 1948. SI AS 1589 Centralni komite Komunistične partije Slovenije, box 6.

26 CENTRALNEMU KOMITETU KPJ. BEOGRAD. Ljubljana, 20. maja 1948. SI AS 1589 Centralni komite Komunistične partije Slovenije, box 6. A statement from the cell of the Secretariat Group of the Directorate-General for the Exploitation of Railways Ljubljana.

27 Celica : Tovarna dek. tkanin Ljubljana. Ljubljana, dne 20. V. 1948. SI AS 1589 Centralni komite Komunistične partije Slovenije, box 6.

28 Resolucija. SI AS 1589 Centralni komite Komunistične partije Slovenije, box 6. The date of the meeting, 6 June 1948, is written in the first sentence of the resolution. The typewriter did not have letters with carons.

29 Partijska celica Breginj, dne 20. maja 1948. SI AS 1589 Centralni komite Komunistične partije Slovenije, box 6.

30 Krajevna celica K.P.S. Vrhpolje 3.6.1948. SI AS 1589 Centralni komite Komunistične partije Slovenije, box 6.

from the Križe cell, calling for death of opponents of the Party, army and the nation, which has already been mentioned.

In a way, these salutations showed the writers' resourcefulness. They used the salutations to emphasise their resolve or to show that they were truly on the right path.

The statements from cells differ in contents and in the intensity of the expressions used. The length of the text is also connected with this. Some statements contain only a few lines. One such example is the statement from the local party cell in Radomlje, a smaller town in the vicinity of Ljubljana. They summed up their agreement with the decision of the Central Committee of the CPY in three lines. On the other hand, there is another statement two pages long. The Cerovo local cell wrote a two-page statement by hand. Had it been typed, it would probably take up only one page; however, there are also typed statements that are two pages long.

Linguistic mistakes have already been mentioned. They indicate, among other things, the different levels of education among party members. Those with primary education, who performed various types of manual labour, were surely less skilled in linguistic expression, because they rarely expressed themselves in writing. A few linguistic mistakes or peculiarities have also been encountered.

The first peculiarity or awkwardness, or perhaps even a lack of knowledge of the Croatian or Serbian language, can be seen in the spelling of names. Generally, there are three mistakes. Other kinds of mistakes encountered were mainly misprints. The most common mistake is incorrectly writing the surname Žujevič instead of Žujović. Not only was Žujović's last name changed, but so was his first name. Thus Sreten became Sretan. The name Sreten is said to originate from the word *sretan* = happy, which means that the meaning of Žujović's name was not changed. This mistake surely did not occur because of their knowledge of the etymology of the name Sreten, but because of carelessness or unfamiliarity with the name in the Slovene environment. Hebrang's name was also changed. Instead of the Croatian Andrija he became the Slovene Andrej. Interestingly, in some places they altered the surname Hebrang. In Žujović's case they changed one letter, but in Hebrang's case they added one. The spelling Hembrang is not that rare. The cell from the Straža factory wrote its resolution by hand and wrote both surnames in the title, making a mistake in both of them. They turned Hebrang into Hembrang and Žujović into Žujevič.³¹ In its statement, the cell from the Novo Mesto people's town committee mentioned both men in two sentences by their first and last names. They are written the same in both cases, but awkwardly, entirely incorrectly. The first and last names are both wrong. Andrija Hebrang became Adria Hebran and Sreten Žujović became Žujevič Sretan. As we can see, they arranged the first and last names unusually. They used the correct sequence of the first name, followed by the last

31 Resolucija o zadevi Hembrang - Žujevič. Straža, dne 19. V. 1948. SI AS 1589 Centralni komite Komunistične partije Slovenije, box 6.

name in the case of Hebrang, but immediately afterwards the incorrect sequence of the last name, followed by the first name in the case of Žujović.³² There is even an example where the surname Hebrang is written several times in a single statement in different ways. As for the surname Žujović, they did not bother with the letter ć. Usually they simply wrote Žujovič.

In statements from places that were part of Italy before the war, we see the Italian-sounding word *segretar* instead of the Slovene *sekretar*. The various spellings found in titles and salutations that are linguistic mistakes were intentional. This includes, for example, writing in upper case, with which they wanted to highlight a title or salutation, or an exclamation within a salutation.

The statements are of various lengths, which means that they used either many or fewer words to agree with the mistakes made by Hebrang and Žujović. The cells either simply stated that they agree with the condemnation of their mistakes, or they also enumerated those mistakes. In such cases they added statements that corroborated their attitude and wrote that they unanimously condemn the criminal acts, “We strongly condemn Hebrang’s chauvinistic acts with which he intended to break up the brotherhood and unity of our Yugoslav nations.”³³ They condemned libelling Tito³⁴, “the criminal acts against the Party and state.”³⁵ Sometimes, their condemnation was not enough, so they took it a step further and wrote “in disgust, we condemn anti-party actions.”³⁶ When agreeing with the decision, they also wrote down their various opinions. They pointed out the battle for socialism, the attainment of the five-year plan, economic development, brotherhood and unity, many victims of the war, the desecration of war victims, and great efforts towards economic development. They expressed their disagreement with factionists, even mentioning Trotskyist factionists,³⁷ with anti-party actions and ambition; and they acknowledged the purity of the Party. They expressed their contempt, saying that such bad actions could only be performed by someone more interested in personal gain than in the benefit of the community. Some cells even resorted to pointing out the special nature of the Yugoslav Party. Members of the cell at Ljudska prosveta Slovenije (People’s Education Society of Slovenia) sent the CC CPY “expressions of their firm belief in the correctness of the political line led by the CC CPY based on

32 Celica Mestnega L.O. Novo mesto, Dne 17.V. 1948. SI AS 1589 Centralni komite Komunistične partije Slovenije, box 6.

33 Celica Podgrad, dne 18.5.1948. SI AS 1589 Centralni komite Komunistične partije Slovenije, box 6.

34 Centralnemu komitetu Komunistične partije Jugoslavije. V Novem mestu, 17. V. 1948. SI AS 1589 Centralni komite Komunistične partije Slovenije, box 6.

35 Partijska celica KPJ Bršljin - Novo mesto. Bršljin 17.V. 1948. SI AS 1589 Centralni komite Komunistične partije Slovenije, box 6.

36 Celica Jama Hrastnik, Hrastnik, 18. 5.1948, SI AS 1589 Centralni komite Komunistične partije Slovenije, box 6.

37 Celica okrožnega inšpeltorata kontrolne komisije, Novo mesto. SI AS 1589 Centralni komite Komunistične partije Slovenije, box 6.

a Leninist analysis of the specific nature of the historical and social conditions of the nations of Yugoslavia, and on the awareness of the active role of Tito's Yugoslavia in the struggle for peace and a powerful people's democracy in the world, led by the world's working masses under the leadership of the great SU."³⁸ Many were unable to compose such sentences, yet there were quite a few who resorted to such communist phraseology.

An important element of the statements were the various promises given by the cells. The most common promise was that of vigilance in their own ranks, in order to prevent the appearance of similar elements and destroyers, like Hebrang and Žujović; of making sure the Party lines stay pure; of strengthening democracy; of educating themselves ideologically; of staying vigilant; of defending the achievements of the National Liberation Struggle; and of fighting against idleness. They substantiated their promises by giving "a solemn Party pledge to steadily walk the line led by the Central Committee of the CPY and to not allow anyone to dishonour our guide, the Communist Party."³⁹ Sometimes, the contents of the promise were more detailed, which mostly depended on the environment in which the cell operated. Companies pledged to invest all their efforts into realising the five-year plans and similar economic goals. "We undertake to further strengthen our ranks and to increase our vigilance against all who would harm or hinder the implementation of our five-year plan. /.../ and we undertake to consistently fight for the quick attainment of socialism."⁴⁰ Educational workers from Zagorje ob Savi wrote the following: "As educational workers we will dedicate all our future efforts to raising the cultural level of our people."⁴¹ Members of the CPS cell at Ljudska prosveta Slovenije wrote the following: "We are aware of the urgent task of Ljudska prosveta Slovenije in view of the heavy burden of clerical, social democratic and other reactionary residues that serve the imperialist agencies beyond the nearby borders as bases for the battle against the building of socialism and a socialist culture in our parts. We are aware of the delicate nature of our ideological front, of the great damage that would be caused by straying from the right path of our Party, by any opportunism, by any weakening of the unity of the Liberation Front right here, on the ideological front. We therefore pledge to invest all our efforts into building our ideology; all our efforts into the battle for great ideological purity and quality of the people's education in Slovenia."⁴² The cell of the

38 Celica KPS pri ustanovi Ljudska prosveta Slovenije. Ljubljana, dne 25. 5. 1948. SI AS 1589 Centralni komite Komunistične partije Slovenije, box 6. In the header the members of the cell felt it was important to mention that the cell had 5 members and that 4 were present at the meeting.

39 Centralnemu komitetu Komunistične Partije Jugoslavije, Novo mesto, dne 17. V. 1948 SI AS 1589 Centralni komite Komunistične partije Slovenije, box 6. A statement from the members of the cell at the District Committee of CPS Novo mesto.

40 CELICA KPS JUGOPETROL-LJUBLJANA. RESOLUCIJA CENTRALNEMU KOMITEJU KOMUNISTIČNE PARTIJE JUGOSLAVIJE. SI AS 1589 Centralni komite Komunistične partije Slovenije, box 6.

41 CENTRALNEMU KOMITETU KOMUNISTIČNE PARTIJE JUGOSLAVIJE. SI AS 1589 Centralni komite Komunistične partije Slovenije, box 6. A statement from the cell of educational workers from Zagorje ob Savi.

42 Celica KPS pri ustanovi Ljudska prosveta Slovenije. Ljubljana, dne 25. 5. 1948 SI AS 1589 Centralni komite Komunistične partije Slovenije, box 6.

joiner's cooperative Št. Vid pri Vipavi imbued its statement with a simple pedagogical element of the home or family environment. The purpose of punishment is to convince the offender that making mistakes does not pay. "The cell fully agrees that the aforementioned comrades are severely punished so they would no longer want to eat away at the healthy roots that have reached their goal in such an exhausted state."⁴³

Such expressions of opinion were often intertwined with statements regarding the sentence proposed for Hebrang and Žujović. As for their opinions on the type and degree of punishment, roughly two kinds can be observed. The first option was to include substantive mentions of their culpability in the statement, repeating the contents of the commission's report. Based on their personal beliefs, they also added some of the things mentioned in the examples above.

Lastly, let me point out an element which undoubtedly reflects the zeitgeist: how the party cells stated their opinions on the sentence. Some cells felt it was enough to write that Hebrang and Žujović should be expelled, while others took it a step further by expressing their enthusiasm for the proposal. "We strongly condemn their anti-Party actions and enthusiastically welcome the proposal of the party commission and the decision of the Politburo of CC CPY to expel the two harmful elements from the Party."⁴⁴ About half of the cells were not satisfied with their expulsion; instead they proposed that they be handed over to the people's court. Certain statements show that people did not fully understand the structure of the judicial system. For instance, the cell at the factory of musical instruments in Mengeš proposed that they be handed over to the Supreme Court and not to a court of first instance.⁴⁵ As for the sentence, they all expected that it would be just. Of course, it is impossible to determine what they considered a just sentence. In some statements, it can be inferred that a just sentence is a sentence in accordance with the law. When stating their opinion on the severity of the sentence, most of them only mention a severe sentence or a sentence in accordance with the law. Quite often, they wrote that they should be punished as severely as the law allows. They added that such criminals deserved such punishment. Hebrang and Žujović were also called by other names, often as the dregs of the Party or the dregs of the nation. "We demand that such elements be punished with the severest sentence, so our Party will remain pure and free of the dregs of the nation."⁴⁶ The statement from the Vrhpolje-Duplje cell also contained thoughts on a Communist as a person with high moral standards. Whoever violates those standards should be punished more severely. "Even though a true

43 Celica KPS mizarske zadruge Št. Vid pri Vipavi. Št. Vid, 7. junij 1948. SI AS 1589 Centralni komite Komunistične partije Slovenije, box 6.

44 Centralnemu komitetu KPJ Beograd. Dole, 18. 5. 1948. SI AS 1589 Centralni komite Komunistične partije Slovenije, box 6.

45 Celica KP TOVARNA GLASBIL MENGEŠ. Mengeš, dne 20./5. 1948. SI AS 1589 Centralni komite Komunistične partije Slovenije, box 6.

46 Partijska celica Breginj, dne 20. maja 1948. SI AS 1589 Centralni komite Komunistične partije Slovenije, box 6.

Communist would be punished enough by expulsion alone, we do not consider it sufficient in this case because we do not consider people working against the CP, i.e. against our people's government, i.e. against the entire internal structure, to be true Communists. We consider such people to be the worst criminals and therefore demand the most severe sentence for them."⁴⁷ In some cases they even demanded that they be punished most severely, by death. They demanded the death penalty with surprising ease. This is interesting because not that long ago death was virtually everywhere. Namely, only three years had passed since the end of World War II. On the other hand, at that time people expected determination and strictness. What better way to demonstrate your orthodoxy than by giving the most radical statements, which were to prove the decisiveness of the members and their support for the leadership. The cell from Kozana wrote that it would not allow a mild sentence to be imposed on them, and that they deserved to die for their actions. In their opinion, all the citizens of the FPRY should demand the same.⁴⁸ Not many cells demanded the death penalty in their statements explicitly. However, we have no way of knowing what many of the cells meant in their statements when they wrote that they should be punished most severely. The most severe sentence could, of course, mean the death penalty, or merely the longest possible prison sentence.

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48 CENTRALNEMU KOMITETU KOMUNISTIČNE PARTIJE JUGOSLAVIJE. KRAJEVNA CELICA KOZANA DNE 28. MAJA 1948. SI AS 1589 Centralni komite Komunistične partije Slovenije, box 6.

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Uradni list Ljudske republike Slovenije.

Summary

Bojan Balkovec

Statements about Žujović and Hebrang from Party Cells

The CC CPS fonds at the Archives of the Republic of Slovenia contains two boxes with approximately 1850 statements from party cells regarding the Hebrang and Žujović affair. In their statements, the party cells supported the decision regarding the expulsion of Hebrang and Žujović from the Party. The statements were either typed or written by hand on different types of paper and in different inks or pencils. Some of the statements are brief and merely sum up the Party's resolution. The statements often abound in phrases and sentences with which the cells substantiated them. Such substantiations are undoubtedly connected with the desire to prove their orthodoxy. When giving their opinions on the punishment, a great number of statements also demand a court sentence; in some cases, explicitly the death penalty.

Martin Previšić

The 1948 Split and a New Round of Factional Struggles within the Communist Party of Yugoslavia: Parallel Biographies and Histories

The split between Yugoslavia and the USSR gave rise to a number of changes in almost every segment of the country, starting with a whole range of political, ideological and economic reforms. Motivated by the conflict, Yugoslav communists sought new ideological pathways to respond to the challenge from Moscow, promoting the workers' self-management system as their unique and innovative ideological alternative. On the domestic front, processes were launched to politically and economically decentralize the state and efforts were invested into the weakening of the Party's role and redefining of the Soviet model and influence in general. As regards its foreign-policy agenda, Yugoslavia began to look into ways of cautiously keeping a balance between the blocks and securing its position among the decolonized Third World countries (the Non-Aligned Movement).

At the same time, the Tito-Stalin conflict also provoked dramatic changes within the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (CPY). The break with Moscow induced factional strifes and large-scale purges of Party members who sided with the Cominform Resolution, i.e. the criticism from Moscow. As a result, in the period from 1948 to 1956, when the conflict ended, a total of 15,737 individuals were arrested and incarcerated in prisoner camps, 400 of whom succumbed to various diseases, maltreatment, beatings, etc.¹ Over this period, the Yugoslav secret police registered 55,663 supporters of Stalin (the Cominformists).² They were interned in a number of camps established all over the country, most of them (13,000 or almost $\frac{3}{4}$ of the total number) on Goli Otok (Barren Island) in the North Adriatic, where they were subjected to a brutal process of political

1 Previšić, *Broj kažnjenika*, p. 180.

2 Radonjić, *Izgubljena orijentacija*, p. 73.

re-education. The latter included forcing inmates to beat each other, snitch on real or alleged Stalin's supporters among them, exposure to hard labour, malnutrition, sleep deprivation, and other forms of mental and physical torture.³

The purge of Stalin's supporters was carried out in specific and extremely complex circumstances. Therefore, its roots should be searched for in more than one place. The great diplomatic, economic and ideological pressure combined with the war psychosis, radicalized the atmosphere in Yugoslavia, which paved the way for an extensive and relatively indiscriminate campaign of arrests of Stalin's supporters. Anyway, the Stalinist attitude of Yugoslav communists, who had been the most rigid followers of the Soviet model in the postwar period, resulted in an adamant and non-selective approach to every opposition within the Party in 1948, when the conflict broke out. During and after the conflict with Stalin, the CPY was trying hard to make all arrested and interned Cominformists look like a homogeneous anti-state group whose common denominator was radical and unconditional support to Stalin with the ultimate goal of seizing power from Tito and his followers. Moreover, they were labeled with all kinds of difamatory names, such as spies, traitors, careerists and the like.⁴ In Yugoslavia, such perception of the Cominformists lasted up until the 1980s, when the real nature and motivation, if any, of the persons commonly known as Stalin's supporters slowly emerged through fictional and nonfictional prose, and after the dissolution of the country, it was finally subjected to historiographic analyses.

Analyses of the documentation held by the Yugoslav state security and the testimonies of former prisoners showed that the Cominformists were actually a very heterogeneous group, consisting not only of those who supported Stalin and the Informburo Resolution, but also of the people who just had some questions or voiced disagreement with some of the points set out in the Resolution. Some of them opposed the idea of collectivization, others were simply confused communists unaware of the sudden clash which made them question what was going on (the wider CPY membership knew nothing about the Resolution until 28 June 1948, when it was publicly disclosed). Then there were Russophiles, those dissatisfied with the economic state of the country, supporters of the North Korean (i.e. Chinese and Soviet) side in the Korean war, and many absolutely innocent and randomly chosen individuals.⁵ The extent and dynamic of arrests of IB (Informbureau/Cominform) members had its own logic, based on a variety of ideological factors, those related to foreign policy and even the military. The number of arrests started rising in February 1949 and they went on until 1951.⁶ Although the proclamation of the Informbureau/Cominform Resolution marks the formal beginning

3 Previšić, *Broj kažnjenika*, p. 192.

4 Banac, *Sa Staljinom*, p. 145.

5 Banac, *Sa Staljinom*, pp. 145-163; Bilić, *Goli otok*, pp. 217-227.

6 Previšić, *Povijest Golog otoka*, p. 463.

of the conflict with Stalin, it took another six months for the Yugoslavs to realize that the break was not just a mere dispute between them and the Soviets, which could be easily averted or resolved. At the Plenary Session of the CPY CC (Central Committee) held in February 1949 in response to the Resolution, it became clear that the Soviets intensified the pressure against Yugoslavia.

In addition to the ideological disqualifications, which had until then been their strongest means of pressure, the Soviets now resorted to an economic blockade as a new step of oppression. However, the Yugoslavs did not in any way contribute to the escalation of the conflict in the period between the disclosure of the Resolution and the Plenary Session. They avoided any kind of anti-Soviet propaganda. Moreover, Stalin and the USSR were glorified just as before. The initiated processes of Stalinization were intensified; Yugoslav diplomats were affirming Yugoslavia's loyalty to the USSR (e.g. at the 4th session of the OUN); the treatment of IB members did not yet become radical. For illustration, a total of 462 people were arrested in the period from the disclosure of the Resolution until the end of 1948, whereas in 1949, when the conflict escalated, this number grew to 6,146. The Goli Otok camp, established in the summer of 1949, will become the backbone of the prison system intended for incarceration of IB members.⁷

But, there is one group that stands apart from the groups mentioned above. Long before the mass arrests of real and alleged IB members right after the disclosure of the Resolution in the summer of 1948, the Yugoslav secret police arrested a group of people who had a lot in common: apart from the fact that most of them supported the criticism from Moscow and Stalin, they shared the same Party background. These were old school communists, founders of the CPY, people who had spent years in the USSR, former participants in the Spanish Civil War, veterans of the People's Liberation War, etc. Incidentally, when the leader of the Communist Party, Josip Broz Tito slandered IB members at the 6th Congress of the KPJ/SKJ, calling them "old sinful factionists and waverers,"⁸ he was actually right to some extent in his otherwise typical communist-like speech. Many of those people had indeed been participants in the "factional struggles" within the CPY and members of its leadership before Tito seized power in the CPY in 1937. Given their political and ideological backgrounds, in 1948 they interpreted and perceived the future quite differently than the younger and inexperienced communists, who were confused. Ideologically, emotionally and generationally more inclined to Moscow than to Tito, they had no doubts as to who to side with in the early stages of the conflict. Besides, their early arrests support the fact that Tito had a good reason to fear their possible role, given their background. This paper will present biographies of two old communists, typical party members with a long party history, especially prior to Tito's takeover of its leadership.

7 Previšić, *Broj kažnjenika*, p. 183.

8 *VI kongres KPJ/SKJ*, p. 36.

Vicko Jelaska was born in 1897 in Split. He spent his youth doing manual jobs. Prior to the fall of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, he was a member of the Croatian Democratic Party led by the Croatian politician Mile Smodlaka. However, in 1919, after WWI, he joined the SDRP/k (Social Democratic Workers Party/Communists).⁹ He had a 20-year long and rich Party career before he was expelled from the CPY in 1938. He was elected as a delegate to the 2nd Congress of the CPY (Congress of Unification), where the Party officially adopted the name of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia. However, he did not attend as he was arrested in Klis (Croatia) by the authorities of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes.¹⁰ From 1925 onwards, he was a member of the CPY regional leadership for Dalmatia and the CPY CC. The Party delegated him to the congress of the Communist International in 1927–1928, but he only got as far as the Austrian border when he was stopped together with Andrija Hebrang and Sima Marković. He was imprisoned in 1936 for one year.¹¹ However, his political fate after the Tito–Stalin split was predominantly determined by the events that took place after 1938, when Milan Gorkić (Josip Čižinski), the CPY secretary general, lost his life in Stalinist purges, as did many other Yugoslav communists. Notably, as a result of the repression imposed against the Communists by the regime of the Karadorđević dynasty, the centers of Party life shifted to prisons in Yugoslavia and to other countries, Paris in particular. The Paris-based group gathered around a line of pretenders to the top of the Party hierarchy (a parallel center), led by the old school communist and Gorkić's associate Labud Kusovac, his wife Krista and Ivo Marić.¹² In opposition to the Paris-based party “center” stood Josip Broz Tito, owing to his allies in the Yugoslav prisons and his status in Moscow.¹³ It should be noted here that this round of factional struggles within the CPY involved people that will find themselves on the opposite side of Tito both in

9 HDA, RSUP SDS SRH, Vicko Jelaska (300 118).

10 Vicko Jelaska played a significant role in the Party life in Dalmatia throughout the interwar period. In fact, he was one of the key CPY figures in that area and as such was elected as deputy to the Constituent Assembly in 1920, with quite a success, gaining 8,074 of the total 88,836 votes. Another important person in the “Dalmatian” CPY was Ivo Marić, another factional loser in the late 1930s and an IB member in 1948. *Karakteristike razvoja sindikalnog*, pp. 261–266.

11 Jelaska was sentenced to two years in prison (but served only one), when the regime authorities “broke into” the Dalmatian CPY organization: For details of the arrest, see: Jelić, *Prilog povijesti Brodogradilišta*, pp. 111–112.

12 Labud Kusovac joined the CPY in 1920. He spent five years in the USSR as an administrative clerk in the Red International. As a CI (Communist International) official, he participated in the Spanish Civil War. When Gorkić was removed from the helm of the CPY, Kusovac opposed Tito's takeover and was expelled from the Party when Tito took the lead. He was re-admitted only after the war. He then served in diplomacy until 1948, when he sided with the IB Resolution and was arrested and interned in a camp. Ivan (Ivo) Marić, member of the CPY since 1919, was one of the key figures of the CPY regional committee for Dalmatia. Having spent some time in the USSR, just like Kusovac, he participated in factional struggles for the CPY leadership and against Tito. In 1939 he was expelled from the CPY. As a supporter of the IB Resolution, he was arrested in 1951 and was interned in a camp.

Tito, *Sabrana djela*, 6:340, 344.

13 See: Pirjevec, *Tito i drugovi*, pp. 55–72; Banac, *Sa Staljinom*, pp. 74–81. Bondarev, *Misterija Tito*, pp. 194–204; *Povijest SKJ*, pp. 142–156.

1938 and 1948, such as Sreten Žujović – Crni, Rodoljub Čolaković, and others. One of Tito's leading and strongest opponents in the country, and Ivo Marić's close associate, was Vicko Jelaska, the CPY secretary of the Dalmatian regional committee. But, when Tito's faction prevailed and he became CPY acting secretary general, the Parisian center was expelled from the Party, including Vicko Jelaska and Ivo Marić.

UDBA's (Uprava državne bezbednosti, State Security Administration) documents on the break with Stalin mention that Jelaska was expelled from the CPY because of "factionalism", opposition to Comintern, etc.¹⁴ He would never be forgiven for this. Before WWII, Jelaska was not involved in politics, but in 1941, in the new, wartime circumstances, he opposed the Partisan uprising, claiming that the fight had come "prematurely" and that Partisan victims would be futile.¹⁵ As a notable old communist, he was arrested in 1942 in Split by the Italian occupation forces and was taken to the court in Šibenik. There he sat side by side with the legendary communist and later People's Hero Rade Končar. Most of the accused were sentenced to death, but Jelaska was acquitted due to lack of evidence, which raised some doubt after 1945 as he was suspected of collaborating with Italians.¹⁶ He remained in Italian prisons until the fall of Italy, and then he returned to Yugoslavia to see the liberation of the country. He did not participate in the People's Liberation War due to illness.

The end of the war and the rise of the communists did not change Jelaska much. Tito clearly felt an aversion and animosity towards his old party enemies. This can be concluded from the fact that UDBA placed Jelaska under surveillance immediately after the liberation: "Our surveillance of Vicko Jelaska began right after the liberation of our country because he was a well-known old opportunist and factionalist, which is why he was expelled from the Party in 1938 by the decision of the CPY CC."¹⁷ The fact that he sharply criticized the policy of Tito's followers with his friends and fellow citizens did not help Jelaska's fate either. As mentioned earlier, ever since 1945 he had been under surveillance by UDBA, whose people watched his every step though he was politically irrelevant and isolated, moving within the circle of peasants around Split and his old supporters. Among them was one of UDBA's informers who operated under the code name of "Bombarder". He noted Jelaska's remarks, particularly those related to the overly ambitious five-year plan launched in 1947 and to his strong opposition to collectivization which was yet to begin on a full scale.¹⁸ He believed that it lacked technical preconditions to be implemented and that peasants were not prepared enough for it in terms of propaganda. He also criticized the taxation policy and the dynamic of debt

14 HDA, RSUP SDS SRH, Vicko Jelaska (300 118).

15 Ibid.

16 Ibid.

17 Ibid.

18 Ibid.

reduction which, as he put it, “favours *kulaks*”. UDBA followed Jelaska’s moves closely. He would not have been given particular attention had it not been for the IB Resolution, which was disclosed in the summer of 1948. As had been expected, he was in favour of it and was particularly irritated by the fact that Yugoslav communists failed to attend the Cominform meeting held in Bucharest in June 1948. He strongly approved of the Resolution article which accused Yugoslav communists of pursuing a *pro-kulak* policy in the villages, and agreed with the Soviet criticism of the Yugoslav foreign-policy plans for Carinthia and Trieste.¹⁹ When Yugoslavia took a pro-Western stand on the foreign scene (General Assembly of the United Nations) *de facto* for the first time in the autumn of 1949, Jelaska interpreted it as a crossing to the side of the “capitalists”, a view typical of an orthodox communist: “In my opinion, the stand our delegation took in the OUN was wrong and in favour of the imperialist countries, clearly to the detriment of the world working class (...).”²⁰

In the spring of 1949, Yugoslavia also changed its propaganda activities. Thus, instead of the usual anti-Western caricatures and articles in the newspapers, it was now the Soviet Union and other block countries that came under attack. In the same spirit, the caricatures of IB leaders exhibited in Split irritated Jelaska: “(...) so I said that not even Hitler or Mussolini had been ridiculed in caricatures to that extent.”²¹ Jelaska did not stop at that. He then criticized Yugoslav involvement in the civil war in Greece and the new trade arrangements with the West. That did it for him. UDBA arrested him on 13 June 1950. During the investigation, Jelaska was questioned about his already described stance on the IB Resolution, but UDBA was also keen to learn more about – what is quite interesting for our subject – the period of factional struggles in the 1930s, his activities in Italian prisons, and even about his connections with the old communists who had been expelled from the Party in 1938 just like him. Obviously, those “old Communists”, who had actually been members of the Party leadership before Tito and those who had lost the factional struggles for power were a thorn in Tito’s side. Tito was aware of their loyalty to the Soviet Union. This is confirmed by the statement Jelaska gave during the interrogation when commenting on the arrests of all those who were in favour of the Informburo Resolution: “I perceived this attitude of our leadership as a struggle against the old communists, and I am specifically saying that most of the old communists were removed from the leading positions in the Party because they disagreed with such conduct and were well aware of the lack of democratism in the Party.”²² For Jelaska, all new cadres in the Party were “newly fledged”, with “no routine” or “Party experience.”²³ UDBA officers were particularly interested in his expulsion from the Party in 1938 and wanted to

19 Ibid.

20 Ibid.

21 Ibid.

22 Ibid.

23 Ibid.

know how he felt about it. Despite his efforts to show the expected self-criticism, Jelaska did not convince his investigators. Notably, before his arrest he was in the company of friends, and among them was a secret police informer. He spoke negatively about Tito's takeover of the Party claiming that, to his knowledge, Tito had become its leader without the approval from the Comintern.²⁴ The same informer put down his exact words: "They (Tito's associates) call me, Marić and Baljkas (all ousted from the Party in 1938, M.P.) opportunists, and they call themselves Marxists. Isn't that ridiculous?"²⁵ UDBA's informer goes on to say that Jelaska commented that Ivo Marić was right when he said that Tito was not a communist.²⁶ It was quite easy for UDBA to close the investigation of Vicko Jelaska. As Tito's old opponent since the time the latter came to power in the CPY, he was kept under surveillance from 1945 onwards. In the period prior to the break with Stalin, he was very critical of the communist power in new Yugoslavia with Tito at its helm. The old antagonism could not be ignored. Jelaska supported Soviet criticism expressed in the Cominform Resolution because of his orthodox communist (Stalinist) views, but also because he hoped that the Resolution would be the end of Tito. When UDBA arrested him, they wanted to know everything, especially the details about his clash with Tito in 1936. His fate was sealed, and he was sentenced to two years of community service, which meant imprisonment in the notorious camp on Goli Otok, where he was subjected to brutal mental and physical torture. Moreover, he was isolated from younger inmates and placed together with 130 other "old communists" in the special section of the Goli Otok camp known as "Peter's Pit", and that was, according to the testimonies of prisoners, the toughest place on the island.²⁷ Having served his punishment, Jelaska continued to support Stalin. However, when he started receiving retirement pay, despite being a factionalist, as one UDBA bureaucrat commented, he also started supporting the Yugoslav system. Jelaska died in 1968.

The case and career of Ladislav Žerjavić is somewhat different. He was born in 1893 in Lobar (Croatia). A labourer by profession,²⁸ in 1912 he joined the Social Democratic Party of Austria, where he worked in tunnel construction, but was soon fired because of his political activities. When World War I broke out, he was drafted in the Austro-Hungarian army and was deployed to the Eastern Front (the Carpathians, Bukovina, Galicia). In 1915 he was captured by the Russians and deported to the POW camp in Omsk. As a prisoner, he did various farming jobs. When the October Revolution broke out, he joined the Bolsheviks and the Red Guard. In 1918 he fought with the Czechoslovakian Legion.²⁹ As a member of the Bolshevik Party he was assigned

24 Ibid.

25 Ibid.

26 Ibid.

27 Jovanović, *Muzej živih ljudi*, pp. 309-318.

28 HDA, RSUP SDS SRH, Ladislav Žerjavić (303 155).

29 After defeats in the war (e.g. in Galicia), a great number of Yugoslavs (predominantly Croats and Serbs) who had fought within the ranks of the Austro-Hungarian army were interned to the labor camps all over tsarist

a number of tasks, the primary one being to motivate numerous Yugoslav prisoners to join the Bolsheviks in the war. As one of the main operatives, he made it possible for the Yugoslav regiment “Matija Gubec“ to join the Bolsheviks. Trotsky himself and Pavle Gregorić “Pajo” (later one of the key figures in the CPY) participated in the negotiations.³⁰ In 1920, the Yugoslav section of the Communist International ordered him to return to the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes so as to establish party cells. In the 1920s, he did hard menial jobs in northern Croatia (mining, digging of tunnels) and at the same time participated in establishing party and trade union organizations. On several occasions he was arrested for his communist activities.

In 1927, the CPY decided to send Žerjavić to the USSR. To that end, in the Vienna-based Party headquarters, he received the cover name of Agabekov. In Moscow he enrolled in the CUNMW (Communist University of the National Minorities of the West), but he soon dropped out, “the reason being the unprecedented factionalism among our party members (...). There were discussions every day about who was on the right path, whether it was Sima Marković or Gorkić, who was in the right, Belgrade or Zagreb (...).”³¹ Factional struggles were commonplace in the life of the CPY in the interwar period. Having left the CUNMW, Žerjavić worked in several industrial plants, participated as a party activist in the forceful implementation of collectivization in the villages, and in 1931 he became director of a state farm (sovkhoz).³² In 1930 he performed various duties related to the management of various agricultural organizations. He was involved in the case of suicide of a party official and was accused of killing him, but eventually he was cleared of suspicion. However, this incident resulted in him being isolated from the Party. After the attack on the USSR, he took part in the transfer of factories to the eastern part of the USSR and worked there as a supervisor. Until the end of the war, he worked on the economic reconstruction of the country and managed several enterprises. He returned to Yugoslavia in September 1946 and found a job in the Administration for the Acquisition of Cereal and later as director of the Sugar Mill until 1952.³³

As concerns the context of his relations with the Soviets, these were not problematic when he returned from the USSR but, of course, they were called into question in 1948. Žerjavić associated with a number of Yugoslav returnees from the USSR. After all, he had Soviet citizenship and at first he lived for a while in the home of Georgijević, a Russian clerk. Among the returnees with whom he was connected was Ante Zorić

Russia. When the October Revolution began in 1917, they joined the Bolsheviks. Later on, it was they who laid the foundations for the CPY introducing Bolshevik ideas in the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. See: Očak, *U borbi za ideje Oktobra*; Očak, *Jugoslaveni u Oktobru*; Banac, *I o'šo Karlo*, pp. 23-43.

30 HDA, RSUP SDS SRH, Ladislav Žerjavić (303 155).

31 Ibid.

32 Ibid.

33 Ibid.

(Red Army major), his Russian wife and Adolf Štumf³⁴, and he was especially close with Milan Kalafatić.³⁵ Both Zorić and Kalafatić supported Moscow policy after 1948. After the circulation of the Informburo Resolution in 1948, Žerjavić, together with Kalafatić, reproached that the CPY should have attended the IB session in Bucharest. Although he did not agree with all the accusations set out in the Resolution, he did agree with the part stating that the Yugoslav Party was semi-illegal.³⁶

Several days after the Resolution he was contacted by Lončarić, a colleague of his, who worked for the Ministry of Railroads and supported the criticism from Moscow. Here is an indicative detail: in his account of the events, Žerjavić states, “He (Lončarić) said that (...) the things set out in the Resolution are true and therefore we should get to work right away. He insisted that I immediately get in touch with all those who returned from the USSR, and there were many of them, in order to organize party cells, i.e. another party.”³⁷ It seems that Stalin supporters assumed, at least in the initial stage of the conflict, that the people who had spent a better part of their lives in the USSR might be more loyal to Moscow than to Belgrade, and that they had more ties with Moscow, emotionally, politically, and maybe even intelligence-wise. Žerjavić is just one such example along with many others. The years he spent in the USSR (1915–1920 and 1927–1946) left an imprint on Žerjavić. Among his comrades, he advocated the view that Yugoslavia had no future without Soviet help. “After all,” he said to an UDBA investigator, “I am more familiar with Russia and Russian people than with my own homeland.”³⁸ Impressed with and convinced of the success of the Soviet industrialization and the great political power personified by Stalin, Žerjavić was siding more and more with Moscow in the conflict. As the conflict was rising, Žerjavić was more and more irritated by the fact that “one can’t say a word without immediately being looked upon as an Informburo supporter.”³⁹

UDBA arrested Žerjavić in late 1949, but he was released upon the intervention of Marko Nikezić.⁴⁰ Žerjavić continued supporting the Resolution even after his release and stayed in touch with a number of Soviet citizens living in Yugoslavia, who were in some way engaged in the activities of the NKVD (People’s Commissariat for Internal

34 Adolf Štumf was a CPY member who spent years in the USSR. He was an instructor in the Party schools and worked in the Comintern apparatus. As a Resolution supporter, he was arrested and interned in a camp.

35 Milan Kalafatić, a Yugoslav Communist, also spent several years in the USSR. He also fought in the Spanish Civil War and participated in the French Resistance Movement. Towards the end of WWII, he returned to Yugoslavia to join the NOB. After the war, he worked as Assistant Minister of Industry. As a supporter of the Resolution, he was arrested and interned in Goli Otok. AJ, Kontrolna statutarna komisija, Dosije Milan Kalafatić.

36 HDA, RSUP SDS SRH, Ladislav Žerjavić (303 155).

37 Ibid.

38 Ibid.

39 Ibid.

40 Marko Nikezić, Yugoslav Communist, participated in the People’s Liberation War (NOB), Foreign Minister in the 1960s, head of the Serbian CPY branch. HDA, RSUP SDS SRH, Ladislav Žerjavić (303 155).

Affairs – Народный комиссариат внутренних дел). He confirmed that to Kirsanov, a Soviet intelligence agent and employee of the Soviet Embassy, telling him: “I am and shall remain loyal to the Bolshevik Party (...).”⁴¹ Soviet operative Kirsanov instructed him about further contacts with the NKVD once he (Kirsanov) returned to the USSR. Notably, one of the NKVD meeting points was the seat of the association of former POWs in the USSR. And, just like in some spy movie, Žerjavić was supposed to walk around the building dressed as agreed upon, smoking a cigarette and wait for an NKVD officer to address him asking for a match.⁴²

As the conflict escalated, Žerjavić increasingly opposed CPY policy. He interpreted events such as the Korean war in the usual dogmatic manner and contrary to Yugoslav foreign policy line: “(...) I took a stand that the Russians were in the right to have pushed North Korea into war against South Korea, arguing that North Korea was a socialist country, whereas South Korea was a capitalist country. Then I said that Russians were spreading socialism further to the east (...).”⁴³ Also, Žerjavić attacked one of Yugoslav fundamental ideological objections to Soviet policy – state capitalism. He said: “I claimed that it’s the same here because here too everything is in the hands of the state, just as it is in the USSR.”⁴⁴ In conversations with his colleagues, Žerjavić went as far as to attack Tito himself. He said that he liked Tito because they both came from the region of Zagorje, that Tito was a good leader, and that they had known each other since WWI when they were captured together, but that Tito “had made a right turn” under pressure.⁴⁵ Žerjavić made many mistakes while trying to avoid arrest.

Taking into account the usual promptitude of arrests, he actually remained free for quite a long time, considering his ties with Soviet agencies (NKVD) and with the returnees from the USSR, and his criticism of CPY domestic and foreign policy. After such a long period spent in Moscow, he could hardly have felt differently. After all, even Yugoslav communists had hard time distancing themselves from Moscow because for most of them Stalinism was in the core of their ideological substance. During the Tito-Stalin Split people were arrested for much lesser violations. Nevertheless, Žerjavić was arrested on 21 February 1951 and sentenced to two years of community service. The statement of reason said: “He slandered and attacked our state and our Party leadership, kept company with Russian emigrants and spies and refused to confess even when the trial ended.”⁴⁶ Like all the others, Žerjavić was interned in the Goli Otok (Barren island) labour camp. Having failed to collaborate with the Yugoslav secret police, he was retried on 23 April 1953 and sentenced to one more year of imprisonment.⁴⁷ The minutes of

41 HDA, RSUP SDS SRH, Ladislav Žerjavić (303 155).

42 Ibid.

43 Ibid.

44 Ibid.

45 Ibid.

46 Ibid.

47 Ibid.; Stevanović, *U Titovim fabrikama*, p. 155.

the investigation procedure conducted in the camp, often with a lot of violence, sum up that “his connections with the Russians were in the focus of interest,” adding that one of his assignments was to gather information on how frequently the Americans visited Tito’s residence at Dedinje. He was supposed to obtain that information from the Russian wife of Tito’s son, Žarko Broz.⁴⁸ Žerjavić was released from the camp in late 1953.

Conclusion

The Tito–Stalin split profoundly affected the CPY in that particular period, as it gave rise to a number of significant changes in domestic and foreign policy, but also in the ideological sphere. The escalation of the conflict resulted in various forms of pressure, from a military, ideological and economic blockade to fierce anti-propaganda and a wave of purges against Stalin’s followers (*ibeovci*). The Yugoslav secret police saw them as opponents of the regime coming from all walks of life. It is therefore hard to give a precise definition of *ibeovci*: some supported the Resolution unconditionally, some were utterly insignificant critics of certain Party measures often unrelated to the USSR. In hindsight, it looks like Party members actually did agree with Tito’s resistance to the pressure from Moscow, and yet only few remained indifferent to the split. Neither the power of the international proletariat nor that of the USSR leader was enough to crush Tito and the leaders of the CPY. Tito’s charisma, built on his leadership in the Partisan movement, meant much more to the broader Party base. The 1948 split fits in the typology of factional struggles within the CPY which had never stopped after its establishment. What is important for the 1948 split, and, consequently, for this paper, is the significant role and impacts of the Party’s prehistory and the 1920–1930 clashes in the alignment with either the Yugoslav or the Soviet side in 1948. Obviously, those who had not been in favour of Tito’s CPY leadership in the late 1930s, and those members who had been at the head of the CPY before Tito, remained disinclined in 1948 as well. Also, quite understandably, those CPY members who had spent most of their lives in the USSR, as well as the old Party members, now sided with Moscow. It was no wonder then that already early in the conflict, and also later on, a large number of communists with such or similar inclinations were arrested. Labud Kusovac, Dragotin Gustinčić, Dragan Ozren, Blažo Raičević, Božo Ljumović, Mirko Marković are just some of them.

The two examples presented in this work sum up why those people did not side with Tito in the conflict with Stalin. Vicko Jelaska belonged to the same generation as Tito. He had been a member of the Party since its establishment and as such he was politically independent of Tito. As a member of the faction that had opposed Tito and lost to him in 1936–1937, he was expelled from the CPY and that aroused a lot of bitterness

48 HDA, RSUP SDS SRH, Ladislav Žerjavić (303 155).

in him, which came forth in 1948. Siding with Stalin was an opportunity to get even in these merciless Stalinist struggles, but it also meant supporting an authentic, Stalin-style variant of communism. Ladislav Žerjavić reasoned in a similar way. Unlike Jelaska, he spent twenty years in the USSR and there was nothing except party discipline that associated him with Tito. Strongly tied with Moscow, politically, emotionally and intelligence-wise, he did not have much choice in 1948 either. On the other hand, Tito had enough political experience to know that those people were real opposition, loyal to the other side. The break with Moscow came as a surprise to everybody. However, Tito was well aware of exactly who his opponents and potential backbone would be once, and if, Stalin prevailed. No wonder that some 130 individuals found themselves in the worst of all camps, Goli Otok, where they went through unthinkable torture.

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Summary

Martin Previšić

The 1948 Split and a New Round of Factional Struggles within the Communist Party of Yugoslavia: Parallel Biographies and Histories

The Tito-Stalin split initiated a sequence of factional struggles in the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, which had been a frequent occurrence almost since the days of its founding. For most of the Party membership, the existence of the conflict, as well as its sources, were kept secret, so many Yugoslav communists were left to seek out the reasons for the conflict on their own, and who thereby often imagined their own interpretations as they were at a loss for plausible explanations. The CPY, pressed from without by ideological, military, economic and diplomatic pressures, as well as its own Stalinist substance from within, would drastically cut down any of the opposing and dissenting viewpoints. Through the presentation of several parallel biographies, such as the one of the old Yugoslav communist Vicko Jelaska, this paper will show how the split with Stalin opened up a continuation of the factional struggles which had been present since Tito's rise to power in the Party. The losers in these earlier struggles would see the split as a new chance for regaining power in the Party with Stalin's help. The CPY leadership focused their attention on these individuals before the onset of mass repression. The other "radical" faction of communists who had escaped or stayed in the USSR and other Bloc countries after 1948 will be examined in this paper. These examples and approach will help further define the complex typologies of the split within the CPY after 1948.

Dragomir Bondžić

The Repercussions of the Tito-Stalin Split in 1948 on the University of Belgrade

After the Second World War, the University of Belgrade was one of the three biggest and the most important institutions of higher education in Yugoslavia, with a crucial role for the state policy of creating trained professionals and a “new socialist intelligentsia”. The development of the higher education system in Yugoslavia after WWII was determined, above all, by the Communist Party’s seizure of power and the beginning of the construction of a new political and social-economic system.

During the first postwar years, the system of higher education was transformed and adjusted to the new goals and tasks, modeled on the Soviet pattern, shaped and imposed by the Party through the network of state and party organs and student mass organizations at universities and faculties. Through these bodies, the Party supervised the work and life of teachers and students, imposed political attitudes and Marxist ideology, and even strived to influence the teaching process itself. In Yugoslavia, the formation of the highly educated staff and a “new socialist intelligentsia” were ever-present basic tasks of the higher education system.¹ The pressure of creating highly educated experts resulted in a sudden increase in the number of students in Yugoslavia. It jumped from less than 30,000 in 1945 to over 60,000 in 1948. At the University of Belgrade alone, the number of students in that same period increased from 15,000 to over 30,000.² They were all to become not only trained experts in their fields, but also committed representatives of the “new socialist intelligentsia”.³

However, there were many obstacles in reaching these goals. The first was the animosity of a considerable part of the teaching staff and a significant segment of the student body toward the new regime and its ideology. In April 1947 among around 600

1 Bondžić, *Beogradski univerzitet*, pp. 137-170; Pervan, *Tito and the Students*, pp. 6-7.

2 *Školstvo u FNRJ*, p. 218.

3 Bondžić, *Beogradski univerzitet*, p. 298.

teachers and teaching assistants, there were only 35 members of the Communist Party, mostly teaching assistants;⁴ in December 1947 among 25,000 students, there were around 2,000 communists;⁵ at the same time, it was estimated by the regime that a significant number of “political enemies” existed at all the departments. The regime tried to overcome this problem by intensive ideological and political work, by exerting pressure through propaganda, and by intermittent cleansing campaigns at the University, which led to the persecution and expulsion of political enemies among teachers and students.⁶

A new problem appeared in 1948 in the ranks of the Communist Party itself. In June 1948, the Resolution of the Cominform was published and the confrontation between Yugoslavia and Soviet Union (between Tito and Stalin) became public. It was an event of great international significance and after it, as John Gaddis asserts, “the communist world would never be the same again.”⁷ The Resolution of the Cominform and the conflict between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union in 1948 caused a strong shock in the Communist Party of Yugoslavia and led to major changes in Yugoslav foreign and domestic policy, state, economy, society and culture. In foreign policy, the relations between Yugoslavia and Cominform countries deteriorated and the Yugoslav leadership gradually started cooperating with Western countries. The main consequence of the conflict in inner policy was a strong wave of repression against the supporters of the Cominform. It was only later, in the early 1950s, that a partial liberalization and changes in administration, economy and culture were implemented.⁸

The consequences of the conflict were also strongly felt at the University of Belgrade. It could be said that the effects of the Tito-Stalin split 1948 played out at three levels: control, persecution and expulsion of the teaching staff from the University, control, persecution, and expulsion of the students from the University, and long-term changes in the teaching process (curricula, syllabi, textbooks, literature, foreign language teaching, international scientific cooperation and exchange of students, etc.).⁹

4 Mitrović and Stanković, *Zapismici 1945 – 1948*, p. 177.

5 Ibid., p. 227.

6 See more in: Bondžić, *Beogradski univerzitet*, pp. 238–263, 298–328; Bondžić, *Univerzitet u socijalizmu*, pp. 315–321, 403–408. On the conditions at other universities in Southeast Europe see: Connely, *Captive University*, pp. 3–281; Najbar-Agičić, *Kultura, znanost, ideologija*, pp. 138–196; Connely and Grüttner, *Universities under Dictatorship*, pp. 139–212, 245–295.

7 Gaddis, *We Now Know*, p. 48.

8 Ibid., pp. 48–49; Laqueur, *Europe in Our Time*, pp. 158–160; Lees, *Keeping Tito Afloat*, pp. 1–120; Cvetković, *Između srpa i čekića*, pp. 368–392; Previšić, *Suđenja i kažnjavanja*, pp. 197–214; Banac, *Sa Staljinom*, pp. 119–251; Petranović, *Istorija Jugoslavije, III*, pp. 195–321; Dimić, *Ideology and Culture*, pp. 315–319; Gabrić, *Preokret kulturno-političke linije*, pp. 101–106; etc.

9 The basis of this research is the documentation of the University administration in the Archives of Serbia, and the documentation of the state and party organs in the Archives of Yugoslavia and the Archives of Serbia (organs dealing with higher education and science and central committees of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia and Serbia). Unfortunately, the documentation of the secret police and the Serbian republican and federal state security authorities on this issue is still inaccessible. It is only possible to find some documents in the materials of the state and party organs and to use the published registry of people convicted because of the Cominform. Also, some relevant published sources, scientific literature and memoirs were useful for this research.

The consequences of the Tito-Stalin split were not so severe for the university teachers because there weren't that many Party members among them. The older members of the Party from the University of Belgrade were far removed from communist theory and practice, so the split in the communist movement in 1948 did not influence them much. However, the Yugoslav-Soviet conflict did impact the careers and lives of several university teachers who were members or sympathizers of the Communist Party. They were all examined by Party authorities and asked to take a position and publicly declare their views about the Resolution of the Cominform. Also, pro-soviet attitudes expressed in classes and lectures were monitored and noted. According to the scarce archival documentation, eleven *Resolution* supporters who criticized the Yugoslav leadership were expelled from the Party and the University, and six of those were arrested and jailed at the Goli Otok camp. Mirko Marković and Marko Vranješević, teachers at the Faculty of Economics, Dušan Dohčević, professor at the Faculty of Law, Vladimir Spasojević, Milovan Bogdanović and Jovan Drakulić, teachers at the Faculty of Agriculture were expelled from the University and the Communist Party and jailed at the Goli Otok camp. Jelena Bogdanović, a teacher at the Faculty of Agriculture, Đorđe Pejić, Dimitrije Pejović, and Milena Janković, teachers at the Faculty of Economics, and Borislav Božović, a teacher at the Faculty of Medicine were only expelled from the University and the Party.¹⁰

Let's point out two interesting examples among the expelled professors of Belgrade University. Mirko Marković was born in 1906 in Montenegro. He became a member of the CPY in 1923. From 1925 to 1935 he lived and worked in the USSR where he obtained a doctorate in Economics in 1935. Then he was sent as a Comintern agent to work in the USA. From 1936 to 1939 he fought in the Spanish Civil War as a Commander of the American Brigade. From 1939 to the 1945 he lobbied for the interests of the CPY in the USA. In 1945 he returned to Yugoslavia and became an editor in the news agency and a colonel of the Yugoslav Army. In 1947 he was appointed associate professor of Political Economy at the Faculty of Economics in Belgrade.¹¹ In September 1948 at a meeting of communists of the University of Belgrade, he declared himself in favor of the Cominform Resolution and against the Yugoslav leadership. He was immediately marked as a traitor. He was imprisoned and expelled from the CPY and from the University of Belgrade.¹² From 1948 to the 1950 he was jailed in Belgrade and from 1950 to the 1954 he

10 Arhiv Srbije, Beogradski univerzitet, f. 56, Zapisnici sa sednica Univerzitetskog saveta, 10. I 1949, 5. IV 1949, 13. V 1949, 1. VII 1949, 5. V 1950; Arhiv Srbije, Medicinska velika škola, f. 29, 20. II 1950; Mihailović, et al., *Zatočnici Golog otoka*, pp. 118, 167, 303, 436, 500; Bondžić, *Beogradski univerzitet*, pp. 258-261. It must be noted that some of the removed professors later returned to the University or continued their scientific careers at some other institution (B. Božović, M. Bogdanović, V. Spasojević, etc.).

