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Approved for Release CIA Historical Collections Division AR 70-14 10CT2013

Top Secret	

Intelligence R	eport	
DCI Interagency Balk		26 October 1993
The Military Role Conflict	of the Serbian Interior N	Ministry in the Yugoslav
Summary		
Government's priman help establish, contro Security Service (RD deployment of elite S Bosnia and Croatia, t	Ministry (MUP) has been one by tools since the beginning of l, and defend "Greater Serbia B) of the MUP has played the erbian Special Police combat to the arming and control of Serve e direct transfer of military su	the Yugoslav Conflict to "The Serbian State leading role through its units and personnel to both bian nationalist
	aining of MUP Special Police	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
main sections, the Star Public Security Service The first Serbian Spectreporting. The unit remailitary reporting indi	ial Police unit was formed in 1 portedly was formed to comba	Special Police (PJM), and the gular police and the fire service. 978, according to defense attaché terrorism, although additional s began forming Special Police
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tasked control tasks, t	tion to the antiterrorist mission to respond to crime, kidnappin, according to defense attaché in the Special Police also conduct e countersabotage/counterinsur	g, hostage taking, and riot reporting. Beyond these police combat operations, to include
some of the most capable cor	Ministry special operations units of all some state of the special operations units of all some state of the special operations the state of the special operation of the state of the special operation of the special operations units of all special operations units operations	ng as elite shock troops-

	The service is a service at a s
	These missions appear to be coordinated
	with "Yugoslav" Army (VJ) border guard and military police
	antiterrorist units. Special Police units in Kosovo appear to have
	primary responsibility for conducting weapons and explosive searches,
	as well as countering any ethnic Albanian paramilitary organizations
	and deterring any potential uprisings
•	
The SJB and of reports.	d Special Police forces are organized on a regional basis, based on a variety
•	mi om 1 - 1 - 1 - 1 - 1 - 1 - 1 - 1 - 1 - 1
•	The SJB has nine regional commands divided into 32 district
	secretariats (SUP). Each of the commands has a Special Police brigade
	in support comprised of one active and three reserve battalions. Each
	battalion is assessed to have 430-600 personnel. The PJM thus consist
	of 3,900 to 5,400 active personnel and 11,600 to 16,000 reservists for
	a total of 15,500 to 21,400 Special Police personnel outside of Kosovo
•	In addition, the Kosovo area is organized into a separate region with
•	• • •
	six SUPs and one Special Police brigade of three to four battalions with
	1,300 to 2,400 active and reservist personnel. Some of these troops,
	however, probably are on rotation from Special Police units in Serbia
	proper. in early 1994 the MUP in
•	Kosovo had about 1,770 SJB and PJM permanent personnel, 1,600
	SJB/PJM personnel on rotation from Serbia, and approximately 2,950
	SJB/PJM reservists.
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•	Overall, the MUP appears to have some 40,000 to 50,000 active
	personnel and 50,000 to 55,000 reservists organized into the RDB with
	about 2,500 active personnel and a "few hundred"possibly some 250
	to 500reservists, the SJB with some 25,000 to 35,000 active
	personnel and 38,000 reservists, plus the PJM troops noted above
hia man 1	Intercons Dellas Task Face
	m was prepared by Interagency Balkan Task Force. ueries are welcome and may be directed to Norm Schindler, Chief, DCI
iteragency Balk	
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elite combat	ing and Equipment. The Special Police have developed a reputation as forces because of their rigorous and thorough training as well as their in combat operations in Bosnia and Croatia (see below).
•	Service in the Special Police is voluntary, according to defense attaché reporting. Each volunteer reportedly is given physical, psychological, and medical tests. He then undergoes a year of special training, including basic, specialized, and team/unit training. The volunteers learn a variety of skills, including basic infantry tactics, martial arts, knife fighting, mountain climbing, parachuting, use of explosives, foreign weapons familiarization, and team training for specific missions.
•	he Special Police's
	training was almost identical to VJ training
	the PJM reportedly had increased their training at the VJ's special forces facilities and had included "tank" (probably APC) maneuvers, gunnery, artillery, antiaircraft, parachute, and air assault training.
•	the Special Police
·	were at least as numerous as VJ special forces and some were better trained
•	The Special Police also have attracted a large number of VJ officers. At a Yugoslav Supreme Defense Council meeting in January 1994, it was reported that 30 percent of the VJ's company grade officers had left to join the Special Police where they receive better pay and privileges
•	The Special Police are equipped primarily as light infantry, but they also have a variety of armored personnel carriersincluding M-60 tracked APCs and BOV-M and TAB-71/72 wheeled APCs60mm/82mm mortars, light antitank weapons, and probably light antiaircraft artillery and shoulder-launched surface-to-air missiles.
	nand and Control. The Special Police currently appear to operate under
	of the RDBat least for operations outside of Serbia, based on a variety
of reporting	although it is unclear if this is the official or unofficial chain of
command.	
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•	Special Police deployed to Banja Luka reported directly	to Stanisic,
•	Special Police units and personnel sent to Sector East in also reportedly operated under RDB command	August 1995
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Special Polic	ce Combat Operations and Deployments 1991-1995	
Bosnia since combat role I Krajina Serb econnaissand	Police have been carrying out combat operations in both C the beginning of the Yugoslav Conflict in 1991. In most chas been to serve as elite assault infantry to spearhead Bos Army (KSA) attacks or counter-offensives. They also have, sabotage, and countersabotage missions, and have train, and rebel Muslim forces.	cases, their main nian and we conducted
oresence in B Ministry Spector take part in extensive sup	ia. The Serbian MUP Special Police appear to have an almosonia, in support of Bosnian Serb Army (BSA) and Bosnicial Police operations. These deployments have included so attacks at Srebrenica and Gorazde in 1993 and 1994, as opport program for Muslim separatist leader Fikret Abdic's 1994 to August 199. (See Annex 1.)	an Serb Interior ending forces well as an
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_	iltrating Sreb	orenica as part o	e personnel were k of a raid upport of the the	
	offensive to	eliminate the S	rebrenica enclav	e. [
reportedly wer MUP base out			MUP direction from	n a
WICT base out	side Stepten	ica.		
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			position leader Ses	
			er claimed publicly	
-			ngside MUP "spec	
			ic during the Sreb	reni
campaign, acc				1
A			reviously identific	
-		•	d appears to have	
commander o	of the Belgra	de Special Pol	d appears to have ice Brigade at the	
-	of the Belgra	de Special Pol		
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commander of according to part of the second	of the Belgra press report MUP reserve n Gorazde in ating in Bosn	e Special Police April 1994 iia since at least	MUP spec	e tin
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Two 180-man BSA assault of the personnel into reportedly are	MUP reservent Gorazde in Bosnia since rotated mont	e Special Police April 1994 ia since at least	MUP spec	e tin
commander of according to part of the second	MUP reservent Gorazde in Bosnia since rotated mont	e Special Police April 1994 ia since at least	MUP specific May that been rotating alf of these person	e tin
Two 180-man BSA assault of the personnel into reportedly are	MUP reservent Gorazde in Bosnia since rotated mont	e Special Police April 1994 ia since at least	MUP specific May that been rotating alf of these person	e tin
Two 180-man BSA assault of the personnel into reportedly are	MUP reservent Gorazde in Bosnia since rotated mont	e Special Police April 1994 ia since at least	MUP specific May that been rotating alf of these person	e tin
Two 180-man BSA assault of the personnel into reportedly are	MUP reservent Gorazde in Bosnia since rotated mont	e Special Police April 1994 ia since at least	MUP specific May that been rotating alf of these person	e tin
Two 180-man BSA assault of the personnel into reportedly are	MUP reservent Gorazde in Bosnia since rotated mont	e Special Police April 1994 ia since at least	MUP specific May that been rotating alf of these person	e tin

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	recently, the MUP has deployed Special Police forces to	
-	e discipline and stop the joint Croat-Bosnian Army offen	
•	Banja Luka. Serbian journalists in Banja Luka claim to h	_
	he Serbian Special Police units in October deployed to Ba	
September fr	om Kosovo to restore BSA discipline. The journalists rep	oortedly indicate
these forces v	were under the overall command of Franko Simatovic-"Fr	enki.'