11 Marković, *Odabrani put*, pp. 7-382.

12 Mitrović and Stanković, *Zapisnici 1945 - 1948*, pp. 45-51; Arhiv Srbije, Beogradski univerzitet, f. 56, Zapisnik sa sednice Univerzitetskog saveta, 10. I 1949; Arhiv Srbije, f. 6, Komitet za Univerzitet, Rešenje o suspenziji, 4. IX 1948; Mihailović, et al., *Zatočnici Golog otoka*, p. 303.

was in the Goli Otok camp. In 1954 he was released but in 1958 he was imprisoned again and he spent two years in the Sveti Grgur camp. After his release, he dedicated himself to scientific work in economics and cybernetics. He died in 1988. In 1984 he wrote his memoirs. They were published under the title “The Chosen Path” in 1997.¹³

The second example is Marko Vranješević, a poet and a lecturer in the Russian language at the Faculty of Economics in Belgrade. He was born in 1903 in Bosnia. He graduated from the Faculty of Philosophy in Belgrade in 1929 and then he served as a Serbian language and literature teacher in high schools in Yugoslavia. During the Second World War, he participated in illegal activities of the National Liberation Movement in Belgrade. After the war he was one of the founders of the Association of Writers of Serbia and he worked as a teacher and head master in the Third High School in Belgrade. In 1947 he was appointed a lecturer in the Russian language at the Faculty of Economics in Belgrade. When the Resolution of the Cominform was launched in 1948, he was suspected as a “Russian spy” and he was arrested in May 1949 and then expelled from the University and the Association of Writers of Serbia. From 1949 to the 1951 he was at the Goli Otok camp and then he was released because he suffered a mental breakdown and was sent to hospital. He committed suicide in 1974. He wrote an autobiographical novel “The Shadow of the Goli Otok”, published in 2004, three decades after his death.¹⁴

The situation of students attending the University of Belgrade was much more complicated. They were young and pretty inexperienced. Many were members of the Communist Party and some of them blindly believed the communist propaganda about the infallibility of the Soviet Union and Stalin. Some of them initially supported the Resolution of the Cominform during the summer of 1948, but a large number of them were “detected” and charged in the next few years. Their “culpability” and “sins” varied, as well as their punishment. Even though many students were on vacation during the summer of 1948, hearings began at the meetings of faculty party bodies and students were punished. Each student had to declare their views about the Cominform Resolution, and at the end of the session, a joint statement of support for the Yugoslav leadership was adopted. Students who supported the Cominform were marked as “enemies” and were quickly punished and expelled from the Party and the Faculty. Some of them were really ideologically close to the Soviet Union and Stalin, but many were only confused, afraid, inexperienced, hesitant to make a decision and didn’t know what to do when they found themselves in this situation.¹⁵

13 Marković, *Odabrani put*, pp. 382-427. See also: Marković, *Priča iz Petrove*, pp. 335-341; Marković, *Istina o Golom*, pp. 113-114; Marić, *Deca komunizma*, p. 285; Banac, *Sa Staljinom*, p. 11; Cvetković, *Između srpa i čekića*, pp. 383-384; Popović, *Marković Mirko*, pp. 184-185.

14 Vranješević, *Senka Golog otoka*, pp. 297-350; Arhiv Srbije, Beogradski univerzitet, f. 56, Zapisnik sa sednice Univerzitetskog saveta, 1. VII 1949; Arhiv Srbije, Beogradski univerzitet, f. 84, Rešenje o udaljavanju sa Univerziteta, 6. VI 1949; Mihailović, et al., *Zatočenici Golog otoka*, p. 500.

15 Arhiv Srbije, CK SKS, Organizaciono-instruktorska uprava, f. 59; Mitrović and Stanković, *Zapisnici 1948 – 1952*, pp. 41, 43, 51-52; Mitrović, *Rezolucija IB*, pp. 246-249; Bondžić, *Beogradski univerzitet*, pp. 306-307.

In September of 1948, the political situation at the University was unstable, especially at the Faculty of Mechanical Engineering and the Faculty of Agriculture. There appeared to be considerable support toward the attitudes expressed in the Resolution of the Cominform, as well as misunderstandings and uncertainty about the conflict. The Central Committee of the Communist Party of Serbia had to intervene: the Committee dismissed the Secretary of the University Committee (Danilo Purić replaced Vjera Kovačević) and then sent a special commission, whose task was to solve the problems and to calm down the political situation. The Commission consisted of members of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Serbia, Dušan Petrović, Risto Antunović and Aleksandar Nikolić. Beside political action and “clarification” of the situation, the main method of the communists at the University was expelling “political enemies”, supporters of Cominform and “waverers”. By the end of October 1948 among 3,800 communists at the University of Belgrade, around 350 declared themselves supporters of the Cominform Resolution or hesitated to make a decision; 79 of them were expelled from the Communist Party and the University. By the end of 1948, 269 students who supported the Resolution of the Cominform in various ways were expelled from the University. Among them were some “waverers”, but also candid supporters of the Cominform and Stalin, who were spreading Cominform propaganda, newspapers, leaflets, slogans and misinformation at the University.¹⁶

In the late 1940s and the early 1950s, a Party organization continued to control and monitor the political situation at the University in order to detect supporters of the Cominform and other “political enemies”. All student members of the Party had to openly declare their views on the Resolution of the Cominform at the Party meetings. Suspicious and hesitant students were examined by Party authorities. The Party apparatus exercised control over political attitudes and everyday life and behavior of the all students at the University. Party organizations at the faculties and the University wrote detailed reports on the political situation, the attitudes of students towards the Cominform and the number of its supporters. Secret police officers and informants also monitored and recorded their observations in detailed reports. These carefully recorded data were sprinkled with denunciations (very often false) provided by colleagues, friends, roommates, etc. At some faculties organized groups of Cominform followers were detected.¹⁷

Various “gravities of sin” and “levels of guilt” were mentioned: support for the entire Resolution or just some parts of it; connections with outspoken supporters of the *Resolution*, concealing information about the activities of Cominform supporters, advocacy

16 Mitrović and Stanković, *Zapismnici 1948 – 1952*, pp. 54-56, 58-60, 125-131, 581-593; Mitrović, *Rezolucija IB*, pp. 249-250; Bondžić, *Beogradski univerzitet*, pp. 307-309.

17 Mitrović and Stanković, *Zapismnici 1948 – 1952*, pp. 128-133, 285-293, 449-452, 484-494, etc; Mitrović, *Rezolucija IB*, pp. 252-253; Bondžić, *Beogradski univerzitet*, pp. 309-311; Arhiv Jugoslavije, CK SKJ, Ideološka komisija, VIII, VII-5, k. 38, Izveštaj UDB-e, 10. XI 1951 (This report was published in: Bondžić, *Izveštaj UDB-e*, pp. 172-188).

of the Cominform attitudes, spreading leaflets, booklets and newspapers, listening to radio stations from Cominform countries, writing hostile slogans, etc., glorification of Stalin and the Soviet Union, criticizing the Yugoslav Party and state leadership, complaints about the political situation in the country, objections to the foreign, domestic and economic policy of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, jokes about Tito and other Yugoslav authorities, the expectation of a quick reconciliation with the Cominform, agitation against state policy, sabotage, defamation of the Yugoslav Party and state, hesitation, uncertainty, suspicion, confusion among students. All these were considered along with other political and ideological transgressions (lack of discipline, awareness, alertness, religiosity, but also immoral life, drinking, gambling, etc.).¹⁸

After July 1948, the party and state authorities reacted harshly in order to punish the supporters of the Cominform and reduce their influence at the University. Various penalties were introduced. Detected and hardened supporters of the Cominform were expelled from the Communist Party and from the Student's Youth Organization; all those were expelled from the faculties and the University, and consequently from student dormitories and all universities in the country. Depending on the degree of the offence, the supporters of the Cominform were arrested, jailed and interrogated about their views, activities and connections with other supporters of the Cominform. Finally, many were jailed in the Goli Otok camp (and also in the Sveti Grgur camp). This was called "rehabilitation" and "social volunteer work", and in fact, it was hard and inhumane torture. All these punishments were for the most part administrative measures, inflicted in the absence of trials or legal proceedings. The Goli Otok camp was called "The Company Mermer", and the prisoners were called "Mermeraši". This was an allusion to the hard work and stone processing that took place at the camp.¹⁹

The number of expelled and arrested students was growing. By the end of 1949, 495 members of the University Party organization were expelled, and more than half of them were subsequently jailed.²⁰ It should be noted, though, that many expelled and jailed students were soon allowed to return and re-enroll at the faculties. They were under special control of the Party organization and the police. Some of them were readmitted to the Party, but many still worked in favor of the Cominform and were arrested again. Nonetheless, throughout the period, students were under a strong political, ideological and propagandistic influence so that the appearance of "incorrect views" would be prevented, the political situation clarified, and the already created "misconceptions" and misunderstandings corrected. One of the consequences was mass recruitment and

18 Arhiv Jugoslavije, CK SKJ, Ideološka komisija, VIII, VII-5, k. 38, Izveštaj UDB-e, 10. XI 1951; Arhiv Jugoslavije, CK SKJ, Kadrovska komisija, XIII-K. 64/5, Izjave studenata, IV-V 1952.

19 See more in: Previšić, *Suđenja i kažnjavanja*, pp. 198-203; Cvetković, *Između srpa i čekića*, pp. 376-381; Bondžić, *Izveštaj UDB-e*, pp. 172-174.

20 Mitrović and Stanković, *Zapismici 1948 – 1952*, p. 285.

engagement of students in the Communist Party. At the end of 1951, the number of communists at the University increased to almost 6,000 (members and candidates).²¹

It is important to mention that the accused and jailed students were often used for propagandistic purposes. In October 1949 in a Belgrade student newspaper, a letter from the students from “Mermer” was published. In it they, sincerely regretful, recognized their ideological “mistakes” and “misapprehensions”, gave support to the Yugoslav Party and leadership, and promised to correct and revise their “wrong views”.²²

It’s very difficult to give an estimate of the total number of students who supported the Cominform and who were punished for this. The official data changed from month to month. Consequently, we do not have a precise and total number. According to the report of the State Security Administration from November 1951, there were 25,377 students at the University of Belgrade; 5,798, or 22%, were members of the Communist Party; at that time, 2,553 students were registered as being supportive of the Cominform, which was roughly 10% of all students and 44% of members of the CPY; among them there were 489 dangerous people who were under surveillance and 154 returnees from the Goli Otok camp. Therefore, 6% of the registered supporters spent some time in the Goli Otok camp.²³ At the University itself²⁴ there were 14,132 students, 2,636 of them or 18.6% were members of the Party, 1,128 students were registered as being supportive of the Cominform, which was 8% of all students and 44% of the members of the CPY; among them there were 171 people under surveillance and 50 returnees from the Goli Otok camp, or 4.4% of the registered supporters. At the Medical College, there were 6,059 students and 1,533 of them, or 25.3%, were members of the Party. 640 students were registered as being supportive of the Cominform, which was 10.6% of all students and 41.7% of the members of the CPY. Among them there were 137 people under surveillance and 50 returnees from the Goli Otok camp, or 7.8% of registered supporters. At the Technical College, there were 5,284 students, 1,570 of them, or 29.7%, were members of the Party, 692 students were registered as being supportive of the Cominform, which was 13.1% of all students and 44.1% of the members of the CPY.

21 Arhiv Jugoslavije, CK SKJ, Ideološka komisija, VIII, VII-5, k. 38, Izveštaj UDB-e, 10. XI 1951; Bondžić, *Beogradski univerzitet*, pp. 309-311; Mitrović, *Rezolucija IB*, pp. 252-253.

22 *Narodni student*, br. 21, 3. X 1949, pp. 3-4.

23 Arhiv Jugoslavije, CK SKJ, Ideološka komisija, VIII, VII-5, k. 38, Izveštaj UDB-e, 10. XI 1951; Bondžić, *Izveštaj UDB-e*, pp. 174-176.

24 It must be stressed that from 1948 to 1954 Belgrade University was divided into three parts: the University, consisting of seven faculties (Faculty of Economics, Faculty of Law, Faculty of Veterinary Medicine, Faculty of Philosophy, Faculty of Natural Sciences, Faculty of Agriculture, Faculty of Forestry), and Art Academies; the Medical College consisted of three faculties (Faculty of Medicine, Faculty of Pharmacy, Faculty of Dentistry); and the Technical College consisted of the Faculty of Mechanical engineering, the Faculty of Electrical engineering, the Faculty of Architecture, the Faculty of Civil Engineering, the Faculty of Technology, the Faculty of Mining and the Faculty of Geology. Bondžić, *Beogradski univerzitet*, pp. 114-116; Bondžić, *Univerzitet u socijalizmu*, pp. 86-87.

Among them there were 181 people under surveillance and 54 returnees from the Goli Otok camp, or 7.8% of registered supporters.²⁵

According to a later estimation produced by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Serbia, by the mid-1950s 1,163 students supporters of the Cominform were expelled from the University of Belgrade; many were arrested and jailed, but most of them were allowed to return and continue their studies.²⁶ In literature, we can find information that by 1953, 700 students who supported the Cominform were expelled from the University of Belgrade, and that 300 of them were arrested.²⁷ Many of them were later allowed to return. Therefore, it can be concluded that all this time the state leadership was aware of the need to educate future professionals and offered punished students a chance to “correct” their mistakes, especially when the danger from the Soviets began to weaken.

Personal tragedies of professors and students were surely the most traumatic consequence of the 1948 split. However, there were less immediate, but very important consequences on the teaching process at the University of Belgrade, which went through a fundamental change. Before 1948, its curricula and syllabi were completely based on Soviet models; the teaching was mostly modelled after Soviet textbooks and literature; the achievements of Soviet science were excessively propagated and imposed; Russian was a mandatory course for all students; scientific cooperation and student exchange were directed solely at the Soviet Union and the countries of Eastern Europe. After 1948, in all these areas changes occurred at the University of Belgrade, and the orientation towards the East was abandoned. In the first few years after conflict, excessive emphasis on the achievements of Soviet science and its application in teaching was persecuted and interpreted as a show of support for the Cominform. Slowly, but of course not completely, the University started to turn to the West and gradually towards distant Third World countries.²⁸ This academic expression of the new Yugoslav orientation may be the deepest repercussion of the Tito-Stalin Split, as it created a context in which generations of students were socialized.

25 Arhiv Jugoslavije, CK SKJ, Ideološka komisija, VIII, VII-5, k. 38, Izveštaj UDB-e, 10. XI 1951; Bondžić, *Izveštaj UDB-e*, pp. 174-176.

26 Arhiv Jugoslavije, CK SKJ, Kontrolno statutarna komisija, VII, K-1/18, Držanje kažnjenih po Informbirou, februar 1957.

27 Marković, *Beograd između Istoka*; Mitrović, *Rezolucija IB*, p. 253.

28 Bondžić, *Hladni rat*, pp. 353-370.

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Summary

Dragomir Bondžić

The Repercussions of the Tito-Stalin Split in 1948 on the University of Belgrade

The Resolution of the Cominform and the conflict between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union in 1948 caused a great shock in the Communist Party of Yugoslavia and major changes in the Yugoslav state and society. The consequences of the conflict were also strongly felt at the University of Belgrade. The University of Belgrade was one of the three biggest and the most important higher education institutions in the country, with crucial importance for the state policy of educating future professionals and a “new socialist intelligentsia”. That is why Party organs pervaded the University and controlled life, work, ideological and political views of the students and the teaching staff. The repercussions of the Tito-Stalin Split were expressed through a more active political control over the University, with participation of the secret police, and the removal of the Cominform supporters from the Party and the University. The first Cominform supporters among the teaching staff and students were detected and punished in the late summer of 1948. In the late 1940s and the early 1950s, the persecution of the Cominform supporters at the University continued. Some of them were arrested and taken to the Goli Otok camp. All the time there was constant ideological, political and propagandistic pressure on the teaching staff and the students, conducted by the Party organs, glorifying the policy of the Yugoslav leadership and attacking the Soviet Union and other countries of the Cominform. Finally, the repercussions of the conflict affected the teaching process through the contents of the curricula and syllabuses, lectures, textbooks, the teaching of the foreign languages, in international cooperation, orientation of scholarship policy, and student’s daily life.

Aleš Gabrič

Cominform Supporters in Slovenia

The Yugoslav authorities characterised the people who supposedly agreed with the Cominform Resolution or simply criticised the policy of the Yugoslav leadership during the dispute with the Soviet Union as Cominform supporters (so-called “ibeovci” or “informbirojevci” in Slovenian). They were retaliated against in two ways. The State Security Administration (UDB,UDV) could impose administrative penalties: it had the authority to arrest individuals by means of a legal act and assign them to community service for the period of up to two years. The second group consisted of people sentenced at court proceedings before regular civil and military courts.¹

This paper is mostly based on the archive material of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Slovenia, which is why the numbers of those sentenced are not complete. The number of those who were expelled from the ranks of the Communist Party does not exactly correspond to the number of those imprisoned. Furthermore, the statistics only seldom take into account those arrested by the Yugoslav Army Countereintelligence Service (KOS) and sentenced at military courts. With regard to Slovenians, Ivo Banac wrote as long as four decades ago that “they were not particularly susceptible to Cominform ideas.”² In Slovenia, open support for the Cominform Resolution was expressed exceedingly rarely, unlike in certain other parts of Yugoslavia.³

The first penalties – expulsions from political organisations – were announced immediately after certain individual members of the Communist Party of Slovenia expressed their opinion about the Cominform Resolution, but their number was very limited. For example, on the list of those excluded from the Party organisations in Ljubljana were 17 names – of these fifteen intellectuals, a single student, and only one worker.⁴ The

1 More on reactions of Yugoslavia to the conflict see: Banac, *Sa Staljinom*; Pirjevec, *Tito, Stalin in Zahod*; Radonjić, *Izgubljena orientacija*; Radonjić, *Sukob KPJ s Kominformom*; Previšić, *Povijest informbiroevskog logora*.

2 Banac, *Sa Staljinom*, p. 150.

3 More on “informbirojevci” in Slovenia see: Jezernik, *Non cogito ergo sum*; Gabrič, *Informbirojevstvo na Slovenskem*.

4 SI ZAL, LJU 684, box 4, 61, Rekapitulacija izključitev v letu 1948.

main reason for the relatively modest number of those punished because of the Cominform dispute in 1948 lay in the attempts of the Yugoslav authorities to assuage the rift between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union. After they had strengthened their repressive apparatus, the Yugoslav authorities started to persecute those who agreed with the Cominform Resolution and celebrated the successes of the Soviet Union, but not before it had become clear that the split between the two states was final.

In Slovenia, mass arrests of Cominform supporters began after the session of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Slovenia on 13 January 1949. The members of the Political Bureau believed that the purges among the members of the political organisations should not be supervised by any Central Committee commission, but should instead be carried out by the Party cells in the field. According to Ivan Maček, exceptions could only be allowed “where the danger of outvoting is notable”.⁵ Already the aforementioned Political Bureau session indicates that Cominform supporters were mostly cultural workers, which is why the authorities saw these people as the most dangerous.

Regarding the first stage of this most extensive action against Cominform supporters, on 16th April 1949 Boris Kraigher, the Slovenian Minister of the Interior, reported that almost three quarters (72%) of all Cominform supporters registered to that date came from the ranks of the intelligentsia, state employees, liberal professions, and expropriated strata. He focused on the situation at the University of Ljubljana somewhat more closely. He evaluated the demands for an appropriate legal procedure against the accused as a weakness because “discussions that anti-state activities should (...) be proven are still being tolerated. (...) However, this is not essential for the struggle to ensure the strength of the Party organisation. What is indeed essential is that this organisation keeps fighting against the emergence of opportunism and lack of trust in the people’s forces, and this is the struggle that the Party should cleanse itself in, regardless of whether it simultaneously involves open anti-state activities organised by the enemies of socialism or not.”⁶

Due to the predominance of cultural workers among the Cominform supporters, the Slovenian Writers’ Association in particular was under scrutiny and teachers were a relatively numerous group as well. Another prominent group that could qualify among the intelligentsia stemmed from the ranks of students and pupils. Most of them studied at the technical and medical faculties as well as at the so-called Classical Gymnasium (grammar school) in Ljubljana. Because of their support for the Cominform Resolution, a considerable number of students and pupils were expelled from the Party and the People’s Youth of Slovenia organisation, while some of them were also expelled from school. The reasons for the expulsions most often involved reactionary standpoints and

5 *Zapisniki politbiroja CK KPS/ZKS 1945/1954*, p. 128.

6 SI AS 1589, IK, box 1, Zapisnik II. Plenarnega zasedanja CK KPS, 15.–16. 4. 1949., B. Kraigher, p. 6.

agreement with the Cominform Resolution. Apart from these two groups, many Party members expelled also hailed from the ranks of the workers, while peasants punished for their support for the Cominform Resolution were few and far between.

The following table includes all of those expelled from the ranks of the Communist Party of Slovenia (CPS) because of the Cominform dispute until the end of 1949, broken down by the time of their expulsion:⁷

Period	Expelled from CPS
Third quarter 1948	54
Fourth quarter 1948	24
First quarter 1949	69
Second quarter 1949	101
Third quarter 1949	59
Fourth quarter 1949	9
	316

The time of the most numerous expulsions from the ranks of the Communist Party of Slovenia in the first and second quarter of 1949 was simultaneously the period when the arrests were most numerous. Judging from the materials reviewed, this period can be specified even more precisely (from, approximately, the middle of February until the end of May 1949). In the subsequent years, the penal measures arising from the Cominform dispute were less common than in 1948 and 1949. In March 1950, Boris Kraigher evaluated the power of the opponents of the regime in Slovenia as follows: "Nowadays both reactions – the Western and the Cominform one – lack any organisation. In fact, the Cominform supporters have not been organised at all, in spite of a number of attempts at their coordination from the espionage centres in Budapest, the headquarters near Lake Balaton, Gorizia, and even more frequently from Trieste, home to the followers of Vittorio Vidali."⁸

Most of those who had been arrested were released from prison in 1953 and 1954. However, this did not mean that they could resume normal lives: only after they had been released did they learn about the difficulties that their families had experienced during their imprisonment. Soon it also became clear that their release from prison (labour camp) did not also imply that they could decide about their own future freely. It was hard for them to find employment, and because these were often intellectuals, whatever work they could find was often incompatible with their education. It was even difficult for them to find housing. Meanwhile, students who returned from prisons had a hard time resuming their studies at faculties. After their release they could only study at a university

⁷ Gabrič, *Informbirojevstvo na Slovenskem*, p. 167.

⁸ *Zapiski politbiroja CK KPS/ZKS 1945/1954*, p. 199.

under certain conditions. For example, the Ministry of Science and Culture of the Republic of Slovenia allowed a former prisoner to re-enrol in the University with the following explanation: “In this regard the Commission took into account the statements from the applicant’s complaint, especially his regret and his promise that in the future he would correct his attitude to our reality and youth organisation as well as strive to participate in the ranks of our socialist intelligentsia as an active and positive member.”⁹

In March 1954, the leadership of the League of Communists of Slovenia put together a list of Slovenian Cominform supporters. It included 2,275 people, who “either proclaimed their opinion publicly, secretly, or were on the fence.”¹⁰

Year	Arrested	Omitted from investigation	Administrative penalties	Court sentences	Members of CPY	CPY non-members
1948	102	31	40	31	50	52
1949	265	61	180	24	248	17
1950	46	16	12	18	27	19
1951	123	63	19	41	76	47
1952	161	64	62	35	75	86
1953	34	5	21	8	28	6
	731	240	334	157	504	227

Of these, 731 people had been subject to judicial proceedings, i.e. approximately every third suspect. Most of these (240) had been omitted from the investigation and not sentenced at courts or sent to community service. The majority of those who had in fact been punished, however, had received “administrative penalties” – meaning that their penalties had been imposed by the executive authority. Not nearly as many people had been sentenced by the judicial branch of power.

9 SI AS 232, K 32/1–50.

10 SI AS 1589, IK, box 8, Priloge k seji IK CK ZKS, 13. 7. 1958, Statistični pregled IB.

The Social Structure of the Arrested

Year	Workers	Peasants	State employees	Students	Intellectuals	Others
1948	29	10	19	1	23	11
1949	79	7	104	45	25	5
1950	16	-	24	1	5	-
1951	38	15	50	9	10	1
1952	56	7	37	19	7	35
1953	20	-	10	3	-	1
	238	48	244	78	70	53

If we take a look at the social structure of the 731 people who were in fact arrested, the intellectuals are clearly in the majority, as they are included in various groups – state employees, students, and intellectuals – and they represent more than a half of those imprisoned. About a third of the arrested were workers, but this number also includes workers from elsewhere who were arrested in Slovenia (for example, in 1952 a large group of Albanians who returned from Czechoslovakia). Other groups – peasants, artisans, the unemployed, etc. – are even more negligible.

In 1957 and 1958, the leadership of the League of Communists of Slovenia often discussed people who had been identified as political opponents a few years earlier, pondering how to reintegrate them into normal life. This included more than 2,200 Cominform supporters. They were divided into several categories: those who “simply criticise out of habit (no more than others) and are not dangerous”; those “who despair, claiming that it is senseless to go into politics”; and those Cominform supporters “who are still hostile towards us today”. Soon it was established that it did not make any sense at all to count approximately half of these people among political enemies because of their support for the Cominform. This information by itself indicates how quickly people could be accused of anti-state activities and included in the list of people dangerous to the state without any evidence whatsoever. This procedure resulted in the initial list being reduced to merely 50 people or so, who were still deemed hostile towards the state in 1958 due to their support for the Cominform.¹¹

Disputes within the Communist Party were nothing unusual, as the struggles between the fractions had already dragged on throughout the long years of the Party’s illegal activities. In 1948, the communists who had been important in the Party organisation before 1937, the year when Josip Broz Tito assumed leadership, became suspicious in the eyes of the Slovenian authorities. Some of the long-time members of the Party felt neglected after the war, as they were, presumably, not sufficiently rewarded for their efforts in the illegal Communist movement. The Slovenian government became particularly suspicious of two leading Communists of the older generation – Lovro Kuhar and

11 SI AS 1589, III, box 78, Informacija o informbirojevcih v Sloveniji, 3. 10. 1958.

Dragotin Gustinčič. During the 1930s, Kuhar – Tito’s sometime close associate – was among the leading Communists abroad. The disagreements between them apparently escalated, and when Kuhar returned to his homeland before the war, no important positions awaited him in the Party structure.¹² He spent most of the war in the prisons and camps of the occupiers. After the war, he instead focused on his literary work as a renowned writer under the pseudonym Prežihov Voranc. The unconfirmed information that Tito shook hands with all the deputies who attended the reception after the adoption of the Constitution, but avoided shaking hands with Kuhar, suggested that Kuhar did not enjoy the trust of his former associate. Dragotin Gustinčič returned home after decades of working abroad, mostly in Moscow. He expected to be appropriately rewarded for all the years of his work in the Party and the Comintern. The government, however, did not offer him any important political position. When Kuhar and Gustinčič met in Ljubljana after the war, they also discussed the sorts of tasks that they had been entrusted with. They both realised that the leading politicians avoided meeting with them, but were unable to identify the reasons for this. Therefore, according to Gustinčič, “we came to the conclusion that this was an agenda of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Slovenia, aimed not only against the two of us, but also against all of the older communists in Slovenia.”¹³

Dragotin Gustinčič is an example of a person whose categorisation as a supporter of the Cominform Resolution was very questionable. He was a person whom the leading Slovenian communists identified as the leading Cominform supporter in Slovenia. He was among the founders of the CPY in 1920 and he spent a decade as a member of its leadership. He was in Spain during the Spanish Civil War, and then he returned to the Soviet Union, where he remained until as late as 1945. After the war, such individuals were rewarded with important cultural or scientific positions by the authorities who, in turn, expected their political loyalty. They were not supposed to exert any influence whatsoever on the political arena. Dragotin Gustinčič was appointed as the first dean of the newly-established Faculty of Economics at the University of Ljubljana. He was thus supposed to implement the kind of education for the new type of economic development planners. But Gustinčič was disappointed with his own political impotence in the new state: as a former leading communist he was insulted by the fact that he had been pushed to the sidelines and convinced that he should be assigned to one of the more important positions in the state leadership.¹⁴

Since the leading politicians refused to respond to Gustinčič’s requests for meetings and discussions, he decided to head into the political arena regardless. As he was not foreseen for any political function at all, he considered the option of standing

12 Barič, *Politični vzpon in zaton*, pp. 88–102.

13 Dolenc, *Med kulturo in politiko*, p. 235.

14 Gabrič, *Od somišljenika do nasprotnika*, pp. 119–123.

independently for the Yugoslav Constituent Assembly elections on 11 November 1945. At the meeting with Vinko Möderndorfer and Lovro Kuhar, Gustinčič proposed that they should all stand as candidates in the elections, and he also considered a number of people who could be invited to participate. The idea was to propose to Tito, the leader of the People's Front list, to "include Gustinčič's candidates as co-candidates on his list". Möderndorfer had misgivings and claimed that such an action could result in an "external appearance of a split", which could damage the expected victory in the elections "in the foreign political as well as in the internal political sense." When Lovro Kuhar stated his own opinion and mentioned that he had already been appointed as a candidate on Tito's list, "Gustinčič lost his main argument for the endorsement of the old communists', as Kuhar was one of those as well."¹⁵ Kuhar and Möderndorfer warned their colleague that his solo action – the case "when Gustinčič wanted to draw up an opposition list" – could be deemed as a "destructive" act, as this would go against the leadership of the Communist Party and the candidate list of the People's Front for the Yugoslav Constituent Assembly elections.¹⁶

Gustinčič brought up a similar idea on the occasion of the Slovenian Constituent Assembly elections in the autumn of 1946. During the first post-war years, the internal administration allocated its resources for the monitoring of the regime's opponents to the so-called gangs and politicians of other political persuasions. For this reason, they did not pay much attention to the disgruntled individuals in their own ranks. They did not come across Gustinčič's idea of presenting parallel candidates in the elections, which had never resulted in a more serious action until the investigation of Gustinčič and his associates. The investigation, however, was indirectly encouraged by Gustinčič himself, who had not only criticised the new authorities in the closed circles of his closest associates, but also detailed his criticism in writing and sent it to the leading Slovenian communists. Initially, he called upon the leading Slovenian politicians to discuss these outstanding issues. The lack of any response, however, only deepened his conviction that the policies were not heading in the right direction.

In January 1946, he thus sent letters to some of the leading Slovenian communists, Boris Kidrič, Edvard Kardelj and Miha Marinko, in which he expressed the most severe criticism of communist authorities written by a communist ideologue. Gustinčič wrote the letters on the basis of narrow-minded doctrinal foundations that had even less to do with the actual circumstances than in the case of the leading communists. In May 1947, he addressed his most comprehensive letter, more than 20 pages long, to the leading Party ideologue Edvard Kardelj. Gustinčič severely criticised the authorities and the Communist Party.¹⁷

15 SI AS 1931, MF XII-003, 4665.

16 SI AS 1931, MF XII-003, 4688, 4590–4591.

17 Gabrič, *Od somišljenika do nasprotnika*, pp. 123–127.

In his letters, Gustinčič criticised the distancing of the Communist Party from the theoretical principles of Marxist and Leninist thinkers. He resented the leadership for pushing older communists away from the mechanisms of power, although they had proven themselves even before Tito had assumed the leadership of the Party. He reproached Kardelj as follows: “Judging from your behaviour, the history of the workers’ movement began around 1937 or perhaps even later.” It was clear from his writing that Gustinčič was offended because he had supposedly not been appropriately rewarded for all the years he had dedicated to the Party. He also criticised the fact that Partisans were given priority over communist experts during the appointment of the management personnel, since professional competence should have been the decisive criterion and claimed that this was the reason why the productivity of the nationalised factories had diminished. He did not agree with the principles of organising cooperatives, as he, quoting Lenin constantly, believed that the Yugoslav model deviated too much from the ideas of Soviet theorists. Wrong decisions regarding the development of industry allegedly deterred the proletariat, which should have represented the core of the communist movement. While listing these mistakes and many others, Gustinčič wondered how it was possible that, after all the analyses by Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin, such errors were possible in Slovenia at all. Furthermore, he disapproved of the national policy at the disputed border area in the Trieste region, as it supposedly over-emphasised the national principles instead of the class-related and revolutionary ones. In Gustinčič’s opinion, the CPY was still overly lenient towards its associates in the Liberation Front, while it failed to implement the Party politics in the entire political space consistently.¹⁸

The leadership of the CPY was not ready for this sort of criticism in 1947. The investigation took place at two levels. Gustinčič was summoned to Belgrade in August 1947 and questioned before a Party commission (instead of being immediately interrogated by the UDB, UDV). The State Security simultaneously started investigating Gustinčič’s associates.¹⁹ Thus the investigation had apparently started at least half a year before the dispute between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union took place. In April 1948, Dragotin Gustinčič and some of his collaborators were arrested because some of the criticism contained in Gustinčič’s letters resembled the reproaches on account of the CPY stated later in the letters from the Cominform.

Ultimately, we can only ask ourselves the following: how could someone be taken as a supporter of the Cominform Resolution when he had been interrogated by the Party Commission more than half a year before the Resolution in question was even published, and when they had already been in prison with a severely restricted access to the media for several months before the Resolution?

18 SI AS 1931, t.e. 445, OD Dragotin Gustinčič, pp. 301–333.

19 SI AS 1931, t.e. 445, OD Dragotin Gustinčič, pp. 369–370.

The report on the close associate of Gustinčič, the aforementioned Vinko Möderndorfer, amply attests to the absurdity of such accusations. Also, in April 1949, when the arrests of the Cominform supporters were at their height, the city committee of the Communist Party in Celje reported about his case: "The reason for the arrest is unknown to us. We suspect that it is related to the process against Bitenc and co-defendants."²⁰ But Möderndorfer had nothing whatsoever to do with Mirko Bitenc, who was sentenced to death in 1948 as an organiser of anti-Partisan armed units during the war and as a post-war spy.

In the aforementioned report of March 1950, the Slovenian Minister of the Interior Boris Kraigher highlighted that everything worth mentioning with regard to the organisation of the Cominform supporters had originated from foreign Cominform organisations. Even when he mentioned some of the smaller Cominform groups in Slovenia in passing, he was not upset about them and did not see them as a relevant political problem.²¹ In the police files, however, the assessments of who might be a dangerous Cominform supporter remained the same. For this reason, Dragotin Gustinčič ended up on the list of dangerous Cominform supporters drawn up in 1958 and was imprisoned for a while once again. He was yet again identified as a dangerous organiser of an otherwise small political group of Cominform supporters. One of the individuals who were imprisoned once again in 1958, but who was subsequently released as the charges against him were dropped, wrote in his memoirs that in this case the charges brought up by the police were also not based on reality. This was Janez Jezeršek "Sokol", who, at that point, made acquaintance with Dragotin Gustinčič in prison and got to know him. He stated that Gustinčič was allegedly "the leader of a group that I knew nothing about, yet I belonged to it according to the police and was also supposed to be sentenced because of it."²²

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AS 232 – Ministrstvo za znanost in kulturo Ljudske republike Slovenije 1949–1951.

AS 1589 – Centralni komite Zveze komunistov Slovenije 1945–1990.

AS 1931 – Republiški sekretariat za notranje zadeve 1945–1989.

SI ZAL – Zgodovinski arhiv Ljubljana

LJU 684 – Mestni komite Zveze komunistov Slovenije Ljubljana 1945–1954.

20 Gabrič, *Od somišljenika do nasprotnika*, p. 132.

21 *Zapisniki politbiroja CK KPS/ZKS 1945–1954*, p. 199.

22 Jezeršek, *Medaljoni našega časa*, p. 83.

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Summary

Aleš Gabrič

Cominform Supporters in Slovenia

The following contribution describes the persecution of actual and imaginary supporters of the Cominform Resolution in Slovenia. In the scientific literature, Slovenia has already been depicted as the part of Yugoslavia where, unlike in certain other parts of Yugoslavia, people agreeing with the Cominform Resolution were relatively few and far between. Furthermore, Cominform Supporters in Slovenia were merely individuals or smaller groups, and therefore they did not represent any larger organised groups or political factors that could seriously challenge the authority of the ruling elite. Nevertheless, the authorities designated many critics of the regime from their own ranks as “Cominform Supporters”, and these were most frequently from the ranks of the intellectuals. The contribution describes the difference between Slovenia and the rest of Yugoslavia with regard to the persecution of the alleged Stalin's sympathisers; points out the difference in

the percentage of the people arrested and their social structure; as well as defines the period when the arrests were most frequent. Special attention is paid to certain cases that deviated significantly from the average. The example of the group gathered around Dragotin Gustinčič is outlined, as this conflict reveals the unsolved disputes between the authorities and the older generation of communists, who felt left out and neglected after Tito had taken over the leadership of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia. It is precisely the case of Gustinčič that indicates how a long-term conflict between an individual and the authorities could lead to people who were already imprisoned at that time and had nothing whatsoever to do with the Cominform Resolution being subsequently designated as Cominform supporters as well. Dragotin Gustinčič's letters, addressed to the leading Slovenian communists in the first years after the war, can be deemed as the most severe critique of the communist regime, written from the extremely leftist viewpoints of the communist intellectuals. The analysis of these letters reveals certain similarities with the criticism that would be voiced by the Cominform Resolution only months later.

Darja Kerec

The Role of Russia and the Soviet Union in the History of Prekmurje

In the spring of 1919, Prekmurje was still a part of Hungary, where Communists, who had joined forces with the Social Democrats, assumed power on 21 March 1919 in what was essentially a coup. The people living in Budapest and the countryside were taken aback by the establishment of the Republic of Councils and were not in favour of the dictatorship of the proletariat. Vilmoš Tkalec, a teacher and church choirmaster (cantor), was active in Prekmurje at that time. During the war, he fought on the Russian Front, where he was also held captive in 1917.¹ After returning home, he worked as a commander of the Hungarian Border Police along the Mura River and as a civil commissioner in Murska Sobota. In late December 1918, around 100 Yugoslav volunteer soldiers, commanded by the Croatian Captain Jure Jurišić, occupied Murska Sobota; they were driven out in the early morning hours on 3 January 1919 by the Hungarian Army. The proletarian rule committed no atrocities, there were no assassinations, attacks on people's property or seizures of plants.²

After the coup d'état in Hungary in April 1919, Tkalec adopted the ideas of Hungarian bolshevism and was elected president of the Workers' Soviet. He became a commissioner for the Slovene March, the Slovenian-speaking area of Prekmurje. He was an interesting character. He became involved in smuggling, which is why detectives came all the way from Budapest to Murska Sobota.³ Hence, for his own legal and political protection, he soon turned into a counter-revolutionary and even strove to establish an autonomous state or to break away Prekmurje from Hungary. Thus on 29 May 1919 in Murska Sobota, on the balcony of the Dobrai Hotel at 11:30 a.m., he declared the so-called Mura Republic. He was supported by some soldiers who wanted to overthrow

1 Knjižnica MS, *Tkalec Vilmoš*; Slovenska biografija, *Tkalec*.

2 Viri za Prekmurje, p. 276.

3 Ibid.

the dictatorship of the proletariat. This republic was founded as a one-man campaign because the people of Prekmurje were not even aware of it. Tkalec even sent a telegram to the leader of Hungarian Communists, Béla Kun, saying that the so-called Slovene March, that is the Slovenian-speaking region which included Prekmurje and part of the Raba Valley, had been transformed into an autonomous republic, and that the nation was not in favour of Communist principles and therefore might turn to Austria for help.⁴ The republic was over in less than a week. Units of the Hungarian Red Guard occupied Murska Sobota on 3 June 1919. On 6 June, all battles ended. On 12 August 1919, the army of the Kingdom of SCS took control of the region of Prekmurje with an international mandate.

The military and political leaders of the Mura Republic retreated across the border to Austria where they were captured. Tkalec soon returned to Prekmurje as the leader of the “White Guard”, but was caught and imprisoned in Lendava.⁵ He miraculously escaped from prison to Hungary where he lived until his death in 1950.

The greatest impact of the Russian Revolution in Prekmurje can be seen in the fact that some of the Bolshevik soldiers engaged in plundering. They looted the manor of the Hungarian Count Avgust Zichy in Beltinci near Murska Sobota and the warehouses of certain traders and started fires in Croatia, for instance in the settlement of Štrigova in the Medimurje region.⁶ The events in Russia also affected the younger generation. On 6 July 1919, the Young Communist Workers’ Society was established in Murska Sobota⁷ and a week later the local Social Democratic Party merged with the Communists.⁸

In March 1919, an agency of the Hungarian Republic of Councils led by Tkalec took control of the central local newspaper *Novine* (Newspaper), which was edited by the Catholic priest Jožef Klekl. Ironically, it was Klekl himself who had published the news of Cadet Vilmoš Tkalec, a wounded prisoner on the Russian Front.⁹ Until 12 August, when Yugoslav troops occupied Prekmurje, the paper was published as *Proletarske Novine* (Proletarian Newspaper) and *Rdeče Novine* (Red Newspaper), but was not popular among readers. During World War I, as the editor of the paper, Klekl had a lot of influence on the emotions and attitudes of readers towards anything Russian. His attitude towards Russia was negative. In his articles he portrayed Russians as the “enemies” and Orthodox Christians who had betrayed the Catholic religion.

Jožef Klekl, who died in 1948, remained politically and socially active even in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. His negative experience with Bolsheviks was reflected in this new state. He was a harsh critic of the liberal ideas penetrating the local cultural

4 Ibid., p. 277.

5 Cigut, *Ustanovitev Murske republike*, p. 43.

6 Viri za Prekmurje, p. 275.

7 Kuzmič, *Kronologija Murske Sobote*.

8 *Novine*, 20. 7. 1919, p. 4.

9 *Novine*, 3. 7. 1917, p. 4.

environment from abroad, including the Soviet Union. In his newspaper *Marijin list* (Mary's Paper) in March 1941, Klekl wrote that the Croatian *Katoliški list* (Catholic Paper) had expressed its concern over cinemas, which did not teach morality as a public educational institution should. He was troubled by the fact that "Marxist propaganda" was spreading throughout Slovenia and Croatia and that "Soviet films, though clad in the Russian national cloth, have a propagandist nature." A month later, Yugoslavia was at war and Klekl's apprehensions of "Russian propaganda" came true. A special kind of symbolism was also evident in the first film shown in Murska Sobota after the arrival of the Red Army in Prekmurje. On 4 April 1945, a few days after the liberation, the cinema Grajski kino showed a Soviet film with a telling title of "6 Minutes after Victory". The soldiers of the Red Army had brought it with them and it is no wonder that the auditorium was sold out. The local newsletter of the Liberation Front reported that "after so many years of occupation, the showing of this film was a great cultural experience for the viewers."¹⁰

So, on 3 April 1945, Prekmurje or Murska Sobota was liberated by Red Army soldiers, who belonged to the left wing of the Third Ukrainian Front. The arrival of the Russians held material and spiritual consequences for Murska Sobota and for the entire region along the Mura River; the Russians did not set foot on other parts of Slovene territory. The first consequence of the arrival of the Red Army soldiers was the establishment of "Russian authorities": from April to mid-May the Mayor of Murska Sobota was the Red Army Major Fedor Barsukov. In January 1945, the sole Prekmurian army formation, Prekmurska četa [Prekmurian corps], was founded, whose fighters participated in the final operations together with the members of the Red Army. Because of another Hungarian occupation, the reaction to the arrival of the Russian liberators was positive, but this would not remain for long; after 1948 the attitude towards the Soviet Union and Stalin changed as it had elsewhere, both in Slovenia and Yugoslavia. In the first two years after the liberation, one can speak of an almost symptomatic affection towards the Red Army soldiers (with the exception of the clergy, the expropriated industrialists and the inhabitants of Hungarian nationality). This affection is reflected primarily in the news items from two local newspapers: *Novi čas* and *Ljudski glas* (Voice of the People), which informed the Slovenes of Prekmurje about events around the world and at home on a daily and weekly basis, respectively. As a rule, one to two pages were dedicated to news items or reports on the advances of the Red Army and the allies across Europe and two more pages to local events (funerals of Red Army soldiers who fell on Prekmurian land, assemblies and celebration in gratitude to the liberators, and voluntary (humanitarian) collection campaigns by the local population for Russian soldiers). As early as 12 August 1945, a victory monument, over 17 metres tall, was unveiled in the

10 Kerec, *Od Talije*, p. 821.

11 Kerec, *Red Army*, p. 99.

centre of Murska Sobota, on Trg zmage; the monument was a result of Russian-Slovene co-operation (the work of the military engineer Arončik and the Kalin brothers, who made the monuments of the partisan and the Red Army soldier). Similarly to the Prešeren Monument in the centre of Ljubljana, the Murska Sobota victory monument, despite post-independence initiatives for its removal, is still a landmark and one of the chief architectural and artistic monuments of Murska Sobota, and, in a broader sense, a unique attraction: this monument is in fact the only one of its kind on Slovene soil.¹¹

This was a time of inclusion in post-war life, of many work campaigns (which did not stop over the years) and preparations for elections to the constituent assembly on 11 November 1945. This was also the time for the first analyses of the merits of individuals for liberating Prekmurje and the accusations of collaborating with the occupiers. Inhabitants along the Mura River did not exactly favour the Russian liberators, which is why the euphoria during the unveiling of the monument on Trg zmage was most likely insincere, even though the politics and the renovation of the town and landscape did not give up on Stalin's legacy until 1948.¹² By 1948, much ink had been used to write about the mutual affection between Stalin and Tito; the spirit of mutual acknowledgment of the merits for liberation was also demonstrated by the fact that Marshal Tito was awarded the Order of Victory. Less than a month after the unveiling of the monument in Murska Sobota, Ambassador Sadčikov awarded Tito with the highest Soviet decoration.¹³

The unveiling of the monument was reported by several newspapers, all of which unanimously welcomed the solemn event and praised the Russian liberators as Slavic brothers and allies: "Last Sunday Prekmurje witnessed a grand manifestation: the unveiling of the Monument of Victory and Eternal Brotherhood. This mighty monument is an artistic work of contemporary sculpture. It stands on a large market in the centre of the town. It was erected by the Slovene people in gratitude to and memory of the fighters of the celebrated Red and Yugoslav Armies." The preserved photographs taken on the day of the unveiling of the monument, at first glance do not show a crowd of people joining in the celebration; in the published news items representatives of the Red Army with the Soviet Ambassador Sadčikov are mentioned above all.¹⁴

12 Ibid., p. 82.

13 Ibid., p. 84.

14 Ibid.



Photo 1: The unveiling of the victory monument on 12 August 1945
(*Pokrajinski muzej Murska Sobota. Katalog stalne razstave, p. 321.*)

A direct consequence of the Cominform conflict was the iron curtain in the east of Prekmurje. All road connections to Hungary were closed. Until 1948, there were as many as 9 border crossings in Prekmurje along the Hungarian state border.¹⁵ In the Raba Valley, on the Hungarian side, one consequence was a hysteria of sorts, directed at Tito; preparations for war also included a preventive “cleansing” of the zone bordering with Yugoslavia. Slovenes in Hungary became potential enemies of the Hungarian Communist regime. In Prekmurje, people were worried because of the systematic Hungarization of Slovenes in the Raba Valley. During the population census of January 1949, Slovenes were forced to declare themselves Hungarian. Many




Photo 2: The monument originally included Stalin's image, which was taken down demonstratively during the conflict with the Information Bureau (*Pokrajinski muzej Murska Sobota. Katalog stalne razstave, p. 322.*)

15 Olas and Kert, *Vpliv državnih meja*, p. 138.

who resisted were arrested; in prison they were forced to declare themselves against Yugoslavia in exchange for freedom. Hungarian authorities formed a 15 km border zone along the Yugoslav and Austrian borders; only the people who had a special card were allowed to linger there. The border separating Hungary from Austria and Yugoslavia was sealed. The border zone was protected by state security bodies. This was manifested in the numerous proceedings initiated against people for suspected espionage and smuggling of people; the police exerted control over the population and people were being exiled or deported. Many ended up on the lists of kulaks or deportees, or were punished for not paying the mandatory tribute in field crops because they did not want to join agricultural cooperatives.¹⁶

The Cominform conflict aggravated the already poor economic situation in the mostly rural region of Prekmurje. It was mandatory to hand over any agricultural surplus. People were required to join agricultural cooperatives. Between 1949 and 1951, the number of court proceedings against farmers increased. At the so-called kulak proceedings, mostly large farmers were convicted of illegal speculation and sabotage, and of opposing the establishment of agricultural cooperatives.¹⁷ Courts passed stricter sentences than in previous years; these were mainly fines and prison sentences. Those who had kept the crop surplus for themselves or had made a profit were labelled speculators, for instance millers and traders.¹⁸

Yugoslav authorities devoted special attention to the youth and pointed out the so-called witch-hunt against the Cominformists, warning young people of it at special educational courses for the youth. At a conference in Ljutomer in March 1949, members of the Youth Organisation adopted a resolution in which they condemned Radio Budapest for spreading lies on the air about socialism in Yugoslavia, Tito, the Communist Party and the work campaigns of the Yugoslav youth.¹⁹ In September, a youth protest rally against the Hungarian government was held in Murska Sobota.²⁰

From July 1948 to the end of 1949, the central newspaper in Prekmurje *Ljudski glas* (Voice of the People) published news about Cominform agitators (called *informisti* or *informkričači* in Slovenian). They appeared at the border in Hodoš, where the Hungarian minority lived. However, the local authorities stressed that national minorities had the same rights and obligations in Yugoslavia as the rest of the population, and that they therefore sided with Yugoslav socialism and joined agricultural cooperatives.

Industrial workers also felt the aftermath of the Cominform conflict. In the company *Proizvodnja nafte* (Oil Production) in Lendava, workers experienced difficulties in the spring of 1949 because some of the countries that had previously supplied machines

16 Munda Hirnök, *Represija nad Slovenci*, pp. 203-204.

17 Čoh Kladnik, *Ozadje sodnih procesov*, p. 70.

18 Roudi, *Življenje v Prekmurju*, p. 89.

19 *Ljudski glas*, 24. 3. 1949, p. 1.

20 *Ljudski glas*, 22. 9. 1949, p. 1.

for oil production activities stopped supplying them due to the conflict or had sent machines that did not work.²¹ Factories organised competitions for realising the annual plan. In December 1949, *Tovarna perila Mura* (Mura Clothing Factory) in Murska Sobota organised a six-hour competition with *Tovarna perila* (Clothing Factory) in Zagreb to boost performance. The Mura factory informed the public that the campaign was its reply to “all of the slander and lies being spread by the Cominform countries”. Such work performance competitions were adopted by all the major companies, especially in the construction industry.²²

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Summary

Darja Kerec

The Role of Russia and the Soviet Union in the History of Prekmurje

Despite the end of World War I, Prekmurje remained a part of Hungary until mid-August 1919. The border between the Republic of Hungary and the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenians was finally demarcated at Trianon on 4 June 1920. The inhabitants of Prekmurje, Slovenians and Hungarians alike, had already become accustomed to uncertain political circumstances during the four years of war. They had been informed of the events of the February (Bourgeois) and October Revolution of 1917, and they awaited the outcome of the war in fear. Prekmurje was the only part of Slovene territory, at the time still a part of Hungary, to be affected by the revolution. In the media in period between the two World Wars (1918/19 to 1941), representatives of the Roman Catholic Church and the local authorities would often express their fear of Bolshevism, social democracy, Marxism and the influence of the Soviet Union, which was only marginal at the time. All of that changed during World War II; as early as 3 April 1945, Russian soldiers (the Red Army, made up of the left wing of the 3rd Ukrainian Front) marched into Prekmurje (Murska Sobota) and liberated it. As the grand victor, the Soviet Union immortalised its military and administrative presence by building and solemnly unveiling a victory monument in the centre of Murska Sobota on 12 August 1945. This monument glorifying a Red Army soldier and a partisan would most likely not have been erected in 1948 (the conflict with the Cominform); however, the government did adopt the Act on the Protection of Cultural Monuments and Natural Features that very year. This monument 17 metres tall was designed by the Russian architect Jurij Arončik, while the two bronze sculptures are the work of the Kalin brothers (the partisan was sculpted by Zdenko, and the Red Army soldier by Boris Kalin). A Russian T-34 tank is also a part of the monument. This was followed by a decade of post-war reconstruction and accelerated industrialisation, and the Russian influences subsided for a while, as they did elsewhere throughout the then Yugoslavia. A demonstrative act in the conflict between Tito and Stalin was the removal of Stalin's image from the top of this monument. In the mid-1950s, events in Hungary once again put the attitude of Slovenians (Yugoslavs) towards the Soviet Union to the test; especially in

Prekmurje and along the border with Hungary, which was sealed tight. In late 1956, Hungarian refugees retreated to the Yugoslav side (according to the available data, close to 2,300 of them sought shelter in Slovenia). Later on, the Yugoslav authorities attempted to resolve their status with a special asylum policy. Until the end of the Cold War, the democratisation of Hungary, and Slovenia's attainment of independence, the border between Yugoslavia and Hungary was strictly guarded on the Prekmurje side; many still remember that an ordinary crossing of the border was quite an adventure for Yugoslav tourists and consumers, because on the Hungarian side not only Hungarian customs officers awaited them, but Soviet soldiers as well.

Christian Axboe Nielsen

Never-ending vigilance: The Yugoslav State Security Service and Cominform Supporters after Goli Otok

Throughout the existence of socialist Yugoslavia, the Yugoslav State Security Service was the primary guardian of the communist party-state against “internal enemies.” Known colloquially as “the Udba,” under the leadership of Aleksandar Ranković it led the struggle against pro-Cominform elements in Yugoslavia after June 1948 and the establishment of the island prison camp on Goli Otok.¹ Understandably, this period of extreme repression has attracted the most interest from researchers. By contrast, this paper will explore the issue of surveillance of Cominform supporters after they had returned from Goli Otok. It will look at this issue up to the mid-1980s and will specifically deal with the problem of fear within the State Security Service of a Soviet-led attack against Yugoslavia after Tito’s death. The main argument is that while Soviet-Yugoslav relations ebbed and waned in the decades following the bilateral rapprochement in the mid-1950s, and an amnesty in 1955, the Yugoslav State Security Service maintained operational interest in the activities of Cominform supporters until the Yugoslav state began to collapse. Simply put, as long as socialist Yugoslavia existed, the fear of “Cominformism” never quite disappeared, even though the Cominform itself ceased to exist in 1956.