	A 11 - 1770 11 1 - 1 - 1 - 1 - 1	. 1.1
. •	According to US diplomats, a variety of sources have r	•
	presence of Serbian Interior Ministry "Red Berets"Sp	
	Banja Luka in October 1995 attempting to calm the cha	totic situation in
	the town.	
•		
	Milosevic ordered Stanisic to deploy Special Police uni	ts from Kosovo
-	to aid the Bosnian Serbs	
•	in late Septem	ber that 1,500
	MUP special forces were deployed to Banja Luka unde	
•	-a senior RDB officer in the "military line" who reports	
	Stanisic The special	•
	reportedly have taken control of Banja Luka and are or	and the second s
	defenses.	
	delonges.	
Croat	ia. Serbian Special Police operations with the Krajina Ser	rhs have been
	than those with the Bosnian Serbsprimarily because the	
	er-but Special Police combat units have been involved in	
		the region since
1991.		
	TO 1 - COLUMN TO 1 HIGH TO 1 COLUMN CATE	
•	Radovan Stojicic-"Badza", the current chief of the SJB	
	Assistant Interior Minister, commanded a Special Police	
	Vukovar during the 1991 war, according to US Embass	• •
	In addition, Belg	
	reported in December 1991 that Stojicic was also the co	
	Slavonian Territorial Defense Forceslocal Serb units of	perating in
	support of regular Yugoslav Army troops.	
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	The MID also and also and a Million Co.	
•	The MUP also redeployed forces to Krajina Se 1995, as fears of a Croatian offensive grew.	ero territory in early
		President Milosevic
	authorized the deployment of a special antiterr	
	RDB chief	Stanisic reportedly
	ordered the unit to depart during the last two v	_
•	unit was tasked to train Krajina Serb forces in	
	and to take part in combat operations if Croati	ans attacked.
	owing the successful Croatian offensive against So	
	5, Belgrade became concerned that the Croatians beheld eastern SlavoniaUN Sector East. A variety	
	B and Special Police were sent to essentially take	
	nd militarily-in order to ensure Belgrade's control	
defenses.		
. •	The US Defense Attaché observed on 9 Augus	
	Police convoy with about 600 personnel cross East from Serbia.	the border into Sector
	East Itolii Seroia.	
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.	I Control of Demonstration France	
arming and	d Control of Paramilitary Forces	,
The	Serbian MUP has armed, trained, and commanded	l a variety of Serbian
	forces since 1990. The three major groups with the	<u>-</u>
described in		
•		former
	Serbian Interior Minister Radmilo Bogdanovic	
	with Serbian paramilitary groups, including Art	kan and Seselj
		•
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	Bogdanovic reportedly was deep	ly involved in
	financing and organizing paramilitary forces.	
•	in early 1992 Bogdanov	ic and
	Assistant Federal Interior Minister Mihalj Kertes were en	
	formation and training of paramilitary units.	
Arms Shipm	nents to the BSA	
The M	MUP also is currently involved in providing military supplie	s to the BSA.
	ariety of reporting.	, , ,
	and of reporting.	, ,
• .		