It is necessary for me to state at the outset that this paper is in many senses an impressionistic draft prepared for the purposes of participation in the June 2018 conference “The Tito-Stalin Split: 70 Years after.” As such, the paper will present qualitative observations and some very preliminary impressions but does not purport to present any systematic research on this topic or detailed conclusions. I leave further research on this matter to colleagues whose curiosity may be piqued by the ruminations contained in this paper.

1 The Yugoslav State Security Service during the course of its existence had a number of different names. For the purposes of this paper, the two most important names were *Uprava državne bezbednosti* (State Security Administration, UDB, 1946-1966) and *Služba državne bezbednosti* (State Security Service, SDB, 1966-1991).

Background

The political and ideological context of the Tito-Stalin split and the main repressive phase symbolized by the establishment of the Goli Otok prison camp and the incarceration of thousands of suspected Cominform supporters has been covered very well in the existing historiography and need not be summarized here.² While the focus on the massive human rights abuses committed by the Yugoslav communist regime on Goli Otok and related prisons such as those at Stara Gradiška and Bileća is understandable, it has led to a comparative neglect of the regime's ongoing vigilance towards, and repression of, suspected Cominformists after the repression at Goli Otok started to recede. Here it should be noted that there are strong indications that the leadership of the Yugoslav party-state knew very well by the early 1950s that a very large portion of those imprisoned in Goli Otok had in fact not been fervent supporters of the Cominform but had rather been hesitant or insufficiently enthusiastic in their support of Tito's stance, or had been the victims of denunciations motivated by various base motives. Alternatively, many of those identified as supporters of the Cominform had committed other kinds of crimes earlier, such as "espionage, banditry, sabotage" but also non-political crimes such as theft and fraud. Law enforcement and state security officials probably found it tempting to "uncover" and punish existing criminals by adding on political charges.³ Nonetheless, regardless of the awareness of the bloated nature of the rolls of *ibeovci* (Cominformists), vigilance remained.

Perhaps the key overriding point that must be emphasized when trying to understand the political context of Yugoslavia's existence is the profound sense of international isolation in which the country found itself after the June 1948 split. The later creation of the Non-Aligned Movement, assistance from the West and rapprochement with the Soviet Union somewhat attenuated this isolation, but the notion of Yugoslavia as a besieged outpost never completely abandoned the mindset of the Yugoslav leadership. As a corollary to this mentality, it is also critical to understand the notion of Yugoslavia being involved in an epic existential struggle in which it had to remain constantly vigilant against both internal and external enemies. A September 1947 document of the Bosnian branch of the Yugoslav State Security Service described how, "in our young state," a mixture of internal and external enemies "oppose and will continue to oppose everything that contributes to the economic strengthening of the state and towards political and cultural development. The activity of the enemy hitherto unfolds on all fields of social, political and economic life."⁴ The fight for the success of socialism was

2 See among other works Banac, *With Stalin against Tito*; Perović, *The Tito-Stalin Split*, pp. 32-63; Previšić, *Povijest informbiroovskog logora*.

3 Archive of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Bosnia and Herzegovina (henceforth, Archive of MUP BiH), Assistant Minister Svetislav Stefanović, Udba FNRJ to Assistant Minister, Udba BiH, 22 November 1949.

4 Archive of MUP BiH, Udba BiH to all district Udba offices, 13 September 1947.

a fight to the death. The deadly seriousness of the situation was of course reinforced by the witch hunt against “Titoists” in the Soviet bloc.⁵

Beyond Goli Otok

Without any doubt, the prison island of Goli Otok became the embodiment of the repression of real and alleged Cominformists in Yugoslavia. However, Goli Otok was in many ways not just the climax of this repression but also the beginning and not the end of the Yugoslav regime’s concerns regarding the Cominformist threat. As the dossiers of these prisoners in the Slovenian archives show, collaboration with the Yugoslav State Security Service was for very many of them a precondition for their release from the island.⁶ Returning to the mainland, they were deployed to uncover other suspected Cominformists and to check the loyalty of those former Cominformists who had (allegedly) recanted in order to be rehabilitated by the regime. Even when such agreements to act as informants were signed, former prisoners from Goli Otok and other prisons bore the mark of political shame and dishonour for many years. Many of them faced difficulty obtaining gainful employment or any form of career advancement. And anyone who has spoken to Cominformists or their descendants has heard stories of how they were shunned by former colleagues and even family and friends.

Yet the story of the continued interest of the Yugoslav State Security Service remains relatively unknown. It can be told in episodes that generally mimic the ebb and flow of the Yugoslav-Soviet bilateral relationship but also the internal crises experienced within Yugoslavia. For example, coinciding with the rapprochement in the mid-1950s, the Yugoslav government enacted an amnesty.

However, a decade later, in connection with the purge of Yugoslav Vice President Aleksandar Ranković and former head of the Yugoslav State Security Service in 1966, Cominformists again faced scrutiny.⁷ Every time a danger to the Yugoslav communist party-state materialized, it was necessary to manufacture a label that could be used to convey the nature of this danger, and the case of Ranković was no exception. The party-state leadership settled on the label of *birokratsko-etatistički* (bureaucratic-statist) deviationism. This label neatly summarized Ranković’s sins: his centralism and his opposition to (slight) political and (more considerable) economic liberalization. In the context of the time, these sins aligned Ranković with the Cominformists, and it was therefore to be expected that the Yugoslav State Security Service would be concerned about the establishment of a *sprega* (“nexus”) – one of the Service’s favourite words – that would consist of irate and powerful supporters of Ranković and unrepentant Cominformists. The fact that

5 For a thorough and detailed account of the other side of the conflict in one Soviet bloc country, see Vojtěchovský, *Iz Praga protiv Tita!*.

6 Archive of Republic of Slovenia (henceforth, AS), F. 1931, šk.1045-1050.

7 SK and BD book, but criticize its one-sided view of events.

many members of both these groups stemmed from the ranks of the Yugoslav army and the security services only increased the perceived danger that they posed to Yugoslavia.

In the event, the fall of Ranković passed without any larger counterattack on the Yugoslav party-state. Yet the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 again quickly raised concerns about the activities of Cominformists.⁸ The Yugoslav State Security Service claimed that it detected lively activity among Cominformists as a result of the events in Czechoslovakia. In addition to the obvious interest in Soviet Bloc citizens and intelligence agencies, the Yugoslav State Security Service once again fixed the spotlight on the “IB complex.”⁹ The latent network of informants among Cominformists was reactivated, and all former Cominformists underwent security checks again, “with the accent on the so-called ‘top’, possible ‘leaders’ and collaborationists,” and lists for the “isolation” of the most dangerous among them were revised. In Bosnia and Herzegovina alone, 1,087 “former Cominformists” were checked by mid-September 1968, while in Macedonia 375 *informativni razgovori* (interrogations) had been conducted.¹⁰ By contrast, and very surprisingly given the well-known disproportional representation of Cominformists in Montenegro, the republican state security service there had up until the invasion only actively monitored 13 former Cominformists. This rather shocking shortcoming appears to have been a function of severely insufficient staffing of the Montenegrin State Security Service.

Perhaps not coincidentally, the Yugoslav State Security Service the year after the invasion of Czechoslovakia updated its own procedures for wartime conditions, and the Yugoslav government found it necessary to redistribute the *Bela knjiga o agresivnim postupcima vlada SSSR-a, Poljske, Čehoslovačke, Mađarske, Rumunije, Bugarske i Albanije prema Jugoslaviji* (The White Book on the Aggressive Behaviour of the Governments of the USSR, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria and Albania towards Yugoslavia), which had been originally issued in 1951.¹¹ Likewise, in May 1972, the federal Yugoslav State Security Service (SSUP SDB) reported on aspects of renewed hostile Soviet activity against Yugoslavia.¹² During this time, Yugoslav-Soviet relations were also tense because of Yugoslav suspicions that Branko Jelić, one of the most important figures in the Croat emigration, was receiving support from the Soviet Union.¹³

8 See Akcija Sokol, AS, F. 1931, šk. 1187.

9 Slovenian State Security Service, Draft of the Contents of the Dossier for the Operation Sokol, 21 August 1968, AS, F. 1931, šk. 1187.

10 SSUP SDB, III. Sector, Official Note on Meeting with Republican SDB Inspectors, 19 September 1968, AS, F. 1931, šk. 1187.

11 Letter of SSUP SDB to Slovenian State Security Service, 26 February 1969, AS, F. 1931, šk. 1051.

12 SSUP SDB, Information on Some Forms of Newer Hostile Activity of the USSR against the SFRJ, AS, F. 1931, šk. 1203. The SSUP SDB provided this information to the commission that was preparing the June 1972 visit of Tito to the Soviet Union.

13 SSUP SDB, Information on Alleged Connections of Dr. Branko Jelić with the Soviet Intelligence Service and Other Factors in the USSR, AS, F. 1931, šk. 1203. For evidence that Moscow’s interest in Croat separatism also attracted attention in the West, see Clissold, *Croat Separatism*, pp. 7–8, 19.

A year later, in February 1973, the SSUP SDB analysed hostile Cominformist activities against Yugoslavia.¹⁴ Such activities included the sending of Cominformist propaganda to Yugoslavia from both the Soviet bloc and from Western Europe, an activity that according to the SDB had increased since a meeting of European communist parties in Moscow in 1969. The first packages with such propaganda arriving in Yugoslavia had been sent from Denmark and West Germany. Based on a later SSUP SDB report, it is likely that these packages contained similar propaganda to that which Soviet visitors to Yugoslavia and representatives in the country had been spreading during those years.¹⁵ “All these materials were printed predominantly in the Serbo-Croatian language from 1969 until 1974 in the edition of the agency *Novosti* in Moscow, which means that they were intended for our citizens. In them, the economic, technical and other accomplishments of the USSR and the leading role of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the life and activity of students and the youth in the USSR, the living standards of the Soviet working people, etc., are praised.”¹⁶ The Yugoslav authorities also watched with concern the visits of Cominformists and other Yugoslav citizens to the *Dom sovjetske kulture* (House of Soviet Culture) in Belgrade. Although visitor numbers had dropped after the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, they recovered by the mid-1970s.¹⁷ Yet Yugoslav requests for similar cultural exhibitionism in the Soviet Union were consistently rebuffed. “Simply put, we have been put in the position that in the Soviet Union only that which corresponds to their criteria can be said about Yugoslavia.”¹⁸

Just like the Yugoslav State Security Service feared the destructive potential of a nexus of the “fascist emigration” – particularly Croats in Western Europe and overseas – with NATO and recalcitrant nationalist elements in Yugoslavia, so the SDB worried constantly about the links between the Cominformist emigration with the Warsaw Pact and obstinate Stalinists in Yugoslavia. And in the case of Kosovo Albanians, Stalinist or pro-Hoxha leanings blended with Albanian irredentism, which was a point of perennial concern within the Yugoslav security services.¹⁹ From the point of view of the SDB in 1973, “It can be said that since the so-called normalization of relations in 1955

14 SSUP SDB, Review of Hostile Activity towards the SFRJ by the Extreme Portion of the IB Emigration in East and West in Recent Times, AS, F. 1931, šk. 387.

15 SSUP SDB, Overview of Intelligence and Propagandistic-Subversive Activity of Soviet Experts on Temporary Work in Yugoslavia and Counteraction by the SDB, April 1975, AS, F. 1931, šk. 1209.

16 SSUP SDB, Subversive-Propagandistic Activity of the Soviet Union against Yugoslavia, 9 January 1975, p. 5, AS, F. 1931, šk. 1209.

17 *Ibid.*, pp. 6-8.

18 *Ibid.*

19 SSUP SDB, Newer Intelligence Regarding Hostile Activity of the Extreme Portion of the IB Emigration in East and West and the Reaction of the External and Internal Enemy Regarding the Arrest and Trial of a Cominform Group, 1 October 1974, p. 18, AS, F. 1931, šk. 1208. See also SSUP SDB, Intelligence of the SDB about Current Events in NR Albania and the Relationship towards the SFRJ, 1974(?), AS, F. 1931, šk. 1208.

until today, and this is also confirmed by our most recent intelligence, there has not been a correct and frank relationship towards Yugoslavia as regards the IB emigration in these countries.”²⁰ The Cominformist emigration continued to receive support from the Soviet Union and the Yugoslav authorities had intelligence suggesting that émigrés continued to be present on active service in the Soviet army “as well as in almost all institutions which are directed towards Yugoslavia.”²¹ The SDB focused on the “discovery, surveillance, documentation and interception of subversive-propagandistic and other enemy [Cominformist] activity.”²² At the end of 1972, 98 persons in Yugoslavia (51 in Montenegro, 1 in Croatia, 23 in Slovenia, 23 in Serbia, none in Bosnia-Herzegovina or Macedonia) were under active “operational processing” by the SDB.²³ The methods applied by the SDB included surveillance, occasional interrogations, warnings, interception of mail and forced resettlement.

In December 1974, Yuri Andropov, who was at that point the chief of the KGB, met with Yugoslav federal secretary for internal affairs Franjo Herljević in Moscow. Hostile Cominformist activity against Yugoslavia was among the topics discussed, though both agreed that Soviet-Yugoslav relations were improving and both promised to prevent any hostile activities against the other’s state.²⁴ Herljević told Andropov that it would be a shame to let the misguided deeds of a few dozen people ruin the bilateral relationship. Andropov further promised that the KGB would keep an alert eye on Yugoslav Cominformists residing in the Soviet Union and restrict their movements, and he offered to provide his Yugoslav counterpart with reports on their activities. For good measure, Andropov also offered to sell technical equipment for intelligence and counterintelligence operations to Yugoslavia and to assist if needed as regarded the “Yugoslav extreme emigration in Western Europe.”²⁵

In this context, it is worth recalling the Yugoslav State Security Service’s focus on the unrepentant Cominformist Vlado Dapčević, who had fled Yugoslavia in 1948, settling in Belgium after stays in Albania, the Soviet Union and other countries.²⁶ In 1975, Dapčević was arrested in Bucharest and extradited to Yugoslavia, where he was originally sentenced to death. The sentence was commuted to twenty years’ imprisonment. Dapčević was also featured in an October 1974 SDB analytical report on the hostile

20 SSUP SDB, Review of Hostile Activity towards the SFRJ by the Extreme Portion of the IB Emigration in East and West in Recent Times, February 1973, p. 20, AS, F. 1931, šk. 387.

21 Ibid., p. 21.

22 Ibid., p. 23.

23 Ibid., p. 24.

24 Janez Zemljarič, Official Yugoslav Note Regarding Meeting on 4 December 1974 of Yuri Andropov and Franjo Herljević, 10 December 1974, AS, F. 1931, šk. 383.

25 Compare, however, with SSUP SDB, Subversive-Propagandistic Activity of the Soviet Union against Yugoslavia, 9 January 1975, AS, F. 1931, šk. 1209; SSUP SDB, Overview of Newest Intelligence Regarding the Subversive Activity of Representatives of the USSR in the SFRJ, AS, December 1975, F. 1931, šk. 1209.

26 Regarding Dapčević and other *neoibeovci*, see Cvetković, *Između srpa i čekića 2*, pp. 469–95.

activities of the Cominform emigration and their reaction to the arrest of Cominformists in Yugoslavia who had been working on establishing “a new Communist Party of Yugoslavia.”²⁷ The arrest of Dapčević and the trial of the so-called “Bar Group” highlighted the continued repression of Cominformists.²⁸ According to SDB analysts, “Bureaucratic-dogmatic forces and other structures of the internal enemy are attempting to exploit this event to spread propaganda about the difficult state of affairs in the country, the creation of a psychosis of tension and unsolved politico-economic conditions.”²⁹ Worryingly for the SDB, Aleksandar Ranković had also expressed interest in the recent arrests, as had his deposed ally Vojin Lukić.³⁰ By contrast, the ousted liberal Serb communist Latinka Perović and dissident Milovan Đilas had expressed concerns that the Soviet and Cominformist threat was not being taken sufficiently seriously.³¹

Operation “*Center-80*”

This mentality would later become less anxious and urgent than it was in the immediate aftermath of June 1948, but it never quite disappeared and could and did flare up, most critically in the period preceding and immediately following Tito’s death in May 1980. By the beginning of the new decade, even the most zealous admirers of the president for life had to admit that Josip Broz Tito was mortal.

Around 3 January 1980, Tito was hospitalized in Ljubljana. The Slovenian State Security Service in mid-January initiated an operation named *Center-80* in connection with Tito’s deteriorating health and the security implications surrounding it.³² Any “bearers of hostile activity” were to be identified and neutralized during this period, whose critical nature was exacerbated greatly by the recent Soviet invasion of Afghanistan on 25 December 1979. The invasion retraumatized the Yugoslav security services, reawakening memories of 1956 and 1968, both of which had also triggered renewed

27 SSUP SDB, Newer Intelligence Regarding Hostile Activity of the Extreme Portion of the IB Emigration in East and West and the Reaction of the External and Internal Enemy Regarding the Arrest and Trial of a Cominform Group, 1 October 1974, AS, F. 1931, šk. 1208.

28 SSUP SDB, Information on the Terrorist and Other Subversive Activity of the Yugoslav Emigration in East and West and the Relations of the Official Organs of Individual Countries towards This Activity, 21 June 1976, p. 18, AS, F. 1931, šk. 387.

29 SSUP SDB, Newer Intelligence Regarding Hostile Activity of the Extreme Portion of the IB Emigration in East and West and the Reaction of the External and Internal Enemy Regarding the Arrest and Trial of a Cominform Group, p. 16, 1 October 1974, AS, F. 1931, šk. 1208.

30 SSUP SDB, Newer Intelligence Regarding Hostile Activity of the Extreme Portion of the IB Emigration in East and West and the Reaction of the External and Internal Enemy Regarding the Arrest and Trial of a Cominform Group, p. 18, 1 October 1974, AS, F. 1931, šk. 1208.

31 Ibid., p. 19.

32 Information Sheet on Operation “*Center-80*,” 23 April 1981, AS, F. 1931, šk. 378; SR Slovenia, Republican Secretariat for Internal Affairs, Enemy Activity Related to the State of Health of the President of the Republic – Proposal for the Establishment of an Operation”.

vigilance against Cominformists. In this context, “numerous speculations” appeared, including regarding “possible Soviet aggression in Yugoslavia.”³³

Although *Center-80* was initiated by the republican state security service in Slovenia, the SSUP SDB was of course also informed and involved. In a manner that seems in hindsight somewhat ridiculous, the pseudonym “Goran” was used to refer to the dying leader. Already on 15 January 1980, the SSUP SDB wrote that “members of all groups of internal enemies are using the intervention of the USSR in Afghanistan and the state of health of ‘Goran’ as a reason for the intensification of their propagandistic activity, networking, evaluation of the situation and advocacy of concrete hostile activities.”³⁴ Of course, many of these “internal enemies” were not Cominformists, but of the 450 persons identified by the SDB as having acted hostilely since the Soviet invasion, more than half – approximately 250 – were identified as being from the “bureaucratic-statist group,” and 190 were Cominformists, with the remainder stemming from the group condemned along with Ranković at the Fourth Plenum of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia in 1966.³⁵ “The largest group desires and expects the intervention of the USSR in our country.”³⁶ Certain individuals even claimed to know that the Cominformist emigration had already formed a “government” awaiting the death of Tito.³⁷ Some even spread rumours about an impending Third World War that would be worse than the Second World War. By contrast, “internal enemies” of “anarcho-liberal” liberal and nationalist stripes tended to think that the West would not permit Soviet intervention in Yugoslavia.

On 27 February 1980, the SSUP SDB issued further evaluations of the evolving situation.³⁸ This analysis highlighted three strategies of those actors exploiting the current situation. First, they sowed doubt about the stability of the “self-managing socialist system.” Second, they tried to provoke and exacerbate panic and “psychosis” among Yugoslav citizens, especially by highlighting the alleged risk of Soviet intervention in Yugoslavia. Third, they sought to attract new adherents to their anti-Yugoslav views. By this point, the Yugoslav State Security Service had registered negative remarks from approximately 2,000 persons, of which half had been made from the “bureaucratic-statist” position.³⁹ Of these 1,000 persons, 577 had in turn earlier been registered as Cominformists, and 60% were currently under the “treatment” of the SDB.⁴⁰

33 Information Sheet on Operation “*Center-80*,” 23 April 1981, AS, F. 1931, šk. 378.

34 SSUP SDB, Important Characteristics of the Activities of the Internal Enemy Regarding the Newest International Situation and Events in Our Country,” 15 January 1980, p. 1, AS, F. 1931, šk. 378.

35 Ibid., pp. 1, 4.

36 Ibid., p. 2.

37 Ibid., p. 3, AS, F. 1931, šk. 378.

38 SSUP SDB, Some Evaluations and Characteristics of the Activities of the Internal Enemy Regarding the Events in Afghanistan and the State of Health of the President of the Republic, 27 February 1980, AS, F. 1931, šk. 378.

39 Ibid., p. 5.

40 Ibid., p. 7.

The comments of these people conformed closely to statements by Soviet diplomats in Yugoslavia. As reasons for desiring Soviet intervention, they highlighted the alleged endangered nature of socialism in Yugoslavia and the poor economic situation. "They glorify the military might of the USSR and its readiness to fulfil 'international obligations'."⁴¹ The SDB displayed concern that these views might align with those of Serb nationalists, Serbian Orthodox clergy and Macedonian nationalists. Moreover, the fear of Aleksandar Ranković and his allies rearing their heads again remained present. However, the SDB also admitted that most of the pro-Soviet sentiment remained on a rhetorical level, and that those uttering such views did not seem ready to convert their sentiments into concrete actions. Many pro-Soviet elements continued to fear repression from the Yugoslav authorities. As a matter of fact, 12 alleged Cominformists had just been expelled from the League of Communists in Vojvodina.

The last report which will be examined here is the SSUP SDB's report on the topic of threats to Yugoslav state security issued in late May 1980, a few weeks after Tito's death.⁴² According to the report, the amount of hostile activity seemed to have declined during the most recent period compared to the period between January and March. Rather ironically, and perhaps affected by the general emotional shock that pervaded Yugoslav society at the time, "a number of bearers of hostile activities spoke about Tito as a great statesman, especially emphasizing his enormous contribution during the People's Liberation Struggle [i.e., the Second World War] and the postwar development of the country. They especially highlight his contribution to the strengthening of the reputation and role of our country abroad and internal stability. Related to this, a significant number of these people as well express the conviction that much more complex circumstances will arise."⁴³ However, the SDB believed that the danger of Cominformist activity in alliance with other hostile actors remained significant. Cominformists still dominated those engaged in making hostile comments.⁴⁴

The activities to suppress and neutralize Cominformist plans would therefore continue, now in the context of Operation *Jedinstvo* (Unity), which had been initiated by the SSUP SDB.⁴⁵ Two years later, in May 1982, it was "business as usual," with the SSUP SDB continuing to monitor and analyse the activities of approximately 1,000 persons (of whom a quarter were under "treatment" throughout Yugoslavia identified with "bureaucratic-statist positions and their nexuses with the IB emigration."⁴⁶ A new

41 Ibid., p. 8.

42 SSUP SDB, Basic Characteristics of the Recent Activities of the Internal Enemy Regarding Current Events Abroad and at Home, with Special Focus on the Period after the Death of Comrade Tito, 23 May 1980, p. 3, AS, F. 1931, šk. 378.

43 Ibid., p. 3.

44 Ibid., pp. 5, 7.

45 Letter of Federal Secretary of Internal Affairs Franjo Herljević, 4 May 1980, AS, F. 1931, šk. 378.

46 SSUP SDB, Hostile Activity of Some Persons with Bureaucratic-Statist Positions and Their Nexuses with the IB Emigration (1980-1981), AS, F. 1931, šk. 2332. See also SSUP SDB, Hostile Activity of Newly Exposed Bearers of the Bureaucratic-Statist Concept from 1980 to 1981, p. 13, AS, F. 1931, šk. 2332.

coordinated dossier on this matter had been established in December 1980. In addition to the previously noted views, the SDB also commented on the misinterpretations of the “counterrevolutionary events in Kosovo” since mass demonstrations had started there and also in their opinion specious comparisons of the situation in Yugoslavia with that in Poland, where martial law had been imposed. As regarded Kosovo, the Cominformists expressed the opinion that “it would not have come to this had Ranković been in power.”⁴⁷

Conclusion

The purpose of this paper has been to cast light on the relatively neglected topic of the surveillance and repression of real and alleged Cominformists in Yugoslavia after Goli Otok. The threat of nationalist émigré terrorism was in many ways much more relevant and concrete—many more Yugoslav lives were lost in the protracted struggle between the Croat emigration and the Yugoslav State Security Service than in IB-related activities. But the threat of a total destruction of Yugoslavia by the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies loomed large until the Gorbachev era.

It is to be hoped that this topic will receive more attention in the future. Much more research is certainly required on this matter, and the relevant archives are slowly becoming more accessible. It would be particularly interesting to move beyond the programmatic and analytical documents predominantly cited in this article and look at the personal dossiers of a select group of persons suspected of maintaining Cominformist sympathies for decades after 1948. Perhaps the best evidence of the enduring nature of the Yugoslav State Security Service’s enduring interest is a list of Cominformist émigrés who were banned from entering Yugoslavia. The list stems from July 1990, only shortly before the collapse of Yugoslavia.⁴⁸

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Summary

Christian Axboe Nielsen

Never-ending vigilance:

The Yugoslav State Security Service and Cominform Supporters after Goli Otok

The paper will explore the issue of surveillance of Cominform supporters after they had returned from Goli otok. It will look at this issue up to the mid-1980s and will specifically deal with the problem of fear within the State Security Service of a Soviet-led attack against Yugoslavia after Tito's death.

Božo Repe

The Tito-Stalin Conflict: Yugoslavia as the Westernmost Part of the Eastern World

After the Communist Party (or the Liberation Front in Slovenia) assumed power and crushed its non-party opposition at the end of World War II, the focus of political dissension in Yugoslavia and Slovenia shifted to the factions within the Communist Party (renamed the League of Communists in 1952). Before the mid-1980s, there was no organised opposition in Slovenia. The only exceptions were the Catholic Church, with which the authorities started searching for common ground in the second half of the 1950s, finally achieving a bearable *modus vivendi* in the 1960s; and the intellectual opposition, centred around individual journals, whose freedom was determined by the current mood and power relations at the top. From the late 1940s to the early 1980s, there were three major instances of score-settling during the Pan-Yugoslav campaigns and purges, which also reached Slovenia and, at the same time, went beyond mere inner-party score-settling: The Cominform, Đilasism and party “Liberalism”.

The Cominform (Communist Information Bureau) was established on 30 September 1947 in Szklarska Poręba, Poland. The session was attended by the communist parties of the Soviet Union, Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Albania, France, Italy, and Yugoslavia. After the session, a communiqué was issued which stated that the tasks of the Cominform were to organise an exchange of experiences between the communist parties and, should the need arise, coordinate their activities based on the spirit of unity, and that it had been decided at the session that the Information Bureau would publish its own periodical with an editorial office based in Belgrade. The actual purpose of this consultation was to strengthen the influence of the Soviet Union in East European countries and in Yugoslavia, while using the biggest Western communist parties (of Italy and France) to influence the turbulent, almost revolutionary conditions in those two countries. This policy soon began to conflict with the policy of the CPY, which was – apart from the VKP(b) [All-Russian Communist Party (Bolshevik)] – the

most powerful communist party in the socialist camp, and which had experienced an authentic revolution under conditions and a setting that greatly differed from that of the Russian Revolution of 1917. Because of this conflict, Yugoslavia found itself in almost total international isolation and on the brink of war. Opting for the Cominform was considered treason by the Yugoslav leadership, who used Stalinist methods to fight the Cominform. While they were settling scores with actual or alleged Cominformists, around 60,000 people in Yugoslavia were expelled from the Party, and 16,312 people (including high-ranking personnel – deputies, ministers, officers, etc.) were given various sentences, including imprisonment at special isolation camps on the islands of Goli Otok and Grgur and elsewhere. Under the guise of “re-education”, prisoners were subjected to various forms of physical and psychological torture; many did not survive. The state further strengthened its repressive apparatus and various forms of exerting pressure while the leadership carried out accelerated collectivisation in the countryside to prove that, despite the criticism of the Soviet Union, it was “building” socialism and was on the “right path”. Around 5,000 Yugoslav citizens, who had fled their home country acted against it in various propaganda centres in East European socialist countries.¹

Dilasism was named after Milovan Đilas, one of the four most powerful post-war Yugoslav politicians (along with Tito, Ranković and Kardelj). During the war, he exerted revolutionary terror in Montenegro (the so-called second stage of the revolution) and was a sworn Stalinist in the first post-war years. However, in the early 1950s he was the main author of the resolutions for the Sixth Congress of the CPY at which the CPY renounced its role of a state party (though only formally) and renamed itself the League of Communists. In late 1953, he wrote a number of articles in *Borba* and *Novi misao*, in which he criticised the bureaucratism within the Party and in society, the Bolshevik party model, and the altered revolutionary morality. His rather confused and contradictory ideas advocated a two-party socialist system (the League of Communists was to be “opposed” by the Socialist Alliance). At the third plenum of the CC of the CPY in January 1954, his ideas were labelled “anarcho-liberalist” and “revisionist”; he was expelled from political life and later received prison sentences on several occasions. He spent a total of nine years in prison, two and a half of which in solitary confinement. He was released in December 1966, after which he emigrated and spent his time writing and lecturing in Western countries, mostly in the USA. He returned to Yugoslavia in the 1980s and died there. Đilas never attempted to create his own faction within the League of Communists nor did he have an organised network of followers; nevertheless, from the mid-1950s to the early 1960s, “Đilasism” was the worst negative ideological label, second only to the Cominform, to be given to opponents of the official policy. His real or alleged followers were then crushed politically (deposings, transfers, and the like).²

1 Lešnik, *Informbiro*, p. 369.

2 For more see in: Perović, *Dominantna i neželjena*.

Party Liberalism was a heterogeneous movement, which emerged at the end of the 1960s and early 1970s in Slovenia, Serbia and Croatia (and partly in Macedonia and Bosnia and Herzegovina), and which was connected with individual influential younger-generation politicians (Latinka Perović and Marko Nikezić in Serbia, Miko Tripalo and Savka Dabčević-Kučar in Croatia, and Stane Kavčič in Slovenia). It was the result of the changes in Yugoslav society from the mid-1960s onwards (economic reform; the admission that the national issue had not been solved once and for all; the political removal of Aleksandar Ranković as Tito's number two and as an agent of repression and an advocate of centralisation). These changes were accompanied by strong national pressures and outbreaks of nationalism, e.g. in Kosovo in 1968 and in Croatia in 1971; by intellectual dissent (expressed through the protests of intellectuals in the 1960s and through student demonstrations in 1968); in part, these changes were also influenced from abroad (the "Prague Spring" and the occupation of Czechoslovakia). In Slovenia, Liberalism aimed at greater political pluralism among and in the existing political organisations and strove for the continuation of economic reforms and the market economy concept with social correctives provided by the state. It insisted on greater Slovenian independence within the federation, including the right to establish direct international contacts and take out international loans, and the participation fee principle in sustaining the federation. It strove for greater independence in the defence policy (Republican Territorial Defence, the right to serve in the army in one's home republic or, if that were impossible, in nationally homogeneous units, and the right to use one's mother tongue in the army). The economic concept envisaged the development of propulsive industries (commerce, banking, transport, tourism, service activities, consultancy, engineering, and also information and computer science, in terms of development). Slovenia was to become a bridge between Eastern and Western countries, while modelling its economy mainly after the West. Energy-wise, it was to work towards the development of "clean" energies (oil, gas, nuclear power). Administratively speaking, it was to be polycentric, but with a uniform and centrally governed education system, health care, cultural, research and scientific activity, and tax policy. In the early 1970s, Tito and the more orthodox movement in the League of Communists crushed the leading Liberal politicians (in Slovenia, around 400 followers of Liberalism, mostly economists, were deposed); they began deviating from the idea of a market economy (and opted for the so-called negotiated economy), while the outlined changes in international relations were kept and institutionalised in the Constitution of 1974.³

In Slovenia, the Cominform was often discussed as a social problem in journalism, literature and historiography, though in a rather biased manner until the early 1980s. The basic premise was that this conflict was merely a logical continuation of previous conflicts, allegedly brought on by the fact that during the war the Yugoslav party had

3 Repe, "Liberalizem" v Sloveniji.

started down an original path towards socialism. The settling of scores, the issue of the falsely accused, and the suffering of prisoners remained “taboo topics”. In the early 1980s, the first influential literary works were written on the topic, and historiography abandoned the previous claims that Yugoslav Communism had been different in the first post-war years, and started advocating the premise that this conflict was precisely why they started abandoning Soviet-modelled administrative socialism and searching for an alternative path (of self-management). Such conflicts can be dated back to the war. The USSR had subordinated its actions to its relationships with the allies and it demanded that the liberation movement in Yugoslavia do the same. Hence, it rejected all “premature” revolutionary measures, as well as measures directed against the government in exile and King Peter (e.g. the issue of proletarian brigades or their insignia – the hammer and sickle; the issue of implementing the so-called second stage of the revolution; the issue of establishing AVNOJ in Bihać as a political but not an authoritative body; something similar could be said for the second AVNOJ session of which the USSR was informed just before it began). The Yugoslav leadership also quietly resented the Soviet one for providing much more modest aid than the West during the war (until the autumn of 1944, when the USSR equipped twelve infantry and two aviation divisions of the Yugoslav Army), and that until the spring of 1942 Moscow praised Draža Mihailović as the leader of the resistance in Yugoslavia. After the war, protests were triggered by Tito’s speech in Ljubljana in May 1945 in which he said that Yugoslavia would not be small change in a bargain between the great powers, referring to the agreement concluded during the war between the Allies, which stated that Austria would be restored to its pre-1938 borders, and which dealt a blow to Yugoslav demands to change the borders in Carinthia; then there was the issue of Trieste, in which the USSR did not want to risk a straining of relations (and potentially a new war); and the issue of occasional inconsistent support given to Yugoslav demands by the USSR at the Paris Peace Conference. Conflicts also arose because of the conduct of the Red Army during military operations on Yugoslav territory (rapes, thefts, violence against the population), but these were covered up until the Cominform conflict. In the first post-war years, economic relations were especially problematic: unequal exchange, the establishment of mixed companies that were more beneficial to the Soviet Union, pressures to establish a mixed Soviet-Yugoslav bank, etc.

However, these conflicts had not eroded the relations between the two parties and countries, generally speaking; the closest relations with the first land of socialism were never questioned and the West believed that Yugoslavia was the most loyal follower of the Soviet Union. The last influential work, which was based on the viewpoint that the different nature of Yugoslavia was the cause of the conflict with Stalin, was the book by Vladimir Dedijer, titled *The Battle Stalin Lost* (1969).⁴ Afterwards, critical judgement

4 Dedijer, *The Battle Stalin Lost*.

gradually strengthened; a more prominent milestone was the period after Tito's death, although in the first half of the 1980s certain historians in Yugoslavia and Slovenia still argued that self-management had not started after the Cominform conflict and as an alternative to the Soviet model, but (as the leading Slovenian politician Edvard Kardelj also claimed) already during the war.⁵ In addition to a number of articles in scientific journals, among the books that adopted a more critical approach in the second half of the 1980s were books by Jože Pirjevec, Dušan Bilandžić and Darko Bekić.⁶ In the late 1980s, the then most prominent expert on contemporary Yugoslav history Branko Petranović wrote that "Yugoslavia remained a communist country even after 1948,"⁷ and that the Yugoslav theoretical thought ("previously paralysed by Stalinist ideological totalitarianism") started focusing on "discovering new paths to revolution" only after the Cominform conflict.⁸ The second half of the 1980s was also characterised by analyses conducted by the then prominent Yugoslav political scientists and sociologists (Zagorka Golubović, Laslo Sekelj, Vojislav Koštunica and others), who attempted to prove with considerable precision and at a theoretical level in what ways the Yugoslav model had remained loyal to the Soviet (Bolshevist) version of socialism even after the Cominform conflict, and where the main differences lay.

In Slovenia, very few people openly supported the Cominform, which is why we cannot speak of an organised Cominform opposition. There was no danger of a "fifth column" in the event of a Soviet attack, in contrast to the traditionally Russophile regions of Yugoslavia. However, the lists of the State Security Administration (UDBA) contained the names of many people who criticised the authorities for various reasons. Because the term Cominformist became a synonym for an internal enemy of the state, such critics of authorities were proclaimed "Cominformists".

Most of them were imprisoned without trial; they were subjected to physical and psychological torture, just as the "real" Cominformists were; and many were censured. In the 1980s, some of the former prisoners wrote about how they had been treated (Janez Jezeršek, Martin Mencej, Radovan Hrast, Cene Logar, Jože Jurančič, Igor Torkar). Political opponents were deprived of freedom in one of two ways. The so-called administrative penalty was imposed directly by the State Security Administration (UDBA) without co-operation with the judicial system. UDBA had great power and could send a person to perform Community Service (CS) for a period of up to two years; this procedure could be repeated (the prisoner was released for a short time and later arrested again). The second way was sentencing performed by civil and military courts. In 1948,

5 See e.g. Vodušek Starič, *Začetki samoupravljanja v, the chapter Nekaj o samoupravi med narodnoosvobodilno vojno in o razvoju leta 1945 v Sloveniji /A Few Words on Self-Management during the National Liberation War and on Development in Slovenia in 1945.*

6 Pirjevec, *Tito, Stalin in;* Bilandžić, *Historija SFRJ;* Bekić, *Jugoslavija u hladnom.*

7 Petranović, *Istorija Jugoslavije,* p. 240.

8 *Ibid.,* p. 288.

not many arrests were made; the majority of Cominformists were imprisoned over the following two years. Dragotin Gustinčič was arrested even before the conflict and was labelled a Cominformist later in prison.⁹

A total of 731 people were arrested (members and non-members of all classes); 334 of them received administrative penalties (penalties of up to two years, with a possibility of them being reimposed, were imposed by the State Security Administration); while 157 of them were sentenced in court. Some of them never returned from serving their sentences. It has been estimated that there were a total of around 1,000 Cominformists in Slovenia, which was a much lower number than in other parts of Yugoslavia.¹⁰ The authorities mostly searched for Cominformists among the intellectuals, because they were the most critical of the government. In the mid-1950s, the passing of Cominform-related sentences ceased (with a few exceptions), but the authorities still kept a close eye on former prisoners and categorised them into four groups based on the “degree of their opposition”. This categorisation was mostly a result of the renewed straining of Yugoslav-Soviet relations in 1956 (dissolution of the Cominform as the coordinating body of communist parties, riots in Poland, the intervention of the Red Army in Hungary). Since this straining was not as severe as the one in 1948, and because by then the situation in Yugoslavia had gradually democratised, the authorities set out to “re-educate” the Cominformists. For that reason, they were divided into categories; those in the first group could immediately rejoin the CP, whereas the authorities considered those in the fourth group openly hostile (in 1958 there were 58 such people). At that time, Cominformism in reality no longer existed, neither as a Yugoslav nor as a Slovenian political problem, even though Cominformists were still under surveillance until the mid-1980s. At the beginning of the 1950s, the conflict with the Cominform was followed by a search for an alternative route to socialism.

Repression slowly began to abate: according to data from the Public Prosecutor’s Office of the People’s Republic of Slovenia there were 207 political convicts in Slovenia in 1952, and 91 in 1953 (between 1948 and 1950 around 1,000 people were convicted of political offences annually, which did not include the so-called administrative penalties.)¹¹ Most priests were released from prison and the authorities allowed the publication of the religious periodical *Družina* (Family) and the establishment of a seminary in Vipava (however, they excluded the Faculty of Theology from the University). Collectivisation was also abandoned (in 1954 there were only 43 agricultural working

9 Dragotin Gustinčič was pre-war communist, a member of the politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, a participant in the debate on the national question in the party in 1920s and a supporter of federalism. He also fought in the Spanish Civil War. In the 1930s he lived mostly in Moscow. After the war, he was a university professor and he did not have a significant influence in CPS. He was arrested in 1948 and released in 1951. He served his sentence on Goli Otok.

10 Gabrič, *Informbirojevstvo na Slovenskem*, pp. 163–174.

11 Čepič et al., *Ključne značilnosti slovenske politike*, p. 104.

cooperatives left in Slovenia; when collectivisation was at its peak, 8,600 farm holdings with 32,000 family members were included in 382 co-operatives). In the context of Slovenia, the new economic system introduced in the early 1950s denoted above all the freeing up of domestic trade and the modernisation of banking on more modern foundations (among other things, the introduction of the so-called communal banks that began conducting transactions with citizens, giving out housing loans, and providing other services to a limited extent). The new economic system also introduced significant changes to the supply of the population. In October 1951, the guaranteed supply system was abolished, coupons were replaced with money, and in the months to come, market prices were introduced for rationed goods. The supply of the population started to depend on the operation of commercial companies and on buyers' earnings.¹² In 1952, the agitprop apparatus was abolished (it was revived in 1956 in a milder form as an ideological commission at the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Slovenia). Ideological control lessened, which resulted in the creation of a number of ideologically unburdened works in diverse areas of culture. (The most typical example of cultural relaxation in Slovenia is the "bourgeois" comedy film *Vesna* directed by František Čap). The relations relaxed after the border issues had been settled, following a severe straining of Yugoslav-Italian relations in 1953 (the signing of the so-called London Memorandum in 1954 and of the Austrian State Treaty in 1955). In 1955, Yugoslavia and Italy signed an agreement on border traffic, the so-called Udine Agreement, which was undoubtedly the first agreement of its kind between the two neighbouring countries after the Cold War. Slovenia had a specific position within Yugoslavia: bordering with Italy and Austria, and with strong national minorities in those countries, it was Yugoslavia's most developed and pro-West oriented region. Opening up the borders enabled people to make comparisons, and Slovenian authorities were forced – more than the authorities in other parts of Yugoslavia – to try to match the personal and social standard to those of the two neighbouring countries. Slovenian industry likewise – though slowly and awkwardly – kept up with the demands of buyers and in the mid-1950s began making refrigerators, washing machines and other household appliances and developing a more attractive textile industry, as well as other industries. Western influences in the post-Cominform period must be viewed within a wider context, together with Western films and music that started coming to these parts in the early 1950s, with the development of television in the late 1950s, and with the increase in motorisation, the number of foreign tourists and economic emigration (so-called *gastarbajters* – workers on temporary work abroad, who regularly returned for holidays, had deposits in Yugoslav banks, built houses). The effects of this early liberalisation process were reflected in a gradual raising of the standard and in a faster path towards consumerism. Despite these

12 Prinčič, *V začaranem krogu*, p. 17.

changes, nothing changed regarding the dominant role of the League of Communists in society, the ideology prevalent in all aspects of social life, and the supremacy of political elites over economic and other centres of power. But on the other hand, a blend of the socialist system and capitalists influences from the West created an unusual atmosphere. People did believe in Tito, self-management and the Non-Aligned Movement, but also in washing machines, refrigerators, TV sets and other elements of consumer society.

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Summary

Božo Repe

The Tito-Stalin Conflict: Yugoslavia as the Westernmost Part of the Eastern World

In Slovenia, very few people openly supported the Cominform, which is why we cannot speak of an organised Cominform opposition. There was no danger of a “fifth column” in the event of a Soviet attack in contrast to the traditionally Russophile regions of Yugoslavia. Still, the lists of the State Security Administration (UDBA) contained the names of many people who criticised the authorities for various reasons. Because the term Cominformist had become a synonym for an internal enemy of the state, such critics of authorities were proclaimed “Cominformists”. Most of them were imprisoned without trial; they were subjected to physical and psychological torture, just as the “real” Cominformists were. A total of 731 people were arrested (members and non-members of Party and from all social strata of the population). 334 of them received administrative penalties (penalties of up to two years, with a possibility of being reimposed, were imposed by the State Security Administration); while 157 of them were sentenced in court. Some of them never returned from serving their sentences. It has been estimated that there were a total of around 1,000 Cominformists in Slovenia, which was a much lower number than in other parts of Yugoslavia. The authorities mostly searched for Cominformists among the intellectuals, because they were most critical of the government. In the mid-1950s, the passing of Cominform-related sentences ceased, but the authorities still kept a close eye on former prisoners. In the early 1950s, the conflict with the Cominform was followed by a search for an alternative route to socialism. The League of Communists kept a dominant role in society, the ideology was prevalent at least in the main aspects of social life, and the supremacy of political elites over economic centres of power was evident until the end of Yugoslavia. But on the other hand, Yugoslavia opened its borders, and Western influence on everyday life was strong, with films, music, and literature, which started coming to these parts in the early 1950s. It also grew with the advent of television in the late 1950s, and with the increase in motorisation and the development of tourism. The effects of these early liberalisation processes were reflected in a gradual rising of the standard and in a faster path towards consumerism.

John P. Kraljic

Yugoslav Communities in North America and the Tito-Stalin Split

World War II marked a watershed in the development of Yugoslav communities in North America.¹ Croatian-Americans and Croatian-Canadians, by far the largest of the three major communities (Serbian and Slovenian being the other two), lived within the shadow of the Independent State of Croatia, which had declared war against, among others, the United States. However, their community's leadership, strongly influenced, alternatively, by Leftist, Communist or Liberal, pro-New Deal ideas, for the most part declared themselves in favor of the Partisans. The leadership of the Serbian community in North America generally favored the restoration of King Peter II and the Chetnik movement. Nevertheless, Serbs in the US and Canada also had very strong and vocal pro-Communist organizations. The Communist Party of Yugoslavia (CPY), which had relied on financial contributions of immigrants in the pre-War years,² placed great store on the sympathy of Yugoslav immigrants and followed these developments with sustained interest.³

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- 1 General histories of Croatian-Americans and Croatian-Canadians include Prpic, *The Croatian Immigrants*; Čizmić, *Hrvati u životu*; and Rasporich, *For a Better Life*. Serbian-Americans and Serbian-Canadians are discussed in Marković, *Doseljenje Srba u Kanadu*; Jončić, *Iseljeničtvo*; and Skorić, *Serbs in Ontario*. General treatments concerning Yugoslav-Americans are found in Govorchin, *Americans From Yugoslavia*; and Prpic, *South Slav Immigrants*.
 - 2 See, e.g., Tito's 20 October 1937 letter to Yugoslav communists in America in Tito, *Sabrana djela* 3:111-12. See also Dimitrijević, *Odnos KPJ prema jugoslavenskoj*, pp. 73-74.
 - 3 As can be seen, for example, in a 20 December 1942 entry in Dedijer's diary: "Today we discovered that in America the well-known writer Louis Adamic strongly came out against Draža Mihailović, emphasizing that only the Partisans in Yugoslavia are leading the National Liberation War (...) Adamic's statement is of great importance." Dedijer, *Dnevnik*, vol. 2, p. 36. See also a more thorough discussion of the importance placed in the work of emigrants in *Ibid.*, vol. 3., pp. 173-84. The Partisan press also followed developments in emigrant communities. See, e.g., Buršić, *Istarska partizanska štampa*, vol. 1, p. 217 (citing to a 27 October 1944 issue of *Hrvatski list*); and *Glas Splita*, p. 111 (citing to a 5 July 1944 issue of the newspaper). A wide body of literature discusses Yugoslav-American communities in the United States and Canada during World War II. See, e.g., Čizmić, *Prilog za istraživanje*; Lees, *Yugoslav-Americans*; and Krišto, *Brother's Keeper*.

A small but influential group of Communists in the Yugoslav communities in the US and Canada formed the bedrock of support for the Partisans and the post-War Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia (FPRY).⁴ During most of the period prior to World War II, the membership of both the Communist Party of the United States (CPUSA) and the Communist Party of Canada (CPC) primarily consisted of immigrants.⁵ In order to work effectively among the larger immigrant groups which had a presence in the Parties, the CPUSA and CPC organized their foreign-born members into national sections or language groups.

In the CPUSA in the early and mid-1930s, the activities of Yugoslav immigrant members revolved around its Yugoslav Section.⁶ The Yugoslav Section had no independent existence or its own membership, being completely subservient to the Party. Its functions were limited to publishing newspapers, mostly in Croatian. The Party sought to extend its influence through other means, such as the establishment of Yugoslav Workers' Clubs which included non-Communists. The Communists assured their control over these Clubs through "fractions" which took unified positions on all issues of importance.⁷ The CPC organized its Yugoslav members somewhat differently, solely through Workers' Clubs, but these again remained tools of the Party.⁸

The Parties viewed the Clubs as "mass organizations," intended "to draw foreign born workers into the general stream of the (...) labour [and Communist] movement."⁹ Both Parties controlled a number of other "mass organizations," such as the International Worker's Order (IWO), a fraternal society established in 1930 by the CPUSA and divided into national groups, including a Croatian-Serbian one appearing in February 1935.¹⁰

During the second half of the 1930s, the Yugoslav groupings within the CPUSA and CPC went through organizational transformations as a result of the implementation of the "anti-Yugoslav" position of the Comintern. Yugoslav Communists in the North America initially resisted this position, viewing unitary Yugoslavism, "as [a] 'higher and more revolutionary' starting point for the development of the workers' movement."¹¹

4 Concerning pre-War Yugoslav Communist organizations in the United States and Canada, see generally Kraljic, *The Croatian Section*; and Granic, *Establishing the South Slavic Radical Labour Press*.

5 Only in 1936 did the CPUSA have more native-born than immigrant members. Ottanelli, *The Communist Party of the United States*, p. 128. In 1929, ninety-five percent of the CPC's membership consisted of Finnish, Ukrainian and Jewish immigrants. The percentage of immigrant members of the CPC remained high in the 1930s. Avakumovic, *The Communist Party of Canada*, p. 34 and p. 120.

6 The Yugoslav Section of the CPUSA was the second largest foreign language group in the Party in 1922-23 and the third largest in 1924-25. The members of the Section, with Croats no doubt constituting the overwhelming majority, numbered 1,290 out of 17,377 Party members in 1924. By comparison, in the same year the Jewish Section numbered 1,368 and the Finnish Section 7,099. Glazer, *The Social Basis*, p. 42.

7 Glazer, *The Social Basis*, p. 50.

8 Penner, *Canadian Communism*, p. 276.

9 Rodney, *Soldiers of the Internationals*, p. 159.

10 Od četvrte do pete konvencije. *Fraternal Outlook*, June-July 1940, p. 51; and Walker, *Pluralistic Fraternity*.

11 Lojen, *Uspomene*, p. 161.

In order to break this “deviation,” the Comintern, through the CPY, sent a number of emissaries to implement structural reforms, reorganizing, for example, the Yugoslav Section into separate Croatian, Serbian and Slovenian Sections, each with its own newspapers, under the direction of a Mirko Marković.¹²

Yugoslavs formed an important component of the Communist Parties in the US and Canada, but they remained a vocal and well-organized minority within their respective communities and were dwarfed by such organizations as fraternal benefit societies.¹³ Of these, the Croatian Fraternal Union (CFU) was by far the largest and most important, with over 80,000 members in 1937.¹⁴

Though not a political body, the CFU remained subject to various political influences, with delegates to its conventions arrayed in blocs fighting to gain control of the organization. In this regard, Croatian Communists in North America were no exception, working within the CFU as leaders of groups variously labeled as the “Progressive Bloc” or “Left Wingers.”¹⁵ But prior to World War II, the Communists and their sympathizers were thwarted in their bid to take control of the CFU, though they succeeded in placing their followers in leading positions of various lodges.

World War II marked a turn-around in the fortunes of Yugoslav Communists in the US and Canada. The occupation and dismemberment of Yugoslavia, the invasion of the Soviet Union and the entry of the US into the war fortuitously occurred within the course of approximately eight months. The Communists used their organizational skills, as well as the increasing sympathy of Yugoslav-Americans toward the USSR and the Partisans, to establish a leading position, primarily in the Croat community.¹⁶ Their

12 Marković’s work on this reorganization is generally discussed in Kraljic, *The Croatian Section*, pp. 145-49.

13 A report from the late 1930s estimated that there were 1,800 to 2,000 Croatian-American members of the CPUSA, an estimated 500 whom lived in western Pennsylvania, 200 in California and on the West Coast, and 100 in New York. Tamiment Institute, New York University, Earl Browder Papers, Series II, Subject Files, microfilm reel 4, no. 65, R-2467. An indication of sympathizers of the Party may be gathered from certain statistics of some of the “mass organizations.” In 1933, thirty-eight Yugoslav Workers’ Clubs claimed 1,718 members and in 1934 sixty Clubs claimed approximately 3,000 members. Prva konferencija J.R. kluba u USA. *Borba*, 1 March 1933, p. 5; and Čizmić, *Hrvati u životu*, p. 241. In 1940, the IWO’s Croatian Section claimed 8,000 adult and children members. Od četvrte do pete konvencije. *Fraternal Outlook*, June-July 1940, p. 51. In Canada, one author estimates that Croats constituted ten percent of the CPC’s 16,000 members in the late 1930s. Avakumovic, *The Communist Party of Canada*, p. 121.

14 Mladineo, *Narodni adresar*, p. xxxii. The most comprehensive work on the CFU is Čizmić, *Povijest Hrvatske bratke zajednice*. See also Smoljan, *Sto godina Hrvatske bratske zajednice*.

15 An unsympathetic pamphlet summarizing the history of Communist-influence in the CFU is Šuljak, *The Communist Conspiracy*.