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•	RDB chief Stanisic's assistant, "Franco"probably "Fre	nki"was
	working with a Serbian munitions firm in September 199	5 to produce
	rockets for the RDB to deliver to the BSA	o to produce
	Tockets for the R&B to defiver to the BBTA	
•		'
•	Twice a week 10 trucks leave the Krusik ammunition plan	nt in Valievo
	under MUP escort for delivery to the BSA	
	under more obtained to the Born	
Roy. MIIP	P Support to Krajina Serb and Bosnian Serb Separatist	c in 1088_01
DOX. MICI	Support to Ixi ajina berb and Dosman berb beparatist	5 III 1700-71
There	are indications that the MUP was involved in organizing ar	nd arming
	sts in both Croatia and Bosnia prior to the outbreak of war.	
Doro sopulation	oto in com cround and bosina prior to the outeroan or war.	
 A forme 	er pfficial stated	that
	pian Interior Ministry had an tradition of involvement and in	terference in
		official also
•	dly stated that any war crimes investigator should look espe	
• .	n Stojicic and Franko Stamatovic-obviously a reference t	•
	vicwho were involved in organizing and arming the easter	
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,	rebellion in 1990 and 1991.	
•	A local observer told US diplomats in June 1995 that the Bosnian	Government
	complained of Serbian interference as early as 1988.	
	In addition, a Serbian newspaper claimed in June 1995	
	deputy chief Stanisic was the "brain" behind Serbian secret police Bosnia and Croatia before the war and that he organized local sec	
	weapons distribution, and coordinated intelligence. Frank Simato	
	also reportedly took part in organizing the uprising in Knin under	
	guerre "Dragan Simendic."	
•		
	Defeated.	
	the Krajina Serb Special Police in the Knin area which constituted	commanded
	first armed resistance to Croatian rule in 1990-1991, according to	
		OB through
	Stanisic and Simatovic almost certainly helped organize and a	arm these
	units.	
	Adam and the 1000 for any alignment of the Wasting Co.	ula laura
•	Arkan was arrested in 1990 for smuggling arms to the Krajina Ser reportedly was released because of pressure from Bogdanovic, ac	
	press reports The RDB	_
	certainly was using Arkan to help arm the Krajina Serbs.	
	Box: Bosnian Serb Interior Ministry Special Police	
	The Bosnian Serb Interior Ministry is a miniature version of the	
_	nized into a security service, a public security service, and a Specia	
	The Special Police brigade is one of the most of combat units and appears to operate under BSA command when company to the company of the most of the	
	bat operations.	arrying out
-	out operations.	
•	The brigade is headquartered in Bijeljina and organized into at lea	st nine
	battalion-sized detachments of about 300-350 troops each. These	
	stationed throughout Bosnian Serb territory, based upon the eight	
	regional MUP commandsSarajevo, Trebinje, Bijeljina, Zvornik,	Dobol, Srbinje
	(Foca), Banja Luka, and Prijedor.	
•	The brigade detachments primarily act as assault infantry to	spearhead
	BSA attacks or counterattacks. For example, elements of the	-
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played a key role in retaining the vital road junction of Trnovo and the Stolice radio relay tower over the past year. Annex 1: MUP Support and Control of Fikret Abdic's Forces The RDB and the Special Police also coordinated an extensive direct military support program--including the deployment of Special Police units--for Muslim separatist leader Fikret Abdic's forces fighting in the Bihac enclave against the Bosnian Army V Corps from November 1994 until August 1995. The RDB and Special Police raised a special unit-designated "Pauk (Spider)"--during fall 1994 to support efforts to recapture ground around Bihac "Pauk" forces operated as an elite assault units and exercised control over Abdic's troops. Regular Krajina Serb Army (KSA) units supported both the special units and Abdic's forces. The unit reportedly was formed from Serbian and Krajina Serb Special Police, Arkan's paramilitary Serbian Volunteer Guard, Captain Dragan's paramilitary unit, and Muslim separatist leader Fikret Abdic's personal bodyguard unit. RDB chief Stanisic reportedly visited the unit by helicopter in December 1994. The unit commander reportedly was General Mile Novakovic, a former Krajina Serb Army (KSA) commander, with RDB official Franko Simatovic as liaison with "Yugoslavia" and a VJ colonel as Simatovic's deputy

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 Another former Abdic soldier claims that special trained troops of the "Yugoslav"--almost certainly meaning Serbian--State Security Service were tasked to control Abdic's forces and conduct reconnaissance-sabotage and sniper missions in the Velika Kladusa area

• In addition to Novakovic, however, a senior Special Police officer-Colonel "Raja" Bozovic (see below)--appears to have directly commanded the special units and Abdic's troops in Velika Kladusa, based on a variety of press.