16 In what proved to be a future embarrassment, the Yugoslav Communists initially supported the Chetnik movement, with Mirko Marković later having to live down the fact that he met with King Peter II during the latter’s visit to the United States in 1942 where Marković presented a check to the King for \$1,000, as noted in the memoirs of the pro-Chetnik Yugoslav ambassador to the United States. Fotich, *The War We Lost*, p. 184. See also Dedijer, *Dnevnik*, vol. 3, p. 56. A collection of Marković’s articles which appeared in the United States during World War II is found in his *Borba u Americi*. Memoirs of note concerning the work of Yugoslav Communists during the War include Lojen, *Uspomene*; Prica, *Amerika*; and Dedijer, *Stevan Dedijer*.

influence may be gauged by the fact that the Croatian-American Party newspaper, *Narodni glasnik*, became a daily which boasted a circulation of 15,000.¹⁷

Croatian Party members played an especially important role in the American Slav Congress, established by the Communists in 1942 as “to influence American government policy toward resistance movements and governments in Eastern Europe.”¹⁸ Communists also strongly supported the establishment of the Congress of American Croats which had been “decisive in directing the political sympathies of Croatians in the US in favor of Tito and the Partisans.”¹⁹ Meanwhile, in Canada, the Communists established a new umbrella organization, the Council Canadian South Slavs, in June 1944.²⁰

Their work during the War and the continued euphoria which many members of the Yugoslav-American community felt towards Tito, the Partisans and the “New” Yugoslavia fed into the Communists’ ultimate success – the takeover of the CFU’s leadership by their allies at its 1947 Convention.²¹ This represented the pinnacle of Communist success in the Croatian-American community. From this height, the Communists suffered a rapid decrease in their influence, chiefly for three reasons. First, the late 1940s saw the rise of the anti-Communist McCarthyist crusade in the US, with an echo of same in Canada. Second, the arrival of refugees displaced by the fall of Royalist Yugoslavia and the Independent State of Croatia and the defeat of the Chetniks changed the composition of immigrants who were politically active in Homeland affairs from a predominately leftist to a more starkly rightist strand. Third, the Tito-Stalin split caused an irremediable decline in far left influence in Yugoslav-American communities.

The split initially caused incredible confusion among Party members in the US and Canada as can be seen in their newspapers, such as *Jedinstvo*. Established in June 1948, the paper resulted from the merger of the former Croatian-, Serbian- and Slovene-language Party newspapers in Canada.²² *Jedinstvo* first took a cautious approach, referring to the leadership of the CPY as “comrades.” The paper republished the texts of both the Cominform resolutions as well as the replies of the CPY leadership.²³ The first page of *Jedinstvo*’s 23 July 1948 edition, for example, carried an article by Moše Pijade.²⁴

17 Andrija Josipović, Uspomene na Stjepana Lojena. *Narodni glasnik*, 31 January 1968, p. 6. This figure needs to be viewed cautiously as possibly being inflated.

18 Isserman, *Which Side Were You On?*, p. 111.

19 Čizmić, *Hrvati u životu*, p. 336. The Congress held its first convention in Chicago in February 1943 in the presence of 927 delegates. Ibid.

20 Skorić *Serbs in Ontario*, p. 32.

21 Šuljak, *The Communist Conspiracy*, pp. 16-23.

22 Neka živi naš demokratski list *Jedinstvo!* *Jedinstvo*, 15 June 1948, p. 1. The author has been unable to locate in the United States or Canada any issues of *Narodni glasnik* for the period studied in this paper. Tragically, it appears that the only complete set is found in the Institut za migracije i narodnosti in Zagreb, though the author has been advised that, unfortunately, much of the Institut’s holdings of the paper are in a parlous state.

23 See, e.g., Izjava Centralnog komiteta Kom. Partije Jugoslavije pobudom Rezolucije Inform. Biroa. *Jedinstvo*, 9 July 1948, p.1; and Odluka CK KPJ o isključenju Hebranga i Žujovića iz KPJ. *Jedinstvo*, 13 July 1948, p. 1.

24 Besprincipijelnost kao oružje u borbi za ‘principe.’ *Jedinstvo*, 23 July 1948, p. 1.

Party members retained hope for a healing of the rift, as shown by a 6 August 1948 *Jedinstvo* editorial. Noting that “Canadian Yugoslavs had been proud and continue to be proud of the heroic achievements of the National Liberation Army of Yugoslavia and of the Yugoslav peoples,” the editorial emphasized that Yugoslav-Canadians followed with great interest events in their homeland, including the recent “disagreements” with the Soviet Union. The paper had hoped that the CPY’s Fifth Congress would have resolved the issues, but it now appeared that nothing had been accomplished. “We are most troubled by the question: can Yugoslavia build a new democracy, can it build socialism, without the support and cooperation of the New Democracies, and especially of the Soviet Union? (...) We raise our voices, and join in all other voices which call for the complete resolution of all these substantive issues of the international workers’ movement (...)” Nevertheless, *Jedinstvo* emphasized that it could only see Yugoslavia remaining independent as an “active partner with the New Democracies and the Soviet Union.”²⁵

The openness displayed by the Communist press began to dissipate during the following two months. No longer did the newspapers honor CPY leaders with the moniker of comrades. Now the heads of the Yugoslav Party were labelled as *Titova grupa*, Tito’s clique.²⁶

This period also saw the resignation of a number of Yugoslav diplomats from their posts in the US and Canada, including several who had been prior members of the CPUSA and CPC. One was Tomo Babin. Babin served as a volunteer with the International Brigades in Spain and played a key role in the establishment of the Yugoslav Seaman’s Club in New York, a Communist-controlled organization of Yugoslav seamen and dockworkers.²⁷ Documents made available after the Cold War indicate that Babin played a more nefarious role, routinely providing information concerning shipping activities in New York harbor to the Soviets.²⁸ His reward came after the War when he became an attaché to the Yugoslav embassy in Washington. After the Tito-Stalin split, Babin ironically, sought political asylum in the US.²⁹

A similar situation occurred in Canada. There, Pavle Lukin, a counselor in the Yugoslav Embassy, resigned on 30 September 1948, noting in his resignation letter that he “believes the policies of the current Yugoslav government to be treasonous to the fundamental interests of our country (...) When the criticisms against the policies of the

25 Želimo brzo i pravednorešenje spornih pitanja. *Jedinstvo*, 6 August 1948, pp.1-2. Similar sentiments about Yugoslavia’s inability to go it alone is found in, e.g., Nova Jugoslavija ne može bez tiješne suradnje sa SSSR-om i novim demokracijama. *Jedinstvo*, 10 September 1948, p. 1.

26 See, e.g., Kuda vodi nacionalizam Titove grupe u Jugoslaviji (iz Moskvske *Pravde*). *Jedinstvo*, 8 October 1948, p.1.

27 Concerning the work of the Seamen’s Club, see Maštruko, *Na svim meridijanima*.

28 Haynes & Klehr, *Venona*, p. 181.

29 Borba za obranu i oslobodjenje Babina. *Jedinstvo*, 22 July 1949, p. 3; Tomo Babin. *Jedinstvo*, 6 April 1956, p. 1. See also Vojtěchovsky, *Iz Praga protiv Tita!*, p. 119. Babin died in Poland in 1956. Tomo Babin. *Jedinstvo*, 6 April 1956, p. 1.

current government in Yugoslavia were first published, I rejected those critiques. However, in studying these critiques, together with the events which have taken place over the course of the past three months, I have concluded that the criticisms are completely correct and were unquestionably necessary (...) Our country cannot progress toward socialism without close brotherly cooperation with the Soviet Union and the countries of the New Democracies (...)”³⁰ Lukin’s resignation accompanied those of a number of other employees of the Embassy who had previously been active in the Yugoslav community in Canada, including Stjepan Miošić and Vojin Grbić.³¹

This period also saw the beginning of “differentiations” within Party ranks. On October 22, 1948, for instance, Jovan Djajić, one of the Serbian-language editors of *Jedinstvo*, was dismissed from his post. Born in Bosnia & Herzegovina, Djajić joined the CPC in 1933 and served as a commissar in the Spanish Civil War. He returned to Canada following the War and became a member of the Council of Canadian South Slavs, a Communist dominated umbrella group.³² Disingenuously, *Jedinstvo* initially claimed Djajić voluntarily sought to resign from his post as a result of “his desire to go to Yugoslavia (...) in November.”³³ However, the resolutions of the Executive Committee of the Council of Canadian South Slavs, adopted at its biannual meeting on 11–12 December 1948, set forth the true reasons for Djajić’s expulsion, noting that he had “come out in favor of the policies of the Tito leadership of the CPY and because he is committed to carrying out a struggle [in favor of same] within [our] organization (...)”³⁴

Jedinstvo’s pages were filled with charges and countercharges made by the respective supporters of Tito and Stalin, usually set forth in various “open letters.” Those supportive of Tito generally came from former CPC and CPUSA members who had returned to Yugoslavia after World War II. These returnees had been encouraged to settle in

30 Pavle Lukin i šestorica drugih uposlenika kod poslanstva FNJR u Ottawi položili ostavku. *Jedinstvo*, 5 October 1948, p. 1.

31 Miošić had been a member of the Inner Board or Executive Council of the WPEC. Izvještaj sa četvrte konvencije. *Borba*, 6 August 1935, p. 3.

32 National Archives of Canada, Ottawa, Rossiiskii tsentr khraneniia i izucheniia dokumentov noveishei istorii, fond 545, opis 6, delo 546, no. 60, microfilm reel K-262; Anti-tenkovska baterija Petka Miletića. *Slobodna misao*, 20 July 1937, p. 2; and Božo Prpić, Umro Jovan Djajić. *Matica*, January 1975, p. 29.

33 Drug Jovan Djajić razrješen dužnosti. *Jedinstvo*, 22 October 1948, p. 1.

34 Rezolucija Gavnog Odbora Vijeća Kan. Južnih Slavena. *Jedinstvo*, 14 December 1948, p. 1. Djajić’s resignation from his posts is further discussed in *20 godina: Kratki pregled*, pp. 88–90. Djajić published a brochure in Canada setting forth his view in April 1949 called *Neopravdana borba protiv Jugoslavije*. See also Gdje su sada. *Jedinstvo*, 30 November 1950, p. 6. At the same meeting, the Council also called for a halt to providing further financial assistance to the FPRY which had been collected within a “General Fund.” The proceeds of the Fund were to be used to purchase machinery and equipment. Andrija Dražić, one of 5 members of an audit committee which reviewed the books of the Fund in June 1948, notes that many of the contributions had been provided as loans by those planning to return to Yugoslavia; the certificates issued to them would then be paid out in Dinars in Yugoslavia. Supposedly, the FPRY ultimately paid all claims represented by the certificates, avoiding a legal clash with the Council. Andrija Dražić, Certificati Rekonstrukcionog Fonda u Kanadi. *Novi list*, 26 August 1952, p. 1. See also Rasporich, *For a Better Life*, pp. 176–78.

the “New” Yugoslavia after the War by both Yugoslav authorities and the immigrant Communist press as part of the so-called *Radnik* movement. Thousands of pro-Titoist, or perhaps merely patriotic or home-sick, Yugoslavs re-emigrated back to Yugoslavia in the immediate years following the War, many being transported by the Yugoslav ship *Radnik*. Communist newspapers in the US and Canada documented almost every sailing of the ship loaded with immigrants. Ironically, a large number of them left Montreal in mid-June 1948, a group which included Edo Jardas.³⁵ This group included Edo Jardas, one of the top Croatian-Canadian Party leaders.

Jardas stands apart from many CPC and CPUSA Party members in that he had a professional career, working as a government official in Yugoslavia from 1919 to 1926, during which he became a member of the *Orjuna*, a right-wing group which propagated Yugoslav unity. Jardas’ subsequent entry into the CPC raised disbelief among his family and friends, one of his *Orjuna* colleagues arguing that the rumors of Jardas’ conversion to Communism must have been a pure “provocation.”³⁶ After serving in the International Brigades in Spain where he sustained serious wounds, Jardas returned to Canada, subsequently becoming a member of the CPC’s Central Committee.³⁷

The Cominform resolution appeared as the *Radnik* slowly made its way across the Atlantic. Subsequent reports claimed that the passengers “all” came out in favor of Tito. Such an assertion is belied by the facts, as we will shortly discuss. Jardas attended the Fifth CPY Congress (subsequently becoming a long-serving CPY and Yugoslav government official). Jardas initially attempted to convince his former comrades in Canada of the righteousness of the Yugoslav Party’s position. To no avail. In an “open letter” to Jardas, a leading group of Yugoslav Canadian Communists accused Jardas of taking an “incorrect path,” noting that they wanted to “assist him” in coming back to the Party fold. “To the extent that you continue to go on [your current] path, know that in us you will have enemies and that we will act towards you as we have acted against the entire Tito clique and their incorrect policies.”³⁸

Jedinstvo did not limit its critiques to Jardas. A multipart series subsequently responded in detail to various letters sent by other returnees to Yugoslavia. The paper

35 Povratnici prve grupe na putu za Jugoslaviju. *Jedinstvo*, 29 June 1948, p. 1.

36 Državni arhiv u Rijeci, Edo Jardas, box 1, folder 1.4. See also a letter from Jardas’ sister found in *ibid.*; and Edo Jardas, *Otvoreno pismo Stankoviću i ostalim režimskim špijonima od bivšeg orjunaša. Borba*, 12 October 1932, p. 3.

37 Državni arhiv u Rijeci, Edo Jardas, box 2, folder 2.1. See also National Archives of Canada, Ottawa, Rossiiskii tsentr khraneniia i izucheniiia dokumentov noveishei istorii fond 545, opis 6, delo 564, no. 30, microfilm reel K-263 (Jardas’ repatriation recommended due to his wounds and because of the request “of his national organization in Canada to carry on organization and newspaper work”).

38 *Otvoreno pismo druga Jardasa. Jedinstvo*, 19 October 1948, p. 2. That time cured this animosity to some extent is reflected in the correspondence Jardas later had with one of the signatories of the “open letter,” Marijan Kružić. Interestingly, despite his close association with the CPC, Kružić apparently was not an “official” member of the Party. Državni arhiv u Rijeci, Edo Jardas, box 1, folder 4.2.

published a number of these letters (though it is not clear whether some were edited), including, among others, one from a group of returnees in Rijeka questioned the paper's report of the death of Arso Jovanović, a letter from Anton Drašner,³⁹ asking that the paper and leadership in Canada not support the spread of "lies" about the CPY, two letters from Ivan Lindarić,⁴⁰ and a letter from a group of returnees in Gospić.⁴¹

Not all returnees though came out in Tito's favor. Probably the most important of the returnees who became a Cominformist was Mirko Marković. Marković joined the CPY in 1924 and later moved to the USSR. He became the leading Yugoslav-American Communist after arriving in the US in 1935, even serving as commander of an American-dominated battalion in Spain, in spite of having lived in the US for only a few of years. After returning to Yugoslavia in 1945, he became the foreign political editor of Tanjug and a dean at Belgrade. Yugoslav authorities arrested him in 1949 and he spent the next 5 years on Goli Otok.⁴²

A review of the Communist Party-dominated press during and after 1948 indicates that a majority of the Yugoslav members of the CPUSA and CPC retained their loyalty to Moscow. This is reflected in the memoirs of Steve Nelson, a Croatian-American born Stjepan Mesaroš, who rose to become one of the top leaders in the CPUSA.⁴³ Nelson claims that he had been tasked to explain the Party's position to Yugoslav members in New York. "At a decisive meeting, I strongly condemned Tito, and of the hundreds of Party members present, only two dared to vote against the position I presented. We didn't have all the details then, but I can see now that many would not have listened to

39 Drašner, born in Daruvar, had been a volunteer in the International Brigades in Spain. He died in 1961 and is buried in Opatija. See, e.g., Štimac, Erdeljac, Lindarić, Serdar, Drašner – ranjeni. *Slobodna misao*, 25 September 1937, p. 1.

40 Lindarić, a native of Krk Island, had also been a volunteer in the International Brigades in Spain. See Pavlič, *Lindarić, Ivan*, pp. 194-98.

41 Razgovor s drugovima u Jugoslaviji. *Jedinstvo*, 5 November 1948, p. 3, 12 November 1948, p. 3, and 19 November 1948, pp. 2-3.

42 Despite his importance both in the early history of the CPY as well as his work among Yugoslav-Americans in the United States, Marković was virtually ignored in Communist historiography in Yugoslavia. For instance, the memoirs of Stjepan Lojen, the leading Croatian American Communist in the late 1930s and during World War II, make no mention of him. See generally, Lojen, *Uspomene*. Marković published a number of articles in *Naše novine*, the successor newspaper to *Jedinstvo* in Toronto, in the second half of the 1980s which those researching this most interesting figure should consult further. See, e.g., Mirko Marković, Kune se u Titu i poriču ga istodobno. *Naše novine*, 16 January 1986, p. 6; Miomir Marić, Prvi kauboj u Beogradu. *Naše novine*, 12 June 1986, pp. 6-7; and Miomir Marić, Povratak sa kamenog ostrva. *Naše novine*, 26 June 1986, pp. 6-7. After his release from Goli otok, Marković married another former inmate, and continued to suffer harassment from Yugoslav authorities thereafter. Miomir Marić, Povratak sa kamenog ostrva. *Naše novine*, 26 June 1986, pp. 6-7.

43 Nelson (1903-1993) arrived in the United States in 1922 and joined the CPUSA in 1925. He attended the International Lenin School, thereafter undertaking Comintern missions to China and India. During the Spanish Civil War he served as commissar of the Lincoln and the Lincoln-Washington Battalions and afterwards became a member of the Central Committee of the CPUSA. He was convicted in 1950 for attempting to overthrow the United States government, which was overturned by a 1956 United States Supreme Court decision. Though breaking with the Party in 1957, Nelson served as the longtime head of the Veterans of the Abraham Lincoln Brigade. See generally Nelson, Barrett & Ruck, *Steve Nelson*; and Eric Pace, Steve Nelson, Ex-Communist Tied To Ruling on Sedition, Dies at 90. *The New York Times*, 14 December 1993, p. B8.

Tito's side even if we had. I lapsed into the classical description of the Soviets as the leading party, a stance that still had currency (...)[We] readily agreed that anyone who parted with the Soviet Union was a renegade."⁴⁴

Those who had left or been expelled from the Party on account of their pro-Titoist sentiments focused their efforts on establishing new organizations and newspapers. Aleksander Jurich headed this work. Jurich had been one of the three "owners" of *Narodni glasnik* in December, 1940, an amateurish attempt to "cover-up" its continued connection with the Party.⁴⁵ Jurich initially joined the Socialist Party after coming to the US in 1910, later joining the CPUSA.⁴⁶ Jurich owned the *Starlight* and *New Starlight* restaurants in New York, both of which he advertised in the Communist press.⁴⁷

In early 1949, *Jedinstvo* claimed that Jurich was looking to take over the New York-based newspaper *Hrvatski svijet*.⁴⁸ *Hrvatski svijet* had been previously published by Don Niko Gršković. A former Catholic priest, Gršković became a member of the London-based Yugoslav Committee during World War I.⁴⁹ Following that War, Gršković's paper (titled at various times as *Svijet* and *Jugoslavenski svijet*), expressed a generally Pan-Slavic, pro-Soviet, pro-Yugoslav, but also a pro-Croat and anti-monarchist point of view.⁵⁰ Not surprisingly, during World War II, by which point the paper came under the stewardship of Anton Tanasković, it took up Tito's cause. The Tito-Stalin split did not lessen the paper's Russophile, Slavistic tendencies, but it nevertheless came out four-square in Tito's favor.

Its viewpoint was most succinctly expressed in a 6 July 1948 editorial which argued that "the overwhelming majority of people here have expressed themselves in favor of Tito. Against Tito are the extreme Communists and the right-wingers. The more moderate among our people, who are first Croats, Yugoslavs and Slavs, approve of Tito and condemn the interference of the Cominform in Yugoslavia's business."⁵¹ A subsequent response to the editorial noted that it set forth the thoughts of "all American Croats-Yugoslavs who have always been in favor of the freedom, democracy and independence of

44 Nelson, *Steve Nelson*, p. 290.

45 Kuda vodite H.B. Zajednice. *Nezavisna Država Hrvatska*, 22 March 1941, p. 3.

46 Concerning Jurich (1892-1979), see Smoljan, *Tito i Iseljenici*, p. 324.

47 Advertisements for Jurich's New York restaurant in 1934 in the CPUSA's *Daily Worker* described it as a place "Where Comrades Meet." Conveniently, the restaurant's location on 15th Street between Union Square and Irving Place, and later on Irving Place, placed them only several blocks from CPUSA headquarters.

48 Rad Titovih agenata u SAD. *Jedinstvo*, 6 May 1949, p. 2.

49 Concerning Gršković's work during World War I, see Čizmić, *Jugoslavenski iseljenički pokret*. See also Hranilović, *Novinarski djelatnost*, pp. 49-64.

50 This did not mean, however, that Communists looked on Gršković and his newspaper with sympathy. See, for example, Stjepan Lojen's brutal critique in his Loyen, *Tko gradi*, p. 13. For his part, Gršković noted Croatian Communists had, after accepting the CPY's and Comintern's anti-Yugoslav line, become "overnight greater Croats than all dead and living Croats," concluding that they exploited the Croatian name merely to advance their own purposes. U svjetlu istinu. *Svijet*, 23 January 1938, p. 2; and Tko je za jedinstvo hrvatskog naroda. *Svijet*, 29 September 1936, p. 2.

51 U današnjem sporu, naš narod je za Tita. *Hrvatski svijet*, 16 July 1948, p. 2.

the Croatian and Yugoslav peoples.⁵² The paper later carried the full text of Tito's report to the CPY's Fifth Congress in multiple installments⁵³ and stories from Yugoslavia in an attempt to show that Tito had wide support in the country.⁵⁴

The paper did not hide its contempt for the hypocrisy of Stalin's supporters within the community noting that while "Tito is no longer good (*ne valja*)," he had been "until recently the best. Nevertheless, most people are not paying attention to the advice of 'comrades,' as our people first stand in favor of Slavdom (*Slavenstvo*) and Slavic solidarity, for whom the 'comrades' do not care, but only use them if they are of use to them."⁵⁵

Despite *Hrvatski svijet's* affinity for Tito, Jurich and a group of supporters struck out on their own, establishing the *Novi list* corporation in 1948 which subsequently published a paper under the same name in New York starting in 1949.⁵⁶ *Novi list* often included vitriolic pieces which attacked the Stalinists. One editorial, for example, noted that the Cominformists around *Jedinstvo* and *Narodni glasnik* engaged in multiple forms of treason, being traitorous to the progressive movement as well as to their own people.⁵⁷

Pro-Titoists further established various Yugoslav-American Clubs, a number taking the title "Friends of New Yugoslavia." The organizers of one such club in Chicago, declared that it would seek to "counter the Cominform's destructive influence of extremist Communist elements among our people in America."⁵⁸

Pro-Titoist elements also found a voice in Louis Adamic. The Slovene-born Adamic became the most prominent Yugoslav-American intellectual in the later 1930s and during the 1940s, having established himself as a prominent writer and political and social commentator. A supporter of the *New Deal* and a promoter of America's cultural and ethnic pluralism, Adamic retained his interest in Yugoslavia becoming, during World War the II, the President of the pro-Titoist United Committee of South-Slavic Americans.⁵⁹ His 1943 work, *My Native Land*, argued forcefully in favor of the Partisans,

52 Marko Jelavić, *Za naš narod u Starom kraju ne treba biti u bojznosti*. *Hrvatski svijet*, 30 July 1948, p. 2.

53 See, e.g., *Iz izvještaja Maršala Tita V kongresu Komunističke stranke Jugoslavije*. *Hrvatski svijet*, 31 August 1948, p. 2.

54 See, e.g., *Povodom kampanje Internacionalnog komunizam protiv Jugoslavije*. *Hrvatski svijet*, 1 October 1948, p. 2.

55 *Jugoslavija i naši 'drugovi' u Americi*. *Hrvatski svijet*, 15 October 1948, p. 2.

56 Will Lisser, *Yugoslavs in U.S. Face Party Fight*. *The New York Times*, 11 February 1950, p. 4. *Novi list* claimed a circulation of 3,400 in 1952. Statement of Ownership, Management and Circulation. *Novi list*, 7 October 1952, p. 4.

57 *Izdaje ih njihov vlastiti rad*. *Novi list*, 6 May 1952, p. 2.

58 *Zabava prijatelja Nove Jugoslavije*. *Hrvatski svijet*, 21 March 1950, p. 2.

59 The United Committee included on its board both Communists and non-Communists, chief among the former being Mirko Marković who allegedly had an important influence on Adamic, which other leaders of the Committee noted. Maletić, *Ujedinjeni odbor*, p. 100. The Committee published its own *Bulletin* (edited by Adamic) which Maletić states had a circulation of up to 25,000 and published numerous pamphlets and brochures supportive of Tito. Maletić states that the Committee received tremendous assistance in mailing and distributing its *Bulletin* from the New York based Yugoslav Seamen's Club. *Ibid.*

exposing the Chetniks as collaborators and condemning the pro-Chetnik and anti-Croat work of Konstantin Fotić, the head of the Yugoslav Legation in Washington.⁶⁰

Like *Hrvatski svijet*, Adamic publicly supported Tito after the Cominform split. Writing in October 1949, Adamic claimed that "The New Yugoslavia is a terrific place. The people are caught up in a strenuous effort linked to a key sense of the future (...). The Yugoslav position is morally and politically sound. The vast majority of citizens know the truth of what is going on in Yugoslavia and they are for the basic policies of Tito's government, for the new system."⁶¹ Adamic's pro-Titoist English writing found expression in a new journal he published, *Trends and Tides*, and in his last book, *The Eagle and the Roots*, which chronicled the six months he spent in Yugoslavia in 1949.⁶²

Yugoslavia placed much store in garnering support for their policies against Stalin among Yugoslav immigrants. While we have not as of yet been able to determine what if any financial support had been provided by FPRY in this regard, clearly the Communist government provided moral encouragement by such tactics as having officials make frequent appearances at community events.

These efforts should be seen as part of the wider effort undertaken by Yugoslav authorities to develop "soft power."⁶³ Yugoslavia sought to influence world public opinion through a variety of methods, such as promoting Yugoslav culture (examples include the English language glossy magazine *Yugoslavia* and the 1950 exhibition of medieval Yugoslav art organized by Miroslav Krleža).

In the struggle with the Comintern, Yugoslavia proved adept at making its positions known and palatable to Western tastes, beginning with the publication of its *White Book*,⁶⁴ and using the writings of such authors as Vladimir Dedijer as well as Adamic and various American and British writers.

Yugoslav immigrants were useful in this regard as they were a potential pressure group which could be used to steer American and Canadian foreign policies in favor of Tito. Moreover, the support expressed for Tito had the added benefit of legitimizing the regime, as can be deduced by the coverage provided in newspapers in Yugoslavia concerning its emigrant communities. Such communities were also seen as a potential source of economic support for the war-ravaged (and boycotted) country.

With the active support of the Yugoslav government, one can say that the pro-Titoists "won" the battle with the Cominformists in the immigrant communities (though

60 Adamic, *My Native Land*. Bogdan Novak has argued that Adamic turned to Tito "because of his ideological closeness to Tito and the Communist cause. Adamic was convinced that in the final stage Tito's Communism would bring a better life to the great majority of the common people." Novak, *Why Adamic Shifted*, p. 190.

61 Louis Adamic on New Yugoslavia. *Hrvatski svijet*, 6 October 1949, p. 2.

62 Adamic, *The Eagle and the Roots*. Many have sought to paint his subsequent mysterious suicide as actually having been a cover for a murder committed by his political enemies, whether pro-Chetniks or pro-Cominformists. Bogdan Radica, for instance, claimed that Adamic "was the victim of Chetniks, who could not forgive him for the truth that he had written about them and Greater Serbianism." Radica, *Mi u Americi*, p. 99.

63 "Soft power" was a term developed in the 1980s. See generally Nye, *Soft Power*.

64 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *White Book*.

not among Party members). The Stalinists, on the other hand, though having (at least the moral) support of the USSR and its allies, could not hope for any overt diplomatic or other institutional assistance. The issues within the relatively small Yugoslav immigrant communities could not be seen as one of vital importance to the Cominform. Perhaps more importantly, the Cominformists were clearly on the “wrong side” in the then opening years of the Cold War. With the Soviet Union taking on the role as the primary foe of the US and its allies, any group favorable to the Cominform simply could not garner much support among individuals looking to make a better life for themselves in the post-war, economically booming societies of North America. As was one group in Chicago wrote in 1950, “we are first and foremost Americans and we are ready to defend America without regard to political questions. To us, America comes first, we live in it freely and live better than we would anywhere else in the world, which is the reason we remain in America. If we did not believe this, we would have returned to Europe long ago.”⁶⁵

However, despite these sentiments, the “victory” of Titoist forces in the propaganda war within Yugoslav-American communities represented a rather hollow one. Evidence suggests that the activity of members of numerous organizations suffered a steep decline in the 1950s. No doubt the internecine strife among former comrades caused many “non-activists” to choose to no longer participate in groups which had for the most part been initially established as social and cultural, and not political, organizations. An example of this can be seen in the Yugoslav American Home in New York City. Established in 1948 on Manhattan’s West Side, the Home’s shareholders included hundreds of individuals, as well as organizations, many of which clearly had connections with the CPUSA.⁶⁶ The Tito-Stalin split led to a vicious battle for control over the Home, which no doubt led many “ordinary” members to ultimately determine not to be part of the organization at all.⁶⁷

65 Zabava prijatelja Nove Jugoslavije. *Hrvatski svijet*, 21 March 1950, p. 2.

66 Ujčić, *A Journal Commemorating*. An original version of this souvenir book is found in the New York Public Library.

67 See, e.g., Club in Row Over Reds; Yugoslav-American Home Heads Deny Control by Communists. *New York Times*, 13 January 1951, p. 10. John Blasko noted that the “poor attendance at affairs held in the Yugoslav-American Home” had likely been caused by its placement on “the subversive list as a front for the American Communist Party – accepting dictates from the Cominform to destroy Democracy.” John Blasko, *America Yugoslav Homes*. *Novi list*, 28 February 1952, p. 4. The building which housed the Home no longer exists, its site having been taken over by the Bus Terminal of the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey. Carol Fijan Starobin, whose father had been active in pro-CPUSA circles in the Croatian community in New York, advised the author that the organ in the Home was donated to the Community Baptist Church in Bayside, New York. Carol Fijan Starobin, interview by author, Great Neck, New York, 26 March 1999. It appears that after the Home had been demolished, its funds were taken over by the Yugoslav Seaman’s Club, which had been included among organizations deemed to be subversive by the U.S. Department of Justice. See Zinn, *Postwar America*, p. 157. The Club was renamed the New York City Seamen’s Club in 1998; though the entity still legally exists, it appears to have no further functions, its last act known to this author being the donation of its remaining monies to the CFU for scholarship purposes (under the name New York City Seamen’s Club Fund). See <https://croatianfraternalunion.org/fraternal-programs/scholarship>.

These issues were clearly exacerbated by McCarthyist policies adopted by governments in both the US and Canada, policies which were joined with non-official anti-foreign and specifically anti-Slavic campaigns within both countries. Such trends further caused many older immigrants and their children and grandchildren to drift away from participating in ethnic organizations.

Internal fractures within the communities only grew with the influx of large numbers of mainly nationalist, anti-Communist refugees to Canada and the US from Yugoslavia. These new immigrants established a plethora of new organizations which overtook the older, pro-Communist organizations (of both the Stalinist and Titoist variety) in size and influence. Already by 1955 the Titoist *Novi list* had folded, while the Friends of New Yugoslavia Clubs never grew into a national organization.

As for the Stalinist organizations, their newspapers surprisingly, though no longer having any mass support, eked out an existence for decades. Despite the rapprochement between the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia in the mid-1950s, their newspapers engaged in continuing arguments with former comrades who had chosen Tito over Stalin. Mirko Marković, for example, published in the 1980s many articles in *Naše novine*, the successor to *Jedinstvo*,⁶⁸ critical of “official” Yugoslav historiography which generally ignored his role in the Communist movement in the US.⁶⁹

Another historical dispute in *Naše novine* revolved around Edo Jardas. An interview given to the Zagreb-daily *Vjesnik* in 1973 spoke about Jardas’ role in the history of the Communist movement among Yugoslav immigrants in Canada.⁷⁰ Jardas’ description raised the ire of many in Canada who viewed him as unfairly taking the credit for the work of others in the movement. An announcement appeared in *Naše novine* on 28 November 1973 which severely criticized Jardas. Jardas not only disputed the criticisms but questioned the sincerity of those who issued the announcement, asking why such an attack had been raised “against a person who had spent his entire life toiling in the class struggle for the emancipation of the working class?”⁷¹

68 According to Anton Kostelac, the name *Jedinstvo* had been dropped because some had thought that the name would be associated with Titoist slogan “Brotherhood and Unity” (*Bratstvo i jedinstvo*) and that the new name would attract new readers. Kostelac noted that at least one supporter of the newspaper claimed that the change “would fool no one – and he was right.” Undated correspondence received in May 2004 from Anton Kostelac to the author. Skorić, *Serbs in Ontario*, p. 42, implies that the new name arose in an attempt to heal the rift between the former Stalinists and a Titoist group called *Bratstvo i jedinstvo*.

69 See, e.g., Mirko Marković, *Kako Dediđer ‘priča istoriju.* *Naše novine*, April 14, 1982, p. 3. The existence of *Naše novine* allowed persons such as Marković, who remained under proscription in Yugoslavia until his death, to publish a portion of his memoirs in a series of articles and also provided a forum to discuss the prison camp at Goli Otok.

70 The interview appeared in September 1973 and has been published as part of collection of interviews. Stuparić, *Revolucionari*, pp. 88–100. As noted by one of his former comrades: “Jardas is well known to all of us who worked with him or cooperated with him in our movement. We all know that Comrade Jardas is a terribly and insanely ambitious man.” Pismo Petra Erdeljaca iz Zagreba. *Naše novine*, 20 February 1974, p. 4.

71 Državni arhiv u Rijeci, Edo Jardas, box 1, folder 4.2 (14 January 1974 letter from Edo Jardas to the Executive Committee of the Alliance of Yugoslav Canadians). The controversy centered on, among other things, Jardas’ diminution of the role played by Tomo Čačić in establishing *Borba* in 1931, the first Croatian-language Com-

By this point, however, such disputes had no wide public resonance. Indeed, *Narodni glasnik* had by then already ended its days, after a national meeting in Chicago on 18 August 1973 determined to shutter the paper, its readers being encouraged to continue to subscribe to *Naše novine*.⁷² The final issue of the latter appeared on 16 April 1987. A Toronto group formerly associated with the paper decided to soon thereafter come out with a new publication, *Horizont*, under the editorship of Josip Gabre, who had previously contributed poems and other literary writing to *Jedinstvo*. *Horizont* last appeared in 1991, its demise “conveniently” coinciding with the fall of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia and marking the end of the “Cominformists” as a group in North America.⁷³

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72 The last issue of *Narodni glasnik* appeared on 29 August 1973. *Narodni glasnik* prestao izlaziti. *Naše novine*, 5 September 1973, p. 2; and Proglas. *Naše novine*, 12 September 1973, p. 3. Kostelac, an editor of *Naše novine* in the 1970s, advised the author that the number of subscribers *Naše novine* obtained as a result of the folding of *Narodni glasnik* represented a “trifle” and circulation of the Canadian paper totaled about 2,000 by 1980.

73 Kostelac advised the author that Gabre insisted on continuing to publish *Horizont* until 1991, to mark 60th anniversary of the Croatian and Yugoslav “labor press” in Canada. Gabre, a native of Šibenik, arrived in Canada in 1959. According to Kostelac, Gabre had fought with the Partisans during World War II. After the war, Yugoslav authorities imprisoned him for 5 years on Goli Otok. Kostelac advises that Gabre died while on a trip to Croatia in 2001. See undated correspondence received in May 2004 from Anton Kostelac to the author; and Rasporich, *For a Better Life*, p. 217.

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Summary

John P. Kraljic

Yugoslav Communities in North America and the Tito-Stalin Split

World War II had been a watershed in the development of Yugoslav communities in North America. Croatian-Americans and Croatian-Canadians, by far the largest of the three major communities, lived with the shadow of the Independent State of Croatia, which had declared war against, among others, the United States. However, their community's leadership, strongly influenced, alternatively, by Leftist, Communist or Liberal, pro-New Deal ideas, for the most part declared themselves in favor of the Partisans. The leadership of the Serbian community in North America generally favored the restoration of King Peter II and the Chetnik movement. Nevertheless, Serbs in the United States and Canada also had very strong and vocal pro-Communist organizations. The Communist Party of Yugoslavia, which had relied on financial contributions of immigrants in the pre-War years, placed great store on the sympathy of Yugoslav immigrants and followed these developments with sustained interest. The end of the War resulted in these pro-Partisan groups having a preponderant voice in their respective ethnic communities. The Tito-Stalin break in 1948 shattered this outward display of unity. This paper will examine the after effects of the break on the two largest Yugoslav-American communities. Most ethnic Croat and Serb Communists in North America sided with Stalin, ultimately leading to the deterioration of their recently won leadership roles in the communities at large. That some Communists supported Tito gave birth to a vitriolic, decades' long campaign between the

two competing pro-Communist camps. These disputes caused large internal fractures to arise in and between many organizations, chasms which increased as a result of the growing anti-Communist hysteria in the United States and the influx of large numbers of mainly nationalist, anti-Communist refugees to Canada and the United States from Yugoslavia. These events had profound and damaging effects on the communities and their organizations which continued into the late 1980s.

Tvrtko Jakovina

Tito's Traitorous Clique, Kangaroos and Croats: The Australian Tour of the Football Club Hajduk and the Fight against the Cominformists in Oceania in 1949

Cominformists Antipodeans

“It is well known that the majority of Yugoslav emigrants in capitalist countries actively fought against the exploiters of the working class.” This sentence was published in the Zagreb daily newspaper *Vjesnik* in late 1949.¹ In Australia, Canada, the USA, Argentina, Uruguay, Chile, France, and New Zealand, Yugoslav emigrants often worked in the most difficult jobs. They were not well-connected, and they could hardly speak the languages of their new homelands, so many of them joined organizations that promised to help them. The leading Croatian newspaper of the time wrote, “The bourgeoisie of these countries felt that they had a great opponent in the workers of Yugoslav origin.” In the most developed industrial countries to which they had moved, they often lived in terrible conditions, so in a world which was receptive to the ideas of the workers' movement, many of them became communists or leftists. In the first half of 20th century, especially after the Second World War, the world was leaning to the left, and the Cold War intensified the divisions between the East and the Soviet Union on the one hand and the West on the other.

After the Resolution of the Information Bureau of the Communist Party of 28 June 1948 and the break of relations between the Soviet Union and the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia (FPRY), between Stalin and Tito, between the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) (VKP(b)) and the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (KPJ), the socialist world was divided. The split was a global one. Not only did all communist

¹ *Vjesnik*, 12 November 1949. (Yugoslav expatriates join our Party's struggle). Majority of newspaper articles in Božidar Novak's collection are clippings. Therefore, it was not always possible to quote page numbers.

parties have to choose their side, better say condemn Yugoslavia, but the lives of ordinary people were affected as well. The split was felt everywhere, including all emigrant associations, from New Zealand and Australia to Canada, Sweden and the United States. The split and the conflict between those who were for or against the countries of the People's Democracy and Stalin or Tito and FPRY was particularly noticeable in the United States, Canada, and Australia. The fact that the football club Hajduk had signed on a tour on the other side of the world lasting several months in the summer of 1949 made the division within the Yugoslavian community, and particularly Croats, more specifically Dalmatians, particularly prominent.

The first Croatian-Slavic society in Australia was founded in the west, in Boulder, in 1912, and it was "inspired by the hatred towards the Austro-Hungarian oppression." This was stated in the material prepared for Božo Novak, a journalist and politician, who led the delegation of the football club Hajduk from Split to Australia in the summer of 1949. A more substantial immigration of "our people", mostly Dalmatians, began after 1923 and the Great War. The immigrants were then taken advantage of by agents who would find them jobs – "the former Honorary Consul Nikola Marić, Jure Banović, and Andrejević and Niketić from Serbia", all of whom were "the core around which reactionaries gathered": "royalists, Greater Serbs, Greater Yugoslavs and Hun lovers."² Joseph (Joe, Jozo) Alagich of Kotišina near Makarska, who took part in the Kotor mutiny in 1918, was the first to encourage Croats to celebrate Labour Day (1 May) in 1926 and to rally them around a leftist workers' platform. On 15 June 1928, the Militant Workers Movement was founded in the house of Petar Srzić, in which Jozo Alagich (Alagić), Šegedin and Ivan Viskich (Viskić)³ had the most prominent roles. Alagich was more of an anarchist than a communist, "and today he is neither – except a Cominformist," as stated by those who supported Tito in 1949. The Militant Workers Movement moved its headquarters to Sydney and was renamed the Yugoslav Immigrants Association in Australia. Although not all members were Croats, they, especially Dalmatians, did make up to 90% of the membership of the Association.⁴ They eventually decided to remove the hammer and sickle from the cover of the Association's periodical, which angered some of the more militant members, like Alagich, who wanted to continue to act conspiratorially, "secretly in forests or parks." It was only at the second congress in 1934 that a clearer course was set, so "comrade Kosović, the current Consul of the FPRY was elected secretary," and then work began "on a massive scale". During the war, there was unity. "We unmasked the 'legendary hero' Draža [Mihailović] and destroyed the dark clouds that spread among our emigrants."⁵ By 1948, the mobilization for moral

2 Center Tripalo, BN, Information from Australia (13 typewritten pages).

3 Tkalčević, *Hrvati u Australiji*, pp. 42-44.

4 Lalić, *Egzodus iz Australije u doba Hladnog rata*, p. 78.

5 Center Tripalo, BN, Information from Australia.

and material help for the homeland was good, repatriation was on the way. Many of the emigrants wanted to return, but others began to appear, those dissatisfied with the outcome of the war.

In that period, the Association dominated the political life of Croats in Australia. According to the Yugoslav sources from the Consulate General in Sydney, there were only seven thousand Yugoslav emigrants in Australia. Half of them lived in Western Australia, mostly Perth. The majority of them worked in the gold fields, and a smaller part were in the desert, cut off from the settlements. "As if they had been cast out of the sky," they "cut the forest" for the mines. In Lakewood, emigrants lived the most primitive lives. "They have eaten plenty of flies and ants in their lives. They live in tents, they don't have water. They especially didn't have water previously, but they bought drinking water, so you can imagine how much water they bought for washing."⁶ In Warriewood near Sidney, in a bay sheltered from the winds, our people had become masters of tomato cultivation. "Good prices of their products are the greatest reason why that place has the most critics of Tito and 'his clique' – because they are afraid that the dispute will be resolved quickly and so they – the 'communists' – will have to go to their socialist homeland to build socialism."⁷

Hard living and working conditions, their exceptionally poor education, the fact that everyone had come from a similar area and that they shared similar fates, and then Tito's victory, the fact that many people in "the old country" and many of their relatives had been partisans, made Australian Croats very receptive to the ideas of the leadership of the Association, which were leftist or far-leftist. Even though they were divided into "royalists", "Catholics" and "simply anti-communists", a large number of emigrants, comprising 30 branches, supported Tito and the Russian Revolution. The periodical *Napredak* (Progress), whose first edition was first published in 1936, was banned from 1939 to 1942 for spreading communist propaganda, and thus it shared the fate of other non-English papers. However, it continued to be published.⁸ In 1947, Ivan Viskiċ became the secretary of the Main Board of the Association. By that time, a number of members of the leadership of the Association had changed. Some had died, some had returned to their homeland, others to the Consulate, so Viskiċ, who was present during that period, although he was not the most prominent member, had come to the fore. The first editor-in-chief of *Napredak*, Ivan Kosoviċ, became the first consul of the post-war Yugoslavia. By the end of the Second World War, Macedonians living in Australia had established the organization "Edinstvo" (Unity) in Perth. "Edinstvo" was a member of the Yugoslav Immigrants Association in Australia, and after 1945 they formed the

6 Ibid.

7 Ibid.

8 Šutalo, *Croatians in Australia*, pp. 205-207; Laliċ, *Egzodus iz Australije u doba Hladnog rata*, p. 79; Tkalċeviċ, *Hrvati u Australiji*, p. 46.

Macedonian League, remaining firmly connected with the YIAA.⁹ Macedonians, like Croats, left the country “when there was no freedom or justice there, when there was no bread or money there.”¹⁰

The feeling that after the war a new era would begin created the atmosphere that people should return from Australia. Optimism, faith in a better future and social justice made people return from France and the United States. They also returned from South America. In 1949, a fifth group of 149 emigrants returned to Dalmatia from Montevideo and Buenos Aires. They also returned after 1948 because “the truth about the just fight of the peoples of Yugoslavia against the revisionist and anti-Marxist actions of the USSR and the Cominform countries has been penetrating among our emigrants in Argentina, Uruguay, Chile, and other countries of South America.”¹¹ They also returned in large numbers from Australia aboard the ships *Partizanka* and *Radnik* – one seventh of them. Many of them wanted to join their families, to return after long years of absence. They spoke poor English, they did not think their children would ever be successful or become completely equal to other Australian citizens. They mostly moved in circles of people like them.¹² Later, those who did not return to FPRY were described as “traitors,” who “do not feel love for their homeland and who do not want to help her build socialism.”¹³

With the Resolution of the Communist Information Bureau on 28 June 1948, “traitors”, “selfish opportunists”, “headed by Ivan Viskiċ and Marin Kovaċeviċ, got ahead of themselves and aligned the Association with the Resolution.” The Communist Party of Australia (CPA) initially condemned the “treachery of Tito’s clique”, although it did not seek to adopt the Resolution. This was done by the communists of Yugoslav origin, believing that Tito’s clique could not remain in power for “more than a month or so, and thus they wanted to back the ‘right’ line.” “Little Jozo cannot fight the great (Joseph),” spoke Marin Kovaċeviċ. “What Stalin says must go,” said Marko Boriċ. “Socialism cannot be built with capitalists,” wrote Marko Jelaviċ in *Napredak*. Indeed, Viskiċ demanded that the sentence stating that the Association had an obligation “to support the FPRY” be removed from the Statute of the Association.¹⁴ The sentence should read that they were obliged “to help the countries of the people’s democracy,” which no longer included the FPRY. It was exactly what Moscow was saying: Tito had become an Anglo-American spy, his government was using “gestapo-fascist” methods.¹⁵ Another reason why Viskiċ’s views were this fervent was the fact that his relative Boro

9 *Napredak*, 5 November 1949. (They asked us to declare our trust to Tito; S. Srbinoŋ).

10 Center Tripalo, BN, Hajduk’s tour of Australia.

11 *Nova Jugoslavija*, 12 January 1950, (Radnik comes to Split with a group of emigrants from South America).

12 Laliċ, *Egzodus iz Australije u doba Hladnog rata*, pp. 82–123.

13 *Vjesnik*, 23 December 1949. (The truth about our struggle has come to Australia 2, Boŋidar Novak).

14 *Vjesnik*, 22 December 1949. (The truth about our struggle has come to Australia 1, Boŋidar Novak).

15 *Naprijed*, 11 November 1949. (Comrade Kardelj’s speech to our emigrants in America).

Viskić, former president of the local union council of Osijek, had been arrested. The "Titoists" had been holding him in prison for nine months, without "any arguments or courage to bring him to court, for they are surely afraid that he would unmask their dirty treacherous doings."¹⁶ In the Association, those "who were eager to insult the peoples of Yugoslavia, to belittle and undermine their National Liberation Movement" had prevailed. The Association had "stooped to counter-revolutionary, Trotskyist positions," and was purging non-sympathisers.¹⁷

In late 1949, the seventh national conference of the Yugoslav Immigrants Association in Australia was held, with delegates who had replaced "the best comrades", who had returned to the old country, and who were all "anti-Titoists". Instead of Tito, they pledged their loyalty to an "international communist movement led by the Soviet Union". They called all emigrants to a "fight against 'terror' in Yugoslavia". They organized rallies, seeking a mass condemnation of the government of Yugoslavia. According to reports in Yugoslavia, the rallies were poorly attended, but the new leadership of the Association still gained victory. The disgruntled members abandoned the Association, which worked in favour of the Cominformists. People in the Consulate believed that many of them were misguided, but the situation was serious because there was no strength to organize a counter strike.¹⁸ The Association was now held only by party members, but it has no support of the masses. These masses seem to be lost. They are still wavering and they don't know where to go, but with the passage of time they are becoming more convinced that the way of the Central Committee (CC) of the CPY is correct. However, many still do not approve of the conflict with the Soviet Union. "It would be wrong to say that such a weak response to the Association's leadership call is evidence that the people is behind us, who are in favour of the CC of the CPY. Even though in some places we do have the majority of active emigrants who have prevented that the resolution be sent, we still cannot claim that these people are in agreement with the policies of our Party and state leadership. Because if this were so, then we could organize the emigrants better and we could depose the leadership of the Association... However, in some places, we did succeed in sending supporting resolutions to Comrade Tito and our Government, etc., but it is nowhere near to what it should be and how we would like it to be."

Leading Cominformists (sometimes referred to in the Consulate as Informovci) in Australia were mostly members of the Communist Party of Australia. Many of them fought against the members of the Association for personal reasons. They were simply jealous of the former leaders who had positions in the Consulate and had until recently worked in similar jobs as they did. In every small and closed community, things are

16 *Napredak*, 27 August 1949. (The arrest of the chairman of the local union council of the City of Osijek).

17 *Vjesnik*, 22 December 1949. (The truth about our struggle has come to Australia, Božidar Novak).

18 Center Tripalo, BN, Information from Australia.

always the same.¹⁹ The Resolution split the emigrants in the United States and Canada as well. Australian Macedonians also “voted no-confidence against Tito and the Yugoslav government”.²⁰ In early August 1949, the conference of the Macedonian League of New South Wales adopted a resolution stating that they regretted “that the nationalist leadership of the People’s Republic of Macedonia – Koliševski, Vlahov – with Tito at the helm, led our people back to the bondage of reactionism and imperialism.”²¹ They condemned Tito’s policy towards Greece.

In New Zealand, there were about 6,000 Yugoslavs. They lived mostly on fishing and the production of resins and wine. The Yugoslav Club in Auckland had been in existence since the 1930s, but it was led by “royalists, Catholics or vulgar anti-communists”, people without a clear political perspective, as stated in a report from the island.²² Savez jugoslavenskih iseljenika u Australiji (the Federation of Yugoslav Immigrants in Australia) was set up in 1942 in order to support the National Liberation Movement. Some of the members of the Savez, members of the Communist Party of New Zealand, took over the leading positions and tried to lead the association like a sectarian society, which was very difficult before 1948. The Main Board of the Savez had been divided for a long time, which led to inactivity of part of the membership, and then prominent members of the Savez, “super-Communists”, launched the initiative to condemn the CC of the CPY. Thus in Auckland on 19 June 1949, “the Cominformists managed to push their Resolution,” so the assembly of the Yugoslav society “Marshal Tito” also stood behind the Cominformists.²³ They did it secretly, at assemblies where few emigrants were present. The interpretation of the Consulate General was that the disgruntled usually withdrew and became inactive.²⁴ The difference in relation to Australia was that there were fewer emigrants, so the divisions were not as prominent, but the Yugoslav Alliance of New Zealand conformed to the Australians. 500 people were buying *Napredak*. “The Devastating work of the Cominformists” put a large number of emigrants off from the association, *Vjesnik* later reported.²⁵

In other countries the situation was similar. Students from Yugoslavia, the “political emigrants in Bulgaria” set up a working brigade “Arso Jovanović”, sending a clear

19 Šutalo, *Croatians in Australia*, p. 207; BN, information from Australia (13 typewritten pages).

In the material, rather detailed characteristics of 22 emigrant Cominformists were listed. Also listed were the names of 14 prominent emigrants “who are on our side”.

20 *Napredak*, 5 November 1949. (They asked us to declare our trust to Tito; S. Srbinoŕ).

21 *Napredak*, 27 August 1949, A conference of a branch of the Macedonian League was held in NSW.

22 Center Tripalo, BN, A short report on the Yugoslav emigrants to New Zealand (4 typewritten pages).

23 *Vijesti iz Nove Jugoslavije* (The News from New Yugoslavia), no. 12, 12 August 1949, (Our emigration).

24 *Slobodna Dalmacija*, 16 September 1949; (A letter of one of our emigrants to New Zealand). Jozë Pivac from Podgora, now in Feilding, New Zealand, wrote on 24 August 1949 that the number of traitors is small. Those who took over *Napredak* and took the traitors’ side, were never true patriots. “Once they were patriots because it served their personal interest, and they were easily drawn to the side of those filthy liars today. (...) Be persistent and united – unity will prevail!”

25 *Vjesnik*, 23 December 1949. (The truth about our struggle has come to Australia, Božidar Novak).

message that they were taking the side of Sofia and not of Belgrade.²⁶ The Swedish-Yugoslav Society decided to sever “all ties with Tito’s clique” on 15 August 1949, although Sweden, like all the countries of northern Europe, generally adopted a friendly stance towards Tito. This was well-received in Yugoslavia, as these were social democrats, so it was believed that co-operation would be better and easier with those who were at least somewhat ideologically close. Thus, the journalists of *Napredak* wrote that the Western media had until recently referred to Yugoslavia as a country with a “cruel Bolshevik dictatorship”, and now it had become a “democracy”, with Tito as a “hero” compared to Manerheim and Yugoslavia to the “poor little Finland”.