Annex 2: Primary MUP-Backed Paramilitary Groups

Arkan's Tigers--The Serbian Volunteer Guard (SVG). The SVG is an elite, well-trained paramilitary unit equipped and controlled by the RDB which allows the Serbian Government to deploy a capable combat force to Bosnia and Croatia in a crisis period without overt Serbian intervention. It operates under the command of Zeljko Raznjatovic-"Arkan." The SVG appears probably numbers between 500 and 1000 personnel.

 A Belgian military assessment in November 1993 indicated that the SVG had about 300 troops at Erdut, according to defense attaché reporting. The unit's missions reportedly included ranger/reconnaissance operations, mobile reserve, defense of key

	points, and the maintenance of KSA discipline.
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	Asserting and STOP Constant of Change COMO and the
•	According to the US Defense Attaché, a video tape of SVG training
	indicates that they are extremely well-equipped and not a "rag-tag group of independent personnel."
	Reuters reporters visiting the Erdut training center
•	in October 1995 also indicated that the approximately 400 SVG troops
	they observed were "not the usual rag-tag bunch of men," but that they
	looked more like professional Western troops.
_	To addition to the Podest torining some (see heless). Ashee were the
•	In addition to the Erdut training camp (see below), Arkan uses the Special Police facility at Ajvalija in Kosovo as a training center,
	Special Police based at the camp
	reportedly work alongside Arkan's personnel.
	Many of Arkan's men who fought in the
	Krajina reportedly were trained at this site.
The C	VG appears to have been first arganized in 1000 fallowing a masting
	VG appears to have been first organized in 1990, following a meeting danovic (see above) and Arkan, although Kertes also reportedly played a
role in the uni	
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	Arkan's Serbian Volunteer Guard was recruited from the Red Star
	soccer team which is thought to be controlled by the Serbian police,
	according to US Embassy reporting. The soccer fan club reportedly
	began offering training in hand-to-hand combat, small arms and explosives in November 1990.
	A Serbian magazine article in March 1993 claimed that Arkan
	met Serbian Interior Minister Radmilo Bogdanovic at the soccer club in
	1990 and offered his services to Bogdanovic.
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	served as the SVG commander during combat operations in eastern
Slavonia in 19	91 with his headquarters in the same facility in Erdut as Stojicic's TDF
HQ (see above	e). The SVG formed a training
center at Erdu	t in 1991 with the support of the Serbian secret police-the RDB
according to U	JS Embassy reporting.
•	UN forces deployed in UN Sector East report that this training camp
	continued to operate throughout 1993 in support of the SVG,
	according to US defense attaché reporting.
	decording to ob describe attache reporting.
•	Arkan claimed in the spring of 1994 that he was turning the training
	center back over to the Krajina Serb Army and withdrawing his
•	
	personnel following a request from Krajina Serb "President" Martic.
	The KSA special
	operation unit, however, that remained at the facility almost
	certainly retained close ties to Arkanif it was not in fact his unit
	redesignated.
•	During the summer of 1995following the Croatian capture of UN
	Sector WestArkan's force regained prominence in Sector East,
	according to a variety of reports. The public re-emergence of his
	force probably was designed to bolster KSA morale in the Sector
	and increase Belgrade's influence. Several sources charged Arkan's
	unit with having deployed around the Krajina Serb assembly building in
	July 1995 in order to intimidate its members on orders from the Serbian
	president, according to press reports.