After the Resolution, the Canadian South Slavic Association (Vijeće kanadskih Južnih Slavena, VKJS) and the editorial board of *Jedinstvo* (Unity) took the side of “the lies against Yugoslavia and its leadership without any arguments”, “arbitrarily, without having convened a conference and without the approval of the membership.”²⁷ The accusations against Tito were untrue, what they were writing was against the workers, the information about the extensive Yugoslav trade with the West was false – the FPRY did not trade with the West any more than other nations of the people’s democracy and the USSR. The proclamation said that Yugoslavia had not split from the “brotherly Slavic and socialist” states. *Jedinstvo* and the Canadian South Slavic Association argued that at the Third Convention 67 delegates and 17 representatives of the youth elected the Main Committee, which instantly lodged “a protest to Tito’s government against terror and persecution of those who only wanted what was good for the people.”²⁸

In Yugoslavia, it was reported that all this was bad for the labour movement in Canada in general, especially for people coming from Yugoslavia. Progressive workers and genuine and honest patriots were not in favour of a destructive campaign against Yugoslavia because it would hamper the progress of “all Slavic socialist countries and destroy the unity of the workers’ movement in the world.” Emigrants were called on not to be afraid of standing with Yugoslavia and its creative potentials. They supported workers from Toronto and the members of the Canadian South Slavic Association in Noranda, Quebec. Tito had showed where he stood during the war, and now “he was building socialism, whether anybody liked it or not.” This was how those who were on the Yugoslav side responded.²⁹ Both camps started rallying, those who protested against the enemy propaganda and those who thought that Tito was simply not in the right. Thus in the summer of 1949, the Social Club of the people of Šibenik in New York held a rally, so the Croatian Alliance in South Chicago adopted a statement attacking

26 *Napredak*, 20 August 1949. (The Paper of the Yugoslav emigrants to Australia and New Zealand; Arso Jovanović; The youth brigade of our students in Bulgaria).

27 *Vjesnik*, 12 July 1949. (The proclamation of Yugoslav emigrants to Canada).

28 *Napredak*, 6 August 1949. (A report from the convention of the Canadian South Slavic Association; resolution on the general work and tasks of the CSSA).

29 *Vjesnik*, 23 July 1949. (Emigrants from Noranda, Canada, condemn the anti-Yugoslav campaign).

“certain people among our expatriates” who were on the side of the anti-Yugoslav campaign.³⁰ In the United States and Argentina, some of the emigrants who sided with the Cominformists were expelled. Tomo Babin was expelled from the United States, just like the authorities of General Juan Perón in Argentina expelled ten leading members of the Slavic Association after the “Andersians and Titoists” attacked the association in early July 1949.³¹ In late July 1949 in Montevideo, the capital of the Eastern Republic of Uruguay, the Seventh Annual Convention of Slavic Societies was held. Eight Yugoslavs attended and proposed a resolution condemning Tito’s government. Belgrade had joined the camp which was “hostile to the Slavs and the people’s democracies,” so they called for Yugoslavia to shift back.³²

The struggle of societies and communists who ended up on opposite sides in relation to the Resolution of the Information Bureau was conducted through newspapers. In early October 1949 in the United States, the *New Journal* (Novi list) was started and was partly financed from Yugoslavia. This was done because the attacks that were coming from “the supporters of Pavelić, Nedić and Mihajlović” during the war were now coming from “some people who had been with us until recently”. Now they “have changed, to their own and the people’s detriment”.³³ As *Napredak* reported, New Zealand and Australia got a new periodical in “our language” in October 1950. *Vijesti iz Nove Jugoslavije* (The News from New Yugoslavia) was a biweekly newsletter. It was duplicated with a hectograph at first, before they moved on to printing.³⁴ The paper, producing about 1500 copies, was edited “at the Consulate General in Sydney”, the now rival *Napredak* reported. This was not a victory, but a “treachery, a further plunging in the mud of the working class and the struggle of the progressive humanity,” a new form of spreading “Trotskyist and traitorous propaganda”. It was all expensive and unnecessary, *Napredak* reported, but “material costs” were not a problem for the “traitorous clique, their masters in Belgrade”. They did not regret “the millions they spent in their fight against the Soviet Union and the progressive movement in the world”.³⁵ What was happening now in the FPRY was worse than any occupation regime in this century, they reported. Traitors think they will break the Savez, *Napredak*, and the workers’ movement, but “the emigrants will dismiss this treacherous rag and its editors, even if they printed it in golden letters!” They requested that their members send *Novi Jugoslavija* back.

The Consulate of the FPRY claimed that although *Napredak* was formally edited by Marin Kovačević, this was actually done by Viskičić. In early 1950, it was reduced from

30 *Slobodna Dalmacija*, 4 September 1949, Sunday Review – Slander against the FPRY.

31 *Napredak*, 6 August 1949, The protest of the Main Board to the governments of the US and Argentina. The Andersians were Poles who supported General Władysław Albert Anders.

32 *Napredak*, 27 August 1949, The Yugoslavs of Uruguay condemn the betrayal in our country.

33 *New Journal*, New York, October 12, 1949; Interview with Budimir Lončar 27 June 2018.

34 Center Tripalo, BN, information from Australia (13 typewritten pages).

35 *Napredak*, 15 October 1949, Limitless funds for the reactionary propaganda.

twelve to eight pages, "which is important, because they have less space to print their falsehoods." Božo Novak and his frequent interlocutor Luka Marković, who worked in the Consulate in Sydney commented that *Napredak* supporters had started to "back down a little."³⁶ That journal looked pathetic, they believed at the Consulate General. "Half of the journal just keeps slandering our socialist homeland, and the other half is filled with ads that keep this sorry excuse of a journal alive, a journal that had such a brilliant tradition and progressive background." Marković recommended that *Nova Jugoslavija* be better edited, that its design be more tasteful and technically better than that of *Napredak*. This did not mean that *Nova Jugoslavija* completely replaced the financially exhausted *Napredak*. "Don't say we have the people on our side. We don't," wrote Luka Marković from the Consulate in early February in 1950. Most of them didn't want to get involved, and two hundred of those who supported him, wrote the obviously realistic Marković, were largely members of the Party, so they still backed the "workers' journal". They were opportunists, cowards, they were committed to their friends.

The divisions that the Resolution of the Information Bureau brought were deep and far-reaching. It impacted not only international politics and the relations within the workers' movement and the socialist states of the time, but it also influenced the everyday lives of Yugoslav expatriates, many of whom didn't have a particularly close relationship with their homeland or were just ordinary citizens. They touched workers who produced resins in the north of New Zealand, maids in Buenos Aires, and stevedores in New York. For example, some more radical left-wing emigrants resented the fact that Alojzije Stepinac was given a mild punishment. Many were puzzled by the fact that after the war the Party continued to operate illegally, so they couldn't find its headquarters in the streets. They wondered how it was possible that all the communist parties were wrong, and only the CPY was right. *Napredak*, the only Yugoslav-Australian periodical, wrote that the propaganda of the "Tito-Ranković" machinery was gaining momentum, launching defamatory attacks on the USSR, and thus surpassing "the propaganda machine of the fascist regimes of Hitler, Franco, Mussolini and the ridiculous imperialistic liars in the USA and other capitalist states."³⁷ Tito was handing over the industry and national wealth to capitalists. Many concessions were made to Italians, Austrians, the English and Americans. "The Yugoslav people are paying dearly for the 'help' of the West," and with its "hostile attitude towards the USSR, the FPRY has completely disconnected itself from co-operation with a socialist country, the protector and the liberator of our peoples." In "all emigrant colonies around the world" expatriates clearly "condemned Tito and his clique" and they remained on the side "of the progressive masses of our nation in the home country" who wanted to build "a true socialism".³⁸

36 Center Tripalo, BN, A letter to B. Novak, 29 January 1950, Luka Marković.

37 *Napredak*, August 20, 1949, (The peoples of Yugoslavia will always remain friends of the USSR).

38 Ibid.

Emigrant associations, at least those who spoke openly in them, “vehemently condemned Tito’s traitorous clique, which betrayed the achievements of the national liberation movement of our peoples, and has become the most prolific slanderer of the Soviet Union, the nations of the people’s democracy and the progressive democratic order in all the world.”³⁹ As “an agent of the international reaction at the command of his imperialist masters,” Tito persecuted all those who wanted to remain “in the anti-imperialist front for peace and democracy.” Thus S. Alagić warned that it was “a sacred duty to provide full assistance to the movement in Yugoslavia, which opposes the treachery of Tito’s clique, and is fighting to save Yugoslavia for the front of peace, for socialism.” This was why it was necessary to fight “against Tito’s agents in this country” and their devastating propaganda. In New Zealand on 21 August 1949, Marin Ivičević explained that *Napredak* (Progress) could not be called as such if it wrote any differently about Yugoslavia. Exposing traitors, writing against the “traitorous leadership,” but not the people, was the “duty” of editors and the association.⁴⁰

“The Titoists are upset that the Democratic Workers’ Movement calls Tito’s regime in Yugoslavia fascist. But what else is it? The regime that persecutes, kills, imprisons and tortures sincere patriots who stood up and advocated co-operation and the unity of the workers’ movement, who defended the Soviet Union as a supporter of socialism and world peace, who fought those who call the enslavement of the people ‘socialism’, what is that but fascism?”, they asked as early as 1950, after the failed rally at which General Consul Vjekoslav Cvrlje spoke. The Committee of friends of the New Yugoslavia was defeated, because those who assembled voted for a resolution supporting the International Labour Movement and the Soviet Union in relation to the “Titoists,” who were nothing more than “ordinary agents of imperialism and reactionism,” and one demanding that “political prisoners... who are fighting against Tito’s clique, and for socialism” be released, and that nations of the people’s democracy co-operate.⁴¹ Could Tito see the truth, having fallen in the “mud of the dollar?”⁴²

Thus, one year after the adoption of the Resolution of the Informburo, at the time of the largest mobilization in the home country, when *Slobodna Dalmacija*, as well as other newspapers in the FPRY, was full of news items about people gathering (narodni zborovi), the condemning of the Cominform countries, the strengthening of the unity of the people against the Cominformists or “against slander and disinformation”, which was the title of a section in the central federal newspaper *Borba* (Struggle), the conflict was in full swing in the emigrants’ rooms and clubs. As for its foreign policy,

39 *Napredak*, September 10, 1949 („Napredak sa priredbe u Warriewood“).

40 *Ibid.*, (M.N. Ivičević on the importance of *Napredak* in NZ).

41 *Napredak*, July 1, 1950, A response from emigrants to the General Consul V. Cvrlje. A short report from the mass meeting in Sydney.

42 *Napredak*, 15 October 1949. (Athletes or Storm-troopers? Sinbad).

the FPRY didn't change its course. It had already rejected the Marshall's plan,⁴³ saying that the pressure from the US on the "Marshallized European countries" was growing. Washington intended to turn them into an open market for their goods. A "Bonn separatist state" had been created by American generals, and then the "West German puppet government", in which "Nazi magnates and other former Hitler's associates" participated. In America, the Ku Klux Klan was getting stronger, and there were reports about strikes in all Western countries. On the one hand, this was what the partners in the West were like, and on the other, there were no contacts with the former allies in the East. The crisis had to be internationalized, and this was happening because it was then that Edvard Kardelj, the Foreign Minister of the FPRY, managed to acquire the status of a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council for Yugoslavia.⁴⁴ The Resolution of the Information Bureau in 1948 had become truly a global phenomenon. Survival could be defended by trying to convince others of one's own rectitude. This was also done in sports. The Belgrade football club Partizan toured Sweden in the summer of 1949, but the most important and longest was the three-month tour of the Split football club Hajduk in Australia.

Hajduk's Australian tour. The Whites fighting the Red Koalas

On 11 July 1949, Hajduk football players landed in Australia after a 42-hour flight. It was the beginning of the "most significant and interesting tour" in the history of the club, which lasted three months.⁴⁵ No football club from Yugoslavia, with or without such a "great tradition and progressive background," had ever been on such a long journey (prior to 5 October 1949).⁴⁶ Preparations for this tour had begun almost two years before the players left for Australia. The Main Board of the Federation of Yugoslav Immigrants in Australia (Savez) and Marin Alagić spoke with the leadership of the Australian Football League at the request of the secretariat of Hajduk. The visit was seen as an opportunity which could contribute to the "rapprochement between our people and the locals." Hajduk was a symbol for most Dalmatians, especially men.⁴⁷ Despite the unambiguous position of the Savez on the IB Resolution of 1948, Hajduk F.C. allowed the Savez to "represent them in this country," and maintained contact until two weeks before coming to Australia, *Napredak* reports.⁴⁸ Before the arrival of the players,

43 Steil, *The Marshall Plan*, pp. 136, 148.

44 Jakovina, *Američki komunistički saveznik*, pp. 286-288.

45 Center Tripalo, BN, Hajduk's tour of Australia (13 typewritten pages), *Naprijed*, 11 November 1949, The highest authority we obey is the will and the interests of the peoples of Yugoslavia. Hajduk's tour of Australia

46 Center Tripalo, BN, Report on the trip (handwritten calculation).

47 *Napredak*, 24 September 1949, Before the departure of the football team of Hajduk, how the trip came about and who made it possible.

48 *Napredak*, 12 November 1949, Something about Hajduk's latest attacks on the Savez.

the Consul of the FRY in Sydney, Ivan Kosović, pulled a manoeuvre so that he could be the one to sign the contract, in an attempt to marginalize the Savez completely and use Hajduk “to spread Titoist propaganda among expatriates, and against our Savez and Napredak.”

According to *Napredak*, Božidar Novak reneged on the deal, defending Tito and attacking the Soviet Union and *Napredak*. In doing so, Novak was constantly “espousing Titoism”. Thus, immediately after the arrival of the Split footballers in Australia, what could have been expected really did happen, just as the relations between the two groups deteriorated. This was happening everywhere. It was happening in Yugoslavia and also all around the world. The IB Resolution caused a rift in the world, and likewise among Yugoslav expatriates. “Already in the first contact with the emigrants, the treacherous and damaging doing of a handful of Cominformists became evident to us,” Božidar Novak wrote in his report.⁴⁹

“The whole of Yugoslavia is looking forward to your first performance. We are certain that you will represent the national sport of Tito’s Yugoslavia with dignity. Warm regards to Hajduk.”⁵⁰ This was the first of many telegrams the players of Hajduk received on the way to Australia. The footballers were supposed to exhibit the strength of Yugoslav football and sports in general, “which bases its prosperity and development on the great care and assistance from our people’s government.” The level of football played by the Split club turned out to be first-rate. The players made “the impression of true socialist athletes,” aware that they represented their “socialist homeland and a new movement in sports.” Indeed, Hajduk demonstrated how sport was viewed in their “socialist homeland”, in contrast to “how it is over there, where sport is closely linked to ‘business’ and where brutal exploitation of man by man is clearly evident.”⁵¹ The footballers also charmed Australians with song. They were asked to sing at receptions and radio stations. It can be assumed that, in addition to partisan songs, they also sang Dalmatian klapa music.⁵² During the tour, 21 matches were played. Hajduk won 19 of them, lost one, and one was a draw.

Consul Ivan Kosović and the Consulate General staff organized a farewell party for the delegation and the footballers on their departure from Sydney on 12 September 1949. Hajduk “represented the sport of Tito’s new Yugoslavia honourably,” said expatriates “faithful to Tito’s Yugoslavia.” The farewell ceremony was held in a hall “adorned with the image of our people’s most vile traitor, Marshal Tito,” and below it was the

49 Center Tripalo, BN, Hajduk’s tour of Australia (13 typewritten pages), *Naprijed*, 11 November 1949, The highest authority we obey is the will and the interests of the peoples of Yugoslavia. Hajduk’s tour of Australia.

50 BN, International Telegram, 22 July 1949, Yugoslav Consulate General for Hajduk Sydney.

51 *Slobodna Dalmacija*, 29 October 1949. (We are returning to our homeland proud for we have carried out the task set by our Party and Tito, Vojko Andrijašević).

52 *Slobodna Dalmacija*, 9 September 1949. (From Hajduk’s tour of Australia, Ivo Mrčić).

“elite from the Consulate,” *Napredak* reported. Novak attacked the USSR, *Napredak* and the Savez, and the representative of the Savez was not allowed to respond “to the vomit uttered by the said speakers.”⁵³ Novak told the emigrants that it was necessary to “always remain faithful to their homeland, especially today in the struggle that our country, led by the CC CPY and Comrade Tito, is fighting for equal relations between socialist countries and communist parties,” *Nova Jugoslavija* wrote. “They called on Yugoslav emigrants to fight even more persistently against the traitors in the *Napredak* editorial board and the Savez, who slander and defame our country and its leadership for the interests of the Informburo.”⁵⁴

Conclusion

The IB Resolution was “a service to the bourgeoisie and the reactionaries,” the unity of the international labour movement was shattered, part of Australian Croats wrote in *Napredak*. Actually, they were right, but they advocated an Stalinist course, an option for which it was better that it did not remain united and dominant. The “waverers among the emigrants” were impressed by the authority of the VKP(b), and they stood up against Yugoslavia, wrote those on the other side. There were many of them, even the official Yugoslav newspapers acknowledged this, but the bigger problem was that it was difficult to get them back to Tito’s side. In 1949, Yugoslav newspapers reported that there were more and more of those who “saw the light,” and realized where real socialism was being built, and the actual listing of the “right ones” – in Canada, Australia, France, America – suggested how dramatic and serious the impact of the fight against the Cominformists on all continents was.

Hajduk’s tour, which in any case would have had a patriotic charge, a propagandistic goal, the task of praising the Yugoslav authorities, had now been given an even clearer, more precise objective. It was necessary to try to show that the Yugoslav position was neither anti-socialist, nor anti-national, nor anti-labour, that Yugoslavia was not an enemy of the ideas under which it fought in the War, that it had not sold out. The staff of the Consulate General, who were known to everyone because they were emigrants themselves, sought to use Hajduk’s tour to send messages of support for Tito and the Yugoslav leadership. So when they arrived at the celebration in Newcastle from the Consulate on 3 September 1949, they requested that “a resolution of confidence in the CC CPY, the Yugoslav government and Marshal Tito” be signed. The organizers, mostly Macedonians, declined to discuss politics, so they were attacked and accused of “fearing the truth... that they are worse than fascists.” Božo Novak, who led the Hajduk

53 *Naprijed*, 11 November 1949. (The highest authority we obey is the will and the interests of the peoples of Yugoslavia. Farewell evening in Sydney).

54 *Nova Jugoslavija*, 18 September 1949 p. 1 (Expatriates say farewell to Hajduk).

delegation in Australia, gave speeches, attacked *Napredak* and the Main Committee of the Savez.⁵⁵

The impact of the Cominform and the Tito-Stalin split was most deeply felt in Yugoslavia, and then among all Yugoslavs. Australian emigrants to Yugoslavia who had returned, as well as those from the United States or Canada, mostly advocated cooperation with Moscow, and after 1948 they found themselves in an embarrassing, almost bizarre situation. They returned from Yugoslavia to the countries they had left was partly because of dissatisfaction, disappointment, and the feeling that “US imperialists” still presented a real danger. Now, overnight, the protector of Yugoslavia and the working masses was supposed to be elsewhere. The IB Resolution undoubtedly weakened the Communist bloc, shattered the unity of Yugoslav communists and leftists, but it also demonstrated the ability of a small country to resist, get organized, become a factor and seize the historic opportunity for development it had never had, to gain the importance no Yugoslav society, at least three decades after the dissolution of the SFRY, would ever have again.

Hajduk’s tour in Australia, not least because of their success on the football pitch, raised the reputation of both the country and Yugoslavs in Australia, at least for a short time. The success of the football players and the club, which carried such a high emotional charge for Dalmatians (especially having in mind their strong views on Tito which were demonstrated in Australia), shook those who had tried to separate Tito from Hajduk, and change current position of Yugoslavia.⁵⁶ Savez, the Federation of Yugoslav Immigrants in Australia, was officially dissolved in 1960, by which time the political composition of Croatian emigrants to Australia had changed. The arrival of some of the supporters of the Ustasha movement or, to put it more mildly, those who disagreed with the communist Yugoslav leadership, even if it was anti-Soviet, changed the path of development of Australian Croats and other Yugoslavs.⁵⁷ The split within the Savez and among older emigrants to Australia emboldened the Ustasha and Chetnik emigration and encouraged their faster organization. The strains within the community that persisted for years after the Resolution remain largely unknown. In Yugoslavia this topic was neglected in historiography since it represented a clear defeat of Tito’s position in the struggle against Stalin, at least among the majority of Australians of Yugoslav descent. This topic has obviously not been interesting for emigration historians because it hardly fits into the stereotypical image of the model emigrant, nor could it subsequently be incorporated in any way into the turbo-nationalist narrative of “pure”, “best”, “successful” “proper” Croats as emigres have been represented ever since.

55 *Nova Jugoslavija*, 12 August 1949, p. 2 (From Hajduk’s tour).

56 *Vjesnik*, 24 December 1949. (The truth about our struggle has come to Australia (Božidar Novak).

57 Šutalo, *Croatians in Australia*, p. 207.

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Summary

Tvrtko Jakovina

Tito's Traitorous Clique, Kangaroos and Croats: The Australian Tour of the Football Club Hajduk and the Fight against the Cominformists in Oceania in 1949

The football club Hajduk from Split embarked on its longest and furthest foreign tour in the beginning of July 1949. The men of Hajduk went to Australia and New Zealand, where they were supposed to demonstrate the force of Yugoslav football and physical culture, although the real reasons were different. Members of the Australian Croatian community had come to Australia before the Second World War and were divided into "royalists", "Catholics", or simply "anti-Communists". A special problem was posed by those who were agitating "against the betrayal of Tito's clique". The paper will describe the tour of one of Croatia's and Yugoslavia's most famous football clubs, emphasizing the penetration of Cominform ideas within the Australian and New Zealand Croatian community, as well as Yugoslav attempts at opposing these ideas.

**GLOBAL REPERCUSSIONS
OF THE TITO-STALIN SPLIT**

Stefano Bianchini

The Tito-Stalin Split, the Italian Left and the Fascination with Anti-Stalinist Communism

When the Tito-Stalin split burst into the international arena in late June 1948, the variegated world of the Italian left was politically and ideologically unprepared to address the implications of such a traumatic event. Caught by surprise, its various players faced a double challenge: on the one hand, they had to comply with the complexity of the national and international geopolitical contexts; on the other, internally they had to tackle a largely unexpected heterogeneous multitude of reactions, which affected parties, militant affiliations, and the support of their constituencies.

The dilemmas of the Italian Left on the eve of the Tito-Stalin split

The Soviet-Yugoslav clash, in fact, occurred in a period when the borders between Italy and Yugoslavia were still unsettled due to the dispute about the future of the Free Territory of Trieste¹. This was formally an independent territory, established on February 1947 according to the provisions of the Peace treaty with Italy. However, its self-government was never established. On the contrary, and despite the responsibility assigned to the UN Security Council, both states continued to claim their sovereignty over this strip of land and the city of Trieste, while the military administration of Zone A was under British and American control, and Zone B under that of the Yugoslav army. This situation was exacerbated by the growing tensions among the WW2 winners and, subsequently, by the beginning of the Cold War. With the obvious aim of influencing the results of the coming political elections in Italy, the governments of France, United Kingdom, and the US issued the so called “Tripartite declaration” on 20 March 1948,

1 The literature on the argument is really abundant. For a first approach see Dimitrijevic, *Bitka za Trst*; Wörsdörfer, *Il confine orientale*; Cattaruzza, *L'Italia e il confine orientale*; Valdevit, *La questione di Trieste*; Pacor, *Confine orientale*; Berce, *Budućnost Trsta*; Smodlaka, *O razgraničenju Jugoslavije s Italijom*.

suggesting to the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia that the whole Free Territory of Trieste should be allowed to join Italy.²

These developments were particularly embarrassing for the Italian left and its Popular Democratic Front, whose main elements were the Communist and the Socialist parties, with the participation of the Republicans and other minor groups. Their unfavorable political position was determined by their internationalist inspirations, the complexity of the domestic situation, and the need to defend a patriotic position. Within this framework, they took a very critical view of the fascist legacy in Italy. At the same time, however, the dominant role of Yugoslavia in Istria put them at a crossroad between the loyalty to the “socialist brotherhood” and the preservation of national territories, which had been the focus of the “unredeemed Italy” narratives for decades. This was especially problematic when it came to the future of the cities of Trieste and Gorizia. Additionally, the balance between these two sentiments was affected by the confrontation between an escalating anti-communist hysteria and the widespread ardor manifested by leftist militants about the people’s democracies which were being built.³

Meanwhile, other important events occurred in Italy before the Tito-Stalin split. They severely contributed to the increase in difficulties within the Italian Communist Party (ICP) at the time when the confrontation between Belgrade and Moscow reached its zenith. Firstly, after a successful result of the Popular Front in the Sicilian elections in April, Salvatore Giuliano, a criminal with strong political connections (from the neo-fascists to State officers and Italia-American Mafia families), perpetrated a murder of some leftist peasants at Portella della Ginestra⁴. A subsequent US intervention on the Prime Minister Alcide De Gasperi induced him to exclude both the Communist and Socialist parties from the government on 31 May 1947. Secondly, the ICP was uncompromisingly criticized during the first conference of the Cominform in Szklarska Poręba in September. During the meeting, as is known, the Yugoslav delegation, led by Edvard Kardelj and Milovan Đilas, expressed serious reservations about the parliamentary politics of the Italian and French Communists. In their view, they were implementing a “revisionist” attitude, which was not consistent with the revolutionary strategy of the international workers’ movement. Rather, the two Yugoslav leaders invited the Italians to follow the example of the Greek Communist Party, which was fighting in the mountains against the military forces of the monarchy, at that time supported by the British army and, later, the US. As such approach was consistent with the political atmosphere

2 The most detailed diplomatic study about the Trieste controversy in Italy is still that of De Castro, *La questione di Trieste*, Additional documentation was analysed by Chicco, *Trieste 1953* and Bianchini in *I mutevoli assetti balcanici*, pp. 11-37.

3 Galeazzi (ed.), *Roma-Belgrado*; Pieluigi Pallante, *Il PCI e la questione nazionale*.

4 Orsatti’s books *Il bandito della guerra fredda*, and Cassabura, *Storia segreta della Sicilia* are based on recent declassified documents.

of the conference produced by the Ždanov's report, the Italian delegation found itself in a very uneasy and frustrating position⁵.

Basically, in a few months, the ICP and its allies were on the one hand forced to quit the ruling coalition in Italy, while on the other, the strategy based on the rejection of an armed struggle, promoted by the general secretary Palmiro Togliatti, was put into question within the Cominform, that is, the newly established European Communist organization. These events generated intense repercussions, both in the Party's leadership and among the activists. Never monolithic, despite its official narrative, the ICP was stirring with different components and diversity of ideas. It was particularly among the former partisans, who actively took part in the war against the Nazi-fascists in the North of Italy between 1943 and 1945, that the attraction of revolutionary perspectives animated their expectations, passions, and a sentiment of nostalgia for the recent heroic times. Therefore, they demonstrated little enthusiasm for Togliatti's parliamentary strategy, which they viewed as too weak and, partially, also obsolete. Some of them even quit the Party between 1945 and 1946, believing it had betrayed the idea of national liberation. Others (the majority), who remained in its ranks, felt encouraged by the conclusions of the founding conference of the Cominform and claimed a more assertive policy against the government.

As a result, and despite the fact that Togliatti was (and remained) culturally very close to Stalin and the Soviet Union, his leading position in the Party gradually weakened over the year and, in late 1947, his opinions soon represented only a minority within the executive committee.⁶ Still, according to typical communist practice, this decline remained confidential and no one publicly contested his role as the General Secretary of the Party. It was, therefore, under these circumstances that the ICP took part in the first free political elections of April 1948 with great confidence, together with its allies of the Popular Front. The outcome was, however, a harsh defeat, which came as a deep disappointment for the leftist parties. Subsequently, the pressure for a more aggressive social opposition strengthened within the ICP under the leadership of Pietro Secchia and Luigi Longo.⁷

It was exactly during this delicate period for the ICP that the world was informed about the Tito-Stalin split. Initially, the news was received with incredulity in Italy, as a temporary misunderstanding that would be soon overcome. In fact, both Stalin and Tito enjoyed great respect and prestige within the Italian left. The former was recognized as the undisputable leader of world communism, but the latter was appreciated as the triumphant partisan commander. True, the Yugoslav critique of the ICP delegation

5 Compare: Kardelj, *Sećanja*, pp. 108-110; Gilas, *Se la memoria*, pp. 152-154; Unkovski-Korica, *The economic struggle*, pp. 57-61 and Guerra, *Gli anni del Cominform*, pp. 153-156.

6 In Italy, this ambivalence of Togliatti's was negatively marked by the term "doppiezza" (which can be approximately translated as "double-dealing"). See Galeazzi, *Togliatti e Tito*, p. 103.

7 Collotti (ed.), *Archivio Pietro Secchia*, pp. 95-108.

during the Cominform conference in Poland had a negative impact on the feelings of the leadership in Rome, but activists were mostly unaware that that had happened. As a result, in the weeks that followed the expulsion of Yugoslavia from the Cominform, the belief that room for mediation between the two parties still existed was predominant in the ranks of the Italian leftist public opinion.

Then on 14 July 1948, Togliatti was shot near the Parliament by an anticommunist student. Within a few hours, political tension in Italy reached its zenith and the country was on the verge of a civil war. Military forces were sent in to put down mass demonstrations and a general strike, and tens of people were killed or injured during street rallies. The tragedy was averted by Togliatti himself, who, speaking on the radio from his hospital bed after a successful surgical treatment, asked Longo, Secchia, and all activists to calm down and refrain from any irresponsible actions. His speech had beneficial effects because the uprising quickly subsided and the political atmosphere began to relax in the whole country. As a result, the news about the Tito-Stalin split did not attract a lot of attention because it was overshadowed by dramatic domestic events and national controversies, at least initially. By contrast, as soon as the situation became normalized, the issue began to acquire a different light under Cold War conditions.

The need to take sides in the confrontation between the two (East-West) camps was challenged by the new international role of Yugoslavia, which created new dilemmas. After all, this country was a people's democracy with a charismatic leader. Although excluded from the "communist brotherhood", Belgrade did not take any autonomous initiative thus far. On the contrary, its Fifth Congress held in July 1948 notoriously ended with paying an enthusiastic tribute to Stalin and the Soviet Union. At the same time, no relevant concessions were made by Tito to meet any demands made by the Kremlin.⁸

The Italian Left facing the split

Under these circumstances, the Italian left differentiated its reactions according to different pathways. Basically, at least four mainstream currents can be identified in this regard. The first one was embodied by the ideological and practical behavior of the ICP, carried out either formally or informally, depending on the different beliefs of its leaders. The second one was reflected in the variegated role that the press of the Popular Front played in the situation; the third one was epitomized by the conspiratorial actions of the "Stalinist hardliners", who were operating across Italy, the Free Territory of Trieste, and Yugoslavia; and the last one – probably the most original and interesting – was fascinated with the potential of an anti-Stalinist socialist perspective. The Yugoslav example,

8 *V kongres Komunističke Partije*, p. 167 and p. 214.

in fact, inspired a circle of respected former Italian partisans, together with people from the world of culture, to express unexpectedly critical statements about Soviet policies, generating mixed reactions in the ICP.

To begin with, the official party policy, and the Popular Front as a whole, took a public stance against the so-called “Titoist ideological deviation”, in accordance with the Soviet instructions that were propagated by the Cominform. Nevertheless, even though the role played by the ICP was the most relevant and influential in the leftist domain, its leadership surprisingly adopted a mild attitude. Togliatti, in particular, recommended to Giuliano Pajetta, who was the ICP delegate to the Cominform, to “criticize, but also express appreciation of the Yugoslav comrades.”⁹ Several reasons may have compelled Togliatti to take this ambivalent approach, but, regretfully, the minutes of the top deliberative body of the Party on the Soviet-Yugoslav affair after June 1948 were often left incomplete. Admittedly, however, the cautious conduct of the ICP in this period was mostly the result of their serious alarm about the risk of a new world war. For example, in his introductory report at the Regional Committee of Emilia-Romagna in March 1949, Antonio Roasio openly referred to the coalition led by De Gasperi as a “war cabinet”.¹⁰ Within this framework, the Party concentrated its organizational efforts to promote a pro-Soviet peace movement, which proved to be particularly active in the 1940s and 1950s, pushing for intense public manifestations and persistent mobilization of activists and citizens. On the other hand, it cannot be excluded that Togliatti was trying to ensure a potential mediation role between Belgrade and Rome about the unsettled border issues for himself. Therefore, it might have seemed advisable to maintain a prudent position in what was still publicly presented as an ideological controversy between Tito and Stalin for potential inter-state diplomatic action.

Actually, this hope, if it ever existed, did not yield any results. But some expectations in this regard could have been held in Belgrade, since Mladen Iveković, the Yugoslav ambassador in Rome, expressed his disappointment with the lack of an intermediary attempt by the ICP in a telegram to his Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 25 March 1949.¹¹ Whatever the case may have been, such a wait-and-see attitude of Togliatti’s could also explain why the communist press maintained a similar “rear-guard position” towards Belgrade in this period, by occasionally publishing critical articles against Titoism. For example, the influential weekly *Rinascita* limited its contribution to an article by Felice Platone, who mentioned the “mistakes” and the “ideological betrayal” of the Yugoslav leadership who fell, in his view, into the trap of nationalism. However, Platone’s real aim was to defend the ICP against the critique of the clerical “Civic Committees” and the social-democrat secessionists, who argued that the Italian Communists were confirming

9 Galeazzi, *Togliatti fra Tito e Stalin*, p. 108.

10 APC, FIG, Partito, 1949, MF 0301/1653.

11 Arhiv Kancelarije Maršala Jugoslavije I-3-B/336 reported by Galeazzi (ed.), *Roma-Belgrado*, p. 110.

their loyalty to the “proletarian internationalism” and Moscow’s guidelines, while setting aside the previously “heralded national character” of their political strategy.¹² Even the daily newspaper *l’Unità* sporadically published short polemical texts against Belgrade, without going into detail about the social and economic situation in the country, which was basically ignored. By contrast, the socialist weekly *Mondoperaio* periodically published critical articles on the economic development of Yugoslavia, on international affairs, and on social and domestic policies, following the Cominform instructions with greater consistency. In a sense, reactions to the Tito-Stalin split expressed by the allies of the Italian Communists were, quite surprisingly, closer to Stalin than the leaders of the ICP and its press, whose attitudes remained basically tepid.

This also impacted the relations with Moscow, and particularly with the Italian section of the international office of the Central Committee of the CPSU, led by Dmitri Ševljagin, who expressed his disappointment behind the scenes, strengthening contacts mostly with his friend Pietro Secchia. The political atmosphere within the party leadership quickly became tense and dark. As a result, in the fall of 1949, when the Yugoslav government invited Italian partisans who had cooperated with the Yugoslav Army during the military operations after 1943 to take part in the celebration of the fifth anniversary of the liberation of Belgrade, the reaction of the ICP was excessive.

Under these circumstances, Giuliano Pajetta wrote a violent article in *l’Unità* against the invitation.¹³ Pajetta had long been considered a “suspicious element” in Moscow because of his prudent statements at the meetings of the Cominform and, even more, because of his warm friendship with László Rajk since the Spanish civil war. A few days later, the communist daily published a resolute letter by the Italian Association of Partisans (ANPI). The letter was signed by a number of influential Italians who struggled under Tito’s Army, and whose content critically compared the “noble ideals of the liberation war” with the “tyrannical and fascist régime” that Tito had imposed on his country.¹⁴

Actually, this vehemence was just a temporary blaze, unusual for the ICP. It can be explained particularly by the growing pressure from the Kremlin, not satisfied with Togliatti’s strategy. The suggestions that were coming from Moscow to the top bodies of the Party were encouraging a more assertive policy, either at the domestic or international level, with greater intensity of mass demonstrations and strikes. This was also the view frequently expressed by Secchia and some other leaders, sometimes publicly, but

12 Platone, *Il fronte del socialismo e i casi di Jugoslavia*, in “Rinascita”, n. 7, lug. 1948, pp. 246-251.

13 G. Pajetta, *Un inganno di Tito*, in “l’Unità”, 14 oct. 1944, p. 1. See also his brother’s book, G.C. Pajetta, *Le crisi che ho vissuto*, pp. 86-88. László Rajk was a Hungarian minister of Interior who was arrested and shot in 1949. He was accused by the Party’s leader Rákosi of being a “Titoist”, although he was not. For details see Fejtő, *Beyond the Rape*.

14 *I partigiani italiani respingono un invito di Tito*, in “l’Unità”, 20 oct. 1949, p. 1 with a comment by M. Kolenc (or Mario Colli, a communist leader from Trieste).

more often during the restricted meetings of the leadership, whose decisions, however, leaked out selectively. In other words, a dispute about the future of the leadership was taking shape, albeit with great discretion.

Clandestine movements in Istria and ICP hardliners

By contrast, an uncompromised aggressive policy, both at the local level and particularly against Yugoslavia, was conducted by the Communists of the Free Territory of Trieste, led by the Stalinist Vittorio Vidali. The party regularly published vehement critical articles, either in the weekly *Il Lavoratore* or in booklets, against "Tito-fascism" or "Tito's clique", which were terms frequently used in Trieste.¹⁵ Vidali himself wrote the introduction to the party congress report by Karel Šiškovič-Mitko against "Tito-fascism"¹⁶. Notoriously, his leadership was autonomous from the ICP, although he maintained intense connections with hardliner leaders in Rome. Actually, his relations with the ICP were often troubled, so he rejoined the party only, and reluctantly, in 1957, that is three years after the signing of the London Memorandum, which allowed the incorporation of Trieste into the territory of the Italian republic¹⁷.

Although the controversial issue of the FTT goes beyond the limitations of this chapter, the abovementioned third mainstream had a conspiratorial base in Trieste and in the region of Istria. In fact, its geopolitical location played a crucial hinge role in the relationships along the line of Rome-Trieste-Belgrade. Particularly, activism promoted in this context by a group of Italian leftists made them, simultaneously, the protagonists and the victims of the conflict between Tito and Stalin.

The reference here is to a real immigration flow, which involved people from various Italian regions, who were highly politically motivated, and who moved mainly to Istria after World War II, and to a lesser extent to Belgrade, Sarajevo, and Ljubljana. After 1947, thousands of workers, especially from Monfalcone's shipyards, joined Pula and Rijeka's docks with the aim of "helping their Yugoslav comrades build socialism," where they offered their expertise for the reconstruction of the naval shipbuilding industry. At the same time, they were also a cohesive group of people, who easily established organized communities at the local level. When, therefore, the news of the Tito-Stalin split broke out, the initial disorientation quickly crystallized and a great majority of them expressed support for the thesis of the Cominform. As a result, when Alfredo Bonelli (a Stalinist hardliner, originally close to Secchia) arrived in Rijeka from Milan

15 See for instance: *La banda di Tito*, "Il Lavoratore", 22 Aug. 1949, p. 1; *La Jugoslavia sotto il terrore*, p. 105., translated from the original booklet of the Organe du bureau d'information des partis communistes et ouvriers, *La Yougoslavie sous la terreur de la clique Tito*, introd. by Duclos, Sedic-Sarl, Paris, 1949; Vidali, *Sul Titismo*, p. 64; Ezio Taddei, *I crimini del Titismo*, p. 31.

16 Vidali, "Prefazione" to Karel Šiškovič-Mitko, *La lotta contro il titofascismo*, p. 45.

17 Colli et al., *Comunisti a Trieste*.

in November 1948, the local environment seemed to be favorable for establishing a clandestine movement inspired by the Cominform. And, in fact, an illegal organization led by Bonelli, together with Andrea Scano and Giovanni Pellizzari, began its activities in Rijeka in early 1949.¹⁸ Working mostly autonomously and with a voluntarist spirit, it specialized in Cominformist propaganda and furtive spreading of information about the economic and social situation in Yugoslavia abroad. However, its members were soon identified and arrested. Later, Bonelli was banished, and he returned to Italy, while Scano spent three years in the Goli Otok camp.¹⁹ Still, a second organization was soon promoted by Adriano Dal Pont, a teacher originally from Friuli, who re-structured the group with the financial support of the ICP in Rome by maintaining intense contacts with Secchia and Antonio Cicalini. The basic support of these organizations was provided by the Italian immigrant workers in Istria, although Dal Pont developed a network of contacts with other groups and individuals throughout Yugoslavia. Nevertheless, this activism was doomed not to last. The organization was disbanded by Udba (the Yugoslav Secret Service) in 1951. A public trial was held one year later. Dal Pont and his followers were sentenced to several years in prison, mainly in the Sremska Mitrovica prison. The last of their group were freed in 1956.²⁰

However, ICP's pro-Soviet cohesion before the Tito-Stalin split was far from consistent. Divided lines did not mark the distance only between hardliner supporters of Stalin and those loyal to the Kremlin, but still maintaining prudent connections. Actually, various members nurtured serious doubts about the rationale of the Cominform arguments. Some of them, like for example the famous poet Alfonso Gatto, who was working for the communist newspaper *l'Unità*, quitted both the periodical and the Party in 1951. Others preferred to remain in the shadows, waiting for better times. Others voiced their disagreement, which the party leadership did not expect, widening unconsciously the inherent dichotomy of the ICP strategy, mainly represented by Togliatti and Secchia.

Valdo Magnani's dissent and Yugoslav politics

The person who played a crucial role in these circumstances was one of the most promising young followers of Togliatti, Valdo Magnani. He was the cousin of Nilde Iotti, Togliatti's partner, and the secretary of the Party in Reggio Emilia, one of the strongest ICP branches in Italy. Magnani, an alumnus of the University of Bologna, had previously been an officer in the Italian army during the Yugoslav occupation. He was stationed in Slovenia, later in Montenegro, Dubrovnik, and Herzegovina, and he

18 See the memoirs of Bonelli, *Fra Stalin and Tito*.

19 Bianchini, *Zwischen Stalinismus und Antistalinismus*, pp. 57-86.

20 More details in Scotti, *Goli Otok. Ritorno all'Isola Calva*, pp.17-49.

learned the Croatian language. When Italy collapsed after 8 September 1943, he joined Tito's partisans and took part in their military operations. Then he became an activist of the "Garibaldi" division of the JNA and a speaker of the political school that the Communists organized for the soldiers and officers in Velimlje. On 12 March 1945 he returned to Italy where he started his career in the ranks of the ICP. In 1948, he was elected member of the Italian Parliament and regularly visited Nilde Iotti and Togliatti in their house in Rome.

All these details are important to frame his personality and political relevance in order to understand how shocking the impact of his declaration of 19 January 1951 was. That day, when he finished his introductory report for the local communist congress, he extracted a note from his pocket and explained his ideas about "national independence". In particular, he expressed his disagreement with the expectation that the socialist revolution can be achieved through foreign military intervention. On the contrary, he asserted that the Party should openly declare that, in case of military aggression, wherever it might come from, the Italian Communist would defend his national territory.²¹

Although he never mentioned Tito, he was immediately accused of "Titoism". Similarly, with the ferocious campaign that was conducted in other socialist countries against autonomous leaders not necessarily close to Tito's ideas (as for example Rajk in Hungary, Xoxe in Albania or Kostov in Bulgaria and, later, Slansky in Czechoslovakia and Gomulka in Poland), a violent reaction hit Magnani and a group of intellectuals who stood by him in Italy. A few days after he read his declaration, Magnani was expelled from the ICP and was accused of being paid by the Yugoslav government. A series of harsh accusations in this regard, labelling him as a "traitor", "sold out to the enemy," appeared in the leftist press (including the socialist and republican ones). Even a suspicious attempt of kidnapping occurred on 25 January.²² Meanwhile, a rigorous strategy of isolation was applied by the ICP in order to avoid any "contagion" of his ideas among the former partisans and the activists of the Party, as well as Magnani's family and his father.

At this point, the story develops in two main directions simultaneously: one concerns the hidden division within the ICP leadership, despite its formal unity; the other one pertains to the establishment of a new political party, founded by Valdo Magnani together with the former partisan and general Aldo Cucchi. The organization enjoyed formal support of Yugoslavia, which was in search of an international and anti-Stalinist

21 Magnani and Cucchi, *Dichiarazioni*, p. 16. The details about Magnani's political experience have been widely scrutinized by myself since 1988 when I had the opportunity to access to the Yugoslav archives in Belgrade, the ICP archives, Magnani's family archive and to meet all the protagonists of these events still alive, including the speaker of the Italian Parliament, Ms. Nilde Iotti. The results of this long research are published in Bianchini (ed.), *Valdo Magnani e l'antistalinismo comunista*.

22 Bianchini (ed.), *Valdo Magnani*, pp. 96-7.

communist alternative. Intricate events marked, therefore, subsequent developments, in this case along the Rome-Belgrade-Moscow line.

In fact, when Magnani made his declaration, Togliatti was recovering from a brain operation in Moscow, after a car accident he had in Ivrea in late August 1950. During this period, the ICP was de facto under the leadership of Secchia and Longo. An attempt of ousting Togliatti from the role of the General Secretary of the Party followed in the subsequent weeks. According to a variety of rumors and a detailed analysis elaborated by scholars and journalists,²³ it seems that a secret meeting of the Cominform occurred in Bucharest, most probably in 1950, and Edoardo D'Onofrio might have represented the ICP. During this meeting, the proposal to offer the leadership of the Cominform to Togliatti was taken into serious consideration, but the Italian leader, when informed of it, bitterly objected. Then, when he reluctantly accepted Stalin's invitation to spend some time in Moscow to recover, the Soviet pressure to replace Togliatti in Italy intensified. Stalin personally suggested that Togliatti should take the leadership of the Cominform. Meanwhile, Dmitri Ševl'jagin worked hard in Rome to convince the Direction of the Party to support the initiative. An ICP delegation went to Moscow twice to persuade Togliatti. A telegram from Rome was sent to Moscow to confirm that, unanimously, the Direction of the Party backed Stalin's idea.

Years later, Giorgio Amendola and Nilde Iotti contested the accuracy of the content of the telegram because the support was expressed by the majority of those present and not unanimously.²⁴ This confirms how intolerant the political atmosphere within the Italian left was in those days.

In the end, however, Togliatti succeeded in returning to Italy, but Stalinist hardliners took the opportunity to rebuke him for the quality and the loyalty of his collaborators, citing Magnani as a negative example. In so doing, they also sought to weaken his authoritative role as a national figure and his idea of a "progressive democracy". Furthermore, they also argued against Togliatti's romantic relationship with the young Nilde Iotti, since he was separated from his wife. In short, an oppressive and culturally regressive Stalinist atmosphere was acutely affecting the Party's hierarchy and, consequently, its members. Although these feelings had already been affecting the Party for a long time, Magnani's public dissent indisputably aggravated such attitudes. In the end, partially confirming his loyalty to Stalin in spite of it all, and partially aware of his political weakness in the ICP leadership, Togliatti sarcastically condemned Magnani's words with one short sentence, without ever mentioning the event. As for Nilde Iotti,

23 So far no original documents about this meeting of the Cominform have been found. Most probably they were destroyed. Nevertheless, in France Lilly Marcou collected the testimonies of Jacques Duclos and Agnes Sávghári; in Italy, Miriam Mafai as well as Nilde Iotti, when I met her at the Italian Parliament, expressed a firm opinion that a fourth Cominform meeting took place. See more details in my edited book *Valdo Magnani*, p. 93.

24 *Ibid.*, p. 97.

she had refused to see her cousin for at least a decade. Even when Magnani re-joined the ICP in 1962, despite the persisting vigorous reluctance in the Party both at the local and national levels, their relationship never fully recovered.

At the same time, while hidden clashes were shaking the ICP leadership between January and February 1951, Magnani was contacted by the Yugoslav Embassy in Rome at the request of Leo Mates, the then deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs.²⁵ Magnani's declaration and the sharp reaction by the ICP were, in fact, interpreted in Belgrade as an attractive opportunity to put an end to their ideological isolation, paving the way, instead, to new and more ambitious international projects. The Yugoslav ambassador in Rome, Mladen Iveković, carefully followed the events in Italy, regularly reporting to Belgrade. As a result, already in February 1951, Nikola Mandić, who had met Magnani during the war and had later become Tito's secretary, was sent to Rome by Aleksandar Ranković.

In a semi-secretive atmosphere, he met Magnani in his house and learned about his project of creating a New Leftist party with an anti-Stalinist socialist orientation. At the end of their meeting, Mandić gave a financial donation to Magnani's "Movement of the Italian Workers" (MIW).²⁶ Other payments followed, although the amount gradually decreased as soon as it was obvious that the new party was unable to attract relevant support, particularly from the membership of the ICP who, despite individual hesitations, remained loyal to its Party instead.

The relationship between Magnani and the Yugoslav leadership was, however, politically intense, at least until 1956. The MIW's marginal electoral results in 1953, despite Yugoslav financial support, significantly contributed to De Gasperi's defeat in his attempt to change the electoral law, while in 1955, after an initiative promoted in Slovenia by Boris Krajerger and Miha Marinko in the aftermath of the implementation of the London Memorandum, the Yugoslav socialist component of the former FTT merged with Magnani's movement, who had in the meanwhile changed its name to the Union of the Italian Socialists (UIS).²⁷

All these events, their implications for the internal harmony within the ICP and between the ICP and the Communists of Trieste, in addition to the never absorbed legacy of the 1951 declaration, affected the process of rapprochement between the YLC and the ICP in the mid-1950s. For example, when a prominent Italian leader, Giancarlo Pajetta, visited Belgrade on 3 December 1955, he made it clear to Veljko Vlahović and Anton Vratuša that Yugoslav support to Magnani was obstructing the improvement of their bilateral relations.²⁸

25 Arhiv SSIP 91236,8-6, also in Bianchini, *Valdo Magnani*, p. 117.

26 I had personally the chance to discuss these issues with Nikola Mandić in Belgrade in 1989. The documentation is currently available in the Magnani archive at the Istituto Gramsci Emilia Romagna in Bologna. See, again, Bianchini, *Valdo Magnani*, p. 51 and p. 121.

27 Krajerger and Marinko, *Stenografski zapiski*, pp. 266-285; Bianchini, *Valdo Magnani*, pp. 143-146.

28 Bianchini, *Valdo Magnani*, p. 151.

On the other hand, however, Magnani's dissent was perceived in Yugoslavia as a serious opportunity to build up an anti-Stalinist but still communist movement in Europe. Some months earlier, on 28 June 1950, a similar project was considered during a meeting of the Communist Politburo, when the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Edvard Kardelj, elaborated the thesis according to which potential conditions existed for encouraging anti-Stalinist mass movements in Germany, France and Italy. He suggested, therefore, to avoid sectarian attitudes and look at socialist parties through new lenses. As Tito recommended to keep away from any temptation to re-create a new "Center of Command", a committee consisting of Ranković, Đilas and Vukmanović - Tempo was tasked with analyzing the situation and preparing a report.²⁹ Subsequently, Đilas, in particular, was active in strengthening contacts with the British Labor Party, the French Socialists, and other social-democrats that might have an interest to initiate some forms of co-operation. In these circumstances, the embassy in Rome cautiously contacted former partisans in Yugoslavia or people who had expressed some doubts about the Cominform statements. Magnani was invited in July 1950, following a public manifestation in Naples when he mentioned the Yugoslav liberation war with comments that were judged as "objective" by the Embassy. Subsequently, his friend Nikola Mandić visited him in Reggio Emilia in the fall of 1950. The available documentation about these meetings, including the collected testimonies and minutes preserved in the Italian archives, confirm that these events were only opportunities for exchanging ideas, without any substantial political impact.³⁰

At the same time, however, such clandestine communication networks illustrate well the atmosphere of uncertainty, feelings, and hopes that marked the broader international context, where semi-secret opinions circulated with great circumspection even in the Western world, crossing the Italian-Yugoslav borders unexpectedly easy for the time of the Cold War. It was, therefore, in these conditions that Magnani's declaration of 1951 acquired inflammatory relevance by unwittingly impacting the internal divisions within the ICP about the future of Togliatti's leadership, while in Belgrade it was enthusiastically welcomed as a confirmation that Yugoslavia was not alone in its idea that an anti-Stalinist communist alternative might really be established.

Conclusions: the decline of a potential socialist convergence against the Cominform

Despite the efforts that Belgrade had poured into this political experiment led by Magnani since February 1951 with the aim of helping it grow, the results were

29 Arhiv Jugoslavije-Fond CKSKJ, AR3/49, 28 June 1950 in *Ibid.*, p. 79 and Bekić, *Jugoslavija u hladnom ratu*, p. 267. Kardelj returned to this issue in 1951, see also Arhiv CK KPJ/IX, 1-II/168, mar. 1951.

30 Nikola Mandić talked to me about this meeting. Magnani himself reported in *Memoria sul MLI*, now in Fond VM, FGR, Bologna. Bianchini, *Valdo Magnani*, p. 84.

ultimately disappointing. Over time, it had become clear that it was not in the variety of the European leftist orientations that the Yugoslav resistance to Stalinist pressures could find substantial support. New events would contribute to modifications in the development of Cold War relations, particularly in the Balkans, from the Balkan Pact to the effects of destalinization, from Berlin mass protests to the Hungarian revolution, to such an extent that Yugoslavia was induced to look for new international opportunities outside Europe.

In the end, they were identified in the strategy of creating a Non-Aligned Movement, which gradually attracted world admiration to Tito and the Yugoslav federation. But the socialist content of the anti-Stalinist inspiration, so dear to Yugoslav leaders during the years that followed the split with Moscow, never acquired a substantial international role, with the limited exceptions of the Eurocommunist policy, nurtured under the Berlinguer leadership in Italy in the 1970s, and Gorbachev's reforms, to a large extent inspired by the Yugoslav self-management, particularly after his long visit to the country in 1988.

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Summary

Stefano Bianchini

The Tito-Stalin Split, the Italian Left and the Fascination with Anti-Stalinist Communism

The contribution will focus on the impact of the Tito-Stalin split on the Italian Left. As is known, the reactions were diversified. On the one hand there was the position of the Italian Communist and Socialist Parties who supported Stalin mostly through media, although minor groups tried to support in Istria a secret movement of "resistance" against Tito. But more surprising for the time being was the process that started some years later, in 1951, when a closest collaborator of Togliatti, Valdo Magnani, took a public political position in support of communist autonomy from Moscow. Excluded from his party, he established a new anti-Stalinist movement, close to Tito, that divided the Italian Left and encouraged Yugoslavia to dream that a communist anti-Stalinist movement could rise in Western Europe. Although this hope vanished soon, the event had a great psychological impact on the Yugoslav leadership.

Karlo Ružičić-Kessler

The Tito-Stalin Split and its Adriatic Dimension: Regional Rifts in a “Monolithic” Movement

This article focuses on the question of relations in the communist camp from a regional and international perspective. The case of Trieste and its surroundings, the Julian March, shows how early after the end of World War II clashes erupted between Italian and Yugoslav communists over the fate of a region disputed between Rome and Belgrade, which became the focus of international politics on a divided continent. Indeed, when analyzing the history of communist movements and their interactions in and around Trieste in the years around 1948, one can find many parallels to a wider range of questions in the context of transnational relations. Trieste was part of Yugoslavia's agenda for control over large parts of southeastern Europe; it was also a key element of its international strategy after 1945 and, therefore, a link in a chain of ambitious projects to secure regional power. The communist scenario of Trieste also shows how different parties tried to achieve their goals inside an internationalist movement that, in principle, adhered to a common strategy. Therefore, it is an example of national agendas in an internationalist context. Moreover, this special case also reflects desires of regional parties tied to their “big brothers” in national capitals, producing their own strategies and further conflicts in the “monolithic” communist world. This article will analyze how relations between communist movements on the Adriatic developed before, during and after the Tito-Stalin split, presenting a special case of early cold war policies.

The Fate of Trieste after World War II and the Communist World

In the last days of World War II, Yugoslav partisans occupied the city of Trieste and its surroundings. The United States and the United Kingdom were not willing to give up on this important city and let it become a communist outpost. Since Soviet leader Joseph Stalin was not ready to risk open conflict with the West over the fate of Trieste, he

ordered Tito to withdraw from the city. After 40 days of Yugoslav occupation, the partisans left the city, while the Italian territories of the Julian March were divided between the Western Allies (Zone A) and Yugoslavia (Zone B), who occupied their respective zones militarily. After the Yugoslav retreat from Trieste, the distribution of forces within the communist camp in the Julian March had to be clarified. The arrangements between the Western Allies and Yugoslavia somewhat favoured the Italian Communist Party (PCI), which had had the difficult task of manoeuvring between its alliance with the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (KPJ), while also trying to accommodate national interests during the war – especially when it came to the questions relating Italy's eastern border. The party leader Palmiro Togliatti, who did not openly support a Yugoslav Trieste but was well aware that this was the result sought by the international communist movement, as well as Stalin, found the ambiguous formula of keeping Trieste's "Italianità" and proposed for Trieste a position of a "free city". First clashes between party leaders from Rome and Belgrade had erupted during the war already, while both sides tried to gain the support from Moscow, who sided with Tito.¹

These events led to a new development in the northern Adriatic. On behalf of the Communist Party of Slovenia (KPS), on 30 June 1945, the KPJ's central committee accepted the creation of an autonomous communist party for Trieste and the Julian March, under the authority of the KPS.² On 13 August 1945, the founding congress of the Communist Party of the Julian March (PCRG/KPJK) was held in Trieste. Slovene Boris Kraigher was elected secretary of the party.³ The unification of all communist forces also reflected the retreat of the PCI from the region⁴ as the Yugoslav communists took over the organisation, while the PCI's stance would have left it with the difficult task of rhetorically defending Trieste's "Italianità", all the while collaborating with the Yugoslavs.⁵ Yet in the fall of 1945, some of the sections of the Italian party in Istria refused to adhere to the new party that they considered "nationalist", which caused their forced dissolution.⁶

The stance taken by part of the Italian communists in the Julian March definitely had validity. Far from being a party of Italian and Yugoslav communists, the PCRG/KPJK became an instrument of Yugoslav (Slovenian) irredentism. In a resolution from 24 September 1945, the PCRG/KPJK decided to ask the population of Trieste to support the annexation of the city by Yugoslavia. The PCI leadership sent a letter to the

1 For more details see: Ruzicic-Kessler, *Togliatti, Tito*, pp. 182–188.

2 Sjednica Politbiroa Centralnog Komiteta Komunističke Partije Jugoslavije, 30.6.1945, in: *Izvori za Istoriju Jugoslavije*, p. 74.

3 Komunistička Partija Julijske Krajine, AJ, ACKSKJ, IX-18/II-1.

4 Karlsen, *Frontiera*, p. 100f.

5 *Ibid.*, p. 96.

6 Verbale dell'incontro di Pratolongo con Bussano e Mastromarino di Capodistria, 21.11.45, APCI, M, Microfilm [mf.] 094, fasc. III/g/doc. 22.

comrades of the PCRG/KPJK, asking them to recede from their position and to “await the decisions of the [peace] conference,” as had been previously accepted by both Rome and Belgrade. Moreover, the PCI declared that if the PCRG/KPJK was to publish its resolution, it would openly disapprove of this.⁷ Indeed, on 7 October the party in Trieste and the mass organisation UAIS supported the principle that Trieste should become part of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.⁸ The argumentation of this decision revolved around the “Marxist-Leninist” development in Yugoslavia and the “prospective of the revolution in Europe and the world” by strengthening areas “where revolutionary forces” had won the upper hand.⁹ Since the party in Trieste had clearly affirmed its position on the future of the city, the PCI needed to exhibit some reaction.¹⁰ In an article in the party periodical *l'Unità*, member of the PCI leadership Luigi Longo described the Italian party's attitude. On the one hand, Longo attacked the Italian “reaction” that had used inflammatory “anti-Slavonic” words and had thus “forced” the communists in Trieste to demand a Yugoslav annexation. On the other hand, he also disapproved of the line followed in Trieste because the workers of the city “also had to think of all Italian workers” and not just of themselves.¹¹

Taking into account the broader picture drawn by the events of late summer and fall of 1945, it can be asserted that the pro-Yugoslav communists had taken steps to enforce their (national) vision of the future settlement of disputes in Trieste and the Julian March. The PCI, on the contrary, rather argued along internationalist and “class” lines. This all makes sense when one considers that Yugoslav organisations could count on the backing of the government in Belgrade which pursued its national interests with the support of Moscow.¹² The Italian communists were still in a fragile position whereby they had to back Yugoslav claims, according to the leading figure of Moscow, but also work in a democratic, parliamentary system, where an overtly internationalist course could mean a loss of votes. Thus, as Longo depicted in his article, the optimum choice – defending Trieste's “Italianità” while simultaneously backing Yugoslavia – was an attempt to satisfy all the currents within Italy as well as within the international communist movement.

In continuation of its attempts to reach a useful agreement with their Yugoslav comrades, the PCI continued to seek dialogue with their counterparts in the Julian March and Belgrade throughout 1945 and in early 1946.¹³ The Fifth Congress of the PCI, held in December 1945 and January 1946, saw Togliatti positioning himself within the stance

7 Lettera della direzione del PCI alla direzione del PCRG, APCI, M, mf. 095, fasc. r/doc. 8.

8 Appunti per una discussione sul problema di Trieste, 10.1.46, APCI, M, mf. 95, fasc. r/doc. 9.

9 Ibid.

10 Karlsen, *Frontiera*, p. 117.

11 Longo, Luigi, Per una miglior difesa dell'italianità di Trieste, *l'Unità*, 30.10.1945.

12 In fact, the representatives from the Julian March complained at Politburo meetings in Belgrade about the behaviour exhibited by the Italian communists and their stance on the “free city”. See: Kidrič to Kardelj, AJ, ACKSKJ, IX-13/10; *Izvori za Istoriju*, 115f.

13 Smodlaka to Tito, 12.11.1945, AJ, ACKSKJ, IX-48/I-13.

pursued by the Party in the previous months. Considering the question of the borders, he emphasised the “Italianità” of Trieste, omitting a direct reference to border questions but asking for a solution that would foresee the involvement of Italy and Yugoslavia in the process. He also declared solidarity with Yugoslavia, showed his understanding for the “workers of Trieste” who did not trust the Italian state, but also disapproved of their desire of being integrated into Yugoslavia.¹⁴ Meanwhile, Yugoslav propaganda accused Togliatti of working for the “Italian reactionaries” and thus made the discordance within the communist movement public.¹⁵ As the question of an “internationalisation” of Trieste¹⁶ became more relevant in international meetings, the PCRG/KPJK suggested that the communist forces refuse this solution and recognise that the inclusion of the Julian March into Yugoslavia was the only acceptable solution for the Slavonic majority of the population. Until the implementation of such an agreement, the PCRG/KPJK would hold the position that Trieste and the Julian March should be incorporated into Yugoslavia. Moreover, the Italian-Slavonic unity persisted as an instrument “against fascism and nationalism”. Therefore, the party in the Julian March would only agree to propositions accepted by both the PCI and the KPJ.¹⁷ Thus, the communists in the Julian March pushed for a clear pro-Yugoslav stance once again, while at the same time criticising the disputes created between the Italian and Julian parties. The PCI responded with a counter proposition. It would not “renounce the Italianità of Trieste” or raise the question of Trieste’s state affiliation, as this would cause major problems within Italy and could be exploited by “reactionary forces”. Moreover, the PCI supported the self-determination of all peoples and “Italian national unity” was seen as a duty of all democratic forces.¹⁸ Taking these issues into account, the PCI proposed a catalogue of measures: the unity of the Italian and Slavonic communists in the PCRG/KPJK should be granted; to achieve this, the PCRG/KPJK should refrain from disseminating pro-annexation propaganda; the Italian and Slavonic communists in the region should adhere to the fight for self-government of the city, letting the people of Trieste decide their fate themselves; the PCRG/KPJK should secure adequate representation of the two nationalities and should be organically linked to the PCI, the KPS and the KPJ to prevent divergence within the party.¹⁹ By demanding closer ties with the Italian and the Yugoslav parties, the PCI would ensure that Ljubljana and Belgrade loosen their grip on

14 More details on the speech in: AJ, ACKSKJ, IX-48/I-14; also the analysis of Karlsen, *Frontiera*, p. 122f.

15 See: Gibiansky, *Trieste*, p. 204f; AJ, ACKSKJ, IX-48/I-17; *Borba*, 2.2.1946 and Josip Broz Tito, *Govori i članci*, p. 168f.

16 The internationalisation had already been examined by the Allies in 1945 following the partition of the Julian March. In 1946, it became more and more obvious that this solution would become the one favoured at the peace conference. See: Rainero/Manzari, *Trattato di pace*.

17 Documento proposta dai delegati del PCRG, 17.1.1946, APCI, M, mf. 095, fasc. r/doc. 10.

18 Posizione della segreteria del PCI sui rapporti col PCRG, 26.1.46, APCI, M, mf. 095, fasc. r/doc 10, also: AJ, ACKSKJ, IX-48/I-15.

19 Ibid.

the party organisation of Julian March. Boris Kraigher, secretary of the PCRG/KPJK, formulated an answer to the Italian plea quite clearly: the Party would not officially take any stance on the future of Trieste. The members of the Party would only talk about the territorial question through other institutions like the UAIS and various societies. Moreover, Kraigher declared that “it is not the duty of a party member to declare his position on the [territorial question]. It is [however] the duty of those who do not embrace the Yugoslav solution, not to declare themselves in favour of any other position.”²⁰ Thus, it was obvious that the two parties would not easily come to an agreement of what was “right” and “wrong” for the international communist movement. Yugoslav leader Tito clearly supported the representatives of the PCRG/KPJK at their meetings with the Politburo in Belgrade. He also refrained from giving in to Italian demands no matter how difficult the situation for the PCI was. Once again, this dispute demonstrated that the logic behind the struggle of the two factions was completely opposite. In fact, Kraigher was quite right when he referred to the incorporation of the PCI into a “bourgeois” system and that this made a difference. The supporters of Yugoslavia backed national ideas and expansionist aspirations of the regime in Belgrade, while the PCI argued along internationalist lines, since it had no direct power in the contested territory and thus had to search for a compromise.²¹

Meanwhile, Tito and Edvard Kardelj complained to the Soviet ambassador to Yugoslavia, Anatolij Lavern'tev, in mid-April 1946 about the PCI and its policy regarding the question of Trieste. The PCI was accused of taking almost the same stance as the other Italian parties, and the Italian communists were also denounced as being “social-democrats” in their views. In this case, Soviet documents show that Moscow was not satisfied with Yugoslav policy since Belgrade had made the discord within the communist movement in January public, and the Kremlin understood that the PCI could not support the Yugoslav cause without losing face before the Italian public.²² Togliatti, who was holding on to the “free city” proposition for Trieste, asked for a compromise when he met the Soviet ambassador to Italy, Mikhail Kostylev, in May 1946. Togliatti argued along the lines of a common Italian-Yugoslav agreement, as he had done several times before, and asked the Soviets to support his proposition at the peace conference. Kostylev responded negatively, concluding that leaving Trieste out of Yugoslavia was akin to “separating the head from the body.”²³ Furthermore, just days after this exchange between Togliatti and Kostylev, a Yugoslav delegation headed by Tito visited Moscow.

20 Boris Kraigher alla segreteria del PCI, 6.2.46, APCI, M, mf. 095, fasc. r/doc 12.

21 See: Situazione politica a Trieste e Udine, Allegato 2, Situazione a Trieste, APCI, M, Verbali Segreteria 1944-1948, mf. 271, p. 24, 26.7.1946; Riassunto di Pradolongo per la direzione del PCI su una riunione con Babic e Jaksetic, 19.8.1946, APCI, M, mf. 096, fasc. t/doc. 8; Situazione a Trieste, APCI, M, Verbali Segreteria 1944-1948, mf. 271, p. 21, 2.12.194; Viaggio del compagno Longo, Ibid., p. 21, 11.12.1946, AJ, ACKSKJ, IX-48/I-33.

22 For more details see: Gibiansky, *Trieste*, pp. 205-207.

23 Aga-Rossi/Zaslavsky, *Togliatti*, p. 149.

Stalin asked if, in the case of the creation of a “free territory”, this would have to include the surroundings of Trieste. Tito replied that the suburbs were Slovene and, thus, only the city could be granted special status, although he still argued for a complete inclusion of the area into Yugoslavia.²⁴ Moreover, the Yugoslav proposition foresaw the loss of territorial integrity between Italy and Trieste, a stance abandoned only in 1954.²⁵

Thus, the Italian and the Yugoslav communists tried to generate a favourable approach in Moscow before the next round of peace talks in June 1946. Stalin’s position on the question of Trieste had until then been pro-Yugoslav. Yet, Stalin had already informed Tito in May that the Western Allies were not giving in on Trieste at the peace conference.²⁶ This was identical to Soviet foreign minister Vyacheslav Molotov’s experience in Paris in June. His discussions with the Western Allies proved difficult on the question of Trieste, and he was not able to impose the Soviet line. Thus, on 23 June, Stalin telegraphed Paris that “we must not derail the [...] conference of ministers because of the issue of Trieste [...] If there is an agreement on other issues, [...] we could propose a modus vivendi analogous to Togliatti’s proposal, i.e. the internationalization of the port of Trieste and a condominium of Yugoslavia and Italy [...]”²⁷ A compromise was reached on 3 July 1946 with a plan to create a free territory. Finally, the partition was formalised with the signing of the Peace Treaty with Italy on 10 February 1947. Yugoslavia annexed most of the Eastern Adriatic territories formerly belonging to Italy. A small strip of land, including Trieste, Capodistria/Koper and Cittanova/Novigrad would form the so-called Free Territory of Trieste (FTT), acting as a buffer between Italy and Yugoslavia, placed under the jurisdiction of the United Nations after the installation of a governor appointed by an international body.²⁸ Since the governor of the FTT was never appointed, the situation de facto remained a partition of the territory between an Anglo-American “Zone A”, consisting of Trieste and the coastal strip leading north to Duino, and a Yugoslav “Zone B” to the east and south, including the north-western part of Istria.

Trieste, the Cominform and the Rift

The signing of the peace treaty with Italy led to a reorganisation and a reshuffling of the situation in what was supposed to become the FTT. A new party was needed for the region, one which would ensure better cooperation between the Italian and Yugoslav communists. In late 1946, representatives of the PCI met with their Slovenian comrades and agreed to enhance the PCI’s position in Trieste.²⁹ Thus a solution was sought out

24 Gibianskii, *Soviet and Yugoslav Records*, p. 119.

25 Taviani, *Giorni di Trieste*, pp. 126–128.

26 See: Valdevit, *Dilemma*, p. 86f; Cattaruzza, *Confine*, p. 301f.

27 Pechatnov, *Allies*, p. 17f.

28 Cialdea/Vismara, *Documenti della*; Varsori, *Trattato di pace*, pp. 156–163.

29 Situazione di Trieste, APCI, M, Verbali Segreteria 1944–1948, mf. 271, p. 24, 23.1.1947.

involving Belgrade, whose position on the matter had in the meantime shifted towards a more pragmatic stance, also factoring in Tito's acceptance of potential Italian control over Trieste as a viable option before the signing of the Peace Treaty with Italy.

Luigi Longo led the discussions with his eastern comrades. In early April 1947, he visited Belgrade to discuss the future order of the FTT. Longo and Milovan Djilas signed an agreement that expressed a will to convene for a congress of the PCRG/KPJK as soon as possible in reaction to the results of the peace conference, to rename the party, and to form a new manifesto.³⁰ The UAIS was to broaden its action in response to "the reactionary groups and American and English imperialist agents."³¹ Moreover, the PCI was to campaign for an autonomous status for the Friuli region.³²

The man assigned to the task of enforcing the decisions reached in Belgrade in April was Vittorio Vidali, an Italian communist who had fought for the international cause in South America during the fascist period.³³ After years of problems, especially with the pro-Yugoslav leadership in Trieste, the PCI was sending a strongman to the city, whose credentials in the international communist movement were impeccable. It soon became apparent within the PCI that Vidali and the old guard would not get along easily. Indeed, his pro-Yugoslav comrades were trying to stall and not convene the congress, waiting instead for the nomination of a governor of the FTT.³⁴ Vidali's point of view becomes clear when one analyses a letter he sent to the leadership of the PCI. In his opinion, it was time to "leave aside insecurities and apply the recent resolution"; to understand "that Italy is not the enemy" and to "bring to an end the lack of respect for promises and pacts" while the "hostility towards the PCI" had "to end once and for all."³⁵

While the Italian movement to reform the PCRG/KPJK was trying to gain momentum, the position of the PCI in Italy changed dramatically. After a governmental crisis in May, the left (the Communists and the Socialists) was ousted from the government.³⁶ The international situation had also changed considerably with the implementation of the "Marshal Plan" in June and the escalation of the East-West conflict during that same period, which would lead Moscow to promote a tighter grip on the communist parties in Western Europe.³⁷

Finally, in late August 1947, the inaugural congress of the new Communist Party of the Free Territory of Trieste (PCTLT/KPTO/KPSTT) was held under the cover of a re-launch for the regional movement by the Italian communists.³⁸ The party leadership

30 See: AJ, ACKSKJ, IX-46/I-56; APCI, M, Verbali Segreteria, mf. 268, p. 435, n. 41.

31 Direzione PCI al comitato circondariale del PCRG di Gorizia, Monfalcone e Gradisca, Risoluzione, 28.3.1947, APCI, M, mf. 247/248.

32 AJ, ACKSKJ, IX-46/I-56; APCI, M, Verbali Segreteria, mf. 268, p. 435, n. 41.

33 *Il Lavoratore*, 19.6.1947.

34 Relazione di Pratolongo sul rientro a Trieste di Vidali, 29.5.1947, APCI, M, mf. 096, fasc. t/doc 20.

35 Lettera di Vidali, *Ibid.*

36 Craveri, *De Gasperi*, pp. 267–302; Aga-Rossi/Zaslavsky, *Togliatti*, pp. 217–221.

37 Pons, *Origins*, pp. 14–16.

38 Congresso costitutivo del PCTLT, 31.8.–2.9.1947, APCI, M, mf. 098, fasc. 56/1.

remained deeply divided after the congress however, as the Yugoslav wing continued to argue that it did not want to take orders from Rome, that it was still faithful to Belgrade, while at the same time mocking the Italians who had been “kicked out of government.”³⁹

Indeed, the repercussions of the new political situation were felt by the PCI in connection with the creation of the Communist Information Bureau (Cominform) and its founding conference in Szklarska Poręba, Poland, in September 1947. The PCI (along with the French PCF) took a severe beating by the Soviets and suffered an even worse defeat by the Yugoslavs, who profoundly criticised the Italian communists’ approach towards internal and international matters and even the entire war period. Criticism by the Soviet Union led the PCI to use even harsher words against the Marshal Plan, “American imperialism”, to strongly adhere to “peace campaigns” and to demonstrate their ability to organise the masses by initiating strikes.⁴⁰

Meanwhile the situation of a fractioned party leadership in Trieste was not overcome. The Belgrade agreements had created a situation in which the Italian wing of the party had become stronger than before, and the Yugoslav wing had to accept the implementation of the Italian Peace Treaty, which made it far more difficult to propagate a “Yugoslav” solution to territorial issues. Indeed, the solution to this situation was found at the next conference held by the Cominform in June 1948 with the decision to condemn Yugoslav behaviour and its overly independent approach to the questions of a Balkan Federation, the intervention in Albania, and the support for the communist movement in Greece.⁴¹ This time around, it was Togliatti who could triumph over the “failures” of Yugoslav communism and get revenge on the comrades who had so fiercely attacked the Italian communists just a few months earlier.

The new communist order in the FTT

The repercussions of the split between Stalin and Tito were strong on the Adriatic as well. The new situation led to a much-desired clarification of positions regarding Trieste and the FTT. The PCI, which remained loyal to Moscow’s line, attacked Tito’s “adventurism” in his foreign policy.⁴² In Trieste and throughout the FTT, the settling of accounts between the rivalling communist movements was fierce. Between late June and mid-July, political battles were fought over the control of the communist movement. The two major communist daily newspapers, *Il Lavoratore* and *Primorski Dnevnik* testified

39 Karlsen, *Frontiera*, p. 193.

40 On Szklarska Poreba: Procacci, *The Cominform*; Pons, *Origins*, pp. 16–21; Pons, *Challenge*, pp. 247–263; Aga-Rossi/Zaslavsky, *Togliatti*, p. 221f.

41 For further information see the volumes cited above and: Banac, *With Stalin*; Marković, *Beograd*; Zuccari, *Dito sulla piaga*.

42 Verbalni Direzione, 8.–9.7.1948, APCI, M, mf. 199, p 12-II; Galeazzi, *Togliatti*, p. 102; Comunicato della direzione del PCI, *l’Unità*, 29.6.1948.

to turf wars over the interpretation of the Cominform Resolution, on what to publish in this context, and on what to do with Belgrade's answer. While at first both editorial boards sided with the Soviet position, the Slovenian daily turned to the Yugoslav interpretation of events after a few days, heavily attacking the Italian comrades in the FTT.⁴³ Moreover, the battle for the future of communism in Zones A and B had begun. In the executive committee of the PCTLT six members supported the resolution while four were against it. In the CC, the vote was evenly split with seventeen members on each side. This situation led also to a split in the Party on the Adriatic. The resolution was accepted and the pro-Yugoslav comrades withdrew to Zone B.⁴⁴ The Yugoslav Army was present there and Yugoslav administration had been implemented, so the apparatus of the Party fell in the hands of Belgrade, while any official who supported the resolution was forced to leave the Zone.⁴⁵ Faced with such a scenario, the party in Trieste prepared a special congress. Before the congress, pro- and anti-resolution activists voiced their ideas at meetings held in factories, within trade unions, and among dockworkers. According to reports from pro-Cominformist circles, the workers of the city were already overwhelmingly supportive of the muscovite line.⁴⁶ The special congress of the FTT was held between 21 and 23 August 1948. This was Vidali's finest hour. The party line was already clarified and he could rest assured of his victory. In his address to the congress, he repeated all of Belgrade's "mistakes" and noted that such mistakes ought to be published to develop the communist movement: "How often did the reaction think it could benefit from an open and bold system [?] The last time it was during the Moscow trials against the Trotskyists and treacherous generals. Yet the effects of this system could be felt in Stalingrad and Berlin."⁴⁷ Moreover, Vidali explained that the Italian and the French communist parties had learned from their mistakes and the international criticism, while the KPJ was assuming it could repudiate the criticism of the Cominform and quit the alliance with the CPSU. Therefore, while in Zone B the KPJ tightened its grip on the communist movement, Vidali enforced his views on the comrades of Zone A, where one quarter of the members were expelled and others "re-educated".⁴⁸

Therefore, the resolution of the Cominform created a clear divide between the opposing communist factions within the FTT. While the years after World War II had been characterized by the attempt both by the PCI and the KPJ to impose their respective points of view concerning the internationally disputed region, the rift inside the communist world had led to the clarification of relations on the Adriatic as well. For the Italian communists, this was definitely a relief after years of performing a balancing act

43 Cronaca avvenimenti del PC Trieste 29.6.-14.7.1948, APCI, M, mf. 099, fasc. VI.

44 Relazione sulla situazione del Partito Comunista del TLT, 30.8.1948, APCI, M, mf. 099, fasc. V.

45 Dichiarazione di Jaksetich, Semilli, Bacicchi, Burlini su fuga da zona B, 1.9.1948, APCI, M, mf. 099, fasc. V.

46 Vidali alla Direzione del PCI, 15.8.1948, APCI, M, mf. 099, fasc. VI.

47 Bozza Relazione Vidali sulla situazione del PCTLT, APCI, M, mf. 098, fasc. IIb.

48 Cronaca avvenimenti nel PC Trieste 29 giugno-14 luglio 1948, APCI, M, mf. 099, fasc. V.

between national interests and internationalist ideals. For the Yugoslav side, the loss of the Soviet ally also meant the loss of influence in Zone A, where, before the resolution, Belgrade and Ljubljana's point of view had largely prevailed.

After June 1948, the PCI subordinated its policies toward Yugoslavia to Moscow's wishes. As there was no change in the Soviet stance before the rapprochement following Stalin's death in 1953, the relations on the Adriatic remained unremarkable. Trieste became a major hub for Soviet financial support of the PCI. Under direct supervision of Vittorio Vidali, immense funds were channeled from Trieste to the Party in Rome.⁴⁹ At the same time, Vidali's regional autonomous movement needed new financial support, as funds entering the city from Yugoslavia had dried up, since cadres loyal to Belgrade had fled the city with part of the party coffers.⁵⁰ The caesura of 1948 also had immediate effects on the elections in Zone A. Whereas the PCTLT gained 21.1 percent of the vote in 1949 and 18.3 percent in 1952, the PCI was able to gain majorities in similar industrial regions to the north of the FTT and in other comparable Italian regions. Vidali replied to the criticism expressed by the headquarters in Rome after the elections of 1949 in August that same year. He pointed out that it had been rather difficult to explain the position of the Cominform to large parts of the population and that this had been due to the mistakes made by the PCI. Moreover, bad economic conditions had affected the elections, whereas Vidali speculated that the "Anglo-Americans" would find a *modus vivendi* with "Tito's clique". In the fourteen months after the resolution, Vidali argued, Rome had done very little to explain the situation which ensued in 1948 clearly. Many "comrades had been expelled" due to their open criticism toward Yugoslavia before June 1948. These wounds, at least according to Vidali, would only heal with time.⁵¹ Nor did Vidali shy away from criticizing the relations between Rome and Trieste. The PCI did not care enough about the future and problems of the Adriatic city: "We wish to feel you closer to us. The Titoists are doing everything to discredit our Party. [...] The situation is becoming more and more aggravated. If you do not support us more often, we will make mistakes."⁵² What followed was a stronger commitment by the PCI toward attacks on Belgrade, most clearly manifested in articles featured in *l'Unità*.⁵³ This policy slowly changed only after Stalin's death in 1953 and the rapprochement between Moscow and Belgrade that ensued thereafter. Yet, Vidali remained a resolute opponent of any rapprochement with Tito's regime. After the meeting between Nikita Khrushchev and Tito in 1955, the leader of an autonomous communist party was not able to perform an about-turn in his views toward the Yugoslav government and the

49 Riva, *Oro da Mosca*.

50 Gori/Pons, *Archivi di Mosca*, pp. 330–333.

51 Promemoria, fto. Vidali, 31.8.1949, APCI, M, mf. 99, fasc. V.

52 Vidali a segreteria PCI Sede, 3.11.1949, APCI, M, mf. 99, fasc. V.

53 Karlsen, *Frontiera*, pp. 213 – a 220.

past. A “normalization” was something he could not accept. At first, he articulated his views in an interview with *Il Lavoratore*.⁵⁴ He continued his attacks during a meeting in Rome: “In Trieste there are some 30,000 refugees from Zone B, where denationalization processes using Nazi-methods can be witnessed daily. All of our comrades and every worker in Trieste have suffered under Tito’s policies. When we talk about the Titoists, we are influenced by our experiences of the past. Therefore it is rather hard to expect from us to accept that the Titoist clique is indeed Marxist-Leninist and that Yugoslavia is a socialist country.”⁵⁵ The party in Rome did not accept Vidali’s point of view, forcing him to withdraw his public comments and, in an effort reminiscent of Stalinist methods, he was also forced to perform an about-face and admit he had been wrong all the time.⁵⁶ Thereafter, the party in Trieste performed its “normalization” and Vidali’s struggle was sacrificed for the greater good of the international communist movement. The endpoint of this story was finally the dissolving of the autonomous communist party of the FTT during its sixth congress held from 28 to 30 June 1957.

Conclusions

This article has portrayed relations between the communist parties on the Adriatic after World War II, in connection with differing ideas and specific conceptions within a regional scenario. Whereas before the signing of the Italian Peace Treaty, the CP’s of Italy and Yugoslavia tried to persuade Moscow of their line and the autonomous party created in Trieste sided with Yugoslavia, the national parties reached an agreement along the lines of the peace treaty, thereafter. Until June 1948, the regional party continued to promote its version of a policy toward Trieste, while it did not accept any rulings from above. The resolution of the Cominform cleared up all ambiguities in Trieste and its surroundings with a regional rift that had come with the international communist split. Thereafter, the regional party was aligned to Italy; yet, even in this scenario, the autonomous status of the party led it to form its own policies, especially after the rapprochement between Moscow and Belgrade in the 1950s, which demonstrated how important it is to analyze regional scenarios in internationalist movements.

54 La dichiarazione del comp Kruscev ed i comunisti triestini, *Il Lavoratore*, 30.5.1955.

55 Riunione die Segreteria, 7.6.1955, APCI, M, mf. 194, Verbali Segreteria.

56 Ibid.

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Summary

Karlo Ružičić-Kessler

The Tito-Stalin Split and its Adriatic Dimension: Regional Rifts in a “Monolithic” Movement

Considering the shifts and rifts inside the common communist camp during the Cold War, one always finds the question of the Tito-Stalin split of June 1948 as a landmark event for emancipation and the search for new paths to socialism, not dictated by one „monolith“. This proposal focuses on interparty relations and dialogue before, during and after the split in the perspective of one major international and transnational question: the fate of Trieste. Both the Italian and the Yugoslav CP were at the center of discussion on the future of Trieste after World War II. While Yugoslavia implemented communist rule, the Italian communists were torn between the struggle within the frame of a “Western bourgeois” democracy and the internationalist movement. The Yugoslav comrades held the upper hand for most of the time due to the support of the Soviet Union, yet the Italian communists did not give up on their “national” agenda, creating a special blend of interests in the small contested strip of land between Italy and Yugoslavia. After the Tito-Stalin split, the question was reversed. Now the Italian communists were at the forefront of the struggle against Tito and financed actions to destabilize the regime. Adding to this complex situation the autonomous communist party installed in Trieste – first dominated by Belgrade and

after 1948 by Rome – took a surprisingly independent stance on some transnational questions before and after June 1948 – being a propaganda tool for Belgrade at first and of the Cominform thereafter. Therefore, the analysis of these interparty relations can tell us more about the question of early “emancipation” in the communist world and how it developed in the corset of a “monolithic” movement, while also revealing the repercussions of 1948 in a wider transnational party network.

Maximilian Graf

Upside-down: Bilateral and Transnational Relations between Austria and Yugoslavia before and after 1948

The Austrian, Italian and Yugoslavian territorial conflicts (South Tyrol, Carinthia, Venezia Giulia and, most importantly, Trieste) were interconnected from postwar to Cold War and beyond. Overcoming mere national or bilateral approaches and analyzing those disputes within the international context makes the various mutual influences visible.¹ By also addressing the transnational dimension of relations between the Communist parties, it becomes clear how multifaceted the connections were.² This chapter argues that the Tito-Stalin split of 1948 constituted the decisive game changer at all levels. Thereafter, everything was upside-down. The example of bilateral and transnational relations between Austria and Yugoslavia demonstrates the sea change of the turbulent years before and after 1948. Beyond a mere analysis of the Austrian–Yugoslav postwar relationship from conflict to rapprochement, this study presents new findings on how this development was related to the question of Trieste.

From Postwar to Cold War

In 1945, relations between Vienna and Belgrade had hit rock bottom. Recovery of bilateral relations seemed almost impossible against the background of the Yugoslav war experiences (with many Austrians having fought in the German Wehrmacht in the Balkans), the subsequent deportation of German-speaking minorities from Yugoslav territory and the expropriation of their property, Yugoslavia's temporary military occupation of southern Austria, and its territorial demands on Carinthia and Styria. The

1 On the "Alps-Adriatic" region in the first postwar decade, see recently Mueller/Ruzicic-Kessler/Greilinger (eds.), *The Alps-Adriatic Region*.

2 On transnational relations in the "Alps-Adriatic" region see the special issue *Comunismi di frontiera. I partiti comunisti nell'area Alpe-Adria 1945-1955*.

installation of an “Iron Curtain” and frequent killings at the border caused a frightening atmosphere. Early postwar contacts were rare.³

However, the interconnectedness of the territorial conflicts in the Alps-Adriatic region is especially evident in an Austrian–Yugoslav encounter in the spring of 1946. During the negotiations on the Italian Peace Treaty, Austria desperately fought a lost cause for the return of (at least part of) South Tyrol. It was within this context that Yugoslavia first attempted to instrumentalize Austria, by pointing out that both countries had territorial conflicts with Italy, and thus a “common enemy.” Yugoslavia initiated a meeting between Austrian foreign minister Karl Gruber and the Yugoslav deputy foreign minister Aleš Bebler at the Mexican Embassy in Paris. Belgrade wanted Vienna to support its claims on Trieste.⁴ The overture was rejected by the Austrian government, because neither the state of burdened relations nor Austrian interests justified such a step.⁵ During his visit to Moscow in June 1946, Tito gave it another try and personally approached the Austrian diplomat Karl Braunias: After some warm words about his Austrian “comrades,” like Franz Honner, Tito renewed the desire for an Austrian declaration supporting the Yugoslav claim on Trieste.⁶ However, Vienna did not consider Belgrade a trustworthy partner, not least because of the looming territorial demands on Carinthia. When Yugoslavia officially announced its territorial claims in the course of the opening negotiations on the Austrian State treaty at the turn of the year 1946, the postwar Cold War made any improvement of bilateral relations very unlikely.⁷

On the contrary, the Austrian communists praised the developments in Yugoslavia and highlighted the country’s own contribution to its liberation from fascism. Already in April 1946, Yugoslavia was called the “freest, most democratic and progressed state of the non-Soviet world.”⁸ As far as we now know, Austrian and Yugoslav communists had established close ties. Some leading Austrian communists had fought in the Austrian battalions of the Yugoslav army at the end of the war. The party leaders met in September 1947 and discussed their politics.⁹ However, from 1945 to 1947 the Austrian Communist Party (*Kommunistische Partei Österreichs*, KPÖ) was part of the Austrian coalition government.¹⁰ Being in governmental responsibility, the KPÖ acted in Austria’s

3 On Austrian–Yugoslav relations 1945–1955, see Suppan, *Jugoslawien*, pp. 431–447; Dragišić, *Österreichisch-jugoslawische Beziehungen*; *Ibid.*, *Odnosi Jugoslavije*.

4 Amtsvermerk, Paris, 29 May 1946; and Norbert Bischoff an Generalsekretär Heinrich Wildner, Paris, 1 June 1946, Vertraulich!, ÖStA, AdR, BKA/AA, II-Pol 1946, Italien 9, Gr.Zl. 111.023-pol/46, GZ. 111.593-pol/46, Karton 14.

5 Amtsvermerk, Gegenstand: Triester Frage im Verhältnis zu Jugoslawien, Vienna, 2 June 1946; and Amtsvermerk, Gegenstand: Triester Frage; Verhältnis zu Jugoslawien, Vienna, 15 June 1946, ÖStA, AdR, BKA/AA, II-Pol 1946, Italien 9, Gr.Zl. 111.023-pol/46, GZ. 111.705-pol/46, Karton 14.

6 Politischer Vertreter Braunias an Bundesminister (BM) Gruber, Moscow, 11 June 1946, ÖStA, AdR, BKA/AA, II-Pol 1946, Gr.Zl. 111.801-pol/46, GZ. 111.814-pol/46.

7 On the territorial demands, see Stourzh, *Um Einheit*, pp. 63–67; Karner/Ruggenthaler, *Stalin, Tito*, pp. 81–105.

8 *Die Kommunistische Partei Jugoslawiens*, p. 221.

9 Mueller, *Soviet Policy*, pp. 90–115; Karner/Ruggenthaler, *Stalin, Tito*, pp. 98–99.

10 On the KPÖ 1945–55, see Mueller, *Die sowjetische Besatzung*; Mugrauer, *Die Politik*, pp. 37–52.

national interest and rejected the Yugoslav territorial claims. At the same time, it heavily criticized the other Austrian parties for having failed in establishing friendly relations to Yugoslavia. Additionally, the Austrian communists demanded a genuine autonomy for the Slovene Carinthians and heavily criticized the alleged suppression of the minority by the regional and federal authorities. In communist interpretation, Austria's – of course questionable – minority policy and the problems of implementing minority rights in Carinthia, especially in public education, was a prolongation of the “German national and fascist policy” of deportation and annihilation. The KPÖ tried to justify its position and to provide the party members with “dialectic” arguments on how the party can on the one hand reject the territorial demands and on the other hand make the case for close relations to Yugoslavia. The clue lies in the subordination of the “national question” to the general “class struggle” and therefore the Austrian communist's struggle for a “People's Democracy.” This position did not change until mid-1948.¹¹ On the contrary, the KPÖ continued to praise the developments in Yugoslavia. In February 1948, the theoretical journal *Weg und Ziel* reported about the solution of the national question in Yugoslavia and stated, that Belgrade “had won the absolute confidence of its neighbors. Yugoslavia has become the spearhead of solid friendship of all freed people in the Balkans.”¹² In May 1948, chief editor Franz Marek praised the Yugoslav “popular front” and concluded: “the Yugoslav Peoples' Democracy is far ahead of other countries.”¹³

The Split and its Consequences

Against this background, the Cominform Resolution constituted an unexpected blow to the Austrian communists. They were not informed in advance about the Cominform meeting on Yugoslavia. Paralyzed from shock, initially the KPÖ issued only the Resolution without commenting on it. The Osvobodilna Fronta in Carinthia rebuffed the Cominform critic and was heavily criticized for its course. The party branches in Carinthia and Styria were on the brink of falling apart. The split dazed not only ordinary party members, the same holds true for many functionaries. However, their dilemma was that even though they hardly believed the accusations against Tito, even more they were not able to think that “infallible” Stalin was wrong. One of those Austrian communists of two minds was Franz Marek, who as chief editor of *Weg und Ziel* had the ungrateful task to justify the whole situation in a special volume of the theoretical journal.¹⁴ He fulfilled this task by sticking to the arguments of the critics by the Cominform accusing the Yugoslav leadership of having left the path of “internationalism” and

11 For more details, see Graf, *The Austrian Communist's*, pp. 50–52.

12 *Der Sieg der wahren Demokratie*, pp. 140–143.

13 Marek, *Einheitslisten, Einheitsparteien und Volksdemokratie*, p. 343.

14 Graf/Knoll (eds.), *Franz Marek*, p. 173.

drifting towards “nationalism” – something the Austrian communists had experienced on the example of the territorial demands. The hardest part in writing this article was definitely the attempt to explain why the critic was made public and in how far this change can be understood in the light of the until then extremely positive communist news coverage on Yugoslavia. At least, Marek’s article did not include terms like “fascists” or “agents of imperialism.”¹⁵ This constituted a remarkable difference to other authors who in the years to come discredited the Yugoslav leadership as “fascists,” “imperialistic agents” and “traitors.”¹⁶ The campaign was reinforced after the show trials in Bulgaria and Hungary. The scripted confessions and judgments were presented as the ultimate proof of Yugoslav guilt.¹⁷ At home the party accused the “Tito clique” of the *Osvobodilna Fronta* to abuse of the national consciousness of the Slovenes in Carinthia and aiming at the decomposition of the Austrian workers.¹⁸ There is some evidence that the leading intellectual of the Austrian communists Ernst Fischer in his first reaction thought about siding with Tito.¹⁹ However, as a Stalinist he stuck with the party line and maybe in compensating his original position he set a peak to the condemnation of Tito. Fischer wrote a Stalinist propaganda play whose only aim was denouncing the Yugoslav leader as a “traitor.”²⁰

Soon, Austrian diplomats noted that the here to fore hostile Yugoslav media coverage on Austria had changed significantly. Now the polemics and attacks were directed against the Austrian Communists and especially Ernst Fischer as well as on Soviet policy in occupied Austria.²¹ This was an early reflection of the forthcoming rapprochement.

15 Marek, *Was lehrt uns die Kritik an den Führern der KP Jugoslawiens?*, pp. 569–596.

16 West, *Die Spione von Belgrad*, pp. 678–707.

17 On the KPÖ and the “show trials” in general, see Keller, *Die KPÖ*, pp. 199–218.

18 Mitteräcker, *Die Tito-Clique in Kärnten*, pp. 512–516.

19 “Many reports tend to confirm development of serious split in ranks of Austrian Communist Party as result of Cominform action against Tito. President Kopenig and General Secretary Fuernberg of Austrian Communist Party reportedly support Cominform while Communist nationalist Fischer defends Tito. Fischer accused of defection from soviet orbit many times in past and such schism may well be final contribution on Fischer’s fall from power if break not healed soon. All efforts being made by Communists to keep these disputes from public. *Osvobodilna Fronta*, Carinthia branch of Austrian Communist Party which favors return [sic!] of South Carinthia to Yugoslavia, made formal break with Cominform supporters because of their current support of Tito. Fuernberg has been sent to Carinthia to attempt to strengthen pro-Cominform elements there.” Telegram (Weeka Austria) to Secretary of State, Vienna, 6 August 1948, NARA, RG 59, Central Decimal Files 1945–49, box 6852.

20 Fischer, *Der große Verrat*. Two decades later Fischer himself named writing this play “worse, than a mistake.” Cf. Fischer, *Das Ende*, p. 271.

21 Politischer Vertreter Conrad-Eybesfeld an BKA/AA, Belgrade, 27 November 1948, Zl. 324-Pol/48, ÖStA, AdR, BKA/AA, II-Pol 1948, Jugoslawien 3, Gr.Zl. 110.464-pol/48, GZ. 118.988-Pol/48; Braunias an BM Gruber, Belgrade, 11 December 1949, Zl. 180-Pol/49, ÖStA, AdR, BKA/AA, II-Pol 1949, Jugoslawien 2, Gr.Zl. 80.333-pol/49, GZ. 89.567-Pol/49; Braunias an BM Gruber, Belgrade, 1 April 1950, Zl. 123-P/50, Geheim, ÖStA, BKA/AA, II-Pol 1950, Politische Berichte Belgrad, Karton 127; Gesandter Braunias an BKA/AA (Abt. 5), Belgrad, 5 April 1951, Zl. 184-P/51, ÖStA, AdR, BKA/AA, II-Pol 1951, Jugoslawien 6, GZ. 134.345-pol/51. For details on the end of the “media war” and its continuation between the Communist parties, see Dragičić, *Österreichisch-jugoslawische Beziehungen*, pp. 149–157.

Tito even giggled with Austrian diplomats over the insignificance of the Cominformists in the neighbor state.²² While the Austrian Communists had taken a clear-cut stance of condemnation on Tito, Austrian diplomacy cautiously followed the events in Yugoslavia and their potential consequences. In one of his first reports in mid-July 1947, the first Austrian post-1945 political representative in Belgrade Walter Conrad-Eybesfeld had written: "Russia's fist weighs heavy on Yugoslavia."²³ Despite this, everybody was surprised when the split happened in 1948. A period of insecurity followed: From Soviet military intervention to reconciliation everything seemed possible.²⁴ The repercussions of the split were manifest at all levels. When Karl Braunias, who had met Tito in Moscow in 1946, assumed office as the new Austrian political representative in Belgrade in late 1949, he noticed how these developments had also affected Tito personally: "When I first saw him in May 1946 in Moscow, he had a bright and rosy-cheeked face, like a young piglet. At my visit in November 1949, I looked into an aged and furrowed face."²⁵ It took almost two years until Yugoslavia's position between East and West was considered permanent – at least for the time being.²⁶ In the course of Belgrade's turn to the West, Austria and Yugoslavia started attempts to solve their existing problems at the bilateral level. The territorial demands were gradually reduced and (more importantly), from the beginning of 1949 they lacked Soviet support.²⁷ In the early 1950s, semi-official Yugoslav statements foreshadowed their abandonment.²⁸

In summer 1949, the promising negotiations on the Austrian state treaty had failed, probably due to Soviet military considerations.²⁹ This view was shared by the Yugoslav leadership. With a smile on his face, Edvard Kardelj told an Austrian diplomat that maybe now the Yugoslavs are responsible for the delayed conclusion of the state treaty since Russia wants to keep its troops in Romania and Hungary because of Yugoslavia. In fact, their presence was – at least formally – only possible because of the occupation of Austria.³⁰

22 Besuch bei Marschall Tito. Braunias an BM Gruber, Belgrad, 7 December 1950, Zl. 509-P/50, Geheim, ÖStA, BKA/AA, II-Pol 1950, Politische Berichte Belgrad, Karton 127.

23 Conrad-Eybesfeld an BM Gruber, Belgrade, 17 July 1947, Zl. 8-Pol/47, Vertraulich!, ÖStA, AdR, BKA/AA, II-Pol 1947, Jugoslawien 2, GZ. 108.259-pol/47.

24 See for example the numerous diplomatic reports of the years 1949/50: ÖStA, AdR, BKA/AA, II-Pol 1949 and 1950, Politische Berichte Belgrad.

25 Braunias recalled this impression in a report of May 1951, when reporting about discussions on Tito's health in Belgrade's diplomatic corps. Braunias an BM Gruber, Belgrade, 30 May 1951, Zl. 259-P/51, ÖStA, AdR, BKA/AA, II-Pol 1951, Jugoslawien 49, Gr.Zl. 135.119, GZ. 135.970-pol/51.

26 Amtsvermerk. Zwei Jahre Komintern konflikt, Vienna, 4 August 1950, ÖStA, AdR, BKA/AA, II-Pol 1950, Jugoslawien 2, Gr.Zl. 120.551-pol/50, GZ. 126.974-Pol/50.

27 Karner/Ruggenthaler, *Eineweitere Unterstützung*, p. 100.

28 Aufgabe der jugosl. Gebiets für der ungenge gegenüber Österreich – Erklärung PIJADES, Vienna, November 1951, ÖStA, AdR, BKA/AA, II-Pol 1951, Jugoslawien 2, Gr.Zl. 131.540-pol/51, GZ. 140.949-pol/51.

29 Mueller, *Gab es eine*, pp. 89–120.

30 Gespräch mit Kardelj, Braunias an BM Gruber, Belgrade, 10 February 1950, Zl. 41-P/50, Geheim!, ÖStA, BKA/AA, II-Pol 1950, Politische Berichte Belgrad, Karton 127. Also, see Bekes/Borhi/Ruggenthaler/Trasca (eds.), *Soviet Occupation*.

In the years after the split, the situation at the Austrian-Yugoslav border normalized, economic cooperation between the neighboring states grew, and political relations improved. The Carinthian question turned into a question of the Slovene minority in Carinthia.³¹ When Braunias visited the Slovene national assembly in summer 1951, President Josip Vidmar told him: “For us Slovenes, it is not important if the Carinthian Slovenes live with us or in Austria. The borders will blur over time. For us, it is just important that the Slovene element in Carinthia has the freedom and possibility of its cultural development.”³² During the spectacular visit of Austrian foreign minister Karl Gruber to Yugoslavia in June 1952, even the minority problem was no longer an issue burdening the two countries’ bilateral relations. For Tito, this visit was a way out of the isolation following 1948³³ and, in fact, Austria had become a diplomatic “ice breaker” for a communist regime – long before “peaceful coexistence,” the state treaty, and neutrality that shaped Austria’s role towards the Socialist states throughout the Cold War.³⁴

The Austrian-Yugoslav rapprochement was mischievously observed by Italy,³⁵ especially because the conflict over Trieste worsened at the same time. From the beginning of 1952, Yugoslavia was increasingly interested in the Austrian position on Trieste, and once again Belgrade aimed at instrumentalizing Austria. Yugoslav diplomacy argued “that the question of Trieste could be easily solved if it were only a question between Austria and Yugoslavia. Austria had always shown understanding for Yugoslavia.” Some even suggested: “Perhaps the best solution would be an Austrian governor in Trieste?”³⁶ Austrian diplomats and politicians constantly had to assure the suspicious Italians that no Austrian diplomatic initiative regarding Trieste was planned.³⁷ Even though Tito did not succeed in influencing Vienna’s attitude to the question of Trieste, his personal engagement in the improvement of bilateral relations was strong. In his conversations with Austrian diplomats he openly spoke about his dislike for Stalin and his former Austrian “comrades.” Additionally, the Yugoslav leader shared his considerations about Soviet policy. In an encounter with an Austrian diplomat in 1952, Tito called Stalin an “old donkey” and regarded the leadership of the Austrian communists as his “footmen,” who someday would pay their price, like everybody else who worked for Stalin. Tito’s assessment on the Austrian state treaty was bleak.³⁸ This changed after Stalin’s death in

31 For details on this process, see Dragišić, *Österreichisch-jugoslawische Beziehungen*, pp. 219–237.

32 Braunias an BM Gruber, Veldes, 29 August 1951, Zl. 390-P/51, Vertraulich!, ÖStA, AdR, BKA/AA, II-Pol 1951, Jugoslawien 2, Gr.Zl. 131.540-pol/51, GZ. 138.433-pol/51.

33 Dragišić, *Österreichisch-jugoslawische Beziehungen*, pp. 158–171.

34 On the term and later years, see Suppan/Mueller (eds.), “*Peaceful Coexistence*”.

35 Graf, *Österreich und Triest*, p. 412.

36 Braunias an BM Gruber, Belgrade, 27 March 1952, Zl. 191-P/52, Geheim, ÖStA, AdR, BKA/AA, II-Pol 1952, Triest 2, Gr.Zl. 149.156-Pol/52, GZ. 150.104-Pol/52, Karton 208.

37 Graf, *Österreich und Triest*, pp. 414–415, 420–422.

38 Braunias an BM Gruber, Belgrade, 8 October 1952, Geheim, ÖStA, AdR, BKA/AA, II-Pol 1952, Jugoslawien 2, Gr.Zl. 146.175-pol/52, GZ. 157.193-Pol/52.

1953, when he expected changes in the Soviet Union. In summer 1954, Tito predicted that Austria would be free within two years' time.³⁹ In fact, the Austrian state treaty was concluded less than a year later. Naturally, it took time to solve all the problems between Austrian and Yugoslavia and some of them continued to cyclically burden relations, but the very years after 1948 had laid the basis for an exceptional (in ideological terms) East-West relationship of the Cold War era in which neutral Austria and non-aligned Yugoslavia positioned themselves between the blocs.⁴⁰

On the contrary, relations between the Austrian and the Yugoslav Communists, which had been excellent after 1945, collapsed against the backdrop of the Tito-Stalin split. Before 1948, the KPÖ had blamed the Austrian government for not establishing close relations with Tito-Yugoslavia. When Austrian-Yugoslav relations started to normalize, the party publicly criticized this reconciliation and spoke of "US-puppets" in Vienna and Belgrade. Tito's warm words about Austria's independence were regarded as "hypocrisy."⁴¹ It was strictly forbidden to all party members to visit Yugoslavia or even to maintain contacts with "comrades" or relatives living in the Southern neighbor state. Any violation of these restrictions was likely to lead to an expulsion from the party.⁴² Tito held a very low opinion of his Austrian "comrades" and the re-establishment of party relations materialized only slowly after Nikita Khrushchev changed the Kremlin's stance in the mid-1950s.⁴³ This was also a result of the "Stalinist" positioning of the KPÖ leadership and additionally influenced by the repercussions of the crackdown on the Hungarian uprising in 1956. Furthermore, Belgrade clearly prioritized the development of bilateral relations to Austria over interparty relations.⁴⁴ With the rapprochement looming on the horizon in 1957, the Austrian party's rank and file were puzzled, not least because Soviet-Yugoslav relations had worsened again in the aftermath of the Soviet intervention in Hungary. In various meetings of local party organizations, it became obvious that many ordinary party members had kept their propaganda inflicted "distrust against Tito." One even claimed: "Tito is and remains a bounder."⁴⁵ Against the revelations of Khrushchev's secret speech in 1956,⁴⁶ some questioned whether the critique on the "Yugoslavian Communists in 1948 was wrong."⁴⁷ The summary of

39 Botschafter Wodak an BM Figl, Bled, 12 August 1954, Zl. 55-Pol/54, ÖStA, AdR, BKA/AA, II-Pol 1954, Politische Berichte Belgrad, Karton 305.