•	After the KSA defeat in Sectors North and South, the SVG
	probably became part of the RDB campaign to shore up Sector
	East's defenses. Arkan claimed publicly in early September that his
•	unit had been reorganized as an official special operations brigade in the
	KSA's Slavonia-Baranja Corps and that his troops had orders to shoot
	anyone who withdrew from the frontline.
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l	Other reports indicate that his unit is training Krajina
	Serb conscripts who escaped from Sectors North and South for
	incorporation in the corps.
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•	On 11 Octoberthe SVG's 5th anniversarythe group drove journalists
•	from Belgrade to Erdut to attend the SVG celebration, according to
	press reports. The SVG vehicles reportedly were not halted enroute by
	any Serbian police and at least some of the SVG vehicles bore Serbian
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	Interior Ministry	y registration p	lates.	
	have only been po			osnia, although SVG as, primarily in the
•	for help to the S 1992. Local par reportedly recap SVG units traine Serbian Nationa	Indicated that VG after Musl ramilitary force tured Bijeljina ed several volu I Guard under	local Bosnian So im forces took o es raised from the after several day nteer units and r	ort completed in the erb politicians appeale ver Bijeljina on 1 Apre TDF and SVG force of heavy fighting. The aviccurrently the BS
. •*	ranthers mote	orized origade-	-and then the S v	<u>G withthe</u>
•	summer of 1992 Arkan's unit too	l indicates at le k part in opera	ast some personitions in Brcko, r	y study completed in t nel associated with reportedly taking over s during Serb infighting
erated as pa	art of a MUP-led s in the Velika Kl	composite spec	cial operations fo	with Arkan's forces orce acting in support from November 1994
•		on" supposedly fighting with A	was commanding by was commandi	one of Arkan's principing a group of well-paithe Velika Kladusa arkan's personnel had ne area.
•			lack Legion that	soldiers identified a trained Abdic forces to enemy territory.
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	A Belgian journalist reported to the UN War Crimes Tribunal that he was captured and held by a group of well-armed and well-equipped soldiers in Krajina Serb-held territory near the Bihac pocket on 5 December 1994. The unit commander claimed he as an ex-French Foreign Legion soldieralmost certainly the commander "Legion" noted above and several captors told him they were from Belgrade.
Srebrenica in that 300 of A	VG also may have been involved in the BSA offensive which captured July 1995. Bosnian Army liaison officers claimed to the UN on 15 July rkan's troops were fighting alongside BSA forces in the enclave, US military reporting.
with Special I Luka area fol JS Embassy edeploying h combat opera	y, Belgrade apparently ordered Arkan and SVG forcesin conjunction Police units mentioned aboveto deploy to western Bosnia and the Banja lowing the September 1995 Croat-Bosnian Army offensive, according to reporting. Arkan, however, reported on 21 October that he was his last battalion of 300 to eastern Slavonia, according to press reports. The SVG's mission appears to have been to conduct tions, restore BSA discipline, and halt population panic which could be refugee flow into Serbia.
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•	US diplomats reported that both Arkan and Mladic appeared to be operating under Belgrade's orders and Belgrade eased the friction

	between the two. Mladic reportedly threatened to arrest Arkan, but allowed Arkan to continue with his mission after Belgrade issued	_
	Mladic orders not to stop him.	
		1
, l	Serbian magazine article also claims that RDB officials Bozovic and	
	Filipovic reportedly arrived in late September in Bosnia with 300 Arkan troops.	
•	A variety of press reports have identified SVG troops engaged in combat operations with BSA forces in the Sanski Most, Prijedor, and	
	Kljuc areas during late September and October.	
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_		
Capta	in DraganRed Berets/Alpha Training Center.	
name Dragan Benkovac in S overran the ar Croatia during	OB also organized and supported Captain Dragan's "Red Berets" (real Vasiljkovic) and his Alpha Training Center which was located near erb-held Krajina from at least as early as 1992 until the Croatians ea in August 1995. Dragan's troops carried out combat operations in the 1991 war and some reports have identified his forces in Bosnia	7
during 1992.		
•	A variety of reporting from Western observers indicates that the forces from Dragan's center were well-trained and highly disciplined.]
Cantai	Dragan told a confidant in spring 1993 that the was operating a	
paramilitary c	amp in Bratunac, Bosniajust outside of Srebrenicaunder the direction at that his superior was "Frenkej," (also spelled "Frenki" the	
nickname for	RDB official Franko Simatovic)	
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•	•
•	"Frenkej" also reportedly supported two Dragan training camps in the Benkovac area of Serb-held Croatia. Dragan stated that "Frenkej" also had been his superior and contact with the Serbian Government in the 1991 Croatian war.
	1)) I Oloutali Wal.
•	Dragan also publicly expressed appreciation to former Serbian Interior Minister Radmilo Bogdanovic, according to US embassy reporting, almost certainly indicating that Bogdanovic probably helped organize or supply Dragan's forces in the 1991 war.
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•	In a November 1993 interview, Dragoslav Bokan, leader of another
•	paramilitary group, the White Eagles, claimed that the "Red Berets" Captain Dragan's unit"were Franko Simatovic's people under the
	command of Mihalj Kertes.
	Communication of Francisco
Vojisl	av SeseljSerbian Chetnik Movement (SCP).
	av Seselj's Serbian Radical Party (SRS) organized a paramilitary group in
	e Serbian Chetnik Movement (SCP). The RDB identified Branislav
Vakic in Octo	ber 1993 as the Commander of the SCP Both Seselj and Vakic
have spoken o	out publicly about their paramilitary forces and their relationship with the
	UP reportedly broke off cooperation with the SCP after Milosevic and
	ispute in 1993.
•	The Serbian Government arrested Vakic and 17 other SRS officials in November 1993 on charges of having committed war crimes against civilians and other atrocities, according to US embassy reporting.
from both the volunteers four Slavonia and i	claimed in a November 1993 interview that the SCP received weapons police and the army, but many more from the police. Seselj stated his 19th in Special Police units under the command of Kertes in eastern n Bosnia under the command of Stojicic, as well as on many battlefields matovic-"Frenki." (Belgrade Borba 221220Z November 1993)
•	Seselj said that his forces cooperation with the MUP dated from
	immediately before the battle of Borovo Selo in eastern Slavonia durin
	the summer of 1991.
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•	Seselj claimed in May 1995 that he was recruiting voperations in Bosnia and the Krajina, but that he was same support from the MUP which his men had pre-	as not receiving the
	·	
Vakic	also gave an extensive interview in September 1994	outlining the
	nd assistance which paramilitary forces under his con	nmand received
from the MU	P during combat operations in Bosnia in 1993.	
•	Vakic claimed that his forces operated alongside M under the command of Obrad Stevanovic during the campaign in spring 1993 (see above). Following the that the MUPthrough "Frenki" invited Vakic to provolunteers to train and operate with MUP forces. Vat Mount Tara in Serbia near Srebrenica and were smulp "special forces" to Srebrenica or Gorazde if Elaunched attacks.	e Srebrenica his battle, he stated rovide additional Vakic's men trained scheduled to go with
•	Vakic reports that his "Old Serbia Volunteer Unit" congratulatory note from the MUP which read "Fro the Special Units of the MUP of Serbia in Bajina B and cooperation during combat operations in the lift the Serbian people in the Serbian Republic" (signerally Vakic claims that his forces' cooperation with the A training at Mount Tara.	om the War HQ of asta: For successes peration struggle of d and stamped).
Subject: The M	filitary Role of the Serbian Interior Ministry in the Yugoslav C	onflict
Requested by: J	i-2/JCS	ſ
Approved by:	· .	
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