40 On this development, see Portmann, *Austria and Yugoslavia*, pp. 435–464; Portmann and Ruzicic-Kessler, *Yugoslavia and Its Western Neighbours*, pp. 296–310.

41 *Völkstimme*, 18 June 1952; Spira, *Die Titofaschisten – Bundesgenossen der Figl-Schärf-Regierung*, pp. 588–596.

42 Meisel, *Die Mauer*, p. 110.

43 On the development of Soviet-Yugoslav relations 1953–1957, see Rajak, *Yugoslavia*.

44 Zabeleška povodom predloga da dolazi u Jugoslaviju nezvanična delegacija KP Austrije, 12 December 1956, AJ, ACKSKJ IX, 6/I-143; Informacija, Belgrade, 23 September 1957, AJ, ACKSKJ IX, 6/I-143.

45 Funktionär-Konferenz über das Juni-Plenum der KPdSU im XV. Bezirk, Report by Josef Lauscher, 12 July 1957, AÖGZ, Nachlass 40 (Josef Lauscher), DO 168, fol. 1037.

46 Mügrauer, *Zwischen Erschütterung*, pp. 257–297.

47 Funktionär-Konferenz über das Juni-Plenum der KPdSU im IX. Bezirk, Report by Josef Lauscher, 15 July 1957, AÖGZ, Nachlass 40 (Josef Lauscher), DO 168, fol. 1048.

another discussion read: “The relation to Yugoslavia and the role of Tito deeply troubled the comrades. Opinions differ.”⁴⁸ Later in the 1960s, the KPÖ refused to join the seminal re-enforcement of critique on Yugoslavia.

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Summary

Maximilian Graf

Upside-down: Bilateral and Transnational Relations between Austria and Yugoslavia before and after 1948

Postwar relations between Austria and Yugoslavia had been extremely tense and the incipient Cold War made the situation even worse. Among the reasons were the repercussions of World War II, the territorial conflict, the treatment of minorities, and the deepening East-West divide. This deadlock was rapidly overcome after the Tito-Stalin split of 1948 and the subsequent re-orientation of Belgrade’s policy towards the West. Fostered by Western support, bilateral relations started to reconcile and already in the early 1950s turned into an early example of détente between an – even though occupied – evolving Western style democracy and a – despite the split – Socialist regime. The situation at the border normalized, economic cooperation grew, and political relations improved. When Austrian foreign minister Karl Gruber visited Yugoslavia in 1952, the former conflictive issues played hardly any role and both sides started to work towards a good neighborly relationship. Tito was a driving force in this development and even exchanged his estimates of Soviet policy with Austrian diplomats at length. On the contrary, relations between the Austrian and the Yugoslav Communists, which had been excellent after 1945, collapsed against the backdrop of the Tito-Stalin split. The Austrian party followed Moscow’s line, condemned Tito as a “traitor” (even though this caused severe internal conflicts) and furthermore deplored any rapprochement between Belgrade and Vienna. Hence, Tito held a very low opinion of his Austrian “comrades” and the re-establishment of party relations materialized only slowly after Khrushchev changed the Kremlin’s stance in the mid-1950s.

David G. Tompkins

Of Lightning Strikes and Bombs: The Tito-Stalin Split and its Effects on Polish and East German Society

The Tito-Stalin split came as a shock to East German and Polish communists and their fellow citizens. After being fêted as a friend postwar, in 1948 Yugoslavia was excluded from the socialist community at the outset of its consolidation, and thus carried freighted symbolic importance for Central Europeans. This article focuses on the attempts by the Socialist Unity Party (Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands, SED) and the Polish United Workers Party (Polska Zjednoczona Partia Robotnicza, PZPR) to create and then transform the image of Yugoslavia for pedagogical purposes during the postwar decade. It argues that party officials and their allies viewed a representation of Yugoslavia as both an opportunity and a threat, and shows that the sudden emergence of *Feindbild* Yugoslavia had significant effects on the worldviews of Poles and East Germans in the early Cold War.

Such images of friends and enemies played a key role in the worldview constructed by East German and Polish communists. Party leaders and their allies deployed these images, based in reality but cast to serve political goals, to help define and elaborate their preferred vision of society and to claim legitimacy for their ideological program. They shaped these profiles of the “other” and exhorted citizens to emulate or reject them accordingly. These images circulated throughout everyday life through popular media and proved essential to the parties’ attempts to influence their populations. For citizens, these ubiquitous representations framed their lived experience of communism in Central Europe and also offered opportunities for negotiation and even resistance.

This paper looks at both the German Democratic Republic (GDR) and Poland as examples of the relationship of two bloc countries to Yugoslavia as well as its related representation there; examining both countries gives a sense of the range of possibility within the bloc and offers comparative insights. And Yugoslavia offers a compelling

and unusual case, as its representation changed from that of friend to enemy (and then back again after 1953). It thus presented a challenge to the usual Manichean worldview that asserted the unstoppable forward march of communism over its capitalist and imperialist foes. The many characteristics of the image of Yugoslavia had been applied intensively if inconsistently in the postwar years, and could be put together in a myriad of ways to create an image useful to party leaders as well to an ordinary citizen. As simultaneously a real actor and a familiar symbol in the early Cold War, Yugoslavia was an important touchstone for Central European debates about Stalinism and the thaw.

Yugoslavia as Heroic Friend, 1945-1948

During the first postwar years, both East German and Polish communists found in Yugoslavia a key ally for the building of socialism and an important mobilizing tool with respect to their populations. An initial image of socialist Yugoslavia as a heroic example coalesced and spread in both countries before the abrupt about-face in the summer of 1948. This positive representation became more widespread in Poland, but proved important for many East German communists as well. For the Germans, the relationship was more fraught given the legacy of the war, while Poles celebrated an analogous resistance to Nazism. The Poles could also draw upon a notion of Slavic brotherhood, while their East German counterparts had to deal with anti-Slav sentiments.¹

Prominent East German communists had a number of personal connections to the Yugoslav leadership, in that some had fought together in the Spanish Civil War. Walter Ulbricht had even helped Tito to travel from Moscow to Yugoslavia during the Second World War to fight.² In the immediate postwar years, the Communist Party of Yugoslavia was a model for East German communists, following closely behind only the Soviet party in the eyes of many SED members.³ The uncertainty surrounding the fate of eastern Germany as well as the negative legacy of German involvement in the Balkans during the Second World War did, however, make contacts between the two parties and peoples more fraught.

The wartime legacy was, however, also usefully instrumentalized by the SED as it looked to the presence of tens of thousands of German prisoners of war in Yugoslavia. Thousands chose to help Yugoslavia rebuild after 1945, in a program that also included communist-inspired education.⁴ There was even a journal, *Der Aufbau—für Arbeitssinitiative und Einsatz der deutschen und österreichischen Kriegsgefangenen in Jugoslawien*

1 Selinić, *Ambasada jugosłowskańska*, pp. 107-108; Behrends, *Stalins slavischer Volkskrieg*, pp. 79-108; Wippermann, *Antislavismus*, pp. 512-524.

2 Bock, *Die Beziehungen zur SFRJ*, pp. 233-251.

3 Weber, *Die SED und der Titoismus*.

4 Mähler, *Die Partei hat immer recht!*, p. 388.

(Construction: For Work Initiative and Service of the German and Austrian Prisoners of War in Yugoslavia), for these Germans and interested individuals in Central Europe.⁵ A not-untypical article lauded the “united workers... as an example and model from which we can learn the most important and great things.... We have learned that only a united people that stays together and in which the working person is the most important citizen can realize the tremendous task of societal renewal.”⁶ This and other articles explicitly evoked Yugoslav efforts towards unity and development as an ideal for Germans to follow. Similar reports with such framing also appeared in the press more broadly, as one in which former prisoners thanked the Yugoslavs and asserted: “We return to our homeland as new people. We take the spirit of progressive democracy and true popular government as a precious asset to implement in our new, developing Germany.”⁷ There was also a move to spread knowledge more widely back in eastern Germany through a German-Yugoslav Friendship Society, but these efforts were cut short by the split in 1948.⁸ A Yugoslav delegation from the youth organization did visit the second Free German Youth (Freie deutsche Jugend, FDJ) meeting in 1947, the first international youth organization to do so.⁹ As late as the end of May 1948, plans to send two delegations, of journalists and cultural figures, to Yugoslavia were continuing apace.¹⁰

The press proved an essential forum in both countries for propagating an image of Yugoslavia, and both the country and its leader featured in extensive and positive coverage in the immediate postwar years, with over 100 articles annually in the main party-linked newspaper *Neues Deutschland*. Yugoslavia was depicted as fighting for peace and democracy, achieving the basis for socialism while engineering impressive economic growth and necessary agricultural reform.¹¹ Other articles reported significant improvement in comparison to the supposedly benighted prewar period, especially with respect to educating society, with great progress made in education.¹² Tito was portrayed as a strong leader, and his views were expressed in glowing terms through numerous articles.¹³

Głos Ludu, the equivalent Polish newspaper, provided a similar image of Yugoslavia, also through hundred of articles from 1945 to 1948. Tito was also portrayed here as a

5 Baer, *Zwischen Anlehnung und Abgrenzung*, pp. 226–35.

6 “Aus eigener Kraft” in *Der Aufbau*, Nr. 22 (May 1948), in Bundesarchiv (BArch), DY-34, 21399.

7 “Kriegsgefangenen danken Marschall Tito,” *Neues Deutschland (ND)*, 30 January 1947, p. 1; “Was Heimkehrer aus Jugoslawien berichten,” *ND*, 15 May 1948, p. 4.

8 “Auszug aus dem Protokoll N. 81 (II) der Sitzung des Zentralsekretariats vom 1. Juni 1948,” p. 16, and “Betr. Gründung einer deutsch-jugoslawischen Gesellschaft,” 23 May 1948, p. 17, in SAPMO-BArch, DY-30, IV 2/20/126.

9 Leonhard, *Die Revolution entläßt ihre Kinder*, p. 409.

10 Protokoll 78 der Sitzung des Sekretariats, 26 May 1948, SAPMO-BArch, DY-30, IV 2/2.1/201, pp. 3–4.

11 “Wirtschaftswunder Jugoslawien,” *ND*, December 5, 1947, p. 4; *ND*, “Bodenreform in Jugoslawien,” 23 January 1947, p. 1.

12 Volksbildung im neuen Jugoslawien,” *ND*, 9 September 1947, p. 1.

13 See for example “Jugoslawien vor den Wahlen: Tito zu Innen- und außenpolitischen Fragen,” *ND*, 10 November 1946, and “Jugoslawiens Außenpolitik: Klare Sprache des Marschalls Tito,” *ND*, 9 August 1947.

heroic and wise leader of both Yugoslavia and the Balkans, a crucial friend of the emerging people's democracies, and as a fighter against fascism and for socialism.¹⁴ Reports focused on Yugoslavia's successes and celebrated the close relationship between the two countries.¹⁵ In a related example, a featured article in the weekly magazine *Kuźnica* positively described Yugoslav political and cultural life as refracted through the monthlong visit of leading literary figure Adam Ważyk in the fall of 1947.¹⁶ A handful of Yugoslav writers made appearances in Polish magazines at this time, and roughly a dozen books were translated into Polish.¹⁷

These links between Yugoslavia and Poland were more extensive than in the case of eastern Germany, due to the presence of a Polish state that could more easily organize such connections as well as a shared wartime legacy of resistance and a notional Slavic brotherhood.¹⁸ These exchanges started at the very top and extended widely in the immediate postwar years. Tito visited Warsaw in March 1946, and the two countries signed agreements on friendship and mutual help, as well as on cultural exchange.¹⁹ Polish president Bolesław Bierut returned the visit during that same fall. Close relations and numerous exchanges also existed between the militaries of the two countries.²⁰ They also exchanged youth work brigades of roughly 100 young men and women in the summers of 1946 and 1947 to help with postwar reconstruction. The Yugoslav delegation in 1946 particularly impressed their hosts as an example to Polish youth with their laudable qualities in work, culture, and education.²¹

The Poles and Yugoslavs organized an impressive number of initiatives, especially given the postwar difficulties. Cultural officials in the Polish Ministry of Culture worked to realize an ambitious plan of exchanges that included films, radio broadcasts, concerts, exhibitions, and students, artists, and cultural officials.²² One high-profile effort was the exhibition "The Art of the Nations of Yugoslavia in the 19th and 20th Centuries" appearing in the National Museum of Warsaw and then in Krakow in the spring of 1948, with nearly 40,000 visitors in the capital and around 10,000 in Krakow.²³

14 Zaćmiński, *Josip Broz Tito*, pp. 283-285.

15 Zaćmiński, *Od przyjaźni do wrogości*, pp. 212-219.

16 Małczak, *Croatica*, pp. 126-128. See also the many articles in AAN, TPPJ, 22.

17 Selinić, *From love and cooperation*, p. 240.

18 Behrends, *Die sowjetische Rus'*, pp. 95-114; Biegański, *Polsko-jugosłowiańskie relacje*, pp. 282-283.

19 Tito toured Warsaw and visited a number of industrial sites. (<http://www.repozytorium.fn.org.pl/?q=pl/node/4149>, accessed 14 July 2018.) See also Dimitrijević, *Tito jako gość*, pp. 172-193.

20 Dimitrijević, *The Yugoslav Polish military-technological relations*, pp. 189-190.

21 "Sprawozdanie z pobytu Jugosłowiańskiej Młodzieżowej Brygady Pracy w Polsce, 17.VII-2.IX.46, in AAN, TPPJ, 2, p. 14. See also Pavlović, *Razmena omladinskih brigada poljske*, p. 211.

22 See the Protokoły warszawskiej podkomisji polsko-jugosłowiańskiej dla spraw realizacji konwencji o współpracy kulturalnej from 1947 in AAN, MKiS, BWKzZ, 132. For a description of this period using Yugoslav sources, see Selinić, *From love and cooperation*, pp. 237-248; using Polish sources, see Biegański, *Polsko-jugosłowiańskie relacje*, pp. 275-295.

23 "Realizacja Planu Pracy, 1-12.47-1.12.48," AAN, MKiS, BWKzZ, 132; Małczak, *Croatica*, p. 734.

Another significant institution for creating and propagating a positive, pedagogical image of Yugoslavia was the Society for Polish-Yugoslav Friendship (Towarzystwo Przyjaźni Polsko-Jugosłowiańskiej), an organization with 60,000 members across the country.²⁴ It had an ambitious program to help realize its efforts to create mass awareness of Yugoslav achievements.²⁵ The Society facilitated a wide range of exchanges going both directions, and tried to leverage events such as Tito's 1946 visit to spread knowledge of Yugoslavia among the Polish population.²⁶ Another important moment was Yugoslav "Republic Day" on November 29, when the Society sought to organize major events and press coverage around Yugoslavia. For the 1947 iteration, it developed talks for schools and other educational institutions to popularize the "new Yugoslavia" among young people.²⁷ More general lectures in Warsaw on the Yugoslav struggle for national liberation were "relatively well attended," in the opinion of the Yugoslavs, seemingly indicating a certain level of interest from the capital's population.²⁸

Even though an awareness of socialist Yugoslavia was not particularly well entrenched in either country during the chaotic postwar years, a useful image had been established. The anti-fascist Yugoslavs had liberated themselves and were building socialism under their dynamic leader, and this image could be evoked to inspire and educate East Germans and Poles.

Tito's Yugoslavia as Hated Enemy, 1948-1954

This all of course changed dramatically in the summer of 1948—the "Yugoslav bomb," in the recollection of Polish writer Jerzy Putrament, or the "lightning strike," as conceptualized by young German communist (and later historian) Hermann Weber.²⁹ Conflicts over alternate paths to socialism and Soviet hegemony within the communist world intensified early that year, climaxing in the expulsion of Yugoslavia from the Cominform by the other member parties, including the PZPR, at the end of June 1948.³⁰ Although the SED was not a member, it joined in the condemnation and proclaimed its allegiance to the USSR and its particular variant of socialism.³¹ In the context of the deepening Cold War and related Stalinist paranoia, and despite the links

24 See article from *Kurier Codzienny*, 26 February 1948, AAN, TPPJ, 22.

25 See the protocols in AAN, TPPJ, 1.

26 See the protocols in AAN, TPPJ, 7.

27 Protokoł, 20 November 1947, *ibid.*, p. 183.

28 Selinić, *From love and cooperation*, p. 239.

29 Putrament, *Pół wieku: Zagranica*, p. 327; Weber, *Damals als ich Wunderlich hiess*, p. 189.

30 For some of the main literature see: Kramer, *Stalin, the Split with Yugoslavia*, pp. 29-63; Perović, *The Tito-Stalin Split*, pp. 32-63; Gibianskii, *The Soviet-Yugoslav Split*, pp. 17-36; Rajak, *From Regional Role*, pp. 65-86; Banac, *With Stalin against Tito*.

31 Norman Naimark notes that Soviet advisers pushed the SED to discuss and publicize the Cominform resolutions more fully. (Naimark, *The Russians in Germany*, p. 315.)

described above, key hardliners in the East German and Polish communist leadership embraced the emerging negative image of Yugoslavia as a useful tool to educate their populations about the correct Stalinist path. At this crucial turn towards consolidation of the Soviet bloc, Yugoslavia became one of the symbols used to purge those who encouraged different political outcomes, including a that particular national roads to communism would not be tolerated. Yugoslavia was portrayed as a dangerous example of the betrayal of correct communist ideals, hypernationalism, and the seduction of the West, and proved a useful pedagogical example against which “proper” socialist society could be constituted during this early peak of the Cold War. The favorable image established and propagated during the immediate postwar years did not just disappear, however, and indeed was evoked by those who desired an alternative to Stalinism.

For the SED in the years following June 1948, Yugoslavia functioned as a negative foil for proponents of the Stalinist path to construct an East German identity. From the popular press to specialized party literature, East German media launched a full-throated propaganda campaign over the next months and years. The very first communiqué in the press set out these terms clearly: Yugoslavia had made major mistakes and East Germans must learn from them by emulating the Soviet Union and building the “party of the new type” on the Soviet model.³² Henceforth, *Neues Deutschland*, like the press across eastern Germany, regularly condemned Tito and Yugoslavia. Tito featured in the title of dozens of articles each year for the following years, and was mentioned in hundreds of articles total. Many of these referred to the “Tito-Clique” and “Tito-Dictatorship,” and portrayed the Yugoslav leader in aggressive terms as in league with Western imperialists and reactionaries. He was accused of deploying fascist methods and having betrayed his communist ideals for money. The Yugoslav population was consistently shown as suffering under his rule, which offered an telling example to those East Germans who might push for a similar path.³³

In addition to newspapers, the campaign used a wide variety of other outlets. In a long article in *Einheit*, the party theoretical journal, in the fall of 1948, Rudolf Herrnstadt laid out the case against Yugoslav “ideological corruption” in strong language.³⁴ Several pamphlets that year explained the nature of the split and its implications for East Germans to party members as well as a wider audience. One of the main brochures intended for wider consumption, *Lessons from the Degeneration of the Yugoslav Party Leadership*, carried its pedagogical intent right in the title. In handy, user-friendly

32 “Erklärung des Zentralsekretariats der SED zur jugoslawischen Frage,” *ND*, 4 July 1948, p. 2; “Arbeiterartei auf Abwegen,” *Berliner Zeitung*, 4 July 1948, p. 2.

33 See for example the articles: “Offener Verrat der Tito-Clique,” *ND*, 8 July 1949; “Die Tito-Clique—eine Agentur der Weltreaktion,” *ND*, 20 November 1949; “Jugoslawien in der Gewalt der Tito-Faschisten,” *ND*, 14 February 1950; “Das erbärmliche Schicksal Tito-Jugoslawiens,” *ND*, 24 August 1951).

34 Rudolf Herrnstadt, “Einige Lehren aus den Fehlern der KPJ” in *Einheit* 3/9 (September 1948), pp. 788–802, here p. 788.

format, it featured the Cominform Resolution and the SED's official resolution, with explanatory contributions by German, Soviet, and other bloc communists. Wilhelm Pieck, co-chairman of the SED and future president of the GDR, provided the introduction, which encouraged Germans to learn from the mistakes exhibited by the Yugoslavs, in particular the need to follow the Soviet path to communism and to build a "party of a new type."³⁵ A similar pamphlet from party leader Walter Ulbricht was directed more narrowly to SED members, whom he exhorted to study and learn from the Yugoslav mistakes, and to overcome their own errors.³⁶ Party officials organized meetings in workplaces to discuss Yugoslavia, and facilitators were provided materials as a guide. The themes of a "political education evening" in November 1948 centered around Yugoslavia's mistakes, in particular "self-glorifying nationalist policies" and a failure to emulate the Soviet Union, and the lessons that Germans should draw.³⁷ In summer 1949, the Volkspolizei (People's Police) were targeted with extensive materials about Yugoslavia's egregious mistakes and encouraged to learn from this for their own fight for socialism alongside the Soviet Union.³⁸ Translations of Renaud de Jouvenel's *Tito: Marshal of Traitors* and Dino Kjosseff's *Tito without Masks*, intended for a broad audience and printed in the tens of thousands, sought to spread this negative image of Yugoslavia throughout society.³⁹

Also to this end, and on the cultural front, Austrian communist Ernst Fischer's play *Der große Verrat* (*The Great Betrayal*), a hardline condemnation of Tito that presented a starkly bi-polar world with only one good side, appeared all across the GDR in 1950-51.⁴⁰ It received its premiere at the German Theater in Berlin in summer 1950 to long applause from an audience that included Walter Ulbricht and President Wilhelm Pieck, and enthusiastic reviews that praised it as a great "political-pedagogical" success.⁴¹ This production was used for even more explicitly propaganda purposes, as it was staged to great acclaim at the Verwaltungsakademie *Walter Ulbricht* on the eve of the 33rd anniversary of the October Revolution.⁴² It also appeared in Leipzig and Dresden, and furthermore served to inaugurate the new theater in Magdeburg on the eve of Stalin's birthday.⁴³

35 *Die Lehren aus der Entartung*.

36 Ulbricht, *Die Bedeutung der Entschliessung*.

37 "Über die Entartung der Führung der KPJ," *Sozialistische Bildungshefte* 3/11 (Berlin: Dietz Verlag, 1948).

38 "Wohin der Nationalismus der Tito-Clique in Jugoslawien führt," *Informationsmaterial der Volkspolizei*, Nr. 4 (Berlin: Verlag für Polizei-Fachliteratur, July 1949).

39 Each had an initial print run of 20,000. de Jouvenel, *Tito: Marschall der Verräter* and Kjosseff, *Tito ohne Maske*; Baer, *Zwischen Anlehnung und Abgrenzung*, pp. 79-81.

40 "Der große Verrat von Ernst Fischer. Programmheft Städtische Theater Leipzig," Schauspielhaus 1951 (Leipzig: Leipzig Selbstverlag, 1951).

41 "Zeittheater großen Stils," *Neue Zeit*, 20 July 1950, p. 2; see also Hans Ulrich Erlau, "Premiere, Diskussion und Kritik," *Neue Zeit*, 21 July 1950. The premiere was also linked to a discussion with Fischer in July 1950 in Kulturbundhaus with various cultural luminaries. (*Neue Zeit*, 19 July 1950, p. 4.)

42 "Sie müssen ein neuer Mensch werden!" *Neue Zeit*, 14. November 1950, p. 3.

43 "Premiere, Diskussion, und Kritik," *Neue Zeit*, 21 July 1950, p. 4.

The show trials of László Rajk in Hungary in 1949 and Rudolf Slánský in Czechoslovakia in 1952 focused on Tito as a major enemy and thus provided regular focus on Yugoslavia.⁴⁴ Articles continued to appear regularly in the East German press in the fall of 1949 that attacked Tito for his treacherous acts towards Hungary and the communist movement.⁴⁵ The party journal *Einheit* featured a number of articles on the Rajk trial, and depicted Tito as a fascist traitor and Yugoslavia as a tool of imperialists.⁴⁶ Such reporting became even more intense with the Slánský trial, as the SED issued a major resolution in spring 1953 and gave it widespread publicity through the press, pamphlets, and discussions at all levels of the SED. It portrayed Yugoslavia as a deepening threat to socialism as it used terror to establish dominance over the working class as part of an imperialist project.⁴⁷ The party leadership believed all this would “arm the party and the German working class with political vigilance and determination... to secure ideological, political, and organizational unity.”⁴⁸ In Poland, an article in the aftermath of the Slánský trial portrayed Yugoslavia as the first example of treasonous behavior that threatened socialism, and portrayed Tito at the heart of the crimes exposed in the show trials across the region. It warned against following a Titoist example that would inevitably lead to fascist dictatorship and capitalist misery.⁴⁹

Poland’s main party newspaper represented Yugoslavia in similar fashion through hundreds of articles, with an increase of negative intensity from summer 1948 through 1949. Most offered a portrayal similar to that seen in the GDR, with regular use of “klika Tito,” “Tito dictatorship,” and “Tito terrorist regime,” as well as choice epithets to describe Tito as a fascist, renegade, traitor, and as the “favorite of the reactionary riff-raff.” Articles were generally careful to place blame on Tito for the damaging effects of his policies on the population, and also to describe in highly favorable terms those Yugoslav communists who were opposing him.⁵⁰ In showing the negative qualities and actions of Tito and his associates, these frequent press reports offered a pedagogical representation of how East Germans and Poles should behave.

Outside of the daily press, many other Polish publications worked to spread this negative image of Yugoslavia under Tito. Prominent journalist Stanisław Brodzki penned a blistering attack on Tito in 1950, in a large print run of 25,000, with chapter titles like

44 For more on the pedagogical aspects of the show trials, see Feinberg, *Curtain of Lies*, Ch. 1.

45 “Tito jahrelangen Verrats überführt,” *Berliner Zeitung*, 13 September 1949, p. 1; “Terror und Mord im Auftrage Titos,” *Berliner Zeitung* 21 September 1949, p. 1.

46 *Einheit* 5/1 (1950).

47 “Über die Durchführung.” See also the two-page reprint of Matern’s speech with the same title in *ND*, 19 May 1953, pp. 3-4.

48 SAPMO-BArch, NY 4076, Direktive des Sekretariats des ZK zur Behandlung des Beschlusses des ZK “Einige Lehren aus dem Prozess gegen das Verschwörerzentrum Slansky” in allen Parteiorganisationen, 9 January 1953.

49 Witold Larski, “Po procesie praskim” in *Sprawy międzynarodowe* 1/21 (1953), pp. 20-33.

50 Zaćmiński, *Od przyjaźni do wrogości and Josip Broz Tito w propagandzie*.

“Five Years of Chauvinist Megalomania,” “The Trojan Horse of Imperialism,” and “Fascist Terror.”⁵¹ The de Jouvenel title mentioned above as well as Jacques Duclos’ *Yugoslavia under the Terror of the Tito Clique* also appeared in Poland for public consumption, as did home-grown works like *Rajk, Tito, Wallstreet. Prozes w Budapeszcie*, which had a high print run of 30,000.⁵² As the last title suggests, as in East Germany Tito and Yugoslavia were folded into the show trials of László Rajk in Hungary and then Rudolf Slánský, and remained prominent *Feindbilder* in both countries throughout the Stalinist era.

Polish officials also sought to saturate the public space with this negative image using whatever means available. Authorities organized around two dozen anti-Tito Yugoslavs who stayed in Poland after the split, and mobilized them to engage in publicity, often at Polish Radio, against Tito.⁵³ The group put out a bulletin, *For Victory*, wrote articles for the Polish press, and spoke at meetings designed to condemn Tito and his associates. A student group was founded in Gdańsk and had members across Poland. In the fall of 1949, banners were hung outside the Yugoslav embassy that condemned “Titoist provocateurs and instigators.”⁵⁴ A high profile trial of Yugoslav official Milić Petrović that same year received considerable press attention that framed his case as illustrative of the Yugoslav threat to Polish socialism. He was convicted of spying and received a further four years for the distribution of illegal publications.⁵⁵ A book with a 10,000 copy print run was published in the aftermath, painted a dark picture of Yugoslav perfidity, and made it clear the lessons to be drawn: “The Polish nation, like all nations that love freedom and peace, sees today... the shameful path of the traitorous Tito clique and the true role of the Anglo-American imperialists. The Polish working class, with the entirety of our healthy and patriotic-thinking society, repeatedly have condemned this betrayal with indignation... In addition to their spying, Titoist agents and provocateurs are trying to spread the poison of nationalist-trotskyist propaganda throughout Polish society and organize political diversion against the foundations of our democratic Polish state.”⁵⁶

The Yugoslavs did not simply accept to this flood of negative publicity, but sought to offer their own counter-image through the spreading of materials in the two countries.

51 Brodzki, *Titowszczyzna*.

52 De Jouvenel and Rolland, *Tito, marszałek zdrajców*; Duclos and Rolland, *Jugosławia pod terrorem kliki Tito*; Cywiak and Jurys, *Rajk, Tito, Wallstreet*.

53 See “Krótka informacja o grupie komunistów jugosłowiańskich-emigrantów politycznych w Polsce” in AAN, KC PZPR, 237/XXII/456, pp. 13-16. They were offered Polish citizenship in 1956. (AAN, KC PZPR, 237/XXII/863, Notatka informacyjna dot. towarzyszy jugosłowiańskich przebywających w Polsce, October 3, 1956, p. 13.) Those who went back suffered hard labor or arrest. (Instytut Pamięci Narodowej [AIPN], BU 01419/54/D, tom. 1, no date, 1961, Notatka informacyjna, signed W. Olender, p. 108.)

54 See the various documents in AAN, KC PZPR, 237/XXII/465. See also Wołobujew, *Jugosłowiańscy emigranci polityczni*, pp. 195-203; Banac, *With Stalin against Tito*, pp. 221-231; Gulic, *Jugosłowiańska emigracja*, pp. 154-168; Pavlović, *Propaganda Kominformu*, pp. 60-78.

55 Szwandrok, *Stosunki Polsko-Jugosłowiańskie*, pp. 60-61.

56 *Proces Milica Petrovica*, pp. 30, 32.

In Poland in 1949 alone, the Yugoslav embassy distributed nearly 23,000 informational bulletins, over 22,000 newspapers, and more than 4000 brochures.⁵⁷ The latter, with titles like “About the False and Unjust Accusations against the Communist Party of Yugoslavia” and “The Real Reasons for the Slanders Directed against Yugoslavia,” were addressed to individuals, party offices, and factory meeting rooms. The Yugoslav embassy also offered Polish-language radio broadcasts.⁵⁸ Polish officials took this counter-propaganda seriously as a destabilizing threat and sought to block its distribution.

In East Germany, materials in support of Yugoslavia also came in, from West Berlin and elsewhere, and were a source of instability.⁵⁹ Indeed, the initial SED declaration in early July 1948 condemned the Yugoslavs for distributing materials in Berlin.⁶⁰ In the fall of 1949, there were numerous reports of pro-Yugoslav materials appearing in Berlin.⁶¹ On the fifth anniversary of the Cominform Resolution in the summer of 1953, the Stasi described a 20-page pamphlet sent through the mail to the “socialists of the GDR” that contained “shameless agitation against the Soviet Union...and sought to glorify Tito and his policies as well as to laud the situation in Yugoslavia as model socialism.”⁶² Coming on the heels of the June 17 Uprising, when hundreds of thousands of East Germans took to the streets in protest of the SED’s variant of socialism, such activity seemed threatening indeed.

Some East Germans and Poles were not willing to accept the official, negative post-1948 image, either because they supported some version of the Yugoslav socialist vision, or because they hoped the dispute signaled the end of the communist era in their country. In the immediate aftermath of the publication of the June 28 Cominform Resolution, students in Krakow reacted “with hope and joy” and celebrated Tito for breaking with Stalin.⁶³ Over the following months, Polish security officials noted repeated praise for Yugoslavia’s split with the USSR.⁶⁴ Yugoslavia as a symbol of protest was frequently evoked by workers at times of unrest and dissatisfaction; some even threatened “a revolution like in Yugoslavia” if their wages were reduced.⁶⁵ In the following years, leaflets and graffiti appeared in workplaces with slogans like “Long Live Tito!” and similar pro-Yugoslav phrases.⁶⁶

57 AAN, KC PZPR, 237/XXII/456, “Notatka informacyjna dot. wrogiej działalności uprawianej przez titowców wobec Polski,” p. 46; AAN, KC PZPR, 237/VII/116, Meldunki z terenu Nr. 32, 5 March 1949, p. 214.

58 See the reports in AAN, KC PZPR, 237/VII/2695, pp. 47–58, and IPN, BU 1572/1513; Selinić, *Ambasada Jugosłowiańska*, pp. 112–114.

59 Klein, “Für die Einheit,” pp. 118–120.

60 “Erklärung des Zentralsekretariats der SED zur jugoslawischen Frage,” *ND*, 4 July 1948, p. 2.

61 See materials in SAPMO-BArch, DY-30, IV 2/4/384.

62 Information Nr. 1008, BStU, MfS, AS 9/57, Bd. 3a, Bl. 373–387 (Hauptbericht, 1. Expl.); also AS 9/57, Bd. 3b, Bl. 1–53 (Anlagen, alle: 1. Expl.), 8 July 1953. www.ddr-im-blick.de, accessed 6 April 2016.

63 IPN, BU 1572/1513, Raport specjalny (no date, but early July 1948), p. 27.

64 AAN, KC PZPR, 237/VII/119, Meldunki z terenu nr. 203, October 10, 1949, p. 34; Jarosz and Pasztor, *Wkrzym zwiarcie*, p. 131.

65 AAN, KC PZPR, 237/VII/118, Załącznik do Meldunków nr. 184, 16 September 1949, p. 398.

66 See the reports from spring 1951 in AAN, KC PZPR, 237/VII/3830, pp. 123–34, 201.

Significant support of Tito's Yugoslavia also continued in East Germany, to the great worry of SED hardliners. The aforementioned German prisoners of war sympathetic to both communism and Yugoslavia came under significant party mistrust and often only unwillingly suppressed the latter part of their biography after 1948.⁶⁷ The SED Control Commission undertook a thorough review of former Yugoslav POWs in the fall of 1949 and discovered a worrying level of support for Tito.⁶⁸ Two state officials, in the Interior Ministry and the Ministry of Industry, headed up "groups" that were sympathetic to Tito.⁶⁹ In Thüringen, yet another former POW had reportedly extended his pro-Tito influence over 50 of the 60 men in his working group. Even in the summer of 1950, he continued to receive the main trade union journal from Yugoslavia and publicly praised Tito's version of socialism.⁷⁰ More generally, contacts between the national trade unions of the two countries perhaps surprisingly continued into 1949 with letters expressing interest in the exchange of ideas and experiences.⁷¹ Other, smaller-scale acts of rebellion were linked to support for Tito, such as throwing rocks through windows during party meetings.⁷²

The highest profile threat to the new image of Yugoslavia and, relatedly, to the hardline vision of communism coming into being in eastern Germany, centered on Wolfgang Leonhard. He was an SED member who had lived in the Soviet Union from 1935 to 1945, and was one of the members of the Ulbricht Group that secretly returned to Germany from Moscow in April 1945. He occupied a particularly influential position as an instructor at the main party school, "Karl Marx," where he had significant contact with young cadres. One of them, the aforementioned Hermann Weber, recalls a 1947 speech that "painted a positive image with ardent zeal" and asserted that Tito "was one of the greatest leaders of the communist world movement."⁷³ Leonhard was very sympathetic to the Yugoslav position in summer 1948, and shared his opinions, as well as Yugoslav materials, with colleagues and students at the school and beyond, to considerable sympathy and interest.⁷⁴ His support for Yugoslavia—and critique of the SED's course—met with interest and sympathy from a significant number of his students and colleagues.⁷⁵ In March 1949, he fled to Yugoslavia, where he gave several

67 Kühnrich and Hitze, *Deutsche bei Titos Partisanen*, pp. 250-51; Mählert, *Die Partei*, p. 388; SAPMO-BArch, DY-30, 42021, Protokoll Nr. 51 der Sitzung des Politbüros am 18.10.49, p. 6.

68 SAPMO-BArch, DY-30, 71315, Protokoll, Sitzung der ZPKK mit den Kommissionsmitgliedern der LPKK, 9 March 1950, pp. 120-152.

69 Ibid., p. 131.

70 SAPMO-BArch, DY-30, IV 2/4/384, SED Hausmitteilung, 4 July 1950, p. 7.

71 See letters from early March 1949 in SAPMO-BArch, DY-34, 5660.

72 SAPMO-BArch, DY-30, 71315, "Protokoll der Sitzung der ZPKK mit den Vorsitzenden der Landes-Partei-Kontrollkomm am 21.10.49," p. 15.

73 Weber, *Damals als ich Wunderlich hiess*, p. 94.

74 Leonhard, *Im Fadenkreuz der SED*, pp. 289-90; Ibid., *Meine Geschichte der DDR*, pp. 99-118.

75 Ibid., *Die Revolution*, pp. 447-459, 467-479.

radio broadcasts in the following months that were heard over Radio Belgrade by some GDR citizens.⁷⁶ Leonhard also penned two short pro-Yugoslav books, for distribution back in East Germany, that sought to counter official SED claims and offer a positive counter-image.⁷⁷ The SED leadership took this situation very seriously, and attempted to suppress these works. The party's central control commission conducted a massive investigation of Leonhard's influence at the party school and in related organizations like the FDJ, in hopes of minimizing any effects, and also organized numerous public meetings and self-critical statements.⁷⁸ The director of the Saxon police school, for example, was removed for his support of Leonhard.⁷⁹ Weber recalls "an unleashed wave of meetings and shocked declarations, and hours-long discussions about faulty vigilance."⁸⁰

Conclusion

The new, negative representation of Yugoslavia was mobilized seamlessly into the larger contexts of building the new Stalinized parties and purging opposition to the SED and PZPR.⁸¹ In the dominant narrative taking shape in both countries, Yugoslavia became useful shorthand for deluded communists who had been subverted by the West, and representative of a dangerous path to be avoided. Tito and his country became cautionary examples of arrogance, hypernationalism, the betrayal of correct communist ideals, the corruption of capitalism, and the seduction of the West, and proved a useful pedagogical example against which the "proper" socialist society could be defined during this initial peak of the Cold War. But the highly positive image propagated during the immediate postwar years did not just disappear, and indeed was mobilized by those who wished for an alternative to the Stalinist system. The confusion and tensions around the revised representation of Yugoslavia produced a significant dissonance among party members and the population—while a consistent worldview that implied the success of communism was undermined, these ideological fissures provided opportunities to explore alternate ideas and to question the correctness of party doctrine. The interaction with and representation of Yugoslavia was thus an important site for contesting what communism would actually look like in East Germany and Poland. For party leaders who desired to construct their vision, for reformers who wanted to modify that vision, and for ordinary citizens who sought to have their voices heard, Yugoslavia was a crucial touchstone in the early Cold War and the decades following.

76 Leonhard, *Im Fadenkreuz der SED*, p. 306.

77 Leonhard, *Die Wahrheit über das sozialistische Jugoslawien*, and *ibid.*, *Kominform und Jugoslawien*.

78 See the huge file in SAPMO-BArch DY-30, IV 2/4/398. See also Weber, *Die SED und der Titoismus*, pp. 246-254.

79 DY-30, 71315, "Protokoll der Sitzung der ZPKK mit den Vorsitzenden der LPKK und deren Stellvertretern am 8.6.49," p. 8.

80 Weber, *Damals*, p. 309.

81 Klein, *Für die Einheit und Reinheit*, pp. 116-124.

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Summary

David G. Tompkins

Of Lightning Strikes and Bombs: The Tito-Stalin Split and its Effects on Polish and East German Society

This paper focuses on the attempts by the East German and Polish workers' parties to create a useful image of Yugoslavia for pedagogical purposes during the postwar decade. A positive representation took shape in the years before the split in both countries. Thereafter, confusion around the revised representation of Yugoslavia produced a significant dissonance among party members and the population. The positive image propagated during the immediate postwar years did not just disappear and indeed was mobilized by those who wished for an alternative to the Stalinist system. The interaction with and representation of Yugoslavia was an important site for contesting what communism would actually look like in East Germany and Poland. For party leaders who desired to construct their vision, for reformers who wanted to modify that vision, and for ordinary citizens who sought to have their voices heard, Yugoslavia was a crucial touchstone in the early Cold War.

Péter Vukman

Cominformist Emigrants in Hungary (1948–1953) Social Composition, Anti-Titoist Activities, Political Trials

As a consequence of the outbreak of the Soviet–Yugoslav conflict in 1948, Cominformist emigrant communities were established in the Soviet Union and in its Eastern European satellite states at the turn of 1948–1949.¹ Their community was organized in Hungary, too, and it served as a “tool” in the ongoing propaganda warfare against Josip Broz Tito and the leadership of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (CPY). Unfortunately, it would be impossible for me to provide the reader with a detailed account of their everyday lives and political activities; therefore, I have reduced the scope of my attention to certain aspects of their history. In the first part of the paper, I am going to briefly summarize the number and social composition of these emigrants and their political activities. In the second and third part, I will put particular emphasis on two trials, or series of trials, which involved some of these emigrants. The first one is related to Lazar Brankov, the first leader of the emigrant community and the other is a series of trials that took place three years later, in 1952. Finally, in the last part of my paper, I will briefly deal with the processes of rehabilitations after 1953.

The number, social composition, and political activities of Cominformist emigrants in Hungary

Based on Hungarian archival sources, the number of the Cominformist emigrants in Hungary was much lower than the post-Yugoslav historiography had previously believed. During my archival research, I managed to identify 132 people by name, who belonged to this community for shorter or longer periods between 1948 and 1953. There

1 For the history of the Cominformist emigrants see: Banac, *With Stalin*, pp. 145–242.; Dragišić, *Napred*; Luburić, *Jugoslovenska informbirovska emigracija*; Mitrović–Selinić, *Jugoslovenska informbirovska emigracija*; Vukman, *Jugoslovenski politički emigranti*; Vukman, “*Harcban Tito és Rankovics klikkje ellen*”, and Vojtěhovsky, *Iz Praga protiv Tita*.

might be many reasons for this significant discrepancy. Most importantly, according to the terminology of the Hungarian Workers' Party (HWP) at the time, refugees were considered to be political emigrants only if they (1) asked for and were granted political asylum, (2) were officially affiliated with the Party and their own organization, and (3) lived in Budapest or in its vicinity. Moreover, there was never a single moment when all 132 political refugees belonged to the same community. The fluctuation was particularly high even in those periods when the total number of political emigrants increased. Their number stabilized around 75 after 1950.²

Nearly 90 per cent of the emigrants were men, most of them in their mid-twenties to early thirties. Approximately three-fifths of the emigrants were born between 1921–1930. The oldest among the emigrants was Dragutin Grujić – he was born in 1893, while Ilija Vrbica was only 15 years old when he crossed the Yugoslav–Hungarian border. The emigrants predominantly came from the neighbouring Yugoslav republics, though one or two asylum seekers also came from Macedonia, Montenegro or the Autonomous Province of Kosovo–Metohija. Some of the records suggest that apart from ideological motivation, kinship, personal and fraternal relations also played a part in their decision-making.³

As for the ethnic composition of the emigrants, it is clear that Serbs made up at least a relative majority (44–51 per cent of the emigrants). Most of them came from Belgrade and the Autonomous Province of Vojvodina, but they were also predominant among the refugees who were born in Croatia. It is almost certain that all ethnic Hungarians who were granted political asylum (10–14 people) came from Vojvodina, even if the majority of Vojvodinaers were also Serbs. As for their social composition, only vague remarks can be made. It is certain that most of them originated from lower social strata. The majority lived in the countryside or were first-generation town dwellers. Those with poor or middle peasant background were highly overrepresented while only a few came from intellectual or mercantile backgrounds.⁴

Serious hardship was a characteristic of their everyday lives. One of the most pressing tasks was to organize their daily activities, and provide shelter and employment for the new arrivals. Large differences appeared in their material and financial situations and housing conditions. While the so-called diplomatic group, the emigrant elite, lived in near luxury and received wages similar to those in the highest echelons of the Hungarian Party and state bureaucracy, other members of the community were almost regularly lacking materially and financially, and their accommodation was terrible. These problems were gradually solved by the mid-1950s. It is also true that these hardships affected not only the emigrants but the general public, as well. We can even say that the

2 Vukman, *Social Composition*, pp. 136–137.

3 *Ibid.*, pp. 137–138.

4 *Ibid.*, pp. 139–140.

financial and material situation of the emigrants was still at least at or above the level of ordinary Hungarians. For most emigrants the Hungarian language also presented a big problem, as they had little to no knowledge of it. This made it more difficult for them to find proper jobs and to become integrated into society. It is also true that learning was considered a high priority. For example, nearly 70 per cent of the actual community participated in higher education in the autumn semester of 1952.⁵

In the meantime, internal conflicts, real and imagined grievances and personal rivalries became commonplace in this rather closed community. An atmosphere of fear and mutual accusations became a striking feature of everyday living. Everybody became afraid and suspicious of others. Therefore, internal divisions and dissention, and personal, political or ideological conflicts had become permanent over the years in this community.

As for their political activities, their most important contribution to the “war against Tito” was their participation in the propaganda war through writing and distributing various printing materials and working at the South Slavic section of Radio Budapest. It must be noted that the anti-Titoist scandal-mongering was not reduced only to the activities of these emigrants, nor were they the ones who assumed a leading role. For Rákosi, they were important as a relatively cheap tool that was easy to use in order to keep the anti-Titoist public opinion alive without risking further escalation of the conflict. The broadcasting of radio programs and the writing of articles were also important because this could strengthen the morale and awareness of shared affinities among the emigrants themselves.

Before the publication of the emigrants’ own paper, *Za ljudsko zmago*, on 1 May 1951, we might consider *Naše novine*, the official periodical of the Democratic Alliance of the Southern Slavs in Hungary, as a quasi-emigrant paper. The topics related to minority issues in this paper also show that the emigrants had a role, although a minor one, in persuading the Serbian, Croatian and Slovenian minorities, and in strengthening their stance against Tito and in favour of the Hungarian leadership. As for *Za ljudsko zmago*, its editorial board had to cope with numerous difficulties from the very beginning. Some of these were material or financial, but a lack of qualified and professional working force and a constant rotation among the staff also resulted in serious problems. The editors, too, lacked the necessary skills and were inexperienced and lacking in talent.⁶

At the same time, the Hungarian State Protection Authority (ÁVH) kept the emigrants under constant surveillance. They were regularly interrogated – immediately after crossing the border, as a prerequisite for their inclusion into the emigrant community or in connection with internal personal conflicts, when a fellow emigrant was arrested (based on real or fabricated charges), or after a Yugoslav agent had been caught. Therefore,

5 Ibid., pp. 141–142.

6 Vukman, *Political activities*, pp. 46–47. For the political activities of the emigrants in more detail see pp. 42–47.

we can say that the emigrants were a useful source of information, especially in the early years of the Soviet–Yugoslav conflict. In the meantime, the ÁVH also recruited agents among the emigrants and used some of them in investigation missions on Yugoslav territory, but this practice was abandoned in the early 1950s. Others were used to spy on other emigrants. The ÁVH considered Lazar Brankov’s nephew their most useful agent, but it was Radovan Vrbica who probably served as an agent the longest. His last known post was in Sofia in 1982.⁷

In connection with the emigrants and the State Protection Authority, it is impossible not to take a closer look at the trials that greatly affected the life and morale of the community. The first was the Rajk trial in the autumn of 1949, in which Lazar Brankov, *de facto* head of the emigrants in Hungary, appeared as one of the leading defendants.

Lazar Brankov and the Rajk trial

The trial itself started in Budapest on 16 September 1949 and served as an excellent tool for Rákosi to raise the level of anti-Titoist propaganda warfare in the country. Rákosi had at least three parallel motives in mind to organize this monstrous, internationally publicized anti-Titoist trial: (1) with Rajk’s execution, Rákosi wanted to get rid of a popular and potential rival within the Hungarian Workers’ Party (HWP); (2) he wanted to quiet the possible Soviet concern about and dissatisfaction with himself and wished to make the Soviets forget his earlier pro-Tito stance; and (3) he hoped to take Tito’s position in the international communist movement.⁸ László Rajk was exactly the right person to target for the CPY leadership’s alleged conspiracy and spying activities against Hungary and the Soviet Union: He belonged to the closest circle of the local Hungarian communist leadership, held important positions as minister of internal, and later of foreign, affairs (1946–1948 and 1948–1949, respectively) and was a renowned figure of the Spanish civil war. Moreover, the “campaign of vigilance” that followed the trial helped to legitimate the atmosphere of “permanent preparedness” and the curbing of individual and collective rights in Hungary.

Rákosi also needed to find a Yugoslav citizen of high standing and importance whose name was well known even to ordinary Hungarians and whose charges would seem real and not fabricated. The ideal person was Lazar Brankov, first *de facto* leader of the Cominformist emigrants in Hungary who personally knew Rajk, even if they were not necessary on friendly terms. Brankov’s role in the trial was made evident for the contemporary audience as the press reports, the speeches of leading politicians, and the indictment at the trial all emphasised his importance in this presumed anti-state conspiracy. In reality, in contemporary parlance the trial was referred to as the Rajk *and* Brankov trial.

7 ÁBTL, 2.1. I/109-a. 335.; ÁBTL, 3.1.9. V-51967., and Vukman, *Political activities*, p. 50.

8 Zinner, *A nagy politikai affér*, Vol. I., p. 235.

Brankov was born in Stari Bečej in Vojvodina in 1912. He became involved in the illegal communist movement as a high-school student and fought as a partisan during the Second World War. He was often on the run and he sometimes hid in Budapest. He returned to Hungary on 10 March 1945 as a member of the Yugoslav mission to the Allied Control Committee. He dealt with cultural and press affairs, economic matters and reparations, as well as South Slavic minority issues – first as a member of the Yugoslav mission and later at different posts at the Yugoslav Embassy. He also took part in tracing down war criminals and had access to the highest Party and state circles. He emigrated on 25 October 1948 as chargé d'affaires of the Yugoslav Embassy in Budapest. He was a real “hot shot”, and Rákosi wanted to use him as much as possible in the anti-Titoist campaign in order to discredit Tito’s Yugoslavia and demonstrate its “deviations” to the Hungarian public. Therefore, Brankov immediately took an active part in the ongoing propaganda war and had an important role in organizing the emigrant community but he got the main role nearly a year later. It was that of one of the main defendants in the Rajk trial.⁹

Brankov and Rajk probably first met at the turn of 1945–1946, and their meetings became more frequent after the later had been appointed as minister of internal affairs (20 March 1946). Brankov served as a kind of liaison officer between the Ministry and the Yugoslav Embassy. He was allegedly present as an interpreter at the meeting of László Rajk and his Yugoslav counterpart, Aleksandar Ranković, at Kelebia in December 1947. After the Soviet–Yugoslav conflict started to escalate, the meetings between Rajk and Brankov became less frequent. After the Bucharest Resolution of the Cominform had been made public, they only met at official receptions. Their meetings and discussions acquired an important new and distorted meaning during the Rajk trial as they were used to confirm the charges of a seditious act. They were arrested nearly simultaneously. Brankov, who was arrested in Moscow on 29 June 1949, had just enough time to read the article in the Soviet party daily, *Pravda*, about Rajk’s arrest that took place on 15 June. Brankov’s arrest was based on fabricated charges of being a Titoist agent. He was first interrogated in the Soviet capital (8 and 16 July), and he almost immediately made a damning testimony against Rajk. As a faithful communist, he must have been fully aware of what kind of testimony his interrogators expected from him. Still, the circumstances of his arrest were rather vague. The Hungarian authorities had probably planned to arrest him in the spring of 1949 at the latest, but the Soviets objected to it first. He was transferred to Hungary at Rákosi’s behest on 19 July 1949. After he had tried to escape unsuccessfully, Brankov crushed under physical and mental torture, and so he mechanically recited a prepared speech at the trial.¹⁰

9 For Brankov’s political activities in English see: Vukman, *A Yugoslav diplomat*; Vukman, *Lazar Brankov*; and Vukman, *Political activities*, pp. 37–41.

10 For Rajk and Brankov see: Vukman, *Tito és Rankovics*, especially pp. 198–208.

For example, he “admitted” that the Yugoslavs started their spying activities right after their first military mission arrived in Hungary in 1945 as Tito expected “us to do a good job in Hungary [...] and it was important to organise a good intelligence service.”¹¹ All of this was based on a master plan suggested by the “British imperialists”, and the gist of the Yugoslav plot “was that Yugoslavia should become the central, leading state in the Balkans and in Central Europe, and that Yugoslavia should organise a Balkan and Central European bloc” which “would become an organisation of the bourgeois democratic Balkan republics with an orientation towards the West rather than towards the Soviet Union.”¹²

In reality, Brankov’s testimony was scripted; spontaneity had little to no part in it. The texts of the testimonies were written in advance and the defendants had to memorize them. Even the judge’s questions and remarks were scripted, their purpose was to create a semblance of spontaneous behaviour. For example, when Brankov started to recite a long list of members of the British and American missions in Yugoslavia during the Second World War, the chief judge asked him: “And you remember these so well? Because I see that so far you have not used your notes at all, and you also mentioned these many names entirely from memory.” Brankov replied without hesitation: “Yes. I remember then well because we had to know them by heart during the war, who they were, so that if we met them [...] we could give them all help on the orders of Rankovich”.¹³

Gyula Alapy, president of the prosecutor’s office accused Brankov on the following three charges: (1) “the crime of having once and continuously been the leader of an organisation aiming at the overthrow of the democratic state order”; (2) the crime of espionage and (3) the crime of murder as an incitement to commit murder of Miloš Mojić.¹⁴ Brankov pleaded guilty on the first two charges but refused to admit that he took part in the murder. According to the charges, Mojić, a journalist at the minority paper *Naše novine*, was murdered by Živko Boarov, a secretary at the Yugoslav Embassy, on Brankov’s order. But Brankov confessed only that he had previous knowledge of it, and he stood by this statement throughout the whole process.¹⁵ Finally, in its verdict on 24 September 1949, the special council of the people’s court found Brankov guilty of all charges and sentenced him to life imprisonment.¹⁶

The trial fulfilled its planned role in the Soviet-Yugoslav conflict and helped to intensify the pressure on Yugoslavia. The high number of anti-Titoist articles in Soviet and Eastern European papers in September – 368 in number altogether, 106 of them in the Hungarian party daily, *Szabad Nép* – was with all certainty a consequence of the

11 *László Rajk*, p. 106.

12 *Ibid.*, p. 123.

13 *Ibid.*, p. 117.

14 *Ibid.*, p. 6.

15 *Ibid.*, p. 139.

16 *Ibid.*, pp. 303–304.

trial.¹⁷ The situation had been rather tense since late summer. Tito and the Yugoslav leadership considered the Soviet note of 18 August 1949 as an ultimatum, and the number of border incidents was quite high in September and October.¹⁸ The Rajk trial served as the ideal pretext for the Soviet Union and its satellites to denounce their treaties of friendship with Yugoslavia. The Soviets denounced it on 28 September, four days after the verdict had been delivered, followed by Hungary and Poland on 30 September, Romania and Bulgaria on 1 October and, finally, Czechoslovakia on 4 October.¹⁹

The kidnapping of Dušan Vidović and its consequences

Three years later, in November 1952, another trial took place in Budapest that had some anti-Titoist propaganda value. Although emigrants did not take any direct part in it, the events that lead to this trial dramatically changed the lives of six other emigrants and their families. In mid-February 1952, Dušan Vidović disappeared. Vidović had been a military attaché at the Yugoslav embassy before he emigrated with Brankov in October 1948. The Hungarian authorities immediately suspected that, in reality, Vidović's emigration served as a cover and that he was working as an UDB agent in the country. The ÁVH was also certain that other emigrants helped him return to Yugoslavia. This assumption is understandable to a certain extent as a real espionage war had broken out between the two countries since 1949,²⁰ and the ÁVH rightly feared that the UDB was trying to infiltrate the emigrant community. It is also true that many emigrants had served in the Yugoslav secret services, state security agencies, or as officers at the armed forces before they emigrated. Otherwise, it would surely have been an embarrassing blunder for the Hungarian services to allow a real Yugoslav agent operating in the country for more than three years. We now know that Vidović was kidnapped by László Bálint and his unit.²¹

17 *White Book*, App. 22., p. 479.

18 A total of 52 border incidents took place in September and 64 in October 1949, 24 of them on the Yugoslav–Hungarian border. *Informbiro i Jugoslovenska (narodna) armija*, p. 214.

19 It is worth noting that the treaty of friendship between Yugoslavia and Albania was denounced by the Yugoslavs on 12 November. *White Book*, p. 164–173. At the same time, 74 Yugoslav diplomats were expelled from the Soviet Union and its Eastern European satellites, 10 of them from Budapest. *White Book*, App. 9–15. pp. 457–471. and *White Book*, App. 2–7., pp. 448–452., 2–7.

20 Based on the figures of the ÁVH, 91 Yugoslav agents were captured in 1950 and 66 in 1951. According to the Command of the Border Patrol Police, a total of 200 UDB agents were captured between 1951–1953. ÁBTL, A–2127/24., pp. 170–179.; ÁBTL, 3.2.5., O–8–014/4., p. 226., MNL OL, XIX-B–10., 1951., 18. doboz 349. ó. e., 1952., 17. doboz. 314. ó. e. and 1953. 15. doboz. 190. ó. e.

21 László Bálint had notorious criminal tendencies and had committed many petty crimes, even in the 1930s. He offered his services to the ÁVH in 1949, but after his offer was rejected, he emigrated to Yugoslavia and was recruited by the UDB. He illegally returned to Hungary on 29 January 1952. His mission was to kidnap the leading figures of the emigrant community one by one. He had to start with Dušan Vidović, who was decoyed from his working place, the Serbian Grammar School in Budapest on 16 February. He was kidnapped and the unit returned to Yugoslavia with him during the very same night. ÁBTL, 3.1.9., V–88800/1., pp. 9–11., 130. and ÁBTL, 3.1.9., V–88800/2., p. 113.

This was not the first time that the UDB had tried to kidnap or kill Cominformist emigrants from Hungary; and the ÁVH had known about this since June 1950 at the latest,²² but they did not consider this as a logical possibility this time. Rather, they arrested eight emigrants – Emil Ognjenović, Đorđe Burgijašev, Savo Novaković, Branislav Doroslovački, Ozren Krstonošić, Milutin Stevanović, Živorad Todorović and Albert Svetina – within a few weeks.²³ Ognjenović was the luckiest among them. He consistently denied the charges against him and admitted only that he and his wife provided false information in order to be admitted into the emigrant community. He was finally interned on 26 April 1952.²⁴ Burgijašev was not so lucky: He was so severely beaten during one of the interrogations in July, that he died of the injuries he sustained on 5 August.²⁵

It is also worth noting that the HWP and the ÁVH did not really trust the emigrants, especially the members of the so-called diplomatic group, i.e. those who defected from the building of the Yugoslav Embassy with Brankov. Doroslovački, Krstonošić and Stevanović belonged to this group. Stevanović and Krstonošić had also been under constant surveillance at least since autumn 1949; as for Krstonošić, the authorities were even thinking about recruiting him as an agent whose task would be to spy on his fellow emigrants.²⁶

Although the authorities seemed to have enough information on these six emigrants, the preparations for their trial lasted for nearly five months. They were first interrogated between 22 and 26 August and the trial was held in camera on 17 September and in the case of Novaković and Todorović on 24 September.²⁷

The most severe penalties were imposed upon Krstonošić and Doroslovački. Both were found guilty on charges of espionage, organizing and participating in subversive activities and of unauthorized possession of firearms. Krstonošić was also found guilty of neglecting the compulsory surrender of foreign currencies. Both of them were sentenced to 15 years in prison.²⁸ According to the verdict, both Doroslovački and Krstonošić were recruited by the UDB in 1947. Doroslovački's duty was to provide information on everyday lives and political activities of the members of South Slavic minorities in Hungary,²⁹ while Krstonošić had to collect information on the economic and political situation. They allegedly participated in the distribution of Titoist propaganda materials

22 ÁBTL, 3.2.5., O-8-014/3., 95.

23 ÁBTL, 2.1., IV/30-a., p. 26.; ÁBTL, 2.1., IV/46., p. 61.; ÁBTL, 2.1., IV/47., p. 4. and ÁBTL, 3.1.9., V-81346., p. 133.

24 ÁBTL, 3.1.9., V-81346., pp. 66., 69., 77-78. and 83.; ÁBTL, 3.1.9., V-81346., pp. 129. and 133.

25 MOL OL, M-KS 276. f., 65. cs., 105. ó. e., p. 28.; MNL OL, M-KS 276. f., 98. cs., 145. ó. e., pp. 9-10., and ÁBTL, 2.1., IX/36., p. 49.

26 ÁBTL, 2.1., IV/45. and ÁBTL, 2.1., IV/27., pp. 21-26., 74-76. and 86.

27 ÁBTL, 2.1., IV/47., pp. 24-29. and ÁBTL, 2.1., IV/30-a., p. 15.

28 ÁBTL, 2.1., IV/27-a., p. 10. and ÁBTL, 2.1., IV/9. (V-85138).

29 ÁBTL, 2.1., IV/9., pp. 13. and 13/2.

after the Bucharest resolution and defected on the order of Brankov so that they could continue their intelligence activities. They supposedly reported on their observations at Radio Budapest where they worked at the department for South Slavic radio programs.³⁰

In his last plea, Doroslovački, who might just have realized the seriousness of the charges and the harshness of the penalty, desperately tried to persuade the judges about his commitment to the world communist movement and his ideological purity: “I have been fighting for the cause of socialism since I was 14 years old. During the war I was arrested by the Horthy fascist police nine times. I was beaten so hard that I lost hearing in my left ear.”³¹ The same can be said about Krstonošić who emphasized in his last plea that “I have been working in [multiple ways] in the fight against Tito. I wrote a 60-page brochure against Tito.”³² I wrote articles in Hungarian and South Slavic newspapers. I participated at thirty rallies in South Slavic villages and unveiled Tito [e.g. Tito’s activities].”³³ All the same, they were unable to influence the verdict.

As for the other defendants, Svetina and Stevanović were sentenced to 10 years in prison for espionage activities and unauthorized possession of firearms,³⁴ Novaković and Todorović were sentenced to 5 years, the former for unauthorized possession of firearms, the later for attempting to cross the border illegally and for infringement against collective property.³⁵ In reality, that meant that he stole a cheap driving belt and wanted to settle down in Czechoslovakia, where he studied and worked between 1946–1948. As an ordinary factory worker, he had no role in the anti-Titoist propaganda warfare. With the exception of Novaković, the other five convicts appealed the verdict, but the court of appeals affirmed the previous verdicts by mid-November.³⁶

As the preparation for the trial were underway, László Bálint’s commando unit crossed the Yugoslav–Hungarian border once again. Their task was to capture Dušan Vidović and Gojko Trbović, two leading figures of the emigrant community. As they did not succeed, they instead trapped and kidnapped Boris Verstovšek on 11 September. On 24 September, the very same day that the judges were hearing the case of Savo Novaković and Živorad Todorović, the border patrol police ran up against Bálint’s unit in the vicinity of Szeged, not far from the Hungarian–Yugoslav border. A skirmish ensued and the commando members were captured.³⁷ The trial that took place between 15 and 17 November 1952 was also exploited in the anti-Titoist propaganda war. In

30 ÁBTL, 2.1., IV/9., pp. 14–15., 20.; ÁBTL, 2.1., IV/27., p. 370. and ÁBTL, 2.1., IV/27-b., p. 17.

31 ÁBTL, 2.1., IV/9., p. 19.

32 The brochure that Krstonošić mentioned was published in 1951 in Budapest: Krstonosic, *A Tito-klika*.

33 ÁBTL, 2.1., IV/27-b., p. 20.

34 ÁBTL, 2.1., IV/45-a., p. 20. and ÁBTL, 2.1., IV/46., p. 20.

35 ÁBTL, 2.1., IV/30., p. 9. and ÁBTL, 2.1., IV/47., p. 29.

36 ÁBTL 2.1., IV/30-a., p. 15.; ÁBTL, 2.1., IV/47., p. 41.; ÁBTL, 2.1., IV/9., p. 59., ÁBTL, 2.1., IV/27-a, p. 16., and ÁBTL, 2.1., IV/45-a., p. 48. In the case of Svetina, the public prosecutor withdrew his appeal for the imposition of a stricter sentence during the appeal hearings. ÁBTL, 2.1., IV/46., p. 46.

37 ÁBTL, 3.1.9., V-88800/1., p. 11. and ÁBTL, 3.1.9., V-88800/2., p. 25.

a well-functioning state founded on the rule of law, the disappearance of Verstovšek and the capture of Bálint's commando unit would surely have meant a decisive turning point for the six emigrants. Still, the internal logic of the paranoid Rákosi system and the ongoing Soviet–Yugoslav conflict did not allow their release, even if the grounds for their arrest proved entirely false.

The arrests and trials profoundly affected everyday lives and living conditions of their relatives, as well. Five of the six convicted emigrants were married. If their wives were not local Hungarians, they were also expelled from the emigrant community. (If their wives were native Hungarians, they were never regarded as members of the community.) They were barely able to make ends meet, and sometimes had to send their children away to school. They only had slight information about what had happened with their husbands.³⁸ Paula Krstonošić even thought about returning to Yugoslavia: she tried to establish contact with the Yugoslav and American embassies in early 1953 and officially asked for repatriation on 27 July 1953, but the authorities rejected her request. She was recruited at the Yugoslav Embassy in October 1953. The Hungarian authorities suspected this and arrested her nearly a year later, on 28 September 1954.³⁹ The inquiry was finished in January 1955, but the ministry of internal affairs could not decide what to do: the review of her husband's trial had already started.⁴⁰

The process of rehabilitation

By that time, Stalin's death had already been announced (5 March 1953) and a slow and prolonged process of normalization between the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia had started. This meant a real challenge for the emigrants, both individually and collectively. As a gesture towards Tito, the Political Committee of the HWP decided on 14 October 1954 to stop their political activities and dissolve their organization. Their community lost its importance, and in the following years, fewer and fewer emigrants remained politically active. Those who did, formed many groups along their different political and ideological views and personal relations.

Stalin's death and the process of normalization opened the way for retrials of those political cases that started after 1948, and for the rehabilitation of the convicted, though this process continued well into the 1960s. It affected the lives of the convicted emigrants mentioned above, as well. Once again, Emil Ognjenović was the luckiest. The investigators admitted that there was no evidence against him, therefore, it would be impossible to bring him to trial. He was released from internment on 17 September 1953.⁴¹

38 ÁBTL, 2.1., IV/30., pp. 42–45.

39 ÁBTL, 2.1., VII/24., p. 8–9.

40 ÁBTL, 2.1., VII/24., p. 111.

41 ÁBTL, 3.1.9., V–81346., pp. 229. and 233.

The retrial in the case of the six emigrants took place a year and a half later, on 7 March 1955. Four of them were completely acquitted of the previous charges and were immediately released from custody. Krstonošić was found guilty only on the charge of neglecting the compulsory delivery of foreign currencies. He was sentenced to six months in prison, but this term was counted as served. Todorović was found guilty on the original charges, but his sentence was drastically reduced to six months which was also counted as served, though he was only completely rehabilitated in 1962. Both of them were released immediately. During the process of rehabilitation, all of them received a certain amount of material and financial compensation. They got some 40–60 thousand forints, a new flat and a two-week holiday. Their medical treatment was covered by the state. Svetina and Novaković were readmitted into the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party.⁴² Svetina found job as a lieutenant police commander and Stevanović became the editor-in-chief of the South Slavic minority paper, *Narodne novine* – both to the constant irritation of the Yugoslav authorities. Not all of them remained in Hungary, though. Todorović, who fought against the Soviet occupiers in the 1956 revolution, Krstonošić and Doroslovački returned to Yugoslavia between 1955 and 1958.⁴³

As for Brankov, he was released by a presidential pardon on 3 April 1956. While in prison, he was regularly interrogated and often used as a witness in other cases or for re-opening politically motivated show trials. He was notorious for changing his testimony according to the interrogators' wishes. The authorities might have wanted him to play a key role in the trial of Gábor Péter, leader of the State Protection Authority, with whom he had an alleged espionage relationship, but Brankov refused to provide any information that would confirm this accusation. He was held in solitary confinement during these years and was not allowed to meet other prisoners, receive visitors or be informed about the political changes. After his release, he was not allowed to stay in the capital and had to live in Győr in the north-western part of Hungary, where he worked as a librarian. After the suppression of the 1956 revolution, he emigrated to Austria and finally settled down in France, where he became a member of the French Communist Party.⁴⁴

To sum up briefly, Cominformist emigrants made up a small and closed community in Hungary, which faced many social difficulties and internal rivalries. Their most important contribution to the “war against Tito” was in the field of anti-Titoist propaganda warfare. They could not escape the paranoid atmosphere of the time, and some of them received long prison sentences in anti-Titoist trials. Two cases were of particular importance: the Rajk trial, in which Lazar Brankov received a life-long prison sentence,

42 Vukman, *Harcban Tito és Rankovics klikkje ellen*, pp. 195–198.

43 *Ibid.*, pp. 234–238.

44 *Ibid.*, pp. 187–194.

and a series of political trials of six emigrants in 1952. All of them were released from prison as part of the process of Yugoslav–Hungarian normalization after 1953. Although they were rehabilitated, not all of them remained in Hungary.

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Summary

Péter Vukman

Cominformist Emigrants in Hungary (1948–1953) Social Composition, Anti-Titoist Activities, Political Trials

The Cominformist emigrants in Hungary made up a rather small and closed community. Based on Hungarian archival sources, their number was much lower than the post-Yugoslav historiography had previously believed. High fluctuation was a characteristic of this community, which also faced serious hardships in organizing everyday lives and activities of its members. In the meantime, internal conflicts, real and imagined grievances and personal rivalries made their lives even harder. Their most important contribution in the “war against Tito” was in the field of propaganda warfare: they participated in the work of the South Slavic section of Radio Budapest and had their own emigrant paper, *Za ljudsko zmago*. The Rajk trial and the sentencing of Lazar Brankov in 1949 provided an excellent propaganda tool for the Hungarian leadership. The other trial I placed particular emphasis on in my paper took place in 1952. It was related to the disappearance of certain important members of the emigrants’ community and showed the internal logic of the paranoid Rákosi system. Lazar Brankov and the other six convicted emigrants were released as part of the process of normalization, which started after Stalin’s death. Although they were rehabilitated, some of them left Hungary within a few years.

Zvonimir Stopić & Li Yunxiao

Confusion among the Communists: Yugoslavia, China and the 1948 Resolution of the Cominform¹

A “Wise politician” becomes a “violator of the basic principles of Marxism and Leninism”

In June 1948, the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (CPY) was collectively denounced by other communist parties for its political and territorial aspirations on the Balkan Peninsula, as well as for the Yugoslav leader Josip Broz Tito's defiance toward Stalin, and was removed from the Cominform.² The leadership of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), which was at the time busy fighting against Chiang Kai-shek's reactionaries, reacted much in the same way other communist parties did. On 14 July 1948, the main newspaper of the CCP, the *People's Daily*, publicized the Central Committee of the CCP's “decision” which stated that in order to guard the fundamentals of Marxism-Leninism, the international workers' movement, peace and democracy, and for the sake of protection of the people of Yugoslavia from American imperialism, the CCP fully agreed with the resolution compiled by the communist parties of Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, Poland, the Soviet Union, France, Czechoslovakia and Italy.³ Explaining how the Yugoslav leadership, namely Josip Broz Tito, Edvard Kardelj, Milovan Đilas and Aleksandar Ranković, acted in violation of the basic principles of Marxism-Leninism, this decision urged all party cadres in China to “seriously study the Cominform meeting

1 This paper was completed during a bilateral project between the Chinese Capital Normal University and the Slovenian Science and Research Center Koper, entitled “China and Yugoslavia in the Global South: Convergences and Divergences”.

2 Literature on this topic is abundant and the main titles in Serbian, Croatian, and English include Banac (1988); Bekić (1988); Gibianskii, Naimark (1997); Jakovina (2003); Jakovina (2002); Lees (1997), etc. In China, we can find two books on the issue: 沈志华 [Shen Zhihua] (2002); 郝承敦 [Hao Chengdun] (2007).

3 See: “中共中央委员会关于南共问题的决议” [Central Committee of CPC's Decision on the question of Yugoslavia], *People's Daily*, 14 July 1948.

resolution on the problem of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia for the purpose of strengthening the class, the Party, internationalism, the spirit of self-criticism and the instilling of discipline.”⁴

The CCP’s understanding and presentation of Yugoslavia shifted dramatically when the Cominform resolution of 1948 branded Tito a traitor of Marxism. As we will see, though, denouncing Tito involved more than just stale ideological rhetoric and headlines in the press. Prior to the summer of 1948, the Chinese communist press, such as the *People’s Daily* or the *World Affairs*, a journal specialized in foreign affairs, would from time to time publish news, reports or essays on Yugoslavia in which Chinese communist supporters could read about the success of Yugoslavia’s anti-fascist struggle, revolution and social development, Yugoslavia’s new (1945) constitution and land reform, its territorial and ethnic diversity, the problem of Trieste, trade agreements with other communist countries and other current events.⁵ These articles were similar in their positive tone and volume to the writings about other communist countries, parties and movements, and in them the Yugoslav leader Josip Broz Tito was often given high praise and usually titled as “Marshal” (铁托元帅). Only a month before the Cominform resolution, for example, the *People’s Daily* was still singing high praises to Tito calling him an “excellent commander in Chief”, a “wise politician”, whose accomplishments are the “cornerstone of the solid friendship and unity of the federation of Yugoslavia’s nationalities.”⁶ The only exceptions to these favorable texts were two articles the *World Affairs* published in January 1948 entitled “Fireside chats on Tito” and “Issues of economic policy in Yugoslavia”, which, in a way, announced the trouble Yugoslavia would soon find itself in.⁷ While the first one, basing its claims on the information obtained from the veiled but knowledgeable “Mr. X” (probably an “expert” coming from the Soviet Union), criticized Yugoslavia’s communist leaders and Tito in particular for making mistakes in their ideological thinking and for acting against the working class, the second article, in a somewhat milder tone, warned about the overlooks that were made in the development toward communism and made suggestions for the Yugoslav government, urging it to take more control over certain capitalist elements.⁸

4 Full quote: “全党干部都应当认真研究共产党情报局会议关于南斯拉夫共产党问题的决议，借以加强党内关于阶级的、党的、国际主义的、自我批评精神和纪律性的教育”；in: *Ibid*.

5 See as an example: 石啸冲 [Shi Xiaochong], “新生欧洲介绍：南斯拉夫” [Presenting New Europe: Yugoslavia], *World Affairs*, 1946-I, 8 January 1946, pp. 12-15; “南斯拉夫的新宪法” [The New Constitution of Yugoslavia], *World Affairs*, 1946-XV, 16 April 1946, pp. 29-30; 南斯拉夫 [Yugoslavia], *People’s Daily*, 23 February 1947; “南斯拉夫的土地改革” [Yugoslavia’s Land Reform], *People’s Daily*, 25 July 1947; “苏波·苏南订贸易协定” [Poland, Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union signed trade agreements], *People’s Daily*, 11 August 1947.

6 Full quote: “约西普·布罗兹·铁托，不仅只是一个出色的统帅，而且也是一个英明的政治家，新南斯拉夫——联邦人民共和国的创建人。作为这一联邦人民共和国奠基的是南斯拉夫各民族间的巩固友谊与团结”；in: 波列威 [Bo Liwei] “铁托” [Tito], *People’s Daily*, 10 May 1948.

7 See: 胡以忠 [Hu Yizhong], “围炉话狄托” [Fireside chats on Tito], *World Affairs*, 1948(II) (15 January 1948), pp. 4-5; 梅碧华 [Mei Bihua], “南斯拉夫事件中的经济政策问题” [Issues of economic policy in Yugoslavia], *World Affairs*, 1948(II) (15 January 1948), pp. 6-7.

8 See: *Ibid*.

Nevertheless, these exceptions did not soften the overall rough change in attitude all that much. As late as early June 1948, the readers of the *People's Daily* could still find articles that described Yugoslavia and Tito in warm sentiments. The last three were written by Liu Ningyi, a high-ranking Party functionary who visited Yugoslavia and held talks with Tito a little less than a year earlier.⁹ Deeply impressed by his experiences, Liu Ningyi did his best to describe the destruction suffered by Yugoslavia during the Second World War, the heroic war victories of Yugoslavia's communists, Tito's personal influence during the war and the post-war restoration, Yugoslavia's impressive economic achievements, the construction of the railroads, opposition to American imperialism, kindness and modesty of the people, strengths of the workers and the peasants. He was especially touched by the strong will of women and diligent young people who, unlike their western counterparts who climb mountains because they have food on their table and have nothing to do, are urging people to "remold the mountains and conquer the rivers."¹⁰

On the palm of imperialism: Chinese presentation of Yugoslavia after the resolution

After the change in attitude toward Yugoslavia was made public with the Central Committee's decision and further confirmed with the proclamations of the Soviet Union and Albania that followed shortly after, as well as with additional "instructions" on how Party cadres should organize seminars and lectures to study the Cominform resolution and CCP's decision, the Chinese communist press slowly began to define the vocabulary for describing the development of Yugoslavia's socialism and Yugoslav communist leadership, which would be re-used and further refined in the years to come.¹¹ In the very beginning, this was mostly done by following the lead of the Soviet Union's and other East European communist countries' press: reprinting articles from other

9 After his return to China, Liu Ningyi (刘宁一) published altogether three flattering articles about Yugoslavia in the *People's Daily*: "铁托和新南斯拉夫" [Tito and the New Yugoslavia], 26 October 1947, "南斯拉夫通讯——在一个新兴的国家里" [Yugoslavia communications – in an emerging country], 20 December 1947, "新的青年新的生活——记南斯拉夫'人民的青年铁道队'" [New Youth New Life – Yugoslavian People's Youth Railroad Team], 1 June 1948. Transcripts on Liu Ningyi's conversations with Tito in Ljubljana on 1 July 1947 are held in the Archives of Yugoslavia: "Marshal Tito receives the representatives of liberated territories of China syndicates and an All-Indian syndical congress", 7 July 1947, Ljubljana, AJ, 507 SKJ, IX 60/II-1. Details surrounding Liu Ningyi's trip to Yugoslavia are provided by Čavoški (2008, 2011).

10 Full quote: "他们不羡慕那吃饱了饭无事干而爬山消遣, 他们要改造这高山, 征服这大川"; in: 刘宁一 [Liu Ningyi], "新的青年新的生活——记南斯拉夫'人民的青年铁道队'" [New Youth New Life – Yugoslavian People's Youth Railroad Team], *People's Daily*, 1 June 1948.

11 See: "南共留苏党员抗议铁托政策" [Soviet Union CP protests over Tito's Policies], *People's Daily*, 30 July 1948; "阿共中央委员会——斥铁托集团叛卖行动" [Central Committee of Albania's CP denounced Tito's clique's traitorous actions], *People's Daily*, 16 July 1948; "太岳区党委指示学习关于南共决议" [Taiyue district Party committee instructs on how to study the Yugoslavian resolution], *People's Daily*, 25 July 1948.

communist controlled newspapers and journals, occasionally supplementing them with their own comments and explanations. One of the first such articles, entitled “Tito persists in playing with the mistakes of nationalism on the palm of imperialism”, reprinted from Moscow’s *Pravda* on 12 October 1948, set the basic framework for criticism China would dispense in the future.¹² It blamed “Tito’s clique” (铁托集团) for the deliberate isolation of Yugoslavia, prompted by the loss of its sincerest friend in international politics, and accused them of failing to understand the mechanisms of current international relations in which the brotherly organization of communist parties, the mutual friendship of new democratic countries and the friendship and cooperation with the Soviet Union are necessary conditions for building socialism, achieving freedom, democracy and safety from imperialism.¹³ The other article that stood out was the Cominform’s report on Yugoslavia printed fully by the *People’s Daily* on 2 December. The author of the article claimed that the weakening of the Party’s role and influence over society would result in nothing but the creation of a path for Yugoslavia of becoming a colony of imperialism. Yugoslavia’s leadership, full of “aristocratic arrogance” (贵族式的傲慢), was also denounced for their attempt to modify the theories of Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin.¹⁴

For Chinese communists, who were fighting a full scale war against the nationalist forces of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek at the time and were relying on the Soviet Union’s moral and material aid, there weren’t many reasons to publicly question the Cominform’s resolution.¹⁵ More so since the support of the United States to the Generalissimo was a clear enough indicator to the CCP that Chinese land was at that same moment being transformed into the very first battleground in the colossal and historic conflict between communism and imperialism. One that could even evolve into World War III because of the undeniably aggressive nature of imperialism, as Mao believed.¹⁶ After all, it was Tito’s communists who deviated from the wishes and guidelines of the Soviet Union and thus endangered the unity of the international workers’ movement, regardless of the reason as to why they had done that.

12 See: “铁托坚持民族主义错误被玩弄于帝国主义掌中” [Tito Persists to play with the mistakes of nationalism on the palm of imperialism], *People’s Daily*, 12 October 1948.

13 See: *ibid.*

14 See: “南斯拉夫共产党的领导集团修改了马列主义关于党的学说” [Yugoslavia’s Communist Party leadership clique is revising Marxism-Leninism], *People’s Daily*, 2 December 1948.

15 The CCP’s relations with Stalin during the Chinese civil war were far from simple. Questions of the level of Soviet influence in Chinese affairs, the reach of the Soviet Union’s dominance in Asia and China’s role in the Soviet Union’s confrontation with the United States, among others, troubled the relations between Mao and Stalin from the beginning of their alliance. See: Kim Donggil (2010); 沈志华 [Shen Zhihua] (2013), chapter *The CCP-CPSU High-level Contacts and the foundation of the Alliance’s*; and Niu Jun’s chapter *The Origins of the Sino-Soviet Alliance*, in Westad (1998).

16 For Mao’s fears see for example his report during the CCP Central Committee meeting held in Yangjiagou, Shaanxi (杨家沟, 陕西省) in December 1947, “目前形势和我们的任务” [The present situation and our tasks], in MZDCW-4.

The reprints from the Communist Bloc press simultaneously served as public shows of loyalty to Stalin, as indirect guidelines on and reminders of the proper course of communist development, as well as public warnings against the questioning of the Party's role. Such reprints continued throughout 1949. In them, the Chinese public could read about how Hungarian communists Mátyas Rákosi and József Révai saw Yugoslavia's turning towards the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and imperialism, partly follow the exchange of letters between the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, educate themselves on the horrible conditions Yugoslavs had to endure under Tito, learn about the fates of condemned Yugoslav communists and gain better understanding of the negative role Yugoslavia played in the Greek Civil War.¹⁷ The original Chinese articles followed the trends set by these reprints. One such article, for example, the "New situation of the new democratic countries in Southeast Europe", published in the *World Affairs* in January 1949, singled out Yugoslavia as the only country in Southeast Europe that was not building socialism and fighting against imperialism.¹⁸ The other, "Tito's clique and the Marshall Plan", published in the *World Affairs* about a month later, described Tito's communists as a traitorous clique and "the tail of imperialism" (帝国主义的尾巴) and classified its members as fake communists and agents of the United States. According to this latter article, Yugoslavia, as a "vassal of Wall Street" (华尔街的附庸), had already joined the Marshall Plan and become a supporter of NATO.¹⁹

There is no third road: Mao Zedong proves he is not Tito

The closer Mao got to achieving victory in China, the more urgent the question of how the New China would actually behave after the triumph of the communists grew. All the more because the communist world was simultaneously witnessing Yugoslavia's unyielding defiance, which only gave more reason for Stalin to deepen his already strong mistrust of Mao. As Chinese scholars Li Danhui and Shen Zhihua noted, Stalin "considered Mao a nationalist who might follow in Tito's footsteps," and Mao himself was very much aware of this.²⁰ Mao personally tried to shake off this "Asian Tito" stigma on

17 See: Josef Révai, "铁托集团——大西洋公约非正式的支持者" [Tito's clique - Supporter of the North Atlantic Treaty], *World Affairs*, 1949(VI) (12 February 1949), pp. 19–20; Duško Novakov, "南斯拉夫人民反铁托党徒的斗争加剧了" [The struggle between Tito's gang and Yugoslavia's people is becoming more intense], *World Affairs*, 1949(VI) (12 February 1949), p. 21; Mátyas Rákosi, "南斯拉夫的托洛茨基分子是帝国主义的突击队" [Trotsky fraction in Yugoslavia is a commando of Imperialism], *People's Daily*, 3, 4, 5 August 1949; "铁托集团和美帝一起公开支持雅典反动派" [Tito and the American imperialism openly support Athens' reactionaries], *People's Daily*, 21 August 1949; 铁托反革命集团的假面具撕掉了 [Tito's counterrevolutionary clique's mask torn off], *People's Daily*, 27 August 1949.

18 See: "东南欧新民主国家的新形势" [New situation of the new democratic countries in Southeast Europe], *World Affairs*, 1949(I) (8 January 1949), pp. 17–18.

19 See: "铁托集团和马歇尔计划" [Tito's clique and the Marshall Plan], *World Affairs*, 1949(VI) (12 February 1949), pp. 6–7.

20 See: Li Danhui, Shen Zhihua (2011), p. 48.

several occasions. In January and February 1949, for instance, when Anastas Mikoyan visited China in order to discuss the CCP's organization issues and the scope of the CCP's cooperation with other communist parties with Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, Liu Shaoqi, Zhu De and Ren Bishi, Mao showed significant interest in Tito and Yugoslavia.²¹ In two telegrams he sent to Stalin, Mikoyan reported that on more than one occasion, while trying to show his concern over the damage Yugoslavia might cause to the unity of the Communist Bloc, Mao clearly referred to Tito as a traitor, equating him with Mao's own Long March enemy, Zhang Guotao.²² The CCP's dependency on the help from the Soviet Union, coated by the exponentially rising global tension between socialist- and capitalist-oriented countries made Mao's position quite delicate. Realizing that attacks on Yugoslavia from the press, as well as his own attempts at distancing himself from Tito, were far from enough to reassure Stalin, Mao opted for a more grandiose show of loyalty. In June 1949, he presented the essay "On the people's democratic dictatorship" in which he enumerated three strict guidelines upon which the foreign policy of the soon-to-be established People's Republic of China would be constructed. With "Leaning to one side" (一边倒), Mao pledged that China would continue its development leaning solely to the Communist Bloc, while with the "setting up the new household" (另起炉灶) and the "cleaning the house before entertaining guests" (打扫干净屋子再请客), Mao indicated that New China would discard agreements which were humiliating for China and establish diplomatic relations with other countries on an equal footing and would do this only after the influence of the imperialists was eliminated. Out of these three guidelines, the first was designed to show Mao's and CCP's undivided loyalty to the Soviet Union.²³ As Mao explained, "all Chinese without exception must lean either to the side of imperialism or to the side of socialism. Sitting on the fence will not do, nor is there a third road. We oppose the Chiang Kai-shek reactionaries who lean to the side of imperialism, and we also oppose the illusions about a third road."²⁴ In this last part it is not difficult to recognize an indirect reference to the only socialist country at that moment to have "chosen" to steer its development along a new, separate road.

21 See: "Record of the Mikoyan and MZD meeting: On Chinese communist party history", Telegram no. 16471, 3 February 1949; "Mikoyan's telegram to Stalin: Opinion on Yugoslavia", Telegram no. 34406, 4 February 1949, RAC, vol. I, p. 420.

22 Zhang Guotao (张国焘) was one of the founding members of the CCP and among the Party's most distinguished leaders until the events of the Long March when his influence diminished in favor of his rival Mao Zedong. In April 1938, he defected to Chiang Kai-shek's forces, which in communist China made his name a synonym for treachery. Before settling in Hong Kong in 1949, he fled to Taipei, and in 1968 he moved to Canada where he lived until his death in 1979. Interestingly, in 1952 in Hong Kong, Yugoslav journalist Jaša M. Levi interviewed Zhang Guotao, dubbed "the Chinese Tito". See: "From the notes of Jaša Levi on Zhang Guotao, the Chinese Tito", May 1952, AJ507 SKJ 60-I-12. Also see Zhang Guotao's (1971) memoirs.

23 See: "论人民民主专政" [On the people's democratic dictatorship], MZDSWFP, MZDCW-5. For more on Mao's three principles see: 牛军[Niu Jun] (2013); pp. 114–131; 沈志华[Shen Zhihua] (2013), pp. 125–133; 黄庆[Huang Qing], 王巧荣[Wang Qiaorong], 武力[Wu Li] (2016), pp. 8–22; Li Danhui, Shen Zhihua (2011); pp. 3–14; Lüthi (2008), pp. 28–31, etc.

24 See: "论人民民主专政" [On the people's democratic dictatorship], MZDSWFP, MZDCW-5.

Mao's "leaning to one side", or better put, "there is no third road" guideline soon became a focal point from which criticism was aimed at Yugoslavia and Tito. A couple of months after its publication, several Chinese high-ranking functionaries used it to further distance China from Yugoslavia. Guo Moruo (郭沫若), a poet, Mao's friend and the vice-Chairman of the Preparatory Committee of the Sino-Soviet Friendship Association, stated that "Tito today is completely following the old road Chiang Kai-shek took 23 years ago. (...) Chiang Kai-shek today is Tito tomorrow."²⁵ Referring to Mao Zedong's "leaning to one side", Mao Dun (茅盾), a revolutionary writer and the vice chairman of the National Committee for literature and art, further explained that "either pro-Soviet or pro-American' or 'leaning on both sides' in international terms means surrendering to American imperialism."²⁶ Even Liu Ningyi, whose praiseful texts on Yugoslavia and Tito the Chinese audience could read just a little over a year ago, spoke out to show his bitter disappointment. Now it was clear to him that "since the first day he betrayed the proletariat and the anti-imperialist democratic camp, Tito has placed himself into the imperialistic reactionary camp; beyond these two camps, there is not and there cannot possibly be a third road to be walked upon." Liu also warned that "if anyone intends to take Tito's road in China, Chiang Kai-shek's fate will be awaiting him".²⁷

Since it was important for Mao and the CCP to publicly demonstrate to the Soviet Union and the world that Mao's binary division of the world was taken seriously throughout China, and not only at the top level, a couple of days after the article containing the quotes by the functionaries appeared, the *People's Daily* also published another which was to show, using the example of the city of Dalian, how in reality everyone in the area controlled by the CCP, from the university deans and trade union chiefs to factory workers and Youth League members, unanimously denounced Tito for his turn toward imperialism.²⁸ This political narrative against Yugoslavia was wrapped up by the *Shanghai Liberation Daily* on 29 August with the lengthy editorial "From betrayal to national treason", reprinted by the *People's Daily* a couple of days later. Tito's "surrender to imperialism and betrayal of the people", as the editorial claimed, "proved comrade Mao Zedong's famous saying: neutrality is a disguise, for there is no third road".²⁹ As

25 Full quote: "今天的铁托，在我们看来，完全走的是二十三年前蒋介石所走的老路。（...）蒋介石的今天，就是铁托的明天"; in: "北平各界拥护苏联对南照会斥铁托反动罪行指出'第三条道路'就是法西斯道路" [All circles in Peiping supported the Soviet Union's note on Yugoslavia denouncing Tito's reactionary crime and pointed out that the 'third way' was the fascist way], *People's Daily*, 28 August 1949.

26 Full quote: "在国际上说什么'既不亲苏，也不亲美'或'两边靠'，实际上都是向美帝国主义投降"; in: *Ibid.*

27 "铁托自从他背叛无产阶级、背叛反帝民主阵营的第一天起，就投入了帝国主义的反动阵营，在这两个阵营之外，没有也不可能第三条道路可走。在中国，谁要是打算走铁托的道路，那么蒋介石命运就等待着它"; in: *Ibid.*

28 See: "旅大各界谴责铁托" [All the circles condemned Tito], *People's Daily*, 31 August 1949.

29 Full quote: "铁托集团已经完全彻底地倒到帝国主义一边，出卖了南斯拉夫人民。（...）这一铁的事实充分证明了毛泽东同志的名言：'中立是伪装的，第三条道路是没有的'"; in: "《上海解放日报》著论痛斥铁托反动集团背叛人民帝国" [Shanghai Liberation Daily denounced Tito's reactionary clique's of people and country], *People's Daily*, 31 August 1949.

one might have expected, the editorial ended with praises of the truths emanating from Mao's "leaning on one side" principle, as well as with the request to "fight for the consolidation of the great friendship between China and the Soviet Union, and thus safeguarding and consolidating the victory of the Chinese people's revolution."³⁰

In order to "stress a close unity with the Soviet Union, lest Mao appear as a second Josip Broz Tito" and somewhat mask their own principles of preserving "a high measure of a self-reliance and *ziligengsheng* (自力更生, regeneration through one's own efforts)", as Lüthi notices, Mao and the CCP went as far as to adjust the fundamental foreign policy of the soon-to-be most populous communist country in the world.³¹ However, Mao's gesture did not work as well as intended. Soon the Yugoslavs would make the situation for Mao and the CCP even more awkward. This time, directly.

"We did not ask for this": Yugoslavia's recognition of China

"The peoples of our country know that this event is of historic importance, that it is the result of magnificent victories of the Chinese people, that it means the realization of a genuinely free, truly democratic and independent China and that it represents an invaluable contribution to world peace." These were the words Vladimir Popović sent to China by telegram on 5 October 1949, congratulating the CCP on their success.³² The Chinese received the telegram on the same day as the ones from North Korea, Hungary and Czechoslovakia, but despite the kind words, the "thank you" note never arrived.³³ Aware of the situation China was in, the Yugoslavs knew that the probability of establishing relations with China at such a delicate moment was quite low. More so because only four days before Mao's proclamation, on 27 September, the Soviet Union denounced the treaty of friendship with Yugoslavia, taking away almost all (and much needed) foreign aid.³⁴ However, the Yugoslavs sent the telegram anyway. They needed to do so in order to make a clear public, if not desperate, statement that they were very much loyal to the communist cause. In a diplomatic sense, this also served as a beginning of their

30 Full quote: (...) 加强以苏联为首的各国人民的反帝国主义侵略阵线的团结，为巩固中苏伟大友谊、保卫和巩固中国人民革命的胜利而斗争"; in: *Ibid.*

31 See: Lüthi (2008), p. 30.

32 See: "Vlada FNRJ priznala Narodnu vladu Narodne Republike Kine" [The government of the FPRY recognized the Government of the People's Republic of China], *Borba*, 6 October 1949.

33 China received the telegram of recognition on 6 October 1949. See: DDDAECDR (2006), p. 571.

34 The act of the Soviet Union was followed shortly after by all the other countries of the Communist Bloc. Information on the chronology of the events, the full texts of Soviet bloc countries' treaty cancellations, as well as Yugoslavia's responses can be found in *Bela knjiga* [*White Book*] (1951), published by the Yugoslavian Foreign Affairs Ministry as part of preparations for their initiative to condemn the Soviet Union and other Soviet Bloc countries' hostile activities toward Yugoslavia in the United Nations. Also see: "Otkazivanje ugovora o prijateljstvu s Jugoslavijom – Akt uperen protiv interesa mira i međunarodne suradnje" [The cancellation of the friendship treaty with Yugoslavia – an act aimed against the interests of peace and international cooperation], *Borba*, 9 October 1949.

building of leverage in their diplomatic dialogue with the Soviet Union, China and the rest of the Communist Bloc.³⁵

For the Chinese, Yugoslavia's recognition came somewhat unexpectedly and instantly drew a new shadow over the greatest day of the CCP. Ten days after the recognition came, Mao met with Nicolai Vasilyevich Roshchin, the first Soviet Union ambassador to China, to explain that China did not ask Yugoslavia for the recognition and to assure him that the CCP will not respond or do anything concerning Yugoslavia without prior consultations with Moscow.³⁶ The Chinese press also made a stand, with three articles denouncing the CPY and Tito in the *People's Daily*.³⁷ The last one, entitled "Imperialists' lead running dog, Tito, is changing Yugoslavia into a fascist prison for Wall Street", marking the end of the year, accused Tito of implementing shameless policies of trading important resources in exchange for capital from the imperialists and his ruthless exploitation of Yugoslav workers.³⁸

However, Chinese diplomatic unresponsiveness, as well as the fact that the attitude of the CCP and the Chinese press toward Yugoslavia did not differ at all from those of other Communist Bloc countries, troubled the Yugoslavs very little. They simply ignored the Chinese press and diplomatic hints and decided to use China and the victories of the CCP to prove their socialist allegiance. Even after 6 October, the Yugoslav daily *Borba* regularly continued to publish articles which supported the struggle of Chinese communists against Chiang Kai-shek's troops as if nothing had changed,³⁹ while Yugoslav diplomats assumed the role of loud defenders of the Government of the People's Republic's right to represent China in the UN. The issue of Chinese representation in the UN was of special value for the Yugoslavs because in discussions about it they could present themselves as

35 Although it was not possible to notice this at that time, the Chinese non-responsiveness regarding the recognition would in the future inadvertently help Yugoslav diplomats to construct a myth of their righteousness and uncompromising positions in relation to "important issues". A valuable counterpoint to this myth is given by Jovan Čavoški who noted that Yugoslavia was, as far as it was known, actually the only communist country besides the Soviet Union that gave its support for the nationalist government of Chiang Kai-shek. See: Čavoški (2011), pp. 562–565.

36 See: "Record of Mao Zedong and Roshchin talks", Document No. 09925, RAC, 16 October 1949, vol. I, pp. 130–131.

37 See: "铁托叛徒出卖战略富源" [Traitor Tito sold strategic resources], "铁托匪帮作希保皇军帮凶" [Tito's gang is an accomplice of Greek imperial army], and "南国人民不顾叛徒迫害" [Yugoslavian people in defiance toward traitorous persecution], *People's Daily*, 15 and 16 October 1949.

38 See: "帝国主义头号走狗铁托把南国变成法西斯牢狱出卖整个国家给华尔街" [Imperialists' leading running dog Tito is changing Yugoslavia into the fascist prison for Wall Street], *People's Daily*, 30 December 1949.

39 An average reader from Yugoslavia was up to date with the successes of the People's Liberation Army and the course of events that took place in China. As examples see "Jedinice Narodnooslobodilačke armije oslobodile otok Kintang" [Units of the People's Liberation Army liberated the island of Jintang], *Borba*, 10 October 1949; "Narodnooslobodilačka armija oslobodila Liučou u centralnom Kvangsiu i nekoliko oblasnih gradova" [The people's Liberation Army liberated Luizhou in Central Guangxi and several cities in the district], *Borba*, 28 November 1949; "Privode se kraju velike operacije za okruživanja kumintaških trupa na frontu južne Kine" [Large operations of surrounding the Kuomintang troops on the South China front are coming to an end], *Borba*, 10 December 1949; "Kuomintaška vlada pobjegla na Formozu" [Kuomintang Government escaped to Formosa], *Borba*, 10 December 1949; "Osloboden je Hainan" [Hainan is liberated], *Borba*, 4 May 1950; etc.

firm supporters of socialism and at the same time distance themselves from the aggressive policies of the Soviet Union. In various UN committees and the UN Security Council, where, on 20 October, the United States conveniently helped them find a place,⁴⁰ Yugoslav diplomats would hold their ground in defending the cause of the CCP by refusing to discuss issues of global importance because a proper representative of China was not present and thus annoying the representatives of the US with whom they had begun to negotiate the conditions of foreign aid, but would never go as far as to boycott any of the committees in which Kuomintang representative sat, as the representatives of the Soviet Union and other Communist Bloc countries did.⁴¹ In addition, when it came to the relations between China and the Soviet Union, the Yugoslavs held nothing back. Ten days after the signing of the *Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance*, for example, *Borba* published a lengthy article in which the main focus was on the Soviet Union's hindrance of the CCP's struggles during the Second World War, Stalin's post-war alliance with Chiang Kai-shek, and Stalin's unprincipled political shrewdness which would surely hurt China in the long run.⁴²

The Yugoslavs, who at the time needed all the photons of the international limelight they could get, in reality showed little concern over how much their support was actually helping the CCP or Mao. Although from the available documents and the press sources we can sense that some genuine brotherly sentiments over the development of communism in China did exist, Yugoslavia's "principled" positions on the victories of the CCP in China, the Chinese representation in the UN or Stalin's insidious manipulations of China in reality served mainly to prove that, despite the criticisms from the Communist Bloc, Yugoslavia had never abandoned socialism, and to emphasize the danger coming from Stalin and the Soviet Union. Chinese communists were of course quite aware of what Yugoslavia was doing in China's name. Although the Chinese were quite reserved when it came to Yugoslavia for the better part of 1950, printing only a few news reports per month, Yugoslavia's persistent referring to China continued to heat up the ever present question of whether China and Mao would in fact become the Asian Yugoslavia and Tito.

40 Yugoslavia participated in the proceedings of the Security Council from 1 January 1950 until 31 December 1951. See: Jovanović (1985), pp. 27–28, 85–89.

41 In a heated debate at the beginning of the United Nations Security Council Social Committee session over the presence of a Kuomintang representative, for example, Yugoslav delegate Gustav Vlahov voted the same way as the Soviet Union and Poland did. In another event, during a session of a UN Security Council Committee for Conventional Armament, Yugoslav Delegate Đuro Ninčić, together with the Soviet Union and delegates from India, voted for the eviction of the Kuomintang representative, but did not leave the session, as Soviet delegate Yakov Malik did. See: "Jugoslavenski delegate na zasjedanju socijalne komisije zahtjeva pravilno rješenje pitanja predstavnštva Kine u OUN" [Yugoslavian representative at the Social Committee session requests the proper solution of the Chinese representation question in the United Nations], *Borba*, 5 April 1950; "Jugoslavenski delegat se izjasnio protiv toga da komisija nastavi rad sve dok se ne riješi pitanje predstavnštva Kine" [Yugoslavian representative spoke against the continuation of the committee's proceedings until the Chinese representation question is not solved], *Borba*, 29 April 1950.

42 See: "Povodom potpisivanja Sovjetsko-kineskog ugovora" [On the signing of the Sino-Soviet agreement], *Borba*, 11 February 1950.

Conclusions: the road to Korea and to the dissolution of the international communist movement

The Cominform resolution had a tremendous impact on the CCP and Mao Zedong personally. Because of it, as we have shown, China had to adjust its general foreign policy guidelines while Mao Zedong had to justify himself before Stalin constantly. However, the impact did not stop there. Xia Yafeng noted that the events surrounding Yugoslavia also had a significant impact on the development of the policy of the United States toward China. Comparing China with Yugoslavia, the Truman administration concluded that the “victory for Communists in China would pose no overwhelming threat to American interests” mostly because, similar as it was with Tito and Stalin, “Mao Zedong and his colleagues were unlikely to defer blindly to Moscow’s wishes.”⁴³ Furthermore, Truman’s decision not to intervene militarily in any way on behalf of Chiang Kai-shek was guided precisely by these premises of the “CCP’s Titoist tendency.”⁴⁴

In short, soon after the Cominform resolution, everyone made the connection between Mao and Tito. Even the Yugoslavs sensed the connection, hoping that at some level China would show that it would rather walk the path without Stalin holding its reins. To their great disappointment, not only did this not happen, but, hoping to remove the “Asian Tito” stigma, Mao Zedong took China in the opposite direction. Apart from other concerns over security and ideology that Mao had, the invasion of Korea considerably helped him win the confidence of the Soviets and remove the suspicion of him being the next Tito. As Li Danhui and Shen Zhihua remind us, in July 1958, Mao explained to the Soviet ambassador to China Pavel Iudin that he knew very well Stalin doubted that the Chinese Communists were genuine Marxists, and that “until the Korean War broke out, he did not change his opinion.”⁴⁵

Although the Korean War overshadowed this unpleasant episode in the international communist movement and made the connection between Mao and Tito far less tangible, the feeling of uneasiness tied to Yugoslavia lingered on around Tiananmen. Not so much because of the similarities that were once drawn between China and Yugoslavia, but because the Chinese in reality did truly believe that it was the Yugoslavs who made an error and thus betrayed the Bloc. Owing to Khrushchev’s mediation in late 1954, the Chinese did soften their views on Yugoslavia, but the trust was never fully regained. It did not take long for the peace to be shattered again. First it was Tito’s unwillingness to give full support to Soviet tanks during the Hungarian revolution, then Yugoslavia’s refusal to sign the joint declaration of 64 communist parties in Moscow in November 1957, and finally the draft of Yugoslavia’s new constitution presented at the 7th Congress

43 See: Xia Yafeng (2006), pp. 14–15.

44 See: Xia Yafeng (2006), p. 38.

45 See: Li Danhui, Shen Zhihua (2011), p. 48. Mao Zedong quote is taken from MZDSWFP, p. 326.

of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia in Ljubljana in April 1958. All this revealed that the intuition of Mao and the CCP, as well as the sharp tone of past criticism, was correct all along. In the early summer of 1958, almost exactly ten years after the Cominform resolution, China, this time leading the charge, began denouncing Yugoslavia and Tito once more for their sins against Lenin and Marx. With these denouncements, which would last for the next ten years, Mao finally managed to shake off any connections he might once have had with Tito, ideologically speaking, at least. As it turned out, China's denouncements of Yugoslavia and Mao's personal liberation of the "Asian Tito" sigma ended up serving as an overture to a major Cold War event, the Sino-Soviet split and thus, peculiarly and even somewhat contradictory, made Mao's actions seemingly similar to Tito's all those years earlier. Although he did begin steering China in the opposite direction from the one Tito took, in the end Mao did exactly what Tito had done and what Stalin feared the most. He took China away from the Soviet Union.

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Summary

Zvonimir Stopić & Li Yunxiao

Confusion among the Communists: Yugoslavia, China and the 1948 Resolution of the Cominform

Yugoslavia's expulsion from the Cominform instantly affected both the internal dynamics of the world's communist forces, as well as the sustainability of the united international struggle against the forces of capitalism and imperialism. These events created an unexpected nuisance for Chinese communists who were at the time in the midst of a relentless struggle against their ideological and political enemy, Chiang Kai-shek's Guomintang. While being in dire need of military and overall logistic aid from their communist brother, the Soviet Union, the Cominform's resolution cast a long shadow over the Chinese Communist Party, and especially its paramount leader Mao Zedong. Considering the troublesome past between the Soviet Union and the CCP and the sheer size and global strategic importance of China, a question arose in Stalin's mind: could Mao be, or rather how long it would take him to become the "Asian Tito". Using the framework set by the leading experts on Chinese Cold War relations, such as Odd Arne Westad, Shen Zhihua, Lorenz Lüthi, Xia Yafeng and others, as well as Yugoslavian and Chinese press and available archival sources, this paper will map the pace of Chinese reactions to the developments of Yugoslavia's tribulations, and will try to show the extent of the affect Yugoslavia's expulsion from the Communist Bloc had on China.

